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**This issue is dedicated to Petr Zima
at the occasion of his 80th birthday.**

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The first issue of the second volume of *Modern Africa* is rich in its variety of topics and geographical distribution. The essays published here address issues which all have their importance for knowledge production about present day Africa. Although the journal ideally has its internal divisions, this issue is remarkable for breaking barriers between disciplines. Jan Klíma is a historian who explains the evolution of political institutions in Namibia throughout the entire colonial, transitional and postcolonial era. The reader will be able to follow Namibian state formation and understand why this country is today an example of political stability after a period of liberation war and de facto occupation by the South African apartheid regime. Obert Hodzi broaches the rather sensitive theme of the commodification of elections in Zimbabwe, a country that displays a high degree of one-partyism while presenting itself as a democracy. Clinging on to power at any cost does not seem compatible with the democratic change of the regime. The third article on politics tackles the conundrum of Jos crises in Nigeria. Peter Nungshak Wika ably explains interests behind atrocities and he sensitively shows how ethnic, religious and purely political factors are intertwined and feed the protracted conflict.

Bettina Engels discusses the discourse on autochthony and allochthony in south-western Burkina Faso using the example of conflicts over land. Social categories of belonging are decisive for access to land resources and conflicts arising from it. Walter Gam Nkwi brings us to south-western Cameroon from where enterprising women initiated trading mobility to China. The case explodes the long established thesis about the male as the migrant and the breadwinner. Finally Borys Bińkowski shows that Fair Trade policies, so much propagated in the global North, have practically no effect in the areas which should be helped by Fair Trade. Ghana is a good example because cocoa from Ghana is widely used for the production of fair trade chocolate sold on European markets. Debunking the myth of Fair Trade reveals the true face of neoliberalism.

This issue also contains a detailed discussion of a recent book on political partisanship. Vlastimil Fiala in his review article persuasively documents the coming of age of the studies on political parties in Africa.

At the close of this note I should mention that starting with 2015 *Modern Africa* is an officially recognized peer-reviewed journal in the Czech Republic. We intend to strive for international recognition with the third volume.

Petr Skalník

THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN COMMUNITIES IN DSWA/SWA/NAMIBIA

Jan Klíma

Abstract: The Republic of Namibia has an extremely complex composition of its population. Bantu nations, Khoisan groups, mixed communities and people of European origin create a political problem of how all those society segments can be represented in the national decision making process in a just and satisfactory way.

During the precolonial time period, the individual tribes and groups had their own chiefs or *kapteins* along with the respective aristocracy or elected representation (*Volksraad* in the case of the Rehoboth Basters). The German colonial rule between 1884 and 1915 united all national and racial groups for the first time, but the African communities remained outside of the gradually constituted white self-administration as a subordinated element. During the South African rule under the League of Nations Mandated Territory regime 1915/1921-1945 the first political representations of Africans were being organized on the ground level. After World War II the controversy between the Union of South Africa (Republic of South Africa since 1961) and the UNO Trusteeship Council led to an effort to seek a solution according to the apartheid politics: the whites from South West Africa were represented directly in both South African parliament chambers. Meanwhile several *homelands* for the native population were projected in conformity with the Odendaal Plan. Under pressure from the international community, only three *homelands* were really proclaimed out of 11 planned. The UNO initiative and the SWAPO armed resistance made it impossible to recognize results of the last elections organized in 1980 within the racial/tribal framework as well as the all-races Transitional Government of National Unity established in 1985. During the last years under the South African administration, traditional chiefs assumed their authority in all African communities. Based on the free and UNO supervised one-person-one-vote 1989 elections the independent Namibia came to existence in 1990. However, all

democratic rights and the bicameral parliament the upper chamber of which respects the equality of each from 13 regions do not guarantee a fully fair representation of all ethnic groups. The merging of the Euro-American democratic system of power with the complicated national/tribal/clan reality is still to be calibrated in the future.

Key words: *History of Namibia, South West Africa - Namibia, representation of Africans, ethnicity, political system.*

Numerous communities¹ with relatively small number of members were and remain dispersed over the large area of 824,269 square km of the contemporary Republic of Namibia (Bradnová 1993: 532). It is generally accepted that Namibia's proclamation of independence on 21 March 1990 was considered a positive turning point in the democratic transition all over Africa, which influenced the dismantling of Apartheid in South Africa, and prevented, at the same time, the whites escaping from Africa as had occurred before in Angola and Mozambique. Since independence, however, the vast African country with 2,2 million inhabitants has been solving the problem how to secure the democratic representation of blacks and whites, big nation groups and small minorities within the artificial colonial boundaries of the modern state. A satisfactory solution has not been achieved until now. During the last two centuries particular conditions of the population movements on the semi-desert soil created singular political patterns depending on the momentous world order. As Namibia differs substantially from comparable African countries it is useful to investigate the question of the effectiveness of the political representation of individual society segments. The answers are important not only for Namibian politics, but also for the general feeling of national identity, and for the everyday co-operation and cohesion of the new African nations.

1 The "community" is a part of an ethnic group with a special identity defined by its unique racial, linguistic, religious, usage and other characteristics.

Too many and too petty for the Germans

After the original inhabitants belonging to small bands of San (Bushmen), some Khoikhoi clans of Nama and Damara people² as well as Bantu groups of Hereros, Ovambos³ and Kavangos came to the country under the leadership of their traditional chiefs. At the end of the 18th century the first Orlams/Oorlams or Afrikaners (of mixed Khoikhoi-Madagascar or Indonesian slaves origin) appeared in half-breeds of Khoikhoi and Madagascar or Indonesia slaves called Orlams/Oorlams or Afrikaners⁴ appeared on the southern part of today's Namibia. Due to the previous influence of white Boers these Afrikaners spoke the local Dutch language (Afrikaans) and elected their *kapteins*. As a consequence of the large *mfecane* migrations the later Caprivi Strip was occupied by the (Ma)Kololo, (Ma)Fwe, (Ma)Yeyi and similar tribes closely related to the Lozi nation. The arid barren land forced the nomadic communities to split into small groups. Along 11 Damara clans, the Khoihoi (Hottentots) were divided into communities called Kai//khaun, Fransman-Nama (!Kharakhoen), Bondelswarts (!Gami-#Nun), Hawoben/Veldschoendrager, Swartbooi, |Hai|Khauan (Berseba Orlams or Khauas-Nama), Bethania Nama, Topnaar-Nama, Keetmanshoop-Nama (Kharo-!oan) and Witbooi-Nama (/Khowesen). Related Mbanderu (Ovambanderu), Himba (Ovahimba) and Tjimba (Ovatjimba) clans separated from the Hereros.⁵ The Ovambos in the northern part of the country built up chiefdoms of Ondonga (Aandong), Kwambi (Aakwambi), Ongandjera (Aangandjera), Kwaluudhi (Aakwaluudhi), Mbalantu (Aambalantu), Kolonkadhi (Aakolonkadhi) and Kwanyama (Ovakwanyama), but more Ovambo clans and groups took a liking to the region situated at the contemporary Angola-Namibia border. The northeastern Kavango people lived in five chiefdoms called Kwangali, Shambyu, Gciriku, Mbunza and Mbukushu.⁶ At the end of the 1860s some 90 families of "Basters" (!Gora), descendants of white Boers and African women, looked for a new land; this group of some 300 members speaking Dutch (Afrikaans) came to the central part of the country to settle down in the place called Rehoboth in

2 The fundamental study and description was given by Schapera (1934).

3 For early history see Williams (1991).

4 More on the Dutch/Afrikaans language and population: Stals (2001).

5 Many founding works made by missionaries remain important, e. g. Vedder (1997).

6 For the first ethnological overview see Hahn (1928).

1870.⁷ Other groups of the mixed “Dorslandtrekkers” of similar origin from Transvaal went through the country several times commencing the 1870s.⁸ Between 1885 and 1887, these “Pilgrims from the Thirsty Land” established their own Upingtonia Republic (or Lijdensrust/Lydensrust),⁹ a weak state of short duration with the center in Grootfontein. In the extreme East some groups of the Tswana people were roving. Continual migrations of herdsmen provoked wars, some clans were exterminated, other clans grew stronger; Orlam Afrikaner chiefs, particularly Jan Jonker Afrikaner (1863-1889),¹⁰ created a germ of the statehood in the region surrounding their main base called Windhoek. In general, the African population was scarce and scanty.

Such conditions were advantageous for the German conquest. The majority of African clans and tribes were deeply influenced by the German Rhenish¹¹ and Finnish Lutheran or by the English Wesleyan missionaries since the beginning of the 19th century. As soon as the territory between Orange and Kunene rivers was proclaimed the German protectorate (*Schutzgebiet*) in September 1884, the private colony of the German tradesman Alfred Lüderitz was quickly transformed into the state colony called the German South West Africa (*Deutsch Südwestafrika*). In May 1885, the German commissioner Ernst Heinrich Göring started to build the colonial administration and the colony was established in conformity with the German colonial Law (*Schutzgebietsgesetz*) passed 17 April 1886. The administration system, however, arose slowly. The military and civil commander (*Landeshauptmann*) was supported by the German troops (*Schutztruppe*) composed exclusively of white soldiers. His office was subordinated to the Colonial Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Kolonialabteilung im Auswärtigen Amt*) from 1890. In 1895, the vast country was divided into a Northern and a Southern district, then into 3 military districts: Ovamboland, Hereroland and Namaland with centers in Windhoek, Otjimbingwe and Keetmanshoop. By 1914 the number of districts (*Bezirkshauptmannschaften*) had increased to 16. The *Landeshauptmann* was given the title of governor (*Gouverneur*) on

7 See Britz et al. (1999).

8 Also the minor communities are mentioned by Gauerke (1978). All historical details were gathered in chronological order by Klaus Dierks on www.klausdierks.com/Geschichte.

9 Among a few works dedicated to this theme the following is to be recommended: Marais and Du Toit (2006).

10 For details consult www.klausdierks.com/Biographies.

11 The educational role of German missionaries was stressed by Parnezgrau (1998).

18 April 1898. The country was considered a part of Germany, that is why the German penal law (*Strafgesetzbuch*) was introduced without taking the African traditions and beliefs into account.

The Africans were mere objects of the administration system. Their chiefs were respected only as helpers and cooperators of the German administrators. On 18 December 1899 governor Theodor Leutwein¹² introduced the usual forms of the local self-administration for the white German townships. The 1900 amendment to the *Schutzgebietsgesetz* declared full civil and political rights only for the white minority. As late as 1903 marriages of white men with African women were legalized, but only under pressure from the Colonial Department. During the wars with Hereros and Namas in 1904-1907 main opposing tribes were massacred,¹³ and later the colonial administration did not count on the African partnership any more. When Hermanus van Wyk died in 1905, a *Basterraad* (Baster Council) was imposed to the proud community of Basters in Rehoboth instead of their traditional *kaptein* and *Volksraad* (council). From 1907 every African older than 7 years had to wear a metallic mark (*Eingeborenen-Passmarke*) for identifying himself as a subordinated labor force unit.

Within the districts, German colonists came together to form a consultative assembly (*Bezirksbeiräte*). On 28 January 1908 they were granted self-determination. The local representations (*Kommunalverbände*) in 12 centers composed of 4-8 delegates elected higher district representations (*Bezirksverbände*) with 4-6 elected members (Tötemeyer 2002: 505–506). Each district sent one representative to the Country Council (*Landesrat*). Beside that autonomous system of the whites, the African population maintained the tribal or clan structure without taking part in the colonial administration and in the decision making of their own country.

Under the pressure of colonization and European weapons several communities and/or their chieftain authorities disappeared during the German rule period. With the death of Jan Jonker Afrikaner in 1889 the Afrikaners ceased to exist as a compact group. Other groups were exterminated or temporarily deprived of any leadership: Khauas-Nama (Khauan) from 1896, Khaikhaun/Gai-Khaun community (*Roote*

12 An important source: Leutwein (1912).

13 See Katjavivi (1988); Erichsen and Olusoga (2010).

Nasie, Red Nation)¹⁴ and Swartboois from 1905, Namas from Bethanien (!Aman) from 1906.

The League of Nations mandated territory in favour of the Union of South Africa

As a part of the Great War¹⁵ South African troops won the campaign of 1914-1915 by defeating the German *Schutztruppe* and by occupying the territory.¹⁶ The Africans, however, were considered unripe to take part in the country administration led by the military commander Percival Scott Beves and then by the representative of the South African protectorate Edmund Howard Lacam Gorges (1915-1920) under martial law. Colonel Stanley Archibald Pritchard was appointed officer in charge of Native Affairs. As early as 1915 the Rehoboth Basters applied to the winners for independence, but their land was only declared a *homeland*. Nevertheless, some chiefs had their posts recognized like Traugott Maharero (Hereros) or Edward Fredericks (Bethanien-Nama). All native communities were supposed to stay within their small delimited reservations. For those cases where chiefs of such small communities were confirmed like Christopher Katjimune (Hereros from Omaruru) or Gerhard Zeraua (Hereros from Otjohorongu). Any opposition was suppressed immediately: the warlike Kwanyama chief Mandume ya Ndemufayo (Hayes 1993: 89-113)¹⁷ was defeated and decapitated in February 1917 by a South African platoon. Then, the Kwanyama kingship was abolished. In 1919 Herero foremen wrote to Sydney Charles Buxton, British general governor of South Africa, that they “wanted to be free finally.” (Krüger and Henrichsen 1998: 158-156). They received no answer.

According to Article 119 of the Versailles Peace Treaty Germany had to hand over all colonies to the Entente powers.¹⁸ South West Africa became a League of Nations Mandated Territory administered by its South African “beneficiary”, a part of the British Empire, in the exceptional “Mandate C” regime. New rulers considered this Mandate

14 See Budack (1970).

15 For further reading: Farwell (1986).

16 For details concerning the German troops see Haupt (2001).

17 Popular myths concerning this African warrior struggling against the Portuguese, Germans and South Africans were gathered and explained by Hayes (1993).

18 For justifying the colonial redistribution the German massacres of Hereros and Namas in 1904-1907 in South West Africa were the most important reason. See Silvester and Gewald (2003).

C statute¹⁹ as an offer to administer the territory as de facto the fifth province of the Union of South Africa. Thus, all African groups, communities and nations living in the Mandate were subject to the political system existing in South Africa. That white rule system was applied in South West Africa by means of the ordinance No 25/1920 prohibiting the “vagrancy”, i. e. migrations of nomadic African herdsmen, and the ordinance No 34/1920 on “masters and servants” according to which the African “servants” were not allowed to abandon their “master” without his consent (Bader 1997: 108). According to the “Land Settlement Programme” the confiscated German farms were allotted to new white owners.²⁰

On 1 January 1921, the military administration terminated and Gysbert Reitz Hofmeyer assumed the highest political post of the South African civil administrator of the Mandate territory.²¹ In 1922, one ordinance prohibited *squatting*, i. e. arbitrary use of idle land by Africans, and all natives started to be controlled whether they wear their identification *passes*.²² Such provisions provoked the UNIA²³ leader Hosea Kutako²⁴ to apply to the League of Nations for handing over the country to the “black” elite. The government’s taxation policy provoked a bloody uprising of Bondelswarts in April-May 1922,²⁵ even the pacific Sans rioted in July 1922, the chief of the Kwambi tribe Iipungu ya Tshilongo distributed weapons among his subordinates to prevent

19 The Article 2 of the Mandate had the following wording: “The Mandatory shall have full power of administration over the territory subject to the present Mandate, as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require.” (Thornberry 2004: 7).

20 S. M. Bennett Nswana, a South African black politician who founded the first Namibian political party SWANC (South West Africa National Congress) in September 1922, stressed that “if any one takes a deeper view of the black problem in South Africa he will find that beneath the question of land tenure lies that of political rights.” See “Native Voters Association.” *Umteteli wa Bantu*, 7 April 1923.

21 A useful monograph for the Mandate period is: Braum (ed.) (1976).

22 This was legalized by the *Natives Proclamation* in South Africa in 1923 which was fully applied in Windhoek as late as in February 1925.

23 The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was founded in the city of Lüderitz in 1920 to promote ideas of Marcus Garvey.

24 Petrus Hosea Komombumbi Kutako (1870/1874-1970) was the Herero chief at that time instead of exiled Samuel Maharero. By founding the *otjiserandu* (*Truppenspieler*) association after Maharero’s death in 1923, Kutako created a conscience of the Herero national identity. As a leading black politician Hosea Kutako struggled for better conditions of the black majority. That is why he is regarded as the father of modern Namibian nationalism.

25 A monograph of that small war was written by Freislich (1964).

his territory from being taken by the whites. The community of Basters asked the South African government to allow the proclamation of an independent *Rehoboth Gebied*, which was rejected. As an answer, the government prepared a military campaign of infantry and air force in April 1925 for suppressing the autonomous policy of the *Basterraad*; under martial law 44 foremen of the alleged Baster uprising were condemned to death, which only was prevented by an intervention of the League of Nations later on. The authorities also abolished the function of the Baster *kaptein*.

In order to calm down the unsatisfied natives the administration established Native Advisory Boards in town/city districts and Boards of Headmen in tribal territories in 1924. The authority of such headmen was applicable only on their limited territory and supervised by a white resident commissioner appointed for the respective region. This confirmed the official racial segregation policy. In conformity with the Constitution Act dated 5 August 1925, the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa was erected as a small local parliament; however, only 6092 whites in the whole country had the right of vote. The South African Colour Bar Law²⁶ also applied to South West African territory. According to Law No 38 from 1928, the South African Administrator became the paramount chief of all natives with the right of installing and uninstalling tribal and local chiefs.

In 1930 the League of Nations declared that the Union of South Africa has no right of sovereignty over the South West African territory. A Swiss member of the Permanent Mandate Commission William Rappard did not mention the impossibility of African political participation, however, he criticized that the administration spends only 10 per cent of the education budget for 90 per cent of the country's African population (Pienaar 1987: 130). Problems went on. Under the threat of an air raid and the use of machine guns, the rebellion of the Kwambi tribe was suppressed in 1932, the chief Iipumbu ya Tshilongo being deposed (Hartmann 1998: 263–288). Even the request of the Windhoek Ovambos to homage the chief Mandume was not settled favorably in 1937. At the end of this decade conflicts between the administration and German adherents of the European Nazi movement put to one side the question of the political representation of the African population.

²⁶ See Dubow (1989).

As soon as World War II was over, Hosea Kutako with friends founded the Herero Chiefs' Council hoping that the victory of democratic forces would enable the desire of his people to be fulfilled. Instead the League of Nations the new United Nations Organization was to decide the future of the country and its inhabitants of all colours. In order to avoid a clear proclamation of the United Nations Trust Territory to be administered by the UN Trusteeship Council, the South Africans arranged a referendum over the complicated question which ended with a strange result: 208.850 votes for the merging of South West Africa with the Union of South Africa, 33.520 against and 56.700 absent (Troup 1950: 108).

In October 1946, the UNO General Assembly received a report on the South African administration of South West Africa. However, the Union of South Africa, although a founding member of the UNO, did not recognize an automatic transfer of the League of Nations rights to the UNO Trusteeship Council (Diener and Graefe 1999: 21). The conflict increased on 14 December 1946, when ONU rejected the South African proposal to join South West Africa to other parts of South Africa as the fifth province of the Union. During disputes and controversies of international lawyers the South African administration continued; thus, the victory of the D. F. Malan's National Party in South African elections in May 1948 proved to be fatal for the occupied South West Africa. The new official policy of the territorial and civic racial segregation (*aparte ontwikkeling* or *apartheid*) would be introduced into South West Africa, too.

Apartheid, Odendaal Report and SWAPO resistance

In 1949, the South African National Party set forth Law No. 23 called *South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act*. This new South West Africa's de facto constitution did not mention the Mandate or Trusteeship regime, but it strengthened the county's political links to South Africa. The white minority of South West Africa was given the right to send 6 deputies to the House of Representatives and 4 to the Senate of the South African Parliament.²⁷ Instead of the previous 12 elected and 6

²⁷ Between 1910 and 1961, the Parliament of the Union of South Africa was bicameral and consisted of the King (represented by the Governor-General), the Senate and the House of Assembly (*Volksraad* in Afrikaans). From 1930 white women were granted the franchise, from 1937 black voters were separated from the other races; in the Senate they were represented by four elected

appointed representatives all 18 representatives of the country's Legislative Council would be elected in the 18 districts. The administrator of South West Africa was responsible to the South African government. By that way the country became a de facto part of the Union. Besides, the Pretoria government informed the ONU that no reports on the administration of South West Africa would be sent to the Trusteeship Council any more.

At the end of August 1950 the local National Party (NPSWA) won the election for the Legislative Council; at the same time, the first 6 MP's and 4 Senators from South West Africa started working in the South African parliament. A conference of South West African missionaries held in September and October supported the policy of "separate development." In January 1951 Johannes von Moltke elected to represent the Karas region delivered the first speech of a South West African representative in the South African parliament.

The *Provision on Urban Territories* No. 56 from 1951 established communal self-governments (Töttemeyer 2002: 507), but the town/city quarters or places were divided according to the racial composition of the local population; for the black quarters reliable Africans were appointed and then controlled by their white superiors. Hosea Kutako wanted to present complaints at the UNO, but the government refused to issue a passport for him and his colleagues.

Inspired by the ANC the former miner Herman Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo founded the *Ovambo People Congress* (OPC) in Cape Town in August 1957, re-named *Ovambo People's Organization* (OPO) in 1958. The same lack of national identity and tribalism were evident when other African organizations came into existence striving to oppose the South African supremacy like the *Damara Tribe Executive Committee* (DTEC) in 1958 or the *Rehoboth Taxpayers' Association* (RTA) in 1959. Racial principles prevailed in the newly founded *South West Africa Coloureds' Organization* (SWACO). Out of the reach of political agitation, the first protest against apartheid arose among the black population in Windhoek forced to move into the black ghetto nicknamed Katutura ("the place we don't want to go to"). The mass boycott of means of transport, restaurants and cinemas on 8 December

senators, and in the House of Assembly by three "native representative" members of Parliament elected in separate black constituencies. From 1957, Coloured voters were separated from the whites. Representation of black voters was ended in 1960.

expressed the indignation of the blacks who had to give up their *Old Location* quarter in favour of whites. On 10 December 1959 the police shot dead 11 persons, 2 of the injured died later on, 54 more injured spread the hatred of the white rule.²⁸

The proverbial “Wind of change” during the “Africa Year” 1960 altered the major part of the continent. Following the “Sharpeville massacre” of 21 March 1960 the Union of South Africa abandoned the British Commonwealth on 31 May 1961 as the fully independent, but generally boycotted Republic of South Africa (RSA). In the meantime, the exiled Ovambos transformed OPO into the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) on 19 April 1960. The communication between RSA and UNO grew more and more difficult.²⁹ Despite this, UNO required a political solution for South West Africa not in the form of state independence, but only as the renewal of the Trusteeship Territory regime.

Hendrik Verwoerd, South African prime minister, entrusted the Transvaal administrator Frans Hendrik Odendaal to “ascertain the social, economic and political situation in South West Africa.” From September 1962, the Odendaal group of experts studied how to satisfy white and black communities in the country within the ruling apartheid concept. At the end of January 1964 the *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs 1962-1963* was published as a proposal of the definitive political organization of the country with 526.000 registered inhabitants. The natives were to develop their specific traditions, languages and religions in 11 homelands (bantustans). The biggest *Hereroland* with 5900 km³ was planned for 35.354 Hereros, *Ovamboland* with 5607 km³ for 239.363 members of various Ovambo tribes, *Kaokoveld* with the area of 4898 km³ was destined for 9234 subjects belonging to different northwestern population groups, the neighboring *Damaraland* with 4173 km³ was determined for 44.353 Damaras, the northeastern *Okavango* homeland with 4170 km³ should grant the specific development to 27.871 of several Kavango ethnic groups, *Bushmanland* with 2393 km³ would be a homeland for 11.762 Sans, *Namaland* with 2168 sq. km for 34.806 southern Namas, *Rehoboth-Gebied* with 1386 km³ for 11.257 Bastards, *Caprivi* with 1153

28 Only after the proclamation of Namibia’s independence was it possible to publish details: Jafra and Ridgway and Kautja and Oliphant and Kapofi (1995; 1st ed. 1991).

29 See Goldblatt (1961).

km³ for 15.840 relatives of the Lozi nation and other tribes living in the northeastern Caprivi Strip. Even the 2632 members of the Tswana minority were not forgotten, their small homeland *Tswana* with 155.4 km³ was situated in the extreme eastern part of the country at the desert Bechuanaland/Botswana border. The registered 12.707 “coloureds” were given no homeland due to the presupposition that they would live in the limited city suburbs. According to the Report, the 92 per cent majority of Africans received only 39 per cent of the country. Their homelands were to be subordinated to the South African Ministry of Bantu Administration,³⁰ which could or would not allow the self-administration of the respective homeland. Only national parks Etosha, Skeleton Coast, Namib³¹ desert and the southwestern coastal *Sperrgebiet* were excluded from the racial scheme. The main portion of territory was reserved for whites as a fundamental part of the fifth South African province.

The Odendaal Report embarrassed some white farmers because 3.406.181 hectares of their land had to be bought up for consolidating the planned homelands (Kube 2002: 295–296). All African leaders of some standing like Clemens Kapuuo on behalf of Hereros rejected the particularization of the country. However, some African groups agreed to the delimitation of their guaranteed tribal areas. Establishing new political parties (CANU for Fwe, UNIPP for Namas etc.) corresponding to the tribal membership confirmed the country’s problem of national identity. For the UNO, the Odendaal Plan was unacceptable in the same period when Zambia and Malawi independence enlarged free Africa, and then the liberation war in three Portuguese continental colonies - including Angola at the northern border of South West Africa - grew stronger.

It was not clear when and how the Odendaal Plan would be put into practice. In the meantime the South African administration engaged the South West Africa natives in the process of low level decision making in conformity with the *Provision for the village administration*

30 Between 1958 and 1966 Michel Daniel Christiaan de Wet Nel was the South African “Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, and Bantu Education.”

31 The unconquerable Namib desert (*Namib* in the *khoekhoegowab* language means “a place where is nothing”, i. e. desert) became a symbol of the future free country. When looking for a better denomination than “South West Africa” the Africans proposed originally the word *Kalanami* (contraction from Kalahari + Namib deserts), but the Ovambo SWAPO co-founder Mburumba Kerina coined, in 1963, the name *Namibia* adopted later on by the international community.

councils from 1963, *Provision on establishing the local administration in the settlement areas of coloureds* from 1965 and *Provision on consultative bodies in the settlement areas of coloureds* from 1966. International and domestic conditions were worsening. After the first armed conflict of the South Africa Defense Force with the SWAPO guerrilla at Omugulugwombashe on 26 August 1966 a wave of detentions³² and persecution began. The UNO Resolution No. 2145 (114 votes in favour, 2 against: RSA and Portugal, 3 abstentions) declared on 17 October 1966 that the UNO direct administration of South West Africa should replace the existing rule because South Africa did not fulfil its duties. In 1966 UNO established the function of the UNO High Commissioner for Namibia.³³ But, the Pretoria government refused to hand over the country to the Committee for South West Africa composed of representatives of 14 UNO member states.

During the Cold War, the anti-communist South Africa was being secretly supported by western powers. That is why for the UNO leaders situation was also quite ambiguous. The UNO General Secretary Kurt Waldheim visited South West Africa in March 1972 to talk to African adherents and adversaries of a contingent independence. Then, he declared that “it would be political suicide if the UNO urges a central government on all tribes now.” Besides, he declined the new name *Namibia* for the country arguing that “the Namib desert covers only a part of the territory.” Despite such an evasive proclamation, SWAPO was given observer status at the UN Trusteeship Council in September 1972.

The South African administration did not give up. In March 1973 the Multi-National (i. e. multi-racial) Advisory Council for South West Africa was established. However, Clemens Kapuuo rejected that body because of its “ethnic” foundation. Until that time only two homelands including their tribal councils were constituted according to the Odendaal Plan: Ovamboland and Kavangoland. At the beginning of

32 The guerrilla fighters seized on their base sit in court immediately in the so-called *Terrorism Trial – The State vs Tuhadeleni and Others*. The SWAPO co-founder Herman Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo was arrested in September 1966, and condemned, in January 1968, to 20 years in prison. Nelson Mandela met him on the Robben Island jail in 1971 (Mandela 2010: 430-431).

33 UNO High Commissioners for Namibia were Anton Vratuša from Yugoslavia (1966-1967), Konstantinos Stavropoulos from Greece (1967-1969), Agha Abdul Hamid from Pakistan (1969-1973), Seán McBride from Ireland (1973-1977), Martti Ahtisaari from Finland (1977-1982), Brajesh Mitra from India (1982-1987) and Bernt Carlsson from Sweden (1987-1988).

August 1973 the first elections for the Legislative Council took place in Ovamboland. SWAPO and its supporters organized a massive boycott so that only about 3 per cent voters appeared at the ballot-boxes. The Kavangoland elections were a totally different case, 66,2 per cent of voters enabled the local council to be instituted. Some governmental favourable measures changed the opinion of Ovambos; 76 per cent of voters took part in the repeated election in Ovamboland in January 1975. But the third and last homeland was established in Caprivi, the other presupposed homelands failed.

In the Old Gymnasium (*Alte Turnhalle*) in Windhoek the Constituent Assembly known as the “Turnhalle Conference” met on 1 September 1975. It was a positive and good turnout for the representation of all the Namibian population components. Three quarters of 181 delegates were democratically elected, one quarter were traditional chiefs. Whites of all three nationalities, representatives of “coloureds” as well as of all important African groups Lozi, Kavango, Ovambo, San, Herero, Damara, Tswana, Basters were present. Although no visible results could be published, this initiative showed the possibilities of an internal solution of the country status still under the South African administration.

Meanwhile the SWAPO was undergoing a deep crisis inside the organization, the Caprivi Strip became a homeland called Lozi on 1 April 1976. In May 1976 also the Rehoboth *Gebied* were granted the autonomous status with the right of electing a *kaptein* of the Baster community. The fifth meeting of the Turnhalle conference proposed three steps to independence, but ONU expressed its “support to the armed struggle led by SWAPO” by means of the Resolution No. 386 dated 20 December 1976. The Turnhalle Conference adopted a new denomination of the country *South West Africa - Namibia*. An autonomous army SWATF (South West Africa Territorial Force) was allowed to be built from July 1977 and the highest South African custodian Marthinus T. Steyn came with a new title of *Administrator-General* for stressing the new approach to the country’s possible autonomy. At the same time, South West Africa ceased to be represented in the Parliament of South Africa.

By creating the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in November 1977 all important political streams of whites and blacks united.

Despite this, more and more new and small political parties arose. Even SWAPO was splitting and its fraction called SWAPO-D refused the armed struggle organized from Angolan bases. The South African prime minister Balthasar Vorster announced that the general election would be organized in December 1978. In order to prevent that UNO adopted the Resolution No 435 on 29 September 1978. According to this decision a body called *United Nations Transitional Assistance Group* (UNTAG) was entrusted to grant a general cease-fire and to prepare all necessary steps for the democratic election and immediate independence. To cope with this task, 5000 UNO soldiers, 1200 civil employees and 360 policemen were being recruited.

Which representation? – from 1978 election to independence

The South African authorities began to respect more and more the African populations in South West Africa – Namibia. Traditional chiefs assumed abandoned functions. Japhet Malenga Munkundi took up the leadership of the Ongandjera tribe after 23 years as a non-existing tribal chief.³⁴ In 1977 the *kaptein* Ben Africa headed the Rehoboth Basters after 52 years of officially non recognized community leadership. Kuaima Riruako renewed Herero chieftain tradition in 1978 after more than 70 years. Even the small Tswana community from the Gobabis region, where the establishment of a homeland never succeeded, acclaimed their headman Constance Letang Kgosiemanga in 1979.

Ignoring the UNO plans, the Administrator-General organized a well prepared election process for 443 441 voters on 4-8 December 1978. Based on the decision of 326 264 valid votes, DTA led by Dirk Mudge (white)³⁵ and Peter Kalangula (black)³⁶ won 41 seats from 50. The democratic principle one citizen - one vote was perfectly fulfilled, but the lawfulness of the election was obstructed by the absence of SWAPO, SWAPO-D and the NNF coalition (8 moderate nationalist parties). As the election had no UNO backing it was not recognized

34 For the regional chief changes and traditions see Tötemeyer (1978).

35 The white Namibian patriot Dirk Frederik Mudge (farmer, born 1928) was a member of the National Party, later he sided with the DTA.

36 Peter Tanyangenge Kalangula (born 1926) as a deacon of the Church of the Province of Southern Africa wanted a separate Anglican diocese in Ovamboland. In 1973, he was nominated to the Ovamboland Legislative Council.

by the international community. That is why the newly constituted National Assembly agreed on 22 December 1978 that the election process would be repeated under the UNO supervision.

When the National Assembly started working on 21 May 1979, SWAPO and NNF designated this body as illegal although one of its first decisions was the abolition of the racial discrimination.³⁷ At that time, SWAPO was successful in gaining world favour. The war grew stronger.³⁸ In 1979 the SADF registered more than 900 conflicts with the SWAPO, the number of South African soldiers increased from 15.000 to 80.000 between 1974 and 1980 (Thornberry 2004: 19). The administration offered new institutions: based on the law from April 1980, the National Assembly elected Dirk Mudge president of the newly created Council of Ministers. One representative of each from eleven ethnic communities worked in this factual country government. Commencing 1 July 1980 the “government service” of 15 administration authorities (popularly called “ministries”) was introduced. The new Law AG 8 stipulated three levels of executive power to be in force from September 1980: the highest level was to be the central government around the general administrator, the second one, governments of 11 ethnic communities and local administrations should work at the lowest level. The Law AG 8 respected African traditions by presupposing a special legal system to be chosen by any individual ethnic group. In August 1980, the project of homelands was scrapped.

On 11-13 November 1980 elections for 9 ethnic governments (whites, Caprivi, Damara, Herero, Kavango, coloureds, Nama, Tswana, Ovambo) were organized; Basters refused to ballot because of their valid *Volksraad* and *kaptein* in function (Kube 2002: 303–304). The San as a nomad group directly subordinated to the central government did not come to ballot-boxes. Such a complicated model more divided than united the Namibian population. Therefore, 53,6 per cent non-white voters boycotted this attempt to solve the political system on the ethnic or racial basis.

In the meantime, the war in Angola continued³⁹ and new political parties and movements came into existence in Namibia. US diplo-

37 For the nationalist standpoint see Kerina (1981).

38 A thorough study was made by Dobell (1998).

39 See Steenkamp (1989).

macy⁴⁰ emphasized the complex solution of regional problems, i. e. negotiation with Cuba, Angola's MPLA and UNITA, South Africa and SWAPO, as a sole way to Namibia's independence. In the shadow of the so-called *Cuban Linkage* further government reforms in Namibia were of no use.⁴¹ After a conflict with the general administrator Danie Hough, Dirk Mudge, the white prime minister, resigned on 18 January 1983. On the next day Hough dissolved the National Assembly and assumed the full executive and legislative power. The conference held on 11-13 May 1984 in Lusaka under the auspices of the Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda brought no result. Under US pressure the South African president Pieter W. Botha announced the new government in Namibia to be formed.⁴² On 17 June 1985 the *Transitional Government of National Unity* (TGNU) assumed the majority of executive powers (Fritz 1991: 90). However, SWAPO and other nationalist parties rejected to co-operate with that body.⁴³

The South African government declared its intention to realize the UNO Resolution 435 starting 1 August 1986 if Cuban troops commence withdrawing from Angola. In the Windhoek's black quarter of Katutura the first public manifestation of SWAPO took place on 30 November 1986. With the Soviet *perestroika* the willingness of terminating the wars in South African region increased. But, it was the bloody battle of Cuito Cuanavale⁴⁴ which accelerated the final solution. Its principles were signed in New York on 20 July 1988 as a pattern for the final Geneva Agreement dated 5 August 1988 (USIP 2002). Based on this, the SADF units abandoned Angola at the end of August 1988, meanwhile Cuban troops started withdrawing in January 1989. The *United Nations Transition Assistance Group* (UNTAG) was deploying its officers and observers from February 1989. The useless SWAPO offensive in April 1989 could not hinder the peace process.⁴⁵ New parties and

40 A broader bipolar context of the Namibia problem was stressed by Menar (1983). For the similar view see Sitte (1983). From the US point of view the complexity of the regional peace process was presented in: Crocker (1993).

41 International circumstances are important for Ya-Otto (1982).

42 On the endeavour of the South African administration in seeking a political solution, see Du Pisani (1985).

43 From the SWAPO side, causes and ideology of the external and internal nationalism are presented in: Katjavivi (1988).

44 The crucial armed conflict can be studied from different points of view: Ricardo Luis (1989); George (2005); Polack (2013). South African standpoint prevails in the respective part of Mills and Williams (2006).

45 A critical view of the SWAPO action appears in Leys, Colin and Saul, John S. (1995).

coalitions were formed to take part in the first elections realized for whites, blacks and coloreds on 7 November 1989 without using the ethnic/race clue. 701 483 registered voters (95 per cent) gave 41 seats in the Constituent Assembly from 72 to SWAPO (in Ovamboland 92,2, per cent), DTA won 21 seats thanks to 28 per cent of votes (66,4 per cent in Hereroland), deputies from more than 5 parties could take part in the first meeting of the Assembly on 21 November 1989 in the historical building of *Turnhalle* in the Windhoek's Bahnhofstraße. On 21 December the designed prime minister Sam Nujoma presented his government, on 16 February 1990 the SWAPO leader Sam Shafiishuna Nujoma was elected president of Namibia and independence was proclaimed on 21 March 1990.

Due to the numbers of individual nation/tribal groups, the civic equality meant the predominance of Ovambos. Smaller communities (including the whites having, however, deputy ministers and strong economic influence) took previous measures of the last South African administration as a better guarantee of their specific development than the new democratic situation. In June 1990 the *kaptein* of the Rehoboth Basters⁴⁶ Hans Diergaardt demanded a full autonomy for his people threatening an armed conflict if the request was not satisfied (Bader 1997: 94). In August a bomb exploded at the headquarters of a journal that revealed the preparation of a plot by white extremists. The governmental *affirmative action*, i. e. preferring the blacks⁴⁷ to whites was visible in the area of bloated state administration, the *black empowerment*, i. e. economic preference of blacks, conflicted with the land tenure of white farmers. In 1992, the living standard of the black population remained low with the average income of 85 USD per capita, whereas 5 per cent of the white population enjoyed the annual income of 16.000 USD.

In 1991-1992, 31 lower territorial units were abolished. Instead of them 13 regions subdivided into 95 districts and 53 municipalities were established. The populous Ovamboland formed four regions called Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto. The Law on local administration No 23 from 1992 defined the representation of cities

46 For the history of this very special community see Britz and Lang and Limpricht (1999).

47 The appointment of 26 years old Sarah Kuugongelva as a head of the State Planning Commission in March 1995 was considered a scandalous error, but it fully tuned with the *affirmative action*.

(15 deputies) and towns (7 deputies at the highest).⁴⁸ This was a basis for the first regional and municipal elections held at the turn of November-December 1992: SWAPO won 9 out of 13 regions and 32 out of 48 municipalities. The white mayor of Windhoek Abraham Bernard May handed over his post to the black SWAPO candidate Matheus Shikongo. But, the *Local Authorities Act* gave localities complicated tasks which could hardly be fulfilled.

The most important task for calming disputes between different communities consisted in the establishment of the Upper House of the Parliament. In 1992, the first elections to the *National Council* were held. It was not so much important that SWAPO won 19 of the 26 seats. This second house was constructed for ensuring regional equity by delegating 2 deputies representing each region to the second house. The election for this chamber on the political party basis, however, weakened the intention of offering a fair representation to different ethnic groups living in non-Ovambo regions of Karas and Hardap (Namas), Khomas, Omaheke and Otjozondjupa (Hereros), Erongo (Damaras), Kavango (Kavangos) and Caprivi/Zambezi (Fwe, Yeyi and others).

Still before the independence, the new chiefs renewed the traditional highest authority of individual nationalities, tribes and clans. This process went on after 1990. Daniel Luipert started leading Swartboois in 1986, Petrus Simon Moses Kooper headed the “Red Nation” (Kaikhaun community) starting 1988, Herman Iipumbu became the first chief of Kwambi tribe in 1991 since 1932, Cornelius Mwetupunga Shelungu (1998-2005, after him Martha Mwadinomho ya Nelumbu) assumed the leadership of the Kwanyama nation which was vacant from 1917. Justus Garoëb became the “king” of Damaras in 1993, Jeremiah Jagger bridged the span of one century when assuming the leadership of the Afrikaner community in 1996. Some chiefs continued in the highest tribal/clan functions like Immanuel Kauluma Elifas (Ondonga since 1975), Stephanus Goliath (Berseba Orlams since 1976), Anna Katrina Christian (Bondelswarts since 1977), Daniel Sitendu Mpasi (*hompa* of the Kwangali tribe), Hendrik Witbooi (1978-2009) and Christian Rooi (since 2009, Witbooi-Nama), Kisco Liswani III (*munitenge* of the Subiya ethnic group since 1996), John Charles Alexander McNab (since 1999, *kaptein* of Basters) and George Simasiku (*mamili* of the

48 Töttemeyer. *Op. cit.*, p. 508.

Fwe ethnic group since 1999). Under their leadership the traditional communities and their languages and cultures are developing without restraints. It is only a question of time before proportional political representation for all such groups is demanded.

The first two Presidents represented the Ovambo majority, both Sam Nujoma and Hifikepunye⁴⁹ Pohamba took part in the armed resistance. To prove the equality of any parentage, the Damara armed struggle participant and minister in governments of the independent Namibia, Hage Geingob⁵⁰ is expected to be elected the state President for the term commencing in 2015.

The transition of the Republic of Namibia was the most important turning point in the modern history of Africa. The peaceful coexistence of three white linguistic groups and many black or mixed tribal and/or clan communities set right the previous radical mistakes which occurred in the Portuguese-speaking countries. The successful development of the state has caused many individual professional and other migrations within the large territory, thus the clan and/or tribe membership is becoming less important nowadays than before. All citizens have the same rights guaranteed. The English language adopted as the unique official language accentuates the unique citizenship, other languages remaining in local use without restrictions. All native communities have sufficient opportunities of asserting their rights at the regional and municipal levels.⁵¹ Despite this, many problems⁵² are enduring⁵³ and looking for a better and really fair political representation of individual Namibian ethnic groups and sub-ethnic/clan communities in the state decision making process remains an urgent task to be solved in a definitive way in the future.

49 As the Christian names reveal the European influence, African names have been preferred since the independence. Hence Lucas “Hifikepunye” Pohamba, Herman “Andimba” Toivo Ya Toivo (the surname “Toivo” given by missionaries means “Hope” in the Finnish language), Gideon “Nahas” Angula, Gottfried “Hage” Geingob etc.

50 Gottfried Hage Geingob (born 1941) took degrees from the Temple University, Philadelphia, the Fordham University, New York (both in the U.S.), and the University of Leeds, United Kingdom. The prime minister between 1990 and 2002, he was newly appointed prime minister in 2012.

51 A good analysis and overview can be read in: Hopwood (2004).

52 For some of them see O’Lynn (2010).

53 New approaches were presented in studies gathered by Henning ed. (2004).

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COMMODIFICATION OF ELECTIONS: THE FUTURE OF ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE

Obert Hodzi

Abstract: The economic voting theory and the responsibility hypothesis posit that voters hold the government accountable for economic performance and will vote for the incumbent if the economy is good. The core assumption is that there is an incumbent and an opposition contesting in an election. But, this is not always the case. In elections following a transitional power sharing government, the schism between the incumbent and the opposition is generally blurred. Political parties that usually contest in the elections would have been part of the transitional power-sharing government. In such cases, voters are not able to apportion responsibility, and political parties compete to claim credit and assign blame. This increases the propensity for election commodification. Applying this proposition to Zimbabwe's 2013 elections, this paper contends that commodification of elections increases in polls following a transitional power sharing government when political parties contesting in the elections were part of the transitional power sharing government, making it difficult for voters to determine responsibility for policy, and leading to intense competition among political parties to claim credit and apportion blame for the performance of the transitional power-sharing government.

Key words: *elections, commodification, power-sharing, responsibility, political parties*

Introduction

The power-sharing government in Zimbabwe emerged from the disputed March and June 2008 elections, and lapsed with the holding of elections on 31 July 2013. Political parties that constituted the power-sharing government formed in February 2009 contested in the 31 July 2013 elections. This raises doubt to the incumbent – opposition assumption postulated by the economic voting theory and the responsibility hypothesis. Premised on the blurring of the incumbent and opposition

narrative in elections following the lapse of transitional power-sharing governments, this paper analyses the impact of such governments on clarity of responsibility and the ability of voters to hold political parties to account through elections, and how that may lead to increased commodification of elections.

First, the paper makes a case for the expansion of the economic voting theory and the responsibility hypothesis' explanatory power in order for them to effectively explain why commodification of elections increases in polls following the end of a power-sharing government. The paper will then secondly provide a background to the power-sharing government in Zimbabwe, focusing on the clarity of responsibility before the power-sharing government was formed and after its formation. This will lead to a discussion of the commodification of the 31 July 2013 elections. Lastly, the future of elections in Zimbabwe will be discussed. It will be argued that commodification of elections is likely to continue for as long as political parties consider the state to be a prize to be won and they rely on clientelistic networks to gain political support.

Re-framing the incumbent-opposition assumption

The economic voting theory posits that “citizens vote for the incumbent government if economic times are good; otherwise they vote against it” (Bratton et al. 2013: 29; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000: 183); hence, “voters hold the government responsible for economic events” (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000: 113). At the core of that hypothesis is an assumption that there is an incumbent and an opposition contesting in an election. But, this is not always the case. In elections following a power sharing arrangement, the schism between the incumbent and the opposition is usually blurred (Powell and Whitten 1993: 401), and the effects are apparent to both voters and political parties. On the one hand, “voters face an added barrier of identifiability by making it harder to determine responsibility for policy” (LeVan 2011: 14), on the other, when the power-sharing “agreements lapse or elections eventually take place, parties that share power compete to take credit or assign blame” (LeVan 2011: 14). That is because in a power-sharing arrangement, the constitutive political parties effectively make up the incumbent government - sharing both political power and decision-making responsibilities; thus, challenging the

basic assumption upon which the economic voting theory and the responsibility hypothesis are premised.

In order to explain electoral conduct in elections following the lapse of a transitional power-sharing government, the responsibility hypothesis has to be expanded because “coalition governments would seem to blur the responsibility of individual parties for whom the voter must vote” (Powell and Whitten 1993: 402). But, first, a distinction has to be made between ‘permanent’ and ‘transitional’ power-sharing arrangements. In the latter, voters and political parties are likely to engage in aggressive electoral competition because votes are converted into political power and “parliamentary seats with a high degree of accuracy” (Franklin 2004: 113). The former is different - political power and representation is normally guaranteed.

Transitional power-sharing arrangements can be defined as a temporal “purposeful distribution of government posts among the most powerful political parties or groups... [It] distributes rights to make decisions according to formally defined procedures” (LeVan 2011: 6). In sub-Saharan Africa, their main objective is cessation of violent conflicts; and a return to democracy, usually, through competitive multiparty elections. Notable examples include the 2008 power-sharing governments in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Their primary goal was cessation of post-election violence; they had a fixed tenure within which, political, constitutional and electoral reforms necessary for holding credible elections were instituted. Both power-sharing governments lapsed with the holding of elections in 2013 and a subsequent return to single-party dominated governments.

In view of the above, in transitional power-sharing governments, the (1) distinction between incumbent and opposition is blurred, which results in (2) the inability of voters to distribute responsibility for economic events, and lead to (3) competition among political parties to apportion blame and claim credit for economic events. In such cases, it seems probable that (4) political parties will resort to measures such as vote-buying to enhance their chances of winning elections, hence (5) commodification of elections increases. Accordingly, the emergent proposition is that: commodification of elections increases in polls following a transitional power-sharing government, when: (a) political parties contesting in elections formed part of the

transitional power-sharing government; (b) voters are not able to determine responsibility for performance; and (c) political parties are not able to claim sole credit for economic performance thereby resorting to measures such as vote-buying in order to enhance their chances of winning elections. These propositions will be applied to the case of Zimbabwe's 2013 elections.

Background of the power-sharing government in Zimbabwe

The power-sharing government in Zimbabwe emerged from disputed March and June 2008 elections. The first round of the elections was conducted on 29 March 2008, but no candidate garnered the required 50% + 1 vote required to form a government. However, for the first time in post-independent Zimbabwe, Mugabe lost the presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T); Tsvangirai got 47.9% of the votes cast while Mugabe trailed with 43.2%. Without a conclusive winner, a presidential run-off was scheduled for 27 June 2008. Fearing an imminent loss, Mugabe and his party, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), unleashed a wave of state-sponsored violence which resulted in the death of several hundreds of MDC-T supporters, mass internal displacements and intimidation. As a result, Tsvangirai officially withdrew his candidature from the presidential run-off on 23 June 2008. But, the Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) argued that Tsvangirai's withdrawal had been issued late therefore the presidential run-off proceeded as scheduled. When results of the presidential run-off election were announced on 29 June 2008, Mugabe had 90.2% of the votes compared to 9.8% for Tsvangirai. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) election observer missions condemned the violence but accepted the result; the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) refused to recognise the elections and imposed further sanctions on Mugabe's regime.

Apart from an apparent lack of legitimacy, ZANU-PF also faced the world's highest inflation officially pegged at 231 million percent by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2010). The breakdown of health services and water supply led to a cholera outbreak in

Harare and Beitbridge amidst a countrywide shortage of basic commodities (World Health Organization 2008). Facing mounting internal and external pressure, particularly from SADC, Mugabe conceded to political negotiations with the MDC-T and its smaller faction led by Welshman Ncube, MDC-N. Under SADC's mandate, South Africa facilitated the negotiations, which culminated in the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations on 15 September 2008, and subsequent formation of a power-sharing government in February 2009.

Power-sharing government institutions and clarity of responsibility

Political institutions and institutional divisions of power are essential to establishing accountability and assigning responsibility for government performance. For voters to be able to hold government to account there should be clarity on institutional divisions of power. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) provided for political institutions but lacked clarity on the division of powers among the institutions. For instance, executive authority was equally vested in and exercised by the Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), President Mugabe (ZANU-PF) and the cabinet which comprised of 15 ZANU-PF, 13 MDC-T and 3 MDC-N nominated ministers¹. The horizontal distribution of executive power among the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet arguably weakened the ability of voters to hold them responsible for their respective policies and performance individually. Public opinion surveys conducted before and during the power-sharing government illustrate the change from clarity of responsibility during the single-party government led by ZANU-PF until 2009 to the lack of clarity of responsibility in the power-sharing government.

Before the power-sharing government was established in 2009, the economy under ZANU-PF's government had reached "crisis proportions" (UNDP 2010:3). The "Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to have contracted by a cumulative 50.3 percent; official inflation peaked at 231 million percent in July 2008; capacity utilisation in industry fell below 10 percent by January 2009" (UNDP 2010:4). Unemployment was upwards of 80%. The education system was not

1 Article 20.1.1 and 20.1.6 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 19) Act, 2009.

spared either, “Primary Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) fell from 99 per cent in 2002 to 91 per cent in 2009... completion rates dropped from 74 per cent to 68 per cent with secondary school enrolment reporting a 7 per cent decline from 2006” (UNICEF 2011:3). An opinion survey conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) during that time, suggested that 89% of Zimbabweans described the country’s economy as ‘bad’ (38%) and ‘very bad’ (51%) (MPOI 2007). ZANU-PF, which had ruled the country for more than three decades, bore responsibility for that economic and humanitarian crisis. Consequently, in the 2008 elections, ZANU-PF lost its two-thirds majority; suggesting that “the protracted and deep economic crisis and the poor policy responses had taken their toll..., [demonstrating] the convergence of economic well-being and political allegiance. [Hence] economic discontent translated into political discontent via the medium of the ballot box, marking the intersection of electoral politics and economics” (Masunungure 2010: 77).

The economic and humanitarian situation changed for the better with the establishment of the power-sharing government. The economy grew by an average of 5 percentage points each year, inflation was reduced to a single digit and there was improvement in basic services’ provision and availability of basic commodities. The power-sharing government was credited for these socio-economic improvements. For instance, 82% of Zimbabweans credited the government of national unity for controlling inflation and 71% for improvements in the economy. But, the biggest beneficiary of these positive opinion polls was Prime Minister Tsvangirai. His performance in the power-sharing government was approved by 81% of Zimbabweans compared to 24% that expressed satisfaction with the performance of President Mugabe.

However, in 2010, the Prime Minister and his party, MDC-T began to lose popularity. In a survey conducted by Freedom House in 2012, “only 52% of Zimbabweans attributed success of the inclusive government to MDC-T, and by 2012 this recognition had fallen to 15%... amongst MDC-T supporters in 2010 a total of 87% had reckoned that the good work was mainly attributable to the MDC-T. By 2012 this was the opinion of only 44% of the MDC-T supporters” (Freedom House 2012: 7, 26). The survey claimed that ZANU-PF picked up a proportion of the shifting credit. By the time elections were conducted in 2013, there was a greater tendency by Zimbabweans to credit both parties

equally. This can be attributed to the lack of clarity in institutional divisions of power in the power-sharing government; consequently, affecting the ability of voters to determine responsibility and appraise respective performance. In such cases, attempts by voters to sanction political actors were “less likely to punish the actual culprit” because, power-sharing governments “blur the responsibility of individual parties for whom the voter must vote and offer a possibility of vote switching within the government” (Powell and Whitten 1993: 402).

The power-sharing government was also fragmented along political lines, and characterised by policy inconsistencies among ministries. Government policies were implemented on the basis of political party interests; hence political parties in the power-sharing government traded accusations against each other of running parallel governments. A notable example of policy inconsistency emanating from political expediency was the issue of civil servants’ salary increment. Although, both ZANU-PF and MDC-T acknowledged the need to increase civil servants’ salaries, they both accused each other of stalling the process. For instance, Mugabe accused Tendai Biti (MDC-T), the former minister of finance in the power-sharing government of sabotaging the government by refusing to increase civil servants’ salaries. In turn, Biti accused Mugabe and ZANU-PF ministers of failing to remit diamond revenues necessary to increase the salaries (Muleya 2011). Both parties sought to obscure their responsibility by blaming each other (Powell and Whitten 1993: 399). As a result of the absence of an identifiable and cohesive incumbent, voters’ ability to hold the government or any part thereof responsible for its performance was diminished. This is because voters are at times “preoccupied with whether they can identify a cohesive political actor (whether it is a person, a party, or a coalition of parties) that they can assign responsibility to and sanction accordingly” (Hobolt et al. 2010: 9). Arguably, in the face of accusations and counter-accusations among parties in the power-sharing government, responsibility lines were further distorted making it difficult for voters to decide on whom to sanction or appraise for the transitional power-sharing government’s performance.

Clarity of responsibility is not only dependent on political institutions and division of institutional power, but on the exercise of political power by parties in the power-sharing government. In the

case of Zimbabwe, institutional divisions of power and responsibility underestimated the entrenched neo-patrimonial political dynamics in the country. For that reason, “the incompatibility between institutions on paper and informal power structures” (LeVan 2011: 10) accounted for the myriad of policy discord that characterised the power-sharing government. For instance, the Security Service chiefs refused to acknowledge Morgan Tsvangirai’s authority. ZANU-PF ministers boycotted the Council of Ministers chaired and supervised by Morgan Tsvangirai in his capacity as Prime Minister (Newsday 2012) - the Council of Ministers was a constitutional body aimed at assessing the implementation of government policies (Constitution of Zimbabwe 2009, Article 20.1.5). Although executive decisions had to be made through consultation, in reality, Mugabe made several unilateral decisions. They included the renewal of service contracts for the Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri, Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga, Lieutenant General Philip Valerio Sibanda (Zimbabwe National Army), Air Marshal Perrance Shiri (Air Force of Zimbabwe) and Retired Major General Paradzai Zimondi (Commissioner of Prisons) (Radio Vop 2012). He also unilaterally appointed six High Court Judges (Sibanda, Kwaramba 2013). Furthermore, he invoked the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act Chapter 10: 20 to bypass Parliament and declare the 31 July 2013 election date unilaterally (Nyashanu, Matenga 2013). On the other hand, ZANU-PF accused the Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti (MDC-T) of unilaterally freezing civil servants’ salaries (Nkatazo 2010), and refusing to fund revival of industries in Bulawayo (Mahumashava 2013), Zimbabwe’s second largest city, as well as fund agriculture (Mushava 2012). Trading of accusations and counter-accusations provided opportunities for both ZANU-PF and MDC-T to diffuse responsibility for government performance in the run-up to the elections, making it difficult for voters to determine responsibility and use the ballot as a sanctioning tool.

Elections: The principal objective of the transitional power-sharing government

The immediate objective of the power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe was to end endemic political violence and foster reconciliation, peace and national healing (Global Politics Agreement 2008, Article

7.1). But, the principal aim was to make institutional (Global Political Agreement 2008, Article 13), constitutional² and electoral reforms aimed at creating a conducive environment for holding new elections. From the onset, political parties considered the power-sharing government to be a means to winning the next election, and the subsequent return to a single-party government. Arthur Mutambara (MDC-N), one of two Deputy Prime Ministers in the power-sharing government, succinctly put it: “We are in the inclusive government because we had... inconclusive elections..., and so we were forced into this arrangement..., so the key mandate of the inclusive government is the creation of conditions for free and fair elections” (Gonda 2010). Mugabe described the power-sharing arrangement as a humiliation. A few days after signing the Global Political Agreement, he told his party officials and supporters that: “if only we had not blundered in the March... elections we wouldn’t be facing this humiliation” (BBC 2008). He then declared that “we are still in a dominant position which will enable us to gather more strength as we move into the future” (Blair 2008). That future was the holding of elections at the end of the power-sharing government’s tenure, elections, which had to be won at any cost to ensure a return to a single-party government. For the MDC-T, its aim was to establish a new democratic dispensation, while for ZANU-PF, it was to re-establish its hegemony in Zimbabwean politics. But for both political parties, the aim was to win the 2013 elections with “supermajorities... to project the image of invincibility and strength...” (Magaloni 2008: 729).

SADC, the guarantors of the Global Political Agreement also considered democratic elections to be the prime goal of the power-sharing government. Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, framed the post-2000 Zimbabwe crisis as a struggle for popular legitimacy between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. He argued that “this cardinal issue undergirded the SADC-mediated negotiations which were conducted with the unwritten and strategic goal of settling the political impasse ‘once-and-for-all’ and via the electoral route” (Masunungure 2009: 4). In order to achieve that ‘strategic goal’, the Summit of the Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation held on 31 March 2011 in Livingstone, Zambia, resolved that, “the Inclusive Government in

2 Article 6 of the Global Political Agreements, 2008 provided for the setup of a Select Committee of Parliament to lead public consultation and subsequently draft a new constitution for Zimbabwe. See: Global Political Agreement, 2008.

Zimbabwe should complete all the steps necessary for the holding of an election that will be peaceful, free and fair, in accordance with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.” (Parliament of Zimbabwe) Resultantly, parties in the power-sharing government agreed and signed the ‘Roadmap to Zimbabwe’s Elections’ on 22 April 2011. The ‘Roadmap to Zimbabwe’s Elections’ gave time-lines within which political and legal reforms had to be made before elections were conducted. As argued by Masunungure, it seems both SADC and political parties in Zimbabwe agreed that, “a transition to democracy can never be achieved without meeting at least one minimum standard and this is the installation of a government freely and fairly elected by the Zimbabwean people” (Masunungure 2009: 8).

Commodification of elections: Winning by all means necessary...

In the run-up to the June 2013 elections, there was a greater tendency among Zimbabweans to credit both parties equally – suggesting that the electorate was increasingly becoming unsure of the performance of each of the political parties in the transitional power-sharing government. Between 2009 and 2010, MDC-T benefited from positive public poll approvals due to “some specific contributions to IG [Inclusive Government]. Yet such credits.... [were not] transferred into the kitty of party political endorsement and declarations to support the party come the next round of elections” (Freedom House 2012: 13). The waning support of MDC-T from 2010 onward could “be explained by the high expectations towards the party’s performance in the GNU; its failure to ideologically and practically to distinguish itself from ZANU-PF during the transitional phase; faction fighting within the MDC; financial and personal misdemeanours committed by the movement’s leaders; and neglect of political organisation within local structures” (Mutisi 2013:5). On the contrary, ZANU-PF gained electoral advantage from its association with the power-sharing government. As Adrienne LeBas puts it “ZANU-PF emerged from the power-sharing period strengthened. It found new means of deploying patronage, not just to military officials and loyalists but also to potentially vulnerable MDC-T voters” (LeBas 2014: 62). Thus, “some voters apparently attribute[d] the country’s ‘right’ direction, the economy’s

‘good’ management, and improved delivery of educational services to ZANU-PF” (Bratton and Masunungure 2012: 8).

However, although ZANU-PF gained more support through the power-sharing government than MDC-T did, overall, both political parties struggled to convince the electorate of their individual contributions. The clarity of responsibility was blurred, and voters found it difficult to determine responsibility for policy and performance amidst competition between ZANU-PF and MDC-T to claim credit and assign blame. Surveys conducted by MPOI (2012) and Freedom House (2012) suggested a closely contested election. For instance, the MPOI survey showed that Mugabe would win the 2013 elections by 33% of the vote compared to 31% for Tsvangirai. Suggesting that, both parties were unable to capture the ‘swing’ vote or convince each other’s supporters of their contributions to the socio-economic well-being attributed to the power-sharing government. But, with both parties intending to win the election with a clear majority and thereafter form a single-party government, they had to do all things necessary to win the election in the first round.

In previous elections, ZANU-PF had used violence, but, that led to international rebuke making it an unviable option in 2013. On the other hand, MDC-T lacked the political machinery to use violence and coercion; hence with both parties unable and/or unwilling to use violence to win elections, they resorted to ‘commodification of the election’, that is, the transformation of an election into an underground private market at which the voter’s choice on the election day can be exchanged for particularistic group or personal material benefits. In that case, both voters and the politicians were tacitly aware that the particularistic material benefits were in exchange for votes. This ‘market for votes’ “emerges when parties cannot use coercion... to control voters” (Lehoucq 2002: 2), and where “there are no other cost-efficient ways of influencing voters” (Lehoucq 2007: 34). Trading of votes in Zimbabwe was by no means the only cost-effective way of winning votes, political parties also used intimidation and voters roll manipulation among other things. But, whereas manipulation of the voters roll was done mainly by ZANU-PF, vote trading was prevalent in all political parties hence widespread.

The neo-patrimonial system in Zimbabwe means that government accountability is not just based on the delivery of collective goods, such as, economic growth, employment, or health care “nor does it rest on improving *overall* distributive outcomes along the lines favoured by broad categories of citizens (e.g., income and asset redistribution through taxes and social benefits scheme)” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2). Rather, it is also based on direct material inducements, such as, access to employment, food aid or cash hand-outs to individuals and groups in exchange for political support. The resultant citizen-politician linkage significantly “diffuse the connection between voting choice and government performance” (Powell and Whitten 1993: 399). Therefore, “relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status” (Bratton and van de Walle 1994: 458).

In the course of the power-sharing government, members of parliament, ministers and councillors from all political parties scrambled for “housing grants, cars and per diems for everything from local and global conferences to the drawn-out public participation process for developing a new constitution” (Moore 2014: 105), they also distributed state resources such as mining rights, government contracts, residential stands, and other resources to their political supporters and families. In essence, they transformed the state into a ‘patrimonial administration’ concerned with being “proprietors, distributors, and even major consumers of the authority and resources of government” (Jackson and Rosberg 1994: 300). It seems, getting into power was an opportunity for them to regain investments they had made to gain elected political office. Hence, although, the economic situation improved in the course of the power-sharing government, “patron-client relations dominate[d] politics and the state fail[ed] to develop as any sort of ‘neutral container’ for its people” (Buzan and Waever 2003: 226).

The commodification of elections in Zimbabwe is therefore linked to the blurred distinction between public and private, state and non-state as well as politics and economics (Taylor 2009:10). Because of that lack of distinctiveness, citizens “expect and mostly get incompetence, bias, venality, and corruption” (Berman 1998: 341). Oftentimes, ordinary citizens argue that voting someone into power is voting for him,

and his kith and kin to benefit from government resources. In view of that, “control of the state is equivalent to control of resources..., satisfying the selfish desire of elites to enrich themselves, often in quite spectacular fashion” (Taylor 2009: 12).

Indeed, political power is “the best and perhaps the exclusive means for acquiring and generating the material wealth necessary for becoming the ruling class” (Fatton 1988: 255). For instance, in 2009, amidst the economic and humanitarian crisis, members of parliament demanded car loans of US\$30 000 each; cabinet ministers and their deputies had several cars each, including top-of-the-range Mercedes Benz (LeBas 2014: 61). Yet, they could not raise civil servants’ salaries. Meanwhile, councillors and mayors approved hefty packages and awarded themselves housing stands and luxurious cars while council workers went for months without salaries and residents continued to experience water rationing, power cuts and non-collection of refuse.

Because political power is perceived as a sure means to gaining state resources for personal enrichment, citizens also consider election periods as ‘harvesting seasons’ - “the time to reap the fruits of the parliamentary tree, so to speak” (Lindberg 2003: 125). One rally attendee who had received groceries at a ZANU-PF rally said that, “at least we get something during the campaign period because that is when the ordinary person becomes relevant to the politician. They usually go away soon after the election only to come back when another election beckons, so this is our time” (Tafirenyika 2013). Accordingly, “from the standpoint of ordinary people..., elections are the times when equality and justice are temporarily achieved as their patrons fulfil their financial obligations to support them in times of need” (Ibana 1996: 130-31).

Another contributing factor to the commodification of elections in Zimbabwe is that, the majority of Zimbabwe’s population (65%) lives in communal rural areas or in resettlement areas where agriculture is their main source of survival. With the majority of its support base in rural communities, ZANU-PF used state sponsored agricultural inputs such a seeds, fertilisers, tractors and pesticides to consolidate its support and maintain its grip on resettled farmers who benefitted from the government’s land reform programme. Agricultural inputs were usually distributed by traditional leaders and only to supporters

of ZANU-PF. On the other hand, MDC-T used Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) sympathetic to its cause to dispense particularistic benefits such as local community activist jobs, and paying allowances for attending community meetings conducted by the NGOs. Attendance of those meetings was usually limited to known MDC-T supporters or at least those perceived to be non-ZANU PF supporters. Notably, after the July 2013 elections, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Davis Marapira (ZANU-PF) told villagers in his constituency that, “we will be distributing these inputs to you to thank you for supporting our party and the President. You voted resoundingly for us and this is your reward..., those who opposed our party should not waste their time to come when we distribute the inputs, we will screen our members and make sure that they are the ones to get the inputs. Why should our enemies want to benefit from our programme, we are now in our own government and we will do things our way” (Chikara 2013). Voters were therefore kept loyal “in part because of the benefits they receive and in part because of the fear of being expelled from the party’s spoils system” (Magaloni 2008: 729).

Solicitation of benefits by voters

Literature on vote buying often suggests that voters are passive participants in the trading of votes –waiting for politicians to solicit and then respond. To the contrary, voters in Zimbabwe often solicit for gifts or private benefits from politicians during election times. The ‘benefits’ vary depending on the social status of the voter - in poor communities, votes can be exchanged for school fees, funeral and wedding expenses, alcohol, agricultural inputs, grocery parcels and cash; while in upper and middle-class communities, votes can be bought with government contracts, mining rights, commercial farms and business loans - “politicians who refuse to be responsive to their constituents’ demands for selective incentives will be held accountable by them and no longer receive votes and material contributions” (Kitschelt 2000: 852). In such cases, the election is won by politicians able to make “credible patronage commitments” (Bratton et al. 2013: 32).

An MDC-T candidate in Mberengwa West constituency complained that he had to make contributions and attend funerals in his constituency, provide school fees and agricultural inputs or risk losing votes to his opponent. He lost the election to a ZANU-PF candidate

who was able to provide material benefits more than he could. Unlike MDC-T, ZANU-PF was able to respond to demands for particularistic benefits from voters in all classes of society: to rural farmers demanding agricultural inputs, ZANU-PF through the Presidential Well-Wishers Agricultural Fund, provided agricultural inputs; to the unemployed youth, ZANU-PF employed thousands of youths as youth officers in the Ministry of the Youth Economic Empowerment and Indigenisation as well as in the army and police force; to the middle class youth demanding business start-up loans, it provided a youth fund; to urban dwellers demanding housing, it provided residential stands through several ZANU-PF linked housing cooperatives; and to urban residents struggling to pay council bills, the Minister of Local Government, Ignatius Chombo (ZANU-PF), instructed all councils to cancel residents' debts weeks before the elections on 31 July 2013. For voters in the upper echelons of society, ZANU-PF provided mineral rights and ownership of equity in foreign companies through the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy, which required all foreign companies to dispense 51% of their shares to local Zimbabweans. ZANU-PF was therefore able to respond to voters' demands for particularistic benefits - showing its ability to meet the immediate needs of the electorate in exchange for their votes.

Voters' demands for particularistic benefits were not just driven by need, but also, by lack of trust in government's ability to fulfil election promises. People could not "wait for material rewards and therefore [preferred] targeted hand-outs to the distant benefits of policy change..." (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:25). Explaining reasons for their loss in the July 31 elections, Tendai Biti, the MDC-T Secretary General argued that, "we [MDC-T] were selling hopes and dreams when ZANU-PF was selling practical realities. We (Zanu PF) are going to give you a farm, it's there. We [Zanu PF] are going to give you \$5 000 through (Saviour) Kasukuwere's ministry." (Chikwanhi 2014) In addition, the majority of Zimbabweans, particularly in rural areas, lack the capacity to understand how government policies could translate to their individual benefit. This is because of a string of economic policies, such as, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), The National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) and Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP), which were either not implemented fully or failed to improve people's livelihood. Resultantly, ZANU-PF's July 2013 election campaign combined the

promise of economic empowerment policies with immediate material benefits such as community share ownership schemes, agricultural inputs and food hampers, which, were distributed at every campaign rally; whereas, MDC-T's political campaign centred on its economic blueprint - JUICE – an acronym for Jobs, Upliftment, Investment, Capital and Environment. Comparing the MDC-T and the ZANU-PF campaign strategy, Tendai Biti queried, "What was our position on indigenisation? We had JUICE, yes, it was good but trying to explain it to Mai Ezra in Chendambuya... So, the issue of articulating an alternative discourse which is walked and lived is very important." (Chikwanha 2014) The election was therefore won by a party that was able to combine immediate material benefits to cater for voters' immediate needs and promise for future individual benefits after the election. This was strategic, voters that did not want to be excluded from official patronage networks opted to vote for ZANU-PF.

Conclusion: The future of elections in Zimbabwe

What is apparent from the discussion above is that transitional power sharing arrangements challenge in a fundamental way the basis upon which the responsibility hypothesis and the economic voting theory are founded. Far from strengthening accountability among political parties constituting the transitional power sharing government in Zimbabwe, the transitory nature of the government led to the commodification of elections – blurring the divide between the incumbent and opposition while simultaneously incapacitating voters from determining responsibility for government performance. The emergent dynamic is that elections became a 'market' on which the voter's choice on the election day was exchanged for particularistic group or personal material benefits. Contrary to the dominant vote buying discourse, at that 'market' it is not just politicians who sought to buy votes, potential voters actively solicited for vote buyers. Resultantly, elections were not won on the basis of performance in government but on the ability to proffer the right price for the vote. So, what is the future for elections in Zimbabwe?

To reclaim elections in Zimbabwe, the socio-economic and political contexts within which elections are conducted require an overhaul. As argued by Said Adejumobi, the focus should be on strengthening "the constitutive and regulative mechanisms and precepts necessary

to promote a healthy and free electoral competition” (Adejumobi 2000: 62). Yet, the reality is that Zimbabwean politics is a zero-sum game, where political parties are focused on sustenance of the neo-patrimonial political system which requires a regular flow of resources to maintain the clientelistic network of patronage. In order to secure those resources, political parties struggle for control of the state – making politics a zero-sum-game. What raises the stakes further is the ‘winner-take-all’ electoral system, where loss in elections means exclusion from the state and its resources. Simply put, “winners control state resources in a context where private economies are weak – which lends election campaigns the tenor of life-or-death struggles” (Bratton et al. 2013: 32). The aim of elections is therefore to capture the state because, “once an incipient ruling class takes over the state, it monopolises it for its exclusive material and political gain and uses it for the violent exclusion of potential rival groups’ (Fatton 1988: 255). Instead of elections becoming the means for voters to hold the government to account and punish non-performing politicians and political parties, they have become a means of exchanging and gaining personal material benefits. For the politician wanting to gain political power and for a political party aspiring to form the next government, election time is investment time, on the contrary, election periods are harvesting periods for voters. This appears to be the cycle in which Zimbabwe’s elections are trapped.

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UNVEILING THE SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PROTRACTED JOS CRISES, CENTRAL NIGERIA

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Abstract: This paper has critically examined the causes and contexts of the protracted crises in Jos Plateau State, Nigeria since 1994. The paper traces the emergence and perpetuation of the conflict to the imposition of an exploitative and competitive colonial system sustained by mass labour migration, ethnic-politics and religious contestations. At the centre of these violent eruptions are the groups' dynamics that the conflict has created: The Indigene versus Settler problematic as well as the Christian versus Muslims militias. The crises in Jos are resource and identity-based in a contest over the native, political and economic soul of the ancient Tin-city. The various attempts made by the State and other non-State actors at finding lasting solutions to these ensuing huge human and material loss in this circle of violence have largely been insincere as they are also politicized. The Conflict perspectives as well as the Ethnic and Resource Mobilization paradigm were adopted in an attempt to understanding the Jos crises.

Key words: *Jos crises, Nigeria, ethnic and resource mobilization paradigm*

Introduction

Throughout history, under a variety of social and political systems and contexts, people in almost all parts of the world have engaged in conflicts and violent expressions, they have also waged wars using a variety of techniques of struggle. In modern times, instances of conflicts and expressive violent outbursts have become more crowded on a diverse range of issues, from politics, economy, religion, ethnicity, ideology and extreme forms of terrorism. In general terms, violent eruptions especially group or collective are usually a result of conflicts which are not properly managed or regulated by society (Sharp 1973). Several violent techniques are often employed to pursue or defend

certain claims or interests by various competing groups in the society. In other words, violence especially those expressed by groups is always precipitated by political, economic and socio-cultural grievances which are not promptly or properly resolved. However, it is instructive to note that conflicts are not inherently destructive in society; in fact, the level of progress, development and civility of a society is measured by its ability to appreciate and resolve conflicts amicably (Wika 2010). It is within these contexts that we seek to examine the various explanations and theorizations presented on the unresolved issues that have characterized the 'Jos crises'.

The last two decades of the twentieth century for Africa were not only periods of economic crises and state policy adjustment; they were also decades of conflicts and violence of varying characters and proportions. This period also witnessed a general resurgence in ethnic and religious conflicts across the continent (Abdu 2010). Nigeria has witnessed a series of conflicts as well as violent eruptions across the length and breadth of the most populous black nation on earth; factors that caused them are both similar and distinct (Egwu 1998). Since the attainment of flag of independence from the British colonialists in 1960, Nigeria has since then experienced violent eruptions ranging from political, inter and intra-religious, ethnic and lately religious terrorism (Sha 1998; Falola 1998; Suberu 2009). The Maitatsine crises in the 1980s, the Efe-Modakeke crises, the Lagos Area boys problem, the Tiv-Jukun crises, the Bassa-Egbura Nassarawa Toto crises, the Kano, Kaduna and Jos religious uprisings, the Niger Delta youth militancy and the Boko Haram Islamic religious terrorism in the northern parts of Nigeria are some of the major eruptions.

In the past eighteen years Plateau state in general and Jos in particular has been literarily tuned into a theatre of intense social conflicts and has been variously labelled by conflict researchers and social commentators as the main site of an age-long ethnic and religious violence within the Middle-Belt region of Nigeria (Sha 1994; Egwu 1998; Best 2007; Wika 2010). Estimates by the media, the police and some of the victims of these violent eruptions put the number of human losses from 1994 to date in thousands with extensive damage to properties estimated to cost billions of Naira. The Crises has also impacted negatively on the developmental strides of the state as resources meant for development are often diverted to maintaining

the usually fragile peace and security (Best, 2007). The conflict has always been centred on religious sentiments between Christians and Muslims; however, ethnicity and politics also play decisive roles. For instance, the 2001, 2002, 2008 & 2010 violent eruptions have various degrees of religious as well as political issues involved. The violent eruptions also spread to other parts of the state including rural areas with devastating magnitude (Best 2007). Perhaps, a new dimension to the crises was revealed in the rural areas surrounding Jos, especially in the clashes between the Berom and Fulani militia groups within some surrounding villages and towns which records the killings of farmers, cattle breeders, and the massacre of Berom villagers in Gyamboruk (Dogo-na Hauwa) an old colonial tin- mine settlement on the outskirts of Jos (Wika 2010).

What makes the crises in Jos unique and perhaps, attractive is the myth that surrounds some of the issues that has characterised the conflict and crises. The indigene and settler debate, the struggle over the ownership of Jos, the significance of the city as the religious headquarters of some sort to both the Muslims and Christians, hence the religious outlook of the crises (Sha 1994; PIDAN 2010). It is generally perceived within both Christians and Muslim organizations in Northern Nigeria that Jos is a fertile ground for the establishment and development of religious movements and ideas partly because the city is among the young and fast growing ones in the old Northern region of Nigeria (Last 2007).

Interestingly, Jos has now been seen as a spiritually fertile ground conducive for Muslim as well as Christian reformers to establish their base for the propagation of their faiths. Jos is at present the spiritual headquarters of the Church of Christ in Nations (C.O.C.I.N.), the oldest and perhaps largest Christian denomination in Plateau State with branches in almost all the states of Nigeria and also in the United Kingdom, Niger, Ghana and Malawi. The city is also headquarters to the Evangelical Church Winning All (E.C.W.A.) denomination, the Anglican Church has a sitting archbishop in the city as well as an archbishop for the Roman Catholic Church. The Living Faith church has its regional headquarters in Jos amidst numerous other Pentecostal Christian denominations. The Muslims also have the national headquarters of the *Jama'atu Izala al-Bida wa Iqamatu al-Sunna* (J.I.B.W.I.S), one of the militant sects of Islam, that coined

its name from Arabic meaning: The Association for Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna. The association started in Jos in 1978 to promote what it asserts as a more orthodox spiritual Islam with emphasis on the Sunna and denouncing the practice of Sufis, (Loimeir 1997; Kane 2003; Danjibo 2010). The *Jamaatu Nasril Islam* (J.N.I.) also has Jos as its state headquarters and so do several other Islamic sects. The geographical location of Jos as the only access by road to all the north-eastern states of Nigeria also explains the contest and fight over its control and ownership. The temperate climate and the agricultural potentials of the state add to the list of issues serving as baits for the control of the city by the contending parties in the conflict. As mentioned earlier, factors causal to the conflict and crises in Jos are both historical and contemporary.

The historical dynamics of the Jos crises

The Jos Plateau has been conducive for Christian missionary activities before the advent of colonial rule. The European Missionaries established their presence with the founding of Jos as a town. The activities of the Sudan United Missions (SUM), as well as the Catholic missionary activities were instrumental to the development of the city and its peoples. The flourishing of Christianity and its spread from Jos was possible because of the rejection of Christianity in the far North and its acceptance on the Plateau especially in Jos, Gindiri and Shendam areas. The position of Jos as a cradle for Christianity in the North is further enhanced by its strategic location as a doorway to most parts of the North, especially the North-Eastern region and at the same time an economically important and strategic city within the Middle-Belt (North-Central) region of the country. Jos was and still is seen as a base for the evangelization of the entire area of Northern Nigeria. The advent of colonialism and the economic boost it created from the tin mining activities in the city attracted a large population of the Nigerian southerners who were largely oriented towards Christianity. In the same token, an equally large numbers of northern Nigerian labour migrants were predominantly Muslims. This historic crystallization was later to give way to economic and religious competition, political assertiveness, religious fundamentalism and violence (Sha 1994).

It could be further argued that colonialism was the single most important factor in the crystallization of contemporary identities

and identity conflicts in Jos. This was possible through the process Suberu & Osaghae (2005) called the “*Cobbling*” of different Nigerian groups into culturally and politically artificial entities. The result is the simulation of inter-group competition and mobilization for power and resources in the new political arrangements, thus the fuelling of ethnic, religious and political conflicts. This development has transformed most of these colonial urban centres, especially Jos, into the melting pots of ethnic contacts, competition, religious consciousness as well as mobilization.

Coleman, characterized these new colonial mining, commercial and administrative cities as “aggregations of tribal (and religious) unions (centres)” (Coleman 1958). Coleman argued further that, such colonial urban centres (or bus stops as it were) have encouraged the formations of kinship, lineage or ethnic associations and religious membership as a strategy and means to cushion the insecurity, instability, alienation and competitiveness characteristic of the new colonial urban life. Prior to the advent of colonialism, the Islamic Jihad which was championed by the self-styled Islamic reformer Othman Dan Fodio had swept the entire parts of what is now referred to as the north eastern and western Nigeria and parts of the Middle-Belt (North-Central) regions of the country including the present day Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Kaduna and Bauchi states (Danjibo 2010). This Islamic mission literally swept through the entire northern portion of the country as well as forcefully converting almost everyone at sight in to Islam. However, the tribal regions of the Middle-Belt especially the Plateau areas put up a strong resistance as captured by a 2010 publication of the Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN):

...during all the Jihadic years of the early 19th century these (native) ethnic groups were not subjugated under the Fulani Emirate rule. The advances of the Jihadic forces were continuously repulsed by them until the Jihadists had to skirt round the Plateau to move into other parts of the country. A classic example was the Naraguta war of 1873 which inflicted tremendous reversals on the Bauchi forces. They met their waterloo from the combine forces of Amo, Afizere, Anaguta, Buji and Berom (Indigenous Ethnic Groups, PIDAN 2010: 4).

When these efforts to forcefully convert the tribal regions of the Middle-Belt into Islam failed, the colonial mining activities provided

a more subtle avenue for the realization of this religious mission, (Wika 2010). These labour migrants that came into Jos in their thousands in the wake of the mining activities were mostly from the Hausa and Fulani (predominantly) Muslim communities of Northern Nigeria extraction. This was critical for the actualization of their subtle religious mission. Similarly, Osaghae & Suberu (2005:15) reported that:

The advent of colonialism in the late nineteenth century and the subsequent amalgamation of the northern and southern Nigeria in 1914 witnessed more migration in response largely to modern economic opportunities in emerging colonial urban centres. A phenomenal instance of such colonial economic migration was the early twentieth century influx of southern Nigerian migrants, especially the Igbo and Yoruba into northern cities like Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and Jos. This migration did not however, lead to greater integration as might have been expected. This was partly due to the continuing strands of state consolidation by the Muslim overlords in the core north in the aftermath of the Fulani Jihad of 1804 that produced an acute sense of territoriality.

The Muslim Hausa-Fulani settler problem in Jos must be understood within the context of these similar migratory factors and patterns especially in the context of the number that migrated into Jos and the religious-cum-economic ideology behind such mass movement; particularly with the failure of the early Jihad crusades within the Plateau areas. Sha (1998) presented a detailed identities roster as well as the estimated number of the Plateau labour migrants based on the 1931 census tabulation:

Table 1: Distributions of ethnic identities and population of labour migrants: Jos Division based on the 1931 census tabulation

Hausa (Northern Nigeria)	6,498
Berberi (Borno State)	1,960
Bagirmi (Northern Nigeria)	1,677
Fulani (Northern Nigeria)	1,097
Tera	648
Kerikeri	590
Arab(Shuwa)	424
Ibo	249
Yoruba	225
Bariba	221
Zaberwa	154
Munshi	153
Bolewa	151
Nupe	95
Asaba(Ibo)	66
Other Northern Province	430
Other Southern province	165
Other Foreigners	16

Source: Capital and Labour on the Nigerian Tin Mines (Freund 1981: 85).

The window provided by the mining migrations for the Northerners was basically seen as another opportunity to conquer and further control areas farther away from their hitherto enclaves in the core North. It was to say the least, an economic opportunity masked in colonial regalia but with a religious soul and mission. Documented evidences revealed that the Hausa and Fulani migrants/settlers were clearly not the first to have been attracted to Jos, even before formal colonialism and the attendant mining activities in the Jos area but perhaps their number rather than time of arrival gave them the false impression and claim that they founded Jos. For instance, Sha (1994: 47) reported that,

The settler question in its present character and form in Jos emerged as a result of colonial penetration and expansion; it was accompanied by such developments as the implantation of the colonial tin mining industry, the construction of railways and the growth of commerce and urbanization. These developments increased the scale of migration and settlement on the plateau and particularly Jos.

It is also important to note that, the contradictory and selective colonial policy reflected in the politics of inclusion and exclusion in their characteristic style of administration, also shaped the dynamics and the problematic of the Hausa/Fulani settler versus the Indigenous ethnic claims over Jos, a central thesis explaining the occurrence of the crises in Jos. As noted earlier, the introduction of capitalism via colonialism in Nigeria set the stage for the emergence of mass settler communities in Jos. This was necessitated by the capitalist economic ventures of the colonialists which required a large labour force for their operation. The establishment of this colonial tin mining industry also necessitated the creation of a large labour force which could not be provided by the population of the Jos natives (Sha 1994). Consequently, the claims by the Hausa labour migrants that Hausa names given to certain areas especially within Jos and environs translates into evidence to its ownership is not only simplistic and common-sensical but largely misplaced and fraudulent (Best 2007). What then happens to Hausa names given to other areas especially in Lagos and a few other northern trade points in the Eastern parts of Nigeria? Are they valid bases for ownership too? However, it is common knowledge that Hausa traders and commercial migrants are fond of given Hausa names to areas they perceived to have constituted the majority. Similar claims abound in parts of Southern-Kaduna in Kaduna state (Abdu 2010). Whether these claims are a reminiscent of the biological idea of ecological succession or a mere friendly gesture to their hosts' communities has left more questions now than answers. Similarly, Adamu as cited by Egwu (2001) observed that:

The criteria for Hausa identity are broad, and include historical claims, cultural traits and social values as well as language and religion. Out of these criteria, Islam has been singled out as an influential social landmark in the acculturation process of the Hausa both at home and in migration (Egwu 2001: 21).

At the centre of the Jos bloodbath is the claim on its ownership by the Hausa labour migrants as demonstrated by the naming of some areas in Jos as basis for ownership. However, Best (2007: 29) documented some of these Hausa names in Jos as well as their original native names before the advent of colonialism and the subsequent attraction of labour migrants including the Hausa, to its flourishing tin mining sites in Jos.

Table 2: List of Native and Hausa names of some areas in Jos

NATIVE (BEROM) NAME	HAUSA NAME
KABONG	GADA BIYU
KUWURI	ANGWAN SOYA
CHUWELNYAP/GWONG	NASARAWA
LARANTO	KATAKO
JOT	GANGARE/GARBA DAHO
TITE	JENTA APATA
KAKRA	ALHERI
ROT NORO	ALI KAZAURE
GURA LOHMETJEI	ANGWAN ROGO
TOP	MAI ADIKO
BERUKURU	BUKURU
JISHE	TUDUN WADA

Source: Conflict and Peace Building in Plateau State, Nigeria (Best 2007: 29).

These changes of Berom to Hausa names as argued by Best (2007) are basically to reflect names of some key Hausa miners as well as the origins of these early tin mining labour migrants such as Ali (from) Kazaure in the present Jigawa State in Northern Nigeria. Furthermore these claims via Hausa names as basis for ownership of some past tin mining posts in Plateau go beyond the state capital including Bokkos, Mangu, Bassa and Jos South Local Government Areas with names of areas such as Doruwa Babuje, Gindin Akwati, Dogo Na Hauwa, Mai Idon Toro, Tenti Babba, Tenti Karami, Mai Katako, Kantoma, Guade, Dutsen Lamba, Mangu Arna, Mangu Hausawa, etc. (Best 2007: 29).

Contemporary issues in the Jos crises

The 1999 declaration and the subsequent implementation of the Islamic Sharia legal system in Nigeria is central to understanding these new waves of religious and ethnic conflicts and violence especially in Northern Nigeria. As I have noted elsewhere, the introduction of the Sharia legal system in Northern Nigeria is instrumental to the new wave of Islamic religious revivalism that has since given way to religious fundamentalism and terrorism in the North and some parts of the Middle-Belt regions of Nigeria (Danjibo, 2010). Particularly, the clamour for the implementation of this religious legal code in Jos by the self-styled *Jasawa* Muslim settler communities, dramatically transformed the religious sentiments and dynamics of the Jos crises. It will be recalled that the then Governor of Zamfara state in North-West Nigeria, Alhaji Sani Yariman Bakura in defiance to perhaps ignorance of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, declared the adoption of the Sharia legal system in the state. Like a whirl-wind, almost all the northern states followed in quick succession. The Obasanjo government (1999-2007) then did not engage these states in a legal battle to seek interpretation of the secularity of the Nigerian state against the adoption of a state religion. The clamour for the stoning to death of Safiya Mohammed in Katsina state over adultery charges (ironically, without the conviction of her male accomplice) as reported by both home and foreign media readily comes to mind as part of the legal contradictions inherent in the Islamic religious law. To date, the religious law has not resolved the contradictions and guarantee the rights to life of a Muslim who willingly converts from Islam to other religions.

It was generally observed that the declaration of the Islamic Sharia system has created a lot of anxiety and tension to most non-Muslims that are either indigenous to these states or citizens. There were issues ranging from (im)proper dress codes, the outright ban on alcoholic drinks, the ban on the sale and consumption of certain animals labelled as 'unholy', the demolition of Christian worship centres and outright denial and revocation of land titles targeted at the Christians in some parts of the north. Public discourse has it that, the introduction of the Sharia law in the Muslim dominated northern Nigeria also attracted accolades from most of the world's leading Islamic countries. Unconfirmed media reports also have it that financial support to states that have adopted the Islamic law as well as inducement to others

willing to follow suit was presented. These perceptions and insinuations are believed to have further heightened the tension between the Christians and the Muslims particularly in the North and all over Nigeria. There were reported cases by the state and national media of thousands of youths from these Sharia-tagged states gaining scholarship admissions to study in some of Islamic countries, including those known globally for the training of Islamic terrorists groups such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, etc.

This chronology of events that followed the adoption and practice of the Islamic Sharia system in all of the Northern states and its clamour in some of the Middle-Belt states including Plateau was perceived and interpreted by the majority of Christians in these areas as a deliberate attempt to consciously and perhaps, forcefully, impose Islamic religion not only in these areas but the nation at large (Wika 2010). It is within the context of this religious reawakening that the Jos crises also adopted its religious characteristics, support, mobilization and execution with religious fundamentalism as its driving force. Furthermore, the interplay of ethnic and religious politics amidst intense socio-economic crises in Nigeria, and Jos in particular, saw the near institutionalization of communal and religious politics with its attendant social and political exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion. Abdu observed that:

The State in Nigeria is a dependent capitalist society with minimal productive capacity and limited capital base, bureaucratic and security apparatus which serves those who are in control of the machinery of government and business. Therefore, since these individuals and groups belong to certain ethnic and religious groups, which they (also) use to sustain their hold on power and resources, the state sometimes also, serve the ethnic categories of those who wield state power. (Abdu 2010: 5).

Particularly, the narrow ethnic and religious politics among the Christians and Muslims in Jos has been largely responsible for the tension and the polarization of its inhabitants. These divisions have also been used as bases for the mobilization for support and the basis for the execution of violent eruptions in the city (Best 2007). From this analysis therefore, the crises in Jos can also be understood within the context of the local political economy as bequeathed by economic imperatives that attracted the old and new polarized inhabitants of

Jos. In the majority of cases, the behaviours and actions of the political and economic actors in Jos are influenced by their religious beliefs as well as ethnic interest. Government decision-making therefore, since the revival of the civilian rule in 1999 in Jos, tends towards ethnic patronage and religious clientism (Egwu 1998). Ifeka (2000) also observed that the state has become the focus of competition between individuals and groups competing for high offices at the centre, largely aiming at getting control of public resources, for personal and ethno-religious benefits. It has also been argued in several quarters that the new democratic order in Nigeria has reinvented a new symbol and idea of the state as an entry point to wealth, influence and control by its actors. This development has not only exacerbated conflict via competition but also fuels the prevalence of violence in such contests (Osaghae & Suberu 2005).

It is important to point out that the challenge in the management of ethnic and religious pluralism within the democratic sphere is not peculiar to Plateau state and Jos but a national problem. At present, the political culture in Nigeria is oriented towards ethnic and religious popularism, populism and patron-client relationship at the expense of the public and/or general good. What is observed has been very divisive, polarizing groups along ethnic and religious lines instead of accommodation in an all-inclusive system of government. This fact was evident as reflected by the religious voting patterns by Nigerians in the recently concluded 2011 presidential election.

Religious pattern of voting in the 2011 presidential elections between the two top candidates: Buhari & Jonathan

Table 3: Religious preference in 2011 presidential elections

MUSLIM DOMINATED STATES (BUHARI)	CHRISTIAN DOMINATED STATES (JONATHAN)
BAUCHI = 82%	ABIA = 99%
BORNO = 78%	AKWA-IBOM = 95%
GOMBE = 60%	ANAMBRA = 99%
JIGAWA = 60%	BAYELSA = 99%
KADUNA = 52%	CROSS RIVER = 98%
KANO = 62%	DELTA = 99%
KATSINA = 72%	EBONYI = 97%
KEBBI = 56%	EDO = 95%
NIGER = 65%	ENUGU = 99%
SOKOTO = 62%	IMO = 99%
YOBE = 56%	ONDO = 81%
ZAMFARA= 67%	RIVERS = 98%
AVERAGE = 64%	AVERAGE = 97%

Source: Election Monitor 2011

Religion and ethnicity are generally regarded as the most basic and politically salient identities in Nigeria. This duo has also influenced and shaped the political landscape of Plateau and North Jos in particular since the return to civilian rule in 1999. The Jos crises present a picture of these complex crisscrossing and recursive identities of which the ethnic, religious and political issues are the most salient and the causal factors for the violent eruptions that has occurred. This is from the point of view of the identities most commonly assumed by the citizens especially for political purposes.

The indigene versus settler problematic in Jos

The indigene versus settler debate in Nigeria is generally a new phenomenon. The Jos debacles may have been reserved as perceived in several discourses, to serve as the legal cum political reference point to the constitutional contradictions these issues have come to represent in Nigeria's political landscape. What has sharpened this consciousness is undoubtedly the increase in the number of states and the atomization of ethnic and religious identities beginning from 1967 when the regions were dismembered (Abdu, 2010). To put this issue in context, the North was the first beneficiary of indigeneity as a concept and practice; for fear of marginalization by the southerners in the civil service in the North, in 1954 an indigenization decree was implemented for the Northern Region to replace the rather too large (for comfort) southern population in the northern civil-service with their northern counterparts (PIDAN 2010).

Conflicts and violent eruptions around the indigeneship and settler-ship question especially in Jos are acute because they also express and reflect deeper divisions and contradictions within the entire political system. The crises in Jos have gained an expression as well as the exacerbation of the ideas and issues around indigeneity and settlership. Commenting on the Indigene-Settler Syndrome in Jos, The Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN) observed that:

...at the heart of the Plateau imbroglio is the deep-seated twaddle called Indigene-Settler Syndrome, an obviously nagging national question which has pervaded the national scene thereby seeking to undermine the tenets of Nigeria's federalism...the spark-point of these recurrent ugly scenarios (in Jos) is the contention over the ownership of Jos between the native Anaguta, Berom and Afizere on one hand and the settler Hausa on the other hand (PIDAN: 101).

It is observed that the Hausa community in Jos for instance, have continued to enjoy multiple indigeneship and identities in Jos North LGC and their localities of origin. For instance, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki Nakande, a one-time Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the platform of Plateau state, hails from Kano, Alhaji Ibrahim Baba Hassan, the immediate past Deputy Speaker of the State House of Assembly hails from Yobe State, and many others benefiting from the State. It

is instructive to note that other settler ethnic groups in Jos who have openly acknowledged and accepted the fact that they are settlers in Jos including those that migrated into Jos earlier and/or about the same time with the Hausa settlers have not enjoyed such privileges yet have remained peaceful and industrious contributing to the growth of their host state.

Young (1985) famously observed that people's perceptions of ethnic group memberships are situational in the sense that they may identify with and mobilized according to multiple or different ethnic categorizations, shifting identifications depending on the political context. The Hausa and other times, Jasawa Muslim settler elements in Jos are often caught in this web of shifting identifications during political contestations. Furthermore, Horowitz (1995) maintains that conflicts along ethnic lines are more likely to turn violent than are conflicts along ideological and other political cleavages. He suggests that because "ethnic brethren" are understood as metaphorical family members, ethnic conflicts attracts intense emotions and a sense of existential threat. Killing of rival groups as we have seen in the Jos crises then appears a more reasonable and justified reaction. This explanation has thus confirmed the claim that ethnic violence, not particularly in Jos alone, is used as a tool by which political elite instil fear on their opponents as well as maintain or increase their public support. Another dimension to the crises in Jos is the emergence and adoption of ethnic militia groups to execute the violence. According to Agbu (Badmus 2006: 19)

Ethnic militia movement is the extreme form of ethnic agitation for self-determination as various ethnic groups assume militant posture and gradually metamorphosed into militia groups each of which bears an ethnic identity and purport to act as the machinery through which the desires of its people are sought to be realised. The common features of these ethnically inspired movements are the resort to violence, preponderance of youth membership, ethnic identity affiliations, and that they are mainly popular movements demanding change over the status quo.

The introduction of ethnic militia groups and its impact on the crises in Jos especially, the 2001, 2008, 2010 & 2011 coordinated violent attacks have left scores dead, widened the scope and frontiers of the conflict and legitimized the use of military weaponry in the execution

of the violence on rival groups. It also goes without saying that the activities of these militia groups in Nigeria generally have constituted real threats and setbacks to the so-called Nigerian project and its corporate existence as a country.

Conversely, group violence carried out in the name of religion and in defence of its faith has long been a feature of human affairs (Suberu 2009). In Nigeria generally, religion has played and is likely going to continue to play a central role in the society. Over the years, our politics and the political landscape has been shaped by religion both at the early period of independence as well as this current period described as democratic revivalism. In virtually all discourse on the Nigerian state, religion is likely to occupy centre stage (Kukah 1994; Falola 1998; Kenny 2006; Suberu 2009). However, historical events linked to religion tilt more towards its negative than the positive contribution to the Nigerian project. The Jihad, the civil war, the Sharia law, the so-called introduction of Nigeria to the Organization of Islamic countries (O.I.C.), the Boko-Haram Islamic terrorism and a wide range of religious conflicts and violent eruptions that have engulfed the country are likely pointers to the fact that religion in Nigeria has assumed a dominant force in the country's political arrangement. In most parts of Northern and the Middle-Belt regions of Nigeria, particularly with the adoption of the Sharia Islamic law system, religious identity now assumes a more critical form of identity than the ethnic, in fact, the religious component is largely used to activate ethnicity, (Osaghae & Suberu 2005). Experiences abound in Nigeria that, of the three major religions Christianity, Islam and Traditional, the traditional is the least politically active on a significant scale partly as a result of the comparatively fewer number of its adherents rather than their belief systems. Commenting on the power of religion and its influence in igniting most of the violence occurrences witnessed particularly in the Northern and Middle-Belt regions of Nigeria, Egwu, (Egwu 1998) argued that:

Religion as an identity is about solidarity and setting of boundaries between those who are considered to be believers and those that are not. This deals with issues of sentiments, feelings and norms that may be a result of shared experiences. This identity is used to create a sense of order, meaning and hope as a counter point to the insecurity of everyday life or to what may

be perceived as an unjust social order. The identity can also bring distress and insecurity to those whom the group seeks to exclude (Egwu 1998:17).

Significantly, the Jos crises have created some identity boundaries in the definition of conflict and the emergence of violent groups in almost all the violent eruptions recorded. The 1994, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011 & 2012 violent attacks in Jos and environs reveals the ethnic, religious and to a lesser extent, political factors as the sustaining ingredients in all its alarming patterns and dimensions. The ethno-religious violence in Jos north as well as the Berom- Fulani violence in Jos South, Riyom and Barkin-Ladi all revealed the adoption of these identities. However, the ethnic factor particularly in the Jos north crises is likely to give way in the future through inter-marriages and what Pedan, (Pedan 2012) called 'situational ethnicity' thus, the in-group and out-group ascriptions of identity depending on context. The religious challenge might be the greatest threat to peace in Jos, particularly with the advent of the radical Islamic terrorist group, the Boko-Haram in the equation.

The Boko-Haram Islamic terrorism in Nigeria

The Boko-Haram insurgency came into the limelight in 2003. I had described the group elsewhere as ideologically convulsed, politically blind (within the context of Nigeria's politics); a ruthless and deadly religious terrorist group. The leader of this movement was the late Mohammad Yusuf, a secondary school dropout who later went to Chad and Niger Republic to study the Quran. In those two countries, Yusuf developed radical views that were abhorrent to westernization and modernization. In a similar fate to the former Maitatsine (Mohammad Marwa's) Islamic religious sect in the 1980s, Yusuf got back to Nigeria and settled in Maiduguri and established the Islamic sectarian group called the Yusufiyya, apparently after his name. The sect was said to have attracted over 28000 members spread across Nigeria, Chad and Niger Republic. Yusuf's radical and provocative preaching was not only limited to other Islamic sects and scholars but also against established political institutions and Christian religious institutions. The ideology and philosophy of the movement can best be understood within the context of the two words, 'Boko' and 'Haram'. While Boko is a Hausa term for book which also transcended to western and/or foreign norms

and values, Haram on the other hand, is an Arabic derivative, meaning 'forbidden'. Coining the two words together, Boko-Haram simply means to forbid everything western as well as western education. The goal of the movement is to replace the modern state formation with the traditional Islamic state because according to them, western norms and values run contrary to Islamic doctrines and values.

Sectarianism generally isolates group members with particular and peculiar identity from the larger body. In this context therefore, all Muslim faithful can profess Islam as their religion but not all can claim to be members of a sect and there are many sects in Islam as there are variations in teachings and interpretations. Perhaps, the earliest known sects in Islam are the Sunni and the Shia (Shiites). Whereas the Sunni believe in integrating religion and society by adopting religion to state structures, the Shiites on the other hand, believe in religious Puritanism such that Islam must be practiced in its pure form and must be guarded from being adulterated by society (Danjibo 2010).

The fratricidal wars that these doctrinal divisions have produced between the Sunni and the Shiites have assumed an indefinable magnitude in Iraq, recording scores of deaths. In Nigeria however, the Boko-haram is not at war per se with other Muslim sects but Christians and Government organizations and institutions that are perceived to having a western soul. The Boko-Haram violent attacks have largely been restricted to the Northern and Middle-Belt regions of Nigeria. Borno State has been the epicentre of these terrorist attacks, with Bauchi, Yobe, Kano, Gombe, Katsina, Kaduna, Plateau and Abuja (the seat of Government) has had their share of the violence. The loss of lives and damage to properties while this violence lasts is inestimable as the sect was said to have used propelled grenades, locally produced bombs and AK47 rifles in carrying out their attacks. Interestingly, one, Abdulrasheed Abdullahi confessed to the police in 2009 that he and another member of the group were sent to Afghanistan to train in the art of bomb and improvised explosive devices making (ThisDay, Thursday September 3rd, 2009, p. 1); which leaves the impression that the sect had been receiving financial and military support from foreign countries and other terrorist groups. Furthermore, the majority of the Boko-Haram members have been brain-washed and believe strongly that dying in the course of defending Islam would make them earn

the status of martyr. Therefore, they are inclined to sacrifice their lives through violent means.

In Nigeria today, religion has become a strong force to reckon with in almost all facets of our public and private lives largely because of the sentiments and beliefs Nigerians have on religious symbols and meanings. Good governance that may translate into improved literacy especially for the youth remains a key ingredient to reducing some of this religious induced violence. Caution must also be taken in using religion to mobilize against modernity and modernism which is perceived by the vast majority of the Muslim population as the root of social ills hence, anti-Islam. If these checks are not adhered to, Nigeria might be slipping towards the path of disintegration along religious lines. The recent proclamation of a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in north-eastern Nigeria by President Goodluck Jonathan is widely assessed to have been yielding results. However, the extent to which military might is preferred as an option to effectively dislodge terrorism is one strategy feared by global analysts which may not yield the needed lasting solution.

Theoretical perspectives on the Jos crises

Most group violence take their roots from group differences, ancient unresolved hatred, century old feuds and the stress and strain of modernity and modernism, including competition over scarce material and non- material resources. These factors individually or jointly contribute to the potentials for tremendous violent occurrences (Lake & Rothschild 2000). The crises in Jos historically stem from longstanding disputes over the ownership and control of Jos and its attendant political and economic privileges between ethnic and religious groups who consider themselves 'indigenes' and those who are viewed as 'settlers'. Religion is readily used as a tool to whip up sentiment between these feuding groups.

The conflict theory

Using the conflict perspective to understand the Jos crises is to view the crises along the identities that have evolved in the evolution of Jos as a modern city and the conflict it has created over scarce values and

resources. Particularly, focus must be put on the historical context in the formation of such identities and their bases for political relevance, demand, mobilization and action. The politicization of these identities is not only salient in the attempt to understanding the crises in Jos but relevant in the definition of the conflict groups. These crises pointers have consistently presented this identity colouration along its mobilization for action which is brought to play depending on the perception of the situation, including the identity adopted by the competing actors.

This situational explanation in the Jos crises exists largely at a collective or group level. Thus members of a group may decide to identify themselves as religious, ethnic and political. The occurrence of the Jos violent eruptions follows this familiar trend, which interestingly has been replicated in most of the violent eruptions in the Middle-belt as well as the Northern parts of Nigeria depending on the level and scope of the conflict.

The ethnic and resource mobilization theory

The ethnic competition perspective is an attempt to refine the human ecology perspective. This perspective treats ethnic conflict as an outcome of ethnic competition and specifies the mechanism that link competition with conflict. Barth (1956) analyses a key mechanism through which competition is transformed into active conflict in what he referred to as “niche overlap” thus, the exploitation and occupation of the same resources coveted by other competitors. This is the core of the competition perspective. Hence, ethnic, religious, political or economic conflict occurs when these groups struggle to control limited resources in the presence of competitors. Competition over the same scarce resources is in this context an important determinant of the ethnic or resource conflict.

This perspective further asserts that group conflict and violent eruptions result when the economy takes a turn for the worse or even with increase in emigration. Thus when two or more ethnic groups living in the same society or community, they inevitably find themselves competing for positions, jobs, appointments, housing, prestige, land and other scarce resources that could both be material as well as non-material. As a result of these, ethnic and other forms of group

consciousness and interests are likely to develop, provided that one or more of the ethnic group perceives that the competition is unfair (Belanger & Pinard 1991).

Conclusion

In Nigeria today, religion has become a strong force to reckon with in almost all facets of its public and private lives. This is as a result of the sentiments and beliefs Nigerians have on religious symbols and meanings. The Jos crises are largely an expression of these contradictions. The manipulations as well as the politicization of religion and ethnic identities especially in most parts of the North and Middle-Belt regions of the country have unfortunately shown no signs of weathering away even within the so-called democratic experiment. Caution must be taken by Nigerians in the actual use and/or the manipulation of religion to mobilize support against modernity, modernism and perceived religious enemies on both divides or else the country may well be on a path to more violent eruptions and an eminent disintegration along ethno-religious lines.

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BEYOND SCARCITY: CONFLICTS OVER LAND AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN SOUTH- WESTERN BURKINA FASO

Bettina Engels

Abstract: Recently, the academic and political debate on resource scarcity and conflict has been revitalized against the background of global trends like climate change and the growing commercial pressure on land. Scholars widely agree that resource scarcity causes or influences conflict via social and political mediation mechanisms. But the respective understanding of social mediation fundamentally depends on theoretical and ontological perspectives. We argue that conflicts over land are indeed distributive conflicts over a scarce resource. But they cannot be understood regarding only the materiality of the resource because the conflicts are embedded in specific social relations. We examine local conflicts over land in the Comoé province, south-western Burkina Faso and illustrate how local citizenship is negotiated in these conflicts. Control of and access to land, as well as social categories of citizenship and belonging are linked to each other in a mutually constitutive relationship.

Key words: *Land conflicts, political ecology, autochthony, citizenship and belonging, Burkina Faso*

Current trends, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, towards large-scale land acquisition ('land grabbing') for commercial agriculture, extractivism, tourism and other purposes remind us that land is a scarce and important resource. At the same time, they give fresh impetus to research on the conflict impacts of resource scarcity. Beginning with the 'environmental scarcity' thesis in the early 1990s (cf. Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994), research on conflicts over scarce natural resources has advanced significantly and become more differentiated in terms of methods and content. Across disciplines and opposing theoretical positions, scholars agree on two points: as a scarce resource, land is subject to conflict; and the

relationship between resource scarcity and conflict is socially and politically mediated. But what does this mediation entail concretely? This article will investigate how social mediation in conflicts over land among local land users works.

Building on work from the field of political ecology, notably from critical development research and social anthropology, we develop a theory-based understanding of disputes over land as expressions of the conflictive processes in the negotiation of collective identities, social group frontiers, membership in political communities (citizenship) and political authority. We argue that while land conflicts indeed represent disagreements over the distribution of a scarce resource, they cannot be explained by focusing solely on the materiality of the resource; instead the explanation must be embedded in the existing social relations on different, nested scales (local, national, regional, global). From this perspective, the question of social mediation shifts away from asking whether, or to what extent, resource scarcity as an allegedly natural process influences or determines social action. By 'social mediation' we mean that every 'natural' process is, as such, already socially structured and produced; we explain this idea in more detail in the theory section below.

The article aims to contribute conceptually to the debate on the conflict effects of resource scarcity. It focuses particularly on the role of social mediation in the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict. Building on empirical insights into land conflicts in South Western Burkina Faso, the article illustrates how social categories of belonging are related to access to, and control over, land, and how they become meaningful in land conflicts. In the institutions that regulate access to land, social relations are negotiated through the question of resource use; in the case of South Western Burkina Faso, this refers to social relations between 'autochthons' and 'migrants'. However, it is important to notice that our aim, in this contribution, is theory-oriented: we intend to contribute to a general debate, building primarily upon insights from selected literature on land relations and land conflicts, particularly with regard to sub-Saharan Africa. The empirical case of Burkina Faso is explored for illustrative purposes only. We do not claim to present in-depth and systematic insights at the micro level. Rather, the case study functions to demonstrate how historically embedded processes on the local, national and regional

scales interact and become relevant for the way in which social relations are negotiated in conflicts over land.

Which social structures become meaningful with respect to access to, and conflicts over, land is historically and locally specific. Within Burkina Faso, autochthony is the most influential category in some places, whereas ethnicity is in others. An analysis of social mediation must therefore start from below the national scale. At the same time, analysis focusing on the local level must not ignore the nation state, as this remains in most cases a central entity of political authority. Control over land is pivotal for political authority; this will be demonstrated by the historical development of land rights and tenure systems in Burkina Faso.

The article is structured as follows. We start by introducing our analytical approach to conflicts over land, based on the assumption of a dialectical relationship between nature and society. Next, we assume that conflicts over land are structured by social categories of inclusion and exclusion, and that the 'land question' is highly relevant for creating and upholding political authority. From these reflections, we draw our understanding of how land as a scarce resource is socially mediated. The case study starts by sketching out how land rights and tenure systems in Burkina have developed historically, and then presents the recent institutions governing access to land. In doing so, we demonstrate first how closely control over land is entangled with authority, and second that access to, and conflicts over, land are structured by social categories of belonging (in this case, autochthony). We illustrate this by examining conflicts over land and local institutions of conflict management in two villages in the province of Comoé in South Western Burkina Faso. The conclusion argues that it is not 'autochthons' and 'migrants' that struggle over land as a scarce resource, but rather that conflicts over land are used to negotiate social categories of belonging to a local political community, linked to the right to use and access resources.

Conflicts over land

The 'environmental scarcity' hypothesis, which has gained some popularity in social scientific research on resource conflicts, states

that resource scarcity leads to conflicts between individuals or social groups in societies where people's livelihoods are based on subsistence farming, pastoralism and the like. Scarcity can result from 'natural' processes such as climate change, from population growth and migration, from overuse and degradation, or from a concurrence of food, meat and agro-fuels production. The question of what causes scarcity (for instance, climate variability or competing land use) is subject to controversial debates. In addition, further exploration is required, in the form of both conceptual reflections and empirical analysis, with regard to how social and political mediation of resource scarcity occurs specifically at the local level, and how causally relevant resource scarcity is compared to political and social factors.

In order to capture the social mediation of material scarcity analytically, we refer to nature and society as spheres not separate from one another but mutually constitutive (cf. Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Bryant and Bailey 1997). Such an analytical approach does not aim to identify single factors of influence or develop causal models. Nature (land, for instance) is always socially produced; at the same time, social relations are not detached from nature's materiality. The use of nature is a central part of social ascriptions, identities and the construction of social and cultural groups. When talking about social mediation, we thus refer to the social ascriptions and relations inherent to nature and the ways in which they impact processes that make nature a scarce resource.

This approach to analysing the mechanisms of social mediation in conflicts over land can build on comprehensive research addressing how access to, control of, and conflicts over land are entangled with relationships of power and domination, and how collective identities and belonging to political communities are constructed and linked to land relations (cf. Peluso and Lund 2011: 668; Ribot and Peluso 2003: 153).

In African studies in particular, numerous studies investigate how land rights and tenure systems have emerged from (colonial) history. Many colonial administrations introduced formalised land rights, thereby creating parallel 'modern' (state-regulated) and 'customary' ('traditional') land rights and impacting local authority relations significantly: 'Colonial rulers confused territoriality with sovereignty, and

conflated African ritual roles, exerting authority over people in lineage, clan or chiefdom. Where the colonial rulers could not identify an appropriate “chief”, they created one. The multiple types of authority and sets of claims over land and its products were glossed by the label “communal tenure”, which became incorporated into the developing body of “customary law”.’ (Peters 2004: 272)

In many cases, this resulted in a racialized property rights system: white settlers owned land as private property; Africans had collective access rights through membership in ‘local communities’ (Berry 2002). Such concepts of ‘native citizenship’ were built upon categories such as ‘tribe’, ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ (cf. Mamdani 1996). Likewise, in many traditional and modern regimes, land rights are linked to membership in such socially constructed groups: clans, ethnic or indigenous groups, nations, etc. Vice versa, control over land is a criterion for defining belonging, as membership in political communities and social groups are not fixed but, rather, subject to social and political negotiation and conflicts.

Social categories of difference and hierarchy (class, race, gender, generation, and ethnicity) are created through social practices, both symbolically and materially. Conflicts over land also deal with the distribution of wealth and assets within societies – determining the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, as Thomas Sikor and Christian Lund put it (Sikor and Lund 2009: 2). Necessarily, this provokes the more general question of which social structures constitute these ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’: which practices reproduce these categories and how stable or contested are the social structures.

Territorial ties are important to the construction of social identities and the demarcation of social groups. In many ‘modern’ nation states, people have to indicate their ‘homeland’ or ‘village’ in order to claim participation at the local or national level (Lentz 2007: 37). (Local) citizenship – the construction of belonging to a political community – defines who can articulate political interests and whose claims to access resources are seen as legitimate. Territorial claims are often legitimated by references to collective identities and fixed by national and international land rights systems (cf. Assies 2000). In many contexts, autochthony is an influential concept linking collective identities to territory and thus legitimating claims to land.

Territory refers to physical spaces where people live, functioning as a category of inclusion in, and exclusion from, political communities. 'Autochthony' constructs social groups that have allegedly 'always' or at least 'for a very long time' lived in a certain area. Inherent in this is an essentialist idea of origin; the 'others' are those who live in the same territory but arrived 'later': the 'migrants'.

In order to understand conflicts over land, to explain why and how in certain temporal and spatial contexts scarce land resources are contested, the analysis must be linked to social and political relations. By focusing on the social mediation of resource scarcity, we dispel the notion that resources run short due to influences external to society, leading to, for instance, distributional conflicts among social groups that could be prevented or resolved by 'better' resource management tools (management and planning of land use, social politics, etc.) Instead we argue that scarcity is always socially produced, since the use of nature is shaped by conflictive processes of social negotiation and is also an integral part of collective identity construction.

Methodology

The field research for this case study was conducted at four locations in Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou, Banfora, Toumousséni and Siniena) in November and December 2012. The primary research consisted of 32 interviews. Interview partners were representatives of national ministries and other authorities, local and regional administrations, international development agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other associations, and the *chefferie* ('traditional chiefs'), as well as farmers and herders in Toumousséni and Siniena. Interviewees were selected with the aim of gathering a maximum of information from different perspectives on current land use and changes in land rights, as well as on land conflicts both in Burkina Faso in general and in the study area in particular. State representatives were selected from a range of institutions and political levels (local, regional, national). The interviews focused on land use, conflicts over land, conflict management, and formal and informal institutions of land rights and land tenure. Secondary sources included documents by state actors on different levels (local, district, national) and studies by state actors, NGOs and researchers.

Land rights institutions in Burkina Faso from a historical perspective

In Burkina Faso, land rights are shaped by overlapping – sometimes complementary, sometimes competing – formal and informal institutions, originating from different historical phases characterised by specific relationships of power, domination and authority. Membership in political communities and ascriptions of collective identities are central elements here.

Local, customary institutions of land rights vary within Burkina Faso. One characteristic feature present in all regions is the strong influence of the *chefferie*. In francophone Western Africa, the *chefferie traditionnelle* is an institution based on the religious or cultural authority of the chiefs.¹ Their legitimacy originates, first and foremost, from ancestry. At the beginning of the colonial period, colonial authorities attempted to break local authority structures and disempower the *chefferie*. But since control over the colonised territories was difficult to maintain due to a lack of resources, the colonial authorities rehabilitated the chiefs and integrated them into a system of indirect rule. Chiefs who resisted or were unwilling to collaborate were killed or removed and replaced by new ‘local authorities’ (von Trotha 1996: 80). The chiefs became intermediaries between the colonial authorities and the population and played an ambivalent role as administrative functionaries and people’s representatives, a role they still play today (von Trotha and Klute 2001: 688). In Burkina Faso, the *chefferie* is still a central actor in land rights and land conflicts.

French colonial authorities introduced numerous land rights regulations at the central state level in what is today Burkina Faso, formerly Upper Volta (Arnaldi di Balme and Hochet 2010: 45). These regulations, in combination with the promotion of commercial and export-oriented agriculture, were primarily aimed at world market integration (Dialla 2003: 7). Introduced in 1925, the *Certificat Administratif* inscribed the categories ‘autochthon’ and ‘migrant’ into state land rights (AOF 1925). Subsequent regulations further promoted individualised land rights (Dialla 2003: 9). In 1932, private land ownership was formally legitimated and codified by the introduction of formal land titles (*titres fonciers*) (AOF 1932). Existing customary land rights

1 I am grateful to one anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.

institutions were widely ignored during the formalisation process. In 1935, all parcels considered untilled and uncultivated, and on which no land title was claimed, were declared to be state property (AOF 1935; Traoré 1999: 124). The colonial land rights system appointed the *chefferie* to be in charge of administering the communal lands. This colonial codification of customary rights led to enduring disputes over hierarchies within the *chefferie* and border demarcations of communal land properties between different groups (Lentz 2007: 39).

The first governments in place after Upper Volta acquired independence, under the presidencies of Maurice Yaméogo (1960–66), Sangoulé Lamizana (1966–80), Saye Zerbo (1980–82) and Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo (1982–83), by and large adhered to colonial land rights (cf. Englebort 1996; Kaboré 2002; Traoré 1999). Only Thomas Sankara (1983–87), by establishing the ‘law on re-organisation of agriculture and soil’ (*loi portant réorganisation agraire et foncière*, RAF) in 1984, attempted to fundamentally reform land relations. The RAF was oriented towards the state-socialist paradigm that functioned as the ideological base of Sankara’s regime. At least in the understanding of its authors, the RAF aimed at guaranteeing access to land – and thus to subsistence farming – for a maximum of Burkina’s population. It would restrict the privileged position of the ruling class with regard to land ownership and limit the *chefferie*’s control over land, widely replacing customary land rights institutions with ‘modern’ national institutions. For this purpose, the RAF included abolishing private land ownership and declared all land to be principally national (state) property. Land titles were annulled and replaced by usage rights (Arnaldi di Balme and Hochet 2010: 45–46). Officially the RAF also eliminated existing customary regulations on access to land (Gensler 2002: 9; Gausset 2008: 54). However, its attempt to ‘purify [land] of all symbolic and traditional socio-political ascriptions’ (Zongo 2009: 123, our translation) failed. Customary regulations on access to land widely remained in place (Gray 2002: 168–169; Ouédraogo 2002: 13–14). In effect, either the *chefferie* or the new political elites at the local level retained control over land. In some cases, these local elites established authority only by controlling access to land. Control over land and political authority are mutually linked: control over land contributes to constructing authority, while authority comes along with control over land (cf. Sikor and Lund 2009: 9–10).

The reintroduction of private land ownership was among the main changes in land rights by the government of Blaise Compaoré, who took over the presidency in Burkina Faso in 1987 and was in office until popular revolution in 2014. After Sankara and his predecessors failed to abolish existing customary institutions of authority, Blaise Compaoré adopted a strategy of incorporating the *chefferie*. This has also been reflected in land rights: the most recent and, since the RAF, most wide-reaching reform of land rights aims at systematically integrating the chiefs into the formal state institutions. Law no. 034/2009 acknowledges the chiefs' control over land and formally integrates them into the newly established commissions on soil allocation in the rural areas (*Commission Foncière Villageoise*; loi 03/2009, articles 81 and 82). In times of inner-state political pressure on Blaise Compaoré, who recently attempted to change the constitution in order to enable himself to remain president for a fifth term after the elections scheduled for November 2015 (Loada and Romaniuk 2014; ISS 2014), he and his ruling party *Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (CDP) rely on support from the countryside and attempt to make the *chefferie* a source of legitimacy.

Autochthony is a central category for traditional land rights institutions in Burkina Faso (cf. Bonnet-Bontemps 2006). Identifying oneself and being identified by others as either 'autochthon' or 'migrant' refers to whose ancestors were the first to clear and cultivate land in a specific area. Territorial reference to concrete place is pivotal to collective identity: more or less everyone is able to indicate 'his' or 'her' village, reflecting the construction that everybody had an ancestor or ancestors at the beginning of his or her genealogy, and that these ancestors can be attributed to identifiable places. Hence a family may live in a village for generations and still be seen as 'migrants'. At the same time, territorial demarcations of the land attributed to an 'autochthon' group are frequently as blurred as the social demarcations of the group itself. At the local level, customary land rights institutions regulate the relations between long-time residents and newcomers regarding the use of agricultural and pasture land. All over Western Africa, typical institutions exist that oblige 'autochthons' to provide land for subsistence farming to new arrivals (cf. Chauveau 2005; Chauveau and Bobo 2003; Chauveau and Richards 2008). In most cases, this does not mean granting property but rather usage rights, linked to certain social and material duties. For instance, migrant land users

have to deliver a share of the harvest to the autochthon owner of the land, offer presents for feasts, or help by working in the owner's fields.

In South Western Burkina Faso, customary institutions are currently the main references in regulating access to land, and the *chefferie* plays a central role. New or additional parcels are usually granted via one of two land institutions: *don* (donation) or *prêt* (loan). Both are provided by the *chef de terre*, the representative of the local *chefferie* in charge of land matters. 'Autochthons' receive an additional piece of land (for instance, when the land available to them is no longer sufficient to feed all the members of the household) from the *chef de terre* as a *don*. Receiving land as a *don* and cultivating it implies full usage rights. 'Migrants', that is, everyone who is not an 'autochthon', receive land as a *prêt*. Several interviewees reported that in recent times land given as a *prêt* was limited to a maximum of five hectares, and that the duration of use was also limited. The reasons given for this trend were increasing conflicts in the transfer from one generation to the next, scarcity of land produced by the return of Burkinabe migrants from the neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire and inner-state migration from the Sahel area, and the risks of land being sold for commercial purposes instead of subsistence farming. The main difference between *prêt* and *don* is that for *prêt* land, usage rights are limited and imply certain duties. All land that belongs to the village, according to customary law, is owned by individuals, families, or in the case of commonly used land, the village community. Traditional land rights institutions oblige landowners to grant land that they do not cultivate to others (e.g. individuals or families that have newly arrived in the village) who need it to feed household members, if the *chef de terre* so decides. In return for cultivating a piece of land as *prêt*, a frequent duty in the form of a share of the harvest, money, or a sacrifice, is demanded from the land user by the owner from the second year of harvest onwards. The amount depends on the land user's income. In addition, the owner retains the principal right to claim the *prêt* land, meaning that if the owner needs the land for his own cultivation, the 'migrant' user has to give it back. Usage rights for *prêt* land are also restricted; in particular, trees may not be planted on *prêt* land. Planting a tree is considered to be an illegitimate investment in loaned land, even if the right to use the land has been granted for an unlimited time period. When land where investments have been made goes back to the owner, the question of reimbursement arises. 'Durable'

investments, in particular trees, are considered ownership claims by migrant land users, thereby challenging the land rights institutions and regulations (Gausset 2004, 2008).

The categories 'autochthon' and 'migrant', as well as the institutions *don* and *prêt*, turn out to be somewhat flexible and permeable in social practice. Some interviewees report that migrants can be granted land as a *don*, too, without temporal limitations and without duties, but have to accept the owner's principal claim to the land. Such expanded rights are granted to 'migrants' whom the community accepts as '*fil du village*' ('son of the village'). 'Migrants' attain this social position by marrying an 'autochthon' or proving special engagement for the village community. Not only do the categories 'autochthon' and 'migrant' have a central structuring function regarding access to land in South Western Burkina Faso, but conversely, land also plays an important role in constructing collective identities. According to the idea that everyone has a village, a place, a piece of land from which he or she originates (although the person may never have been there), 'autochthons' are attributed a spiritual bond to 'their' land – a bond that 'migrants' do not have, or only have to some other place. Ancestry is crucial to the construction of autochthony; when 'migrants' are accepted as '*fil du village*' and thus granted expanded rights, this does not mean that, in consequence, they are perceived as 'autochthons', not even in the next generation (cf. Bierschenk et al. 2001; Bonnet-Bontemps 2006).

Conflicts over land and conflict management in Toumousséni und Siniena

The villages of Toumousséni und Siniena are located in the municipality of Banfora in the province of Comoé, Cascade region, in South Western Burkina Faso, near the border to Côte d'Ivoire. With average daily temperatures reaching 30–35 degrees Celsius, about 1,000 mm annual precipitation, and a dry season lasting five to six months, agricultural conditions are favourable in the region compared to other parts of Burkina Faso. Two rivers, the Comoé and Léraba, carry water throughout the year. More than 80 per cent of the population rely on agriculture for their livelihood, mainly through small-scale, rain-fed farming (cereals, cotton, sesame, peanuts and tree fruits) (FEWS NET 2010; Loye et al. 2009; PRCCU 2005). Large-scale sugar cane and cot-

ton farming, as well as timber production, make the region around Banfora the third most important industrial location in Burkina Faso after the capital Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso (PRCCU 2005: 36). Due to the comparably good agro-ecological conditions, the South Western region traditionally receives inner-state migration from the drier and more drought affected north and central plateaux. Thus, numerous inhabitants of Toumousséni and Siniena are ‘migrants’.

Migration to the region increased between the end of the 1990s and the year 2002, when tens of thousands of Burkinabe migrants returned from the neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. This was due to xenophobic attacks in Western and Southern Côte d’Ivoire, which peaked in November 1999 with more than 15,000 migrant farmers expelled, and in mid-September 2002, when an inner-state armed conflict started in Côte d’Ivoire after a failed coup d’état. Many returnees, farmers in Côte d’Ivoire, tried to establish new lives in the agricultural areas of South Western Burkina Faso, close to the Ivorian border, and were in need of land. Not surprisingly, this had a significant impact on the region’s land reserves (Brédeloup 2006; Loada 2006; Ouédraogo 2002; Riester 2011).

Demographic development in the Cascades region² (MEF 2010: 2)

Year	Population size
1985	253,360
1996	334,303
2006	531,808
2007 (estimated)	544,621
2008 (estimated)	566,843
2009 (estimated)	589,741

From our empirical data (interviews and observations), we can differentiate between two forms of autochthon–migrant land conflicts occurring in the study region: distributional conflicts over the scarce resource of land (competing claims to one piece of land, conflicts over border demarcations, etc.) and conflicts over the rules and regulations regarding land use. Distributional conflicts emerge less from the ar-

2 The Cascades region is one of 13 regions in Burkina Faso, encompassing the provinces of Comoé and Léraba, with Banfora as the regional capital.

rival of new land users than from the passage from one generation to another, when the children of an 'autochthon' family raise claims to land that has been used by 'migrants', often for generations. In Siniena, 'migrant' land users reported in interviews that their 'autochthon' neighbours expanded their parcels from year to year. One interviewee stated his fear that, after his death, his children and grandchildren would ultimately be expelled from the land. Though land conflicts in Burkina Faso have only escalated to violence in a minority of cases so far, conflicts between individuals, families or generations have often transformed into inter-group conflicts between 'autochthons' and 'migrants' (Gausset 2008; Zongo 2009).

Conflicts between 'autochthons' and 'migrants' over the rules and regulations concerning land use often emerge in relation to investments on *prêt* land, particularly when migrant land users plant trees (cf. Gausset 2004; Gray 2002). Regulations also exist for trees already growing on *prêt* land. In Toumousséni, for instance, fruit from these trees belongs to the village community; everyone has the right to eat it. Migrant land users are not allowed to sell fruit from trees growing on *prêt* land. Conflicts over challenges to, or violations of, land use rules are also distributional conflicts in as far as planting trees on *prêt* land or claiming exclusive access to these trees' fruit are considered long-term claims to the land by 'migrants'. But first and foremost, in conflicts over the rules and regulations concerning resource use, social relations are negotiated that grant 'autochthons' a privileged position vis-à-vis 'migrants' with respect to access to land.

For the customary management of conflicts over the distribution and use of natural resources in South Western Burkina Faso, the *chefs de terre* also play a central role. In Toumousséni und Siniena, conflict parties seek them out when property or usage rights or parcel demarcations are in dispute. The *chef de terre* makes his decision by drawing on his own knowledge and asking village inhabitants. If he feels unable to regulate the question at hand, or if one of the actors concerned does not accept his decision, other institutions are activated. When conflicts are framed in a way that goes beyond questions of access to, and use of, land, the village assembly – consisting of the *chef de village* and the village elders – takes charge of the negotiations. Issues not limited to land fall under the responsibility of the *chef de village* and village elders. In the village assembly, only men have the right

to speak; women can take part as observers. The *chef de village* chairs the assembly. After the conflict parties and witnesses have spoken and all questions have been answered, the village assembly discusses the case and the elders reach a decision. In cases of material damage (i.e. damage to the fields, stalls or granaries), the aggrieved party makes a suggestion for compensation. If the conflict parties cannot agree on the amount of the compensation, the *chef de terre* acts as a mediator. For certain damages, there is a fixed compensation that is widely accepted within the village community. If someone is found guilty of breaking the rules of resource use, the elders decide on sanctions ranging from a sacrifice to exclusion from the village community. But only 'migrants' can be banned from the village; *fils du village* and 'autochthon' inhabitants can at most receive a monetary penalty for breaking the rules. Hence, the social categories 'autochthon' and 'migrant' also structure the management of land conflicts: exclusion from the community can mean the denial of access to resources and, in conflict cases, can result in physical exclusion from the village, too.

Conclusion

When increasing numbers of people have to make do with fixed amounts of land, the land becomes a scarce and contested resource and may be subject to different kinds of social conflict. In this paper, examining the case of land conflicts in South Western Burkina Faso, we have identified two factors that contribute to an increase in the number of land users: returning migrants from the neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire, and inner-state migration from other parts of Burkina Faso. Whereas other scholars point to migration as a link between environmental change and conflict, and thus a cause, trigger or enforcing factor for resource conflicts (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1999; Kahl 2006), we argue that migration cannot be identified as a triggering or causal moment for conflicts in South Western Burkina Faso. Migration is, rather, a common and socially legitimated practice, regulated by local institutions (of land rights, among others). In the study area, conflicts over land can indeed be observed mostly between 'autochthons' and 'migrants' (whereby the ' *fils du village*' is a relevant category regarding land use rights but not in land conflicts). However, the conflicts are not a result of migration but, rather, a forum in which to negotiate social ascriptions and relations. 'Autochthon' and 'migrant' are

categories of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging or not belonging to the local political community. Conflicts over who can make claims about political participation and access to resources occur in all societies, and in these conflicts, social categories are steadily produced and reproduced. Social relations – here, between ‘autochthons’ and ‘migrants’ – are neither given nor stable but socially produced and continuously negotiated. This negotiation is potentially a conflictual process.

In conclusion, what role does resource scarcity play in the emergence of conflicts? As natural resources, agricultural and pasture land are principally renewable; nevertheless, at a given point in time, they are only available in a limited amount. Thus, land is indeed a scarce resource from which, under certain conditions, a growing number of people have to live. But as the case study on land conflicts in South Western Burkina Faso has demonstrated, it is analytically curtailed to infer a linear causal relationship from scarcity and growing population density to resource conflicts. Instead, in the analysed case, conflicts over land did not necessarily accelerate when numerous migrants returned from Côte d’Ivoire and population numbers increased in a relatively short period of time. It was not the arrival of ‘migrants’ or returnees that tended to trigger conflicts but rather the passage from one generation to another. This is reflected in the local institutions of land rights. Access to land, and its limitations, are linked to categories of inclusion in the local community (notably, autochthony). According to the local land rights institutions, access rights are only inheritable without limitation by people whose unlimited membership in the community is not contested. Thus, when ‘migrant’ land users die, their children and grandchildren may risk having to give up the land. When they raise claims to land that their parents used as *prêt*, this implies, in addition to the material claim, a claim of belonging to the village community and wanting to enjoy the corresponding rights. In this sense, conflicts over land during the passage from one generation to another are a form of negotiating broader social relations, namely the entanglement of local citizenship and access rights. In this respect, it is unwise to analytically separate distributional conflicts over a scarce resource from conflicts over the negotiation of social identities. It is inaccurate to claim that pre-existing ‘autochthon’ and ‘migrant’, ethnic, or other social groups struggle over a scarce material resource; rather, conflicts over the distribution of this resource construct and

reinforce these social groups in the first place. Material inequality and the socio-cultural construction of categories of power and difference are inseparably interwoven.

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MEN STAY AT HOME WHILE WOMEN MOVE OUT: NEW TRENDS OF MOBILITY TO CHINA AMONGST BAMENDA GRASSFIELD WOMEN (CAMEROON)

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Abstract: This article examines the mobility of women from the Bamenda Grassfields to China. Prior to the improvement in road and air transport, men had always been seen as those who move out and thus the breadwinners in the family. However, there is an increasing shift from this paradigm and recently with advancement in road and air transport female migrants have in many ways become the breadwinners of their families thus changing the socio-cultural norms hitherto unknown in the region. Women's mobility in the past was linked to spousal reunions or for family reasons. Drawing from archival and secondary sources, oral interviews, and secondary sources this article argues that the new wave of mobility of women from the Bamenda Grassfields to China has altered previously perceived notions of men as breadwinners of the family and has led to a new dynamic in this region with women becoming more assertive. These women have come to represent what is known as "China Women" and they have fundamentally challenged patriarchal roles and control in the cultural fabric of the sub region. What accounts for this new wave of migration to China? To what extent does this phenomenon impact on the existing notion of men as breadwinners? The article concludes that the stereotypical view that conceives women as sedentary to stay at home and look after the livestock and children while their husbands move in search of family incomes has been challenged by the women of this region.

Key words: *women migration, Bamenda Grassfields, Cameroon, China, Bamenda*

Introduction

Migration the world over is not a new phenomenon. Yet women do not seem to have taken centre-stage in academic discourses with regards to migration. The traditional pattern of migration within and from Africa which was male-dominated, long-term, and long-distance is increasingly becoming feminized. Anecdotal evidence reveals a striking increase in the migration of women. A significant share of these women is made up of migrants who move independently to fulfill their own economic and social needs; they are not simply joining a husband or other family members. They move in pursuit of their independent ambitions as well as to improve the standard of lives for their families. This process has been dubbed as the feminization of migration.

At the dawn of the 21st Century we are witnessing a rapid feminisation of migration, especially at the transnational level (Bjeren 1997; Buijs 1993; Chant and McIlwaine 1995; Knorr and Meier 2000; Almquist 1994; Barker and Feiner 2004; Bottomly 1975; Gabaccia 1994). This has seen the movement of female maids from South East Asia to the Middle East and from Latin America to North America (Chant and Radcliff 1992; Castles and Miller 2003). Women professionals from West and Southern Africa, such as nurses, to the United Kingdom and Middle East, as well as internal and regional migration of women within West Africa for commercial purposes (Adepoju 2006). Yet the movement of women from Africa to South East Asia has not yet been the subject of any significant research; a gap which reflects the dearth of work on south-south relations more generally. This paper aims to contribute to this much needed research.

The literature on women's geographical mobility has shown how this form of migration came much later than that of the male. Clifford (Clifford 1992: 183), observes that 'Good travel (heroic, educational, scientific, adventurous, ennobling) is something men should do. Women are impeded from serious travel. *Some of them (women) go to distant places but largely as companions...*' In other words, women were always believed to have travelled in conjunction with men. There is evidence, however, that European women, at least, travelled alone as far back as the 19th century. Thus, the geographical mobility of African women sketched here suggests a different picture. The mobility of women as independent agents as demonstrated by the women of the

Bamenda Grassfields resonates with other women in Africa and has occupied some space in research landscapes. For instance, Barnes (Barnes 2002: 87) studied the migration of women in Southern Africa, especially between South Africa and Zimbabwe during the colonial period. She employed statistical, documentary and oral evidence to critique the dominant paradigm that women were silent observers of migration in colonial Southern African historiography. She stated that 'when historians follow the dominant model and consider mobility, travel, and migration *a priori* as male preserves, African women are automatically consigned to mass immobility. They are barred from centre stage and frozen in perpetual economic childhood'.

Using the concept of 'navigation', Both (Both 2006) has sought to understand girl migrants and young women in Ndjamen, Chad. The work aimed to contribute to a 'broader understanding of the positions of girls and young women in Chad'. Both concludes among other things that 'the girls are not only being shaped by the urban structures, but partly shaped themselves...' Kihato (Kihato 2009) has also researched the migration of women from different parts of Southern Africa to Johannesburg. She concludes that these women used different methods to find themselves in different locations in Johannesburg.

Thus the movement of women to China in as much as it paints a different picture also contributes to the literature on women as independent migrants who moved without being dictated to by the men. Their mobility was not mostly informed by economic imperatives as the case of Barnes and Both has shown. While some earlier studies in Ghana draw attention to the effect of women's migration on their lives and reproductive roles, most current studies emphasize the economic and social independence and reproductive role of women and young females. The changing labour market trends and the rising participation of women in the global workforce have increased opportunities for skilled female migrants. In the area of health care, women dominate the nursing sector and have formed a large part of the skilled labour migration out of Ghana. Nurses and midwives form the majority of health worker migration in Ghana. Although several studies have been undertaken on the migration of skilled healthcare workers from Ghana and its impact on the health care sector, very little has been done in terms of a gender analysis of the Ghanaian health workers. However, research on this topic is still quite rare and scanty with special focus to

the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon. The Bamenda Grassfields has most often been considered as a peripheral context, but this article wants to highlight and place it within a context of global processes that have a long history. The people of this region had been involved in the trans-Atlantic slave trade as well as long distance trade since the 19th century (Warnier 1981).

In Africa South of the Sahara, rural to urban migration has been historically held as a male-dominated affair dating back to the period of long distant trade/bush trade. The restrictive colonial policies and socio-political patriarchal controls which were embedded in most African societies (Manchara 2003) were assumed to have seriously curbed female migration. Colonial labour policies, for example, whether German, British, French or Portuguese resulted in the mobility of men into urban and semi-urban areas of Africa in search of paid jobs while women were expected to stay behind in rural areas to care for livestock and look after the children and farm the land. (Boserup 1970; and Khasiani 1995). The improvement in Information Communication Technology (ICT), the increase in the educational opportunities and in “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 1990: 63-78). All these happenings have triggered the mobility of women from their areas of origin to areas which could provide their daily needs. In a broader perspective this article also fits into the historiographical debates on global history and historical processes on different levels: trans-regional history and interconnectedness. Drawing from Patrick Manning’s (Manning 2006: 175-195) article on “Interactions and Connections” in which he describes and analyzes interactions forms the backdrop through which I position this article. The article will then take up the discussion on migration more generally prior to migration to China. It would be imperative to review migration trends in Cameroon in general and the Bamenda Grassfields in particular in order to understand China as a new destination and a domain which women have competed successfully with their male counterparts. The dynamics of such migrations will be discussed further taking empirical evidence from the women who were implicated in the process.

Methodology

Several methods were used to gather the data for this paper. Although a much more contemporary topic it was imperative to historicise it. Consequently, I found the archives quite relevant. The Buea National Archives situated in Buea, Cameroon was used. Although with much difficulty, because some of the files were destroyed by termites and rats, I made use of files which showed statistics of people who have been migrating from the Bamenda Grassfields to coastal Cameroon. The gaps which existed in the archival documents were filled by two methods: First, I conducted interviews with the women who were implicated in the process. These interviews were more unstructured than structured because with this method questions were not pre-arranged and through this I allowed spontaneity to prevail. Consequently, questions were allowed to develop during the course of the interview. Secondly, I used a method which is closer to social sciences-personal observation. I observed some of these women who had migrated to China and back and how they differed with their peers in what they had accumulated. The inequalities were striking in terms of the houses and cars which they ran in direct contrast to those who had not migrated to China.

In a broader spectrum, the article challenges the widely shared stereotyped image of African women that while men moved they were sedentary. The case of female migrants from the Bamenda Grassfields of Northwest Cameroon going to China recently has altered this perceived notion of sedentary women in migration literature thus providing new binoculars to look at this form of migration and thus adds to the debate. The article becomes more relevant as these women have gradually become breadwinners of their homes - something which was long held by men. Apart from becoming breadwinners these "Chinese Women" have also embarked on building modern houses, owning "putsch" cars which in itself is a novelty in the historicity of migration in the region. This new form of mobility and new found wealth is liberating women from the shackles of male domination, the corollary being a disregard for patriarchal controls which for a long time restricted them from mobility.

Migration in Bamenda Grassfield History

The area of concern, the Bamenda Grassfields of Northwest Cameroon, is a marginal area as regards to its infrastructure and economic development. This situation has partly led people to move out of the region, hence a long history of mobility developed since the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independent epochs. The everyday life of many Cameroonians in this area is inextricably linked to mobility. In the early 19th century this sub-region received new aggressive people who were described by early anthropologists that they were fleeing from the North of Cameroon. Once in the Grassfields they embarked on building very strong centralised states which incorporated some weaker states and consolidated the stronger ones. The area therefore experienced much migration as early as the 19th century.

That was not too unique to Bamenda, it was a process that was going on elsewhere in Africa. Besides, the socio-cultural oecumene of this region is central in the explanation of their ever-mobility, a point which was first touched by Warnier & Rowlands (Warnier & Rowlands 1978) and later developed by Nyamnjoh (Nyamnjoh 2002). This mountainous area was both a refuge area for people fleeing the wars of the big empires in the Sahel-Sudan zone of the 18th and 19th century, as it was an area where kingdoms were vested. These kingdoms settled in valleys but only after they had been itinerant for a long time. These kingdoms are notorious for their wars and multiple displacements. The mountains offered protection to the people and a good vestige for the kingdoms that in the course of an itinerary history settled there. Under the German rule which lasted from 1884-1914, a plantation complex was developed in the Southern coastal part of the area, transport developed at a snails-pace, roads were best suited for wagon drawn carts. After the First World War the British took over this region and administered it as part of the Eastern provinces of Nigeria and as a result, English was the lingua franca. That explains why the name of this region today including Bamenda is known as Anglophone Cameroon.

Pre-colonial Cameroon experienced tremendous migrations. The trend of migration was generally from the north to the south. The Islamic jihads which were launched by the Islamic cleric, Usman don Fodio to purify Islam in Northern Nigeria directly affected the Northern part of Cameroon and consequently forcefully pushed many people

from the north to the south of the country (see Njeuma 1978; Fanso 1989, Nkwi & Warnier 1982; Ngoh 1996). Besides, the slave trade of the 16th Century also forced many people from this region who were sold into slavery. They moved from this hinterland to the coastal part of the country where they were shipped for the American plantations (Rowlands 1978; Chilver 1961; Nkwi 2011).

Furthermore, trade in the Bamenda Grassfields was one of the main factors which influenced the migration of people. Chilver (Chilver 1961: 233-258), Warnier (Warnier 1980a: 79-92), Kopytoff (Kopytoff 1981: 371-382) and Rowlands (Rowlands 1979: 1-19) studied the region with regard to trade and migration. This trade was regional and long distance. The direction of the movement of people from the Bamenda Grassfields was towards the coast which included the Cross River basin, the Wouri estuary and Bimbria (Kah 2009: 220). Most of the articles of trade included amongst others, palm kernels, palm oil, mats, blacksmith equipment like knives, spears, dane guns and cutlasses. Reversed migration to north is rare and usually takes place when people prefer to commune with family friends or take holidays. The rare situation of any mass migration to the north can be explained from the harsh Sahelian conditions. Secondly, the north is predominantly Muslim as compared to the Christian south. However, government policies of transferring public civil servants from one region to another for balanced development have also occasioned people migrating towards the north from the south. This notwithstanding, traders also migrate to the northern areas to buy commodities which they in turn sell in the south. These commodities include amongst others groundnuts, onions and cattle which are in demand in the south.

The perennial south migration needs further explanation. Within the littoral quadrant of Cameroon there is a heavy concentration of different economic activities which include amongst others industry, trade and commercial agriculture. Migration to this region is often by young male youths from rural areas in search of job opportunities or to set up petty trade. Recently young girls have also undertaken such migration as housemaids, baby sitters, prostitutes and bar attendants (Nkwi 2014).

Women Migration from the Bamenda Grassfields to Coastal Cameroon

In order to fully appreciate and understand female migration from the Bamenda Grassfields to China it is relevant to locate the problem in history. Readings in the migration literature in Africa seem to suggest that it was male dominated. This trend of events was partially true until recently when it was challenged. Initially, in colonial Cameroon which was accompanied by the opening of a plantation complex in the coastal part of Cameroon, labour was attracted from the hinterlands. Yet women were never given the opportunity to migrate. This was as a result of the recruitment policy which was put in place by the colonial system. The policy excluded women from being recruited to work in the plantation because they would act as detractors to the males and as a result minimised production (Konings 2012). Consequently, everything was done to exclude women from migrating to the coastal plantation. Measures put in place colonial overseers to control labour, enforced by messengers deterred women from migrating to the plantations. Perhaps, another deterrent was the high death rate recorded in the plantation that instilled fear in women migrating to the coastal plantation or any towns in Cameroon for labour purposes.

However, the absence of women in migration to the plantations did not go on *sine die*. In 1954 and 1957 respectively, two tea estates were opened - one in the littoral quadrant of Cameroon and the other one in the Northwest region of Cameroon (Konings 2012: 7). From a purely gender perspective the opening of the tea estates was to open a new caveat in the migration history of the Bamenda Grassfields women. While plantation labour continued to rely on male labour, the tea estates constituted a radical break with the *status quo ante* and the old tradition of holding women back at home (Konings 2012: 8). From the very start, a large number that was recruited to pluck the tea was predominantly women (Konings 2012: 9).

The colonial gender discourses have tended to describe paid labour outside the home as being masculine and it gradually started to define men as the 'breadwinners' and women as 'dependent housewives'. Several authors have also rightly and arguably suggested that colonial officials and employers were initially inclined to support resistance by male elders to female migration and wage employment that could

undermine the latters' control over women's vital productive and reproductive labour (Obbo 1980; Moore 1988; Gordon 1996) Some of the authors have also added that colonial employers promptly recognised that keeping women's productive and reproductive labour in their communities would serve capital accumulation by reducing male labour costs (Meillassoux 1975; Safa 1979; Wolpe 1980). Although such arguments have combined to exclude women from the world of migration the situation appears to be more complex and dynamic than was previously thought.

Its complexity is simply explained on the grounds that neither male opposition nor colonial ordinances did completely prevent women from migrating especially to the commercial urban areas. Urban centres became cynosures for females to escape rural patriarchal domination and build up a relatively autonomous existence following a personal crisis in their family status, such as widowhood or divorce and deteriorating economic conditions in rural areas (Konings 2012: 10). Everywhere in Africa migration had a painful consequence for women as they had to endure the stigma of being branded as prostitutes or loose women for the rest of their lives (Obbo 1980; Stichter 1985). Colonial reports indicate, as Ruel was to argue (Ruel 1960: 236-237), that women who attempted to migrate were pursued and forcefully brought back to their rural villages¹. Ruel showed that some of the Upper Banyang chiefs of Cameroon travelled to the coastal towns of Cameroon in 1953 to round up, with the help of the police, women from their own ethnic group who had been found loitering and to repatriate them. The chiefs sooner or later discovered that even when they succeeded these women simply went back to the cities.

The failure to keep these women in check indicated a radical reverse of the traditional way of looking at female migration. Quite recently, women are recruited mostly from the Bamenda Grassfields to work as housemaids and some as baby sitters in homes in most Cameroonian cities. Some have moved to Yaounde, Douala, Victoria and Buea to

1 File Qe (1926) 2, Labour and Industrial Conditions, National Archives Buea (NAB); Qe (1929) 1, Labour Ordinance no. 1 of 1929 (NAB); File Qd/a (1932) 11, Plantation Labour Inspections: The General Subject; (NAB); File Qd/a (1940) 5, Plantation Labour Inspection: Reports Victoria Division; (NAB); File V, 787, Sf 1938/1, Measures against Prostitutes; (NAB); File 929, Sf (1943) 2, Child Prostitution in Lagos 2, Prostitution General, (NAB); File 1020, Sf (1941) 1, Traffic in Women to the Gold Coast, (NAB); File 730, Sf (1939) 2, Traffic in Girls to the Gold Coast, (NAB); File 2374 vol.111, Ca (1942) 1, Provincial Annual Report 1944.

start petty trade in a variety of items like pepper, huckleberry, corn, beans, and groundnuts. The introduction of mobile phones and the opening of call boxes (telephone booths) or kiosks also led to the mass migration of young girls from the Bamenda Grassfields to the major cities of Cameroon to seek employment and work inside these call boxes. Through that they improve the standard of living back in the Grassfields (Nkwi 2009).

Female traders engaged in petty trade have significantly contributed to the family income. They assist their husbands not only in the provision of basic necessities but also help to contribute to the school fees of the children and pay hospital bills when need arises. One of the informants, Marianna is a renowned business woman who deals in Irish potatoes and pepper. She buys from markets in Bamenda and sells in Douala and Buea. She confirmed in an interview that she makes three trips per week and her net gain per month is between 250,000 and 300,000 CFA Frs (euro=500). According to her, this money augments the meagre income of the family who depends much on the husband's income as a hawker.

Another woman, Julia deals exclusively in huckleberry. She has been doing this business since 2002. She said:

“When my husband died in 1999 he left me with five children to take care of them. I had no means of income to feed them, pay their fees and provide medical attention when it was needed. I started following my neighbour Beatrice in this trade. In our group we use to be sometimes fifteen and sometimes twenty moving down to the South (Douala, Buea and Limbe) with different goods to sale. With that I raised money and now the children are big.”

In the 1980s and 1990s with the introduction of the neo-liberal reforms and the economic reforms which affected Cameroon and Africa, women were to face new challenges and difficulties. However, with the emergence of China as the new economic hub as well as the improvement in air transport led women to turn to China timidly for economic salvation. As the demand for Chinese goods increased, it also witnessed a rise in the number of women that redirected their line of trade towards China.

China, the New Destination

Several dynamics appear to explain and justify this recent trend in the feminisation of migration more especially to China. The general argument here is that women migration to China represents a new type of migration. Historiography has failed to take into account the earlier less visible movement of women which shows that the migration of women to China does represent a shift in scale of movement from before. Cross et al. (2006) suggest that the trend is sparked by increasing poverty at the household level, creating the need for more women to move to look for work to supplement the meagre salaries of their husbands. In the same vein, Adepoju (Adepoju 2006) maintains that fragile ecosystems make subsistence farming risky, and the economic crisis that has caused many men to lose their jobs, resulting in women finding ways of supporting the family hence migration from rural to urban areas, often in pursuit of self-employment in the commercial sector. Making a further case as regards to female migration Adepoju (2010) opines that the rise in proportions of women migrating is partly due to improved access to education and training opportunities, making women more employable both locally and internationally. Furthermore, Casale and Posel (2002) support the contention that there is an increasing need for women to enter the labour force, however, they also highlight changes in household composition and the reduction in marriage rates as factors in the feminisation trend.

The motives of migration in history have been discussed a lot. These factors are grouped into economic, social and political. These aspects contribute to female migration to China as China has come a long way from the authoritarian state and is more friendly towards foreigners (blacks). The domestic industrial growth of China as well as the socio-economic situations in Cameroon have added to the above to make China a destination of choice. Cameroon and China established diplomatic relations in 1971 and following the agreement Cameroon imported trucks, textiles, farm and agricultural products such as rice. From Cameroon, China imported mostly cocoa and coffee. Sino-Cameroon relations were cordial and sometimes actually benefitted Cameroon. For instance, in 1975, a Chinese medical team arrived to Mbalmayo in Southern Cameroon and within a short time, the team's medical expertise and dedication had transformed the relatively obscure Mbalmayo hospital into a major hospital as patients from all

over the national territory flooded to Mbalmayo to receive medical attention. In 1986, the Lagdo hydro-electric complex was completed at a huge cost of 41,000 million CFA Francs. With that electric plant Cameroon became the second largest producer of electricity in Africa South of the Sahara. In terms of trade Cameroon and China recorded startling statistics between 1971 and 1982.

Table 1 below shows some of the trading statistics between Cameroon and China in millions of francs:

TABLE I

TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMEROON AND CHINA

YEAR	CAMEROON IMPORTS FROM CHINA	CAMEROON EXPORTS TO CHINA
1971	5, 680 Million Francs CFA	2,375 Million Francs CFA
1976	3, 373 Million Francs CFA	473 Million Francs CFA
1980	6, 217 Million Francs CFA	320 Million Francs CFA
1982	6, 500 Million Francs CFA	480 Million Francs CFA

Source: Ngoh 1986: 291

A look at Table I shows that in 1971 when the agreement went operational Cameroon imported goods from China worth 5, 680 Million Francs CFA and exported goods worth 2,375 Million Francs CFA. In 1976 alone, Cameroon imported goods worth 3,373 Million francs CFA from China and exported 473 Million francs CFA worth of goods to China. In 1980 Cameroon imported 6,217 Million francs CFA worth of goods from China and exported 320 Million francs CFA worth of goods to China. Generally, the trading figures show that it was not in the favour of Cameroon. However, it also suggests that China was economically viable and attractive to migrants.

While the Chinese economy was buoyant that of Cameroon was de-generating. By the mid 1990s the economy of the Cameroon state was ailing. This was aptly described by the headlines of *La Nouvelle Expression*, February 24-27, 1995, ‘La Banque mondiale prévoit: encore un demi siècle de misère pour les Camerounais’ (The World Bank Forecasts: Another Half-a-Century of Misery for Cameroonians).

Nkwi: MEN STAY AT HOME WHILE WOMEN MOVE OUT

Between 1988 and 1992, Cameroon's productivity was the worst among forty-one African countries from which statistics were collected (Takougang and Krieger 1998). The public service sector was in fragments as salaries were not paid regularly despite salary cuts from 70 to 40 percent. Retirement age was enforced at 55 years of age with pensions as problematic as salaries. The 100 percent devaluation of CFA Franc in 1994 took an additional toll (Nkwi 2006: 97). Unemployment was at 25 percent especially amongst university and professional school graduates. There was real misery. As a result in the boom in Chinese economy and a downturn in that of Cameroon, Cameroonian women from the Bamenda Grassfields seized the opportunity to migrate to China for trading purposes in order to ameliorate the worsening social and economic conditions in which most families found themselves. This was done with largely unforeseen consequences on the region of departure.

Trade appears to be one of the factors which has led to the migration of women from the Bamenda Grassfields to China. The women of the region have been quite enterprising since the economic downturn in the mid 1990s. They travel to China and purchase goods of various kinds which includes amongst others, dresses, artificial hair, shoes, household goods and cosmetics just to name but a few. Official statistics are missing but during the research a head count suggests that out of two hundred women traders around Bamenda metropolis ninety were mobile traders who had been going to China. One of these women who gave her name as Juliana deals in cosmetics and artificial hair. Her husband went on voluntary retirement as a result of the devaluation of the Communauté Franc Afrique (CFA), making life more difficult. He could not meet the childrens' fees and their health bills. Julia who before then was just a seamstress got a loan and started going to China. She owns a very big shop employing workers in the shop and housemaids at home. She had eventually taken over what the husband used to do as she could pay the children's school fees and even foot their hospital bills. According to her "I think that I am lucky because through my efforts I can cater for the family at a time when my husband is unable. Of course he used to do it when everything was fine."²

2 Interview with Julia, Old Town, Bamenda, 23 July 2012.

Another woman in the social class of Julia was Beatrice. She has been going to China thrice every year and deals in all assorted types of Chinese ceramics. She recounted that she had been introduced to the business by her elder sister. Importantly, the income she makes a year is in the neighbourhood of 2.5 million or €2,500. With this amount of money she has been able to build a two apartment house and also runs an Lexus jeep.

The connection between trade and mobility is well-known to students of Africa and has been well documented. For instance, Dike (1956) in his *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta* has shown how through trade the Niger Delta was peopled by waves of migrants. Curtin (1972) wrote a critique of the slave trade which was essentially and ultimately about trade and mobility. In a similar vein, Meillassoux (1971) established the connection between markets and indigenous trade in West Africa. Zeleza (2003) has shown how pre-colonial trade was conducted in North, West, South and Central Africa and the nodal points as well as goods which were traded. All of these studies, directly or indirectly link trade and migration in Africa. Andersson (Andersson 2006: 375-397) has shown how the trade led to the migration of people from the Mzimba district of Malawi and how the traders were responsible for bringing in South African goods into Malawi. Van der Laan (Van der Laan 1992: 531-547) traced how trade led to the migration of Lebanese traders to the West African coast. Eades (1993) did similar work on enterprising Yoruba traders from Western Nigeria who established successful trading networks throughout the Gold Coast. In a similar way, Pfaff (Pfaff 2007: 61-88) has demonstrated how she followed two Zanzibari traders on their journeys. The nuances and differences with the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon are unique. Women have taken the frontline in trade in this sub region.

In the Bamenda Grassfields, scholars have also carried out some excellent works. Trade in the Bamenda Grasslands and Kom was one of the main factors which influenced the geographical mobility of people. Chilver (Chilver 1961: 233-258), Warnier (Warnier 1981: 79-92), Kopytoff (Kopytoff 1973: 371-382) and Rowlands (Rowlands 1979: 1-19) studied the region with regards to trade and migration. Neither the literature on Africa nor the Bamenda Grassfields have adequately positioned women. These women prefer China because through it they will likely make a quick turnover and also because Chinese goods

Nkwi: MEN STAY AT HOME WHILE WOMEN MOVE OUT

are comparatively inexpensive and there is high demand in the sub-region. Margaret is one of the trading women who lives and owns a shop in Bamenda, the capital of the Northwest Region of Cameroon. She started going to China in 1995 and they were 15 in their group. As time went on the number increased and as by 2000 there were close to 100 women going to China from the Bamenda Grassfields alone as traders. The Bamenda Grassfields' experience of trade was similar to that elsewhere in pre-colonial and colonial Africa. As Pfaff points out these traders not only transported goods but more importantly newness and new ideas into the home region. As makers of new wealth and bearers of new ideas they were bonded as a new class with a new identity and formed a new social stratum.

These 'new women' or Chinese women have fundamentally altered the cultural norm which used to be the domain of men and have given rise to apprentices or 'boy boy' category. Although this has been an ongoing issue since the colonial period, it has taken a new twist now. A new twist in the sense that it is usually the privilege of men to have apprentices and 'boy boy' but now it is women. They are mainly recruited by these women to help out in the family chores and business places as well. After working for an agreed number of years they are given a lump sum amount of money which they call "settlement". The female 'boy boy' now could open up her own business and also start going to China provided she had accumulated enough capital. In certain instances some of the apprentices became part of the 'family' of the trader.

Another factor which has been responsible for female migration to China has been education. Following China's global emergence, the country developed a new curriculum that emphasizes the teaching of English Language to the 'new Chinese youth'. This led to the active recruitment of English teachers to China. This recruitment drive further gave opportunities for more women to migrate to China as teachers. Clementina was born in 1978 in Kom, Bamenda Grassfields. After her elementary and high school she went to the University of Yaounde, Cameroon where she read English literature and modern languages. She got married to Nicholas Mbi in 2000. In 2004 she migrated to China where she taught the English at a high school and later at the University. While in China, Clementina regularly sent 650,000 CFA Francs (1,000 euros) to her husband every month. Clementina's case

was not an exception as a similar communication with Beatrice, Judith and Caroline revealed the same situation.

Apart from migrating to China for education and/or trading purposes there are also other women who occasionally go to China only to purchase household goods not for retail. Such women accumulate money or take loans and travel to China with their fellow peers. They purchase household equipment which includes refrigerators, gas cookers, window and door blinds and tiles. The reason which they gave to me was simply that the things are cheap when they are bought from China than when they are bought in Cameroon Grassfields. Angelina put it graphically but in a creolised pidgin language “I di go China because ting them over dear for dis kontri” (“I go to China because things are very expensive in Cameroon”). Equipped with this social visibility as shown in the new household goods, these type of women could easily be differentiated from their friends who had no opportunity to travel out.

Conclusion

Physical mobility of people from place to place as individuals or as groups is essentially horizontal, potentially limitless, and generally motivated by the desire and ambition to take advantage of new opportunities for self or group advancement. Between 1990 when the economy of Cameroon and most African states experienced a downturn, and 2000, when there was a marked improvement in communication technologies the number of women travelling out of the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon to China have steadily increased. This spatial mobility was greatly facilitated and accelerated by ‘modern’ transportation and communication technologies like the internet and mobile phones and a reduction in airfares. A good number of women took advantage of this and have become the breadwinners of the family. In addition, they were the first women to become familiar with the building of new houses, possessed flat screen television sets, acquired and owned new cars and new cosmetics thus further distinguishing themselves as women of newness and the new ways. Restless and ambitious, through their mobility and by their daily encounters with the wider world, they did not only form a new status and identity when they returned home from ‘abroad’. With their outlook changed

they formed a new social strata and hierarchies in the society that enjoyed enhanced prestige and social status. Since Ester Boserup's (1970) seminal work on women and economic development in the Third World, studies have continued unabated to confirm her findings that women are not equal beneficiaries with men to the spoils of modernization and development.

As indicated in this article, there has been abundant literature to show that women are and have been moving as companions to their husbands. For instance, in Africa South of the Sahara, rural to urban migration has been historically held as an affair of men dating back to the period of long distant trade/bush trade. In other words it was male-dominated. This was partly justified by colonial policies and socio-political patriarchal controls which were embedded in most African societies (Manchara 2003). This article has shown that the migration of women to China from the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon has altered the perceived way of life of the people of the region that saw women as sedentary. The movement of women therefore and the accumulation of wealth by them in their own right could start pointing to a new understanding of women's mobility in trans-national migration literature. This is more crucial as it has shown changing mobility patterns from intra-national to transnational. That is from Northwest to Coastal Cameroon and later on to China. If well scrutinised the empirical data adds to knowledge on gender dynamics on migration especially in Cameroonian historiography. The Clementinas, Margaretas, Beatrices, Judiths, Julias and Carolines are representatives of the society dynamics and could also thus show the way to the new theorization of women's migration. Working very closely with them has so far shown that unlike in the past when men were the breadwinners and migrants, their movements to and from China have largely altered that conventional reasoning. Thus the debate on women and migration has moved to a new level.

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THE IMPACT OF FAIR TRADE ON THE LIVING STANDARDS OF FARMERS IN GHANA SOCIAL COOPERATIVES AND CORPORATE COOPERATIVES¹

Borys Bińkowski

Abstract: Fair Trade is a complex movement, but its central purpose is to help disadvantaged small producers from developing countries through trade. The most recognized aspect of the movement is Fair-trade International, the biggest Fair Trade certification organization. The system was created to give advantages in international trade for farming cooperatives who decided to join the movement.

Although in last 20 years of Fair Trade growth there have been many studies of the movement, there has only been one wide spectrum survey on the impact of Fair Trade on rural producers. Many others were concentrated at other aspects of the movement or were irrelevant. The research presented here is the first qualitative Fair Trade impact study conducted in Ghana. It also has a wide spectrum and is a part of broader ongoing research in two other regions of the world.

Research was conducted to examine Fair Trade's (in particular Fair-trade International's) impact on farmers and communities in Ghana by comparing it to farmers and communities that do not benefit from the system. A qualitative study was conducted, based on 75 interviews, among them interviews with farmers of cocoa and oranges, members and employees of cooperatives, owners and employees of food companies and representatives of Fairtrade International.

Observations of 5 villages and 1 small town, alongside the interviews conducted, resulted in the conclusion that there are no substantial differences in the standards of living between farmers which are

1 The research project was funded by the National Centre of Science (Narodowe Centrum Nauki) on the basis of the decision number DEC-2011/01/N/HS4/02146, and carried out by the Polish Centre of African Studies (Polskie Centrum Studiów Afrykanistycznych).

members of cooperatives benefiting from Fair Trade and farmers from the comparison group.

The research suggests that small cooperatives and big cooperatives function differently. Small cooperatives are operating in the interest of their members, while big cooperatives are focused on creating business potential. The study revealed that small cooperatives provide more benefits for farmers while the big ones transform into ventures similar to corporations.

Key words: *Fair Trade, Ghana, cocoa farmers, Fairtrade International, Fairtrade certificate*

Aim of the study

The aim of the study is to test the differences in the development of communities and families (households) that use the solutions proposed by Fair Trade and those that sell their products on a conventional basis. It aims to answer the question: does Fair Trade guarantee an improvement in living standards?

The second part of the study is a comparison between farming in big and small cooperatives. It tests the hypothesis that members of small Fair Trade cooperatives enjoy more benefits than members of big ones.

Previous impact studies

Valerie Nelson & Barry Pound (2010) examined 80 academic publications and reports on various aspects of Fair Trade over a period of 10 years. Among them were 23 reports containing 33 impact studies of Fair Trade on producers or their organizations². In the reported group there were no case studies of tea, cotton, cane, rice or nut farmers, though these are important crops that are already certified.

Of the 33 impact studies 31 showed the positive effects of Fair Trade on producers³, but most of the studies were superficial and based not on field study but questionnaires filled in by boards and office

2 The majority investigating in coffee production in Latin America.

3 In 29 cases it was growing income, in 27 cases a stabilization of income, and 22 cases showed growing empowerment.

employees of cooperatives rather than farmers themselves. Only two case studies concerned Ghana and cocoa, but these were also not very significant or not current.

Among the three impact studies about Fair Trade in Ghana the most significant is *Monitoring Impact of Fair Trade Initiatives: A Case Study of Kuapa Kokoo and the Day Chocolate Company* (Ronchi 2002). However, it was made at a time when the Fair Trade share of the whole turnover of the Kuapa Kokoo cooperative was no bigger than 10%, so the impact on farmers was not yet visible. The same assumption could be given to another study mentioned by Nelson and Pound, namely *Overview, Impact, Challenges, Fairtrade...* (see OPM and IIED), which was published in 2000.

A more valuable current publication (which was not described in the review of Nelson and Pound) is *Gorzka czekolada [Bitter Chocolate]* (Poplawski and Szeniawska 2013). It describes the state of cocoa production and trade in the neighbouring Ivory Coast. This is a comprehensive source of information about farmers and their problems in similar social and economic situations to Ghana, but it lacks some important impact study data.

The most significant and comprehensive study about the impact of Fair Trade on producers is research conducted by Sara Klier (2012). It contains six case studies conducted in five countries. One part of this study was carried out in Ghana. It was about one of the biggest Fair Trade cooperatives in the world (Kuapa Kokoo), whose members cultivate cocoa. The field research was based on questionnaires and interviews with cocoa farmers in one village.

This study was the source of the report *Assessing the Impact of Fairtrade on Poverty Reduction through Rural Development* (Klier 2012), in which the author observes that Fair Trade in Ghana is not very efficient and has several disadvantages: engagement of farmers in the decision-making of cooperatives is very low, benefits from Fair Trade tend to apply most to owners of farms, who may or may not be the actual farmers, and the Fair Trade impact on rural development is minimal⁴.

4 It is important to note, that the positive impact of Fair Trade on development in the other 5 cases was much higher than in Ghana and cocoa case.

The study was concentrated in just one place, based on five days of field research, mostly quantitative and with some questionable methodology assumptions. The Sara Klier study⁵ is best treated as an introduction to a more serious and larger study.

Research methodology

A grounded theory method (GT) was used in the study. It assumes that the members of a society will know it best, and therefore the researcher should avoid bringing in prior theories and the confirmation bias that may result (Glaser, Strauss 1967). Using the grounded theory method, the researcher develops a theory of communities based on their own observations, supported by multiple interviews with various actors in society, and therefore the conclusions of the study are based only on the data collected.

Research is based on qualitative field research collected in Ghana in November and December of 2012 and January of 2013. The basic research methods were interviews from a carefully pre-prepared script. The study was based on interviews with cocoa farmers divided into four groups. One was the control group, the second group consisted of members of the big cooperative (Kuapa Kokoo), a third consisted of the members of the small cooperative⁶, and the fourth was a group of many different people working with farmers.

During the research 56 in-depth interviews were conducted with cocoa farmers, including 13 interviews with members of the cooperative AB-OCFA and 16 members of the cooperative Kuapa Kokoo. Five interviews were conducted with farmers of oranges, including the four members of cooperatives affiliated with Fair Trade. In addition, 14 interviews were conducted with representatives of the Fair Trade cooperatives, as well as representatives of the government agency Cocobod, a local cocoa agriculture researcher, and representatives of three certified private companies engaged in the processing of Fair Trade products. Altogether 75 in-depth interviews were conducted⁷.

5 Especially the part conducted in Ghana.

6 ABOCFA: Aponoapono Biakoye Organic Cocoa Farmers Association.

7 All interviews were registered. Wherever possible it was recorded (except 4 cases). All responders were also photographed (except small portion of interviews with representatives of cooperatives and other officials). All of them agreed to an interview and to a photograph.

Interviews with farmers were divided into three distinct parts. The first concentrated on the characteristics of farm work, the difficulties of farming, methods of cultivation and sales. The second concerned the quality of the farmer's household life and in the majority of cases evaluation was based not only on the questions, but also on observations.⁸ Members of Fair Trade cooperatives were also asked about the benefits of membership and their relationship with the cooperative.

Furthermore, the interview script was prepared to encourage open answers from respondents and to provide additional information. Due to the individual nature of the interviews, the answers given by the respondents and the different nature of their problems, it was not reasonable to unify responses and reduce them to statistical indicators. Therefore all information collected was used as a part of qualitative study.

Members and employees of cooperatives were not given the details about the planned research, to avoid the researcher being directed to pre-selected farmers⁹. All visits were conducted with random respondents. Besides interviews based on the script, unstructured short conversations with farmers and other local community members were conducted.

Additional research methods included active observations of village life¹⁰ and less participatory observations¹¹.

Fair Trade principles

Fair Trade (FT) is a global movement with producers in the global South and consumers in the North as the essential parts. Four of the most significant Fair Trade organizations agreed in 2001 to establish a definition of the movement: "Fair trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks

8 About 85% of the interviews were conducted at farmer's homes.

9 As often happens with official delegations from companies working with cooperatives, or with journalists or researchers. This mechanism was repeatedly noticeable in research methodologies of another studies, as well as statements of farmers and another interviewed responders.

10 Shadowing – following the farmer's everyday life; observations of community life during an active stay in the village.

11 Mainly observation of living conditions and infrastructure, and other development indicators in the communities.

greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers – especially in the South. [...]” (A charter of Fair Trade principles 2012: 6).

Fair Trade has many aspects and forms. The most important and best recognized aspect of the movement is the system of certified international trade of goods such as coffee, tea, cocoa, cotton, cane sugar, fresh and dried fruits, spices, herbs, gold, handicrafts and many others. There are several international certification initiatives, such as Fairtrade International, IMO (owner of Fair for Life certificate), Naturland (with certificate Naturland Fair) or World Fair Trade Organization, whose Fair Trade standards cover a broader set of criteria across production and trade. Fair Trade also has a strong and vital movement of volunteers and NGO’s, especially in Western Europe, who campaign for the use of ethically produced products. Finally, Fair Trade is fast developing a more direct model of trading with much stronger relations between the producers in developing countries and manufactures or traders in the countries of consumption.

The movement and its activities are strongly recognized in Western Europe¹², the United States and other developed countries. In other countries around the world it is almost unknown.¹³ The market for Fair Trade goods is estimated at five billion Euros in sales for the biggest certification movement alone (Fairtrade International 2013). Annual growth of sales is estimated at 10-12% which is substantial, especially in a period of economic crisis.

General principles of Fair Trade (World Fair Trade Organization 2012) are:

- creating opportunities for economically disadvantaged producers,
- transparency and accountability,
- fair trading practices,
- payment of a fair price,
- ensuring no child labour and forced labour,

12 Especially in the United Kingdom.

13 It is also unrecognised in the areas of production of Fair Trade goods in the developing countries.

- commitment to non-discrimination, gender equity and freedom of association,
- ensuring good working conditions,
- providing capacity building,
- promoting Fair Trade,
- respect for the environment.

In the case of Fairtrade International, these principles are ensured by regulations called Fairtrade standards. The most important financial standards are minimum price and the Fairtrade premium. The minimum price mechanism guarantees producers (cooperative or plantation) that the price for the produced goods will not be lower than a fixed base price. In practice it covers the costs of maintaining production in periods of low prices on the international market. The Fairtrade premium is an additional payment to organizations of producers that is used for capacity building among farmers (or producers) and their organizations. Decisions about how to use the Fairtrade premium are supposed to be taken democratically by members of the co-operative or members of the workers union if it is a private plantation. Another important standard of Fairtrade Int. is: “enabling pre-financing for producers who require it, facilitating long-term trading partnerships and enabling greater producer control over the trading process, setting clear core and development criteria to ensure that the conditions of production and trade of all Fairtrade certified products are socially, economically fair and environmentally responsible” (Fairtrade International: Standards 2013).

Fair Trade, cocoa farming, production and trade regulations in Ghana

To understand the development and function of Fair Trade in Ghana it is important to appreciate the specifics of the cocoa trade in the country. The market is constructed in such a way as to confer advantages on big international trade corporations, and is hampered by a government monopoly, creating problems for initiatives promoting smaller cooperatives or direct trade.

Commercial farming of cocoa in Ghana started in 1879 (Ghana Cocoa Board: The history of cocoa and its production in Ghana 2013). It was promoted by colonial government and the cultivation of cocoa spread fast. Cocoa quickly became the most significant export commodity of the Gold Coast (contemporary Ghana) (Bowes 2011: 214-215) and became very important for the livelihood of hundreds thousands of farmers¹⁴.

Nowadays Ghana, after the Ivory Coast, is the second largest producer of cocoa in the world. It is estimated that the country produces between 730 and 870 thousand metric tonnes per year (Cocoa Market Update 2012).

Around 90% of the cocoa beans on the international market come from small producers with farms of around two to five hectares. Ghana is a case in point with 445,000 small farmers (Cocoa Barometer 2009: 4; Cocoa Market Update 2012; Cocoa Barometer 2009).

The extreme fragmentation of the production of cocoa beans contrasts sharply with the monolithic companies that control the international cocoa trade and the production of chocolate. This model is supported by government regulations - cocoa beans are bought directly from the government agency Cocobod, mostly by large companies, including Barry Callebaut, ADM and Cargill.

Barry Callebaut produces about one third of all liquid chocolate.¹⁵ An additional 25% of its production comes from outsourcing to other companies. It's a prime example of the centralization and monopolization of chocolate processing, from roasting and grinding through to the finished product. Although it does not sell products under its own brand, it provides unfinished products (bulk chocolate) for other brands and its role in the production of chocolate continues to grow (Cocoa Barometer 2009: 9, 12; Cocoa Barometer 2010: 5).

Since 2008 some of the international companies mentioned here have invested in facilities for producing chocolate components in Ghana.

14 Around 1970 price of cocoa on international market was big enough to provide farmers income enabling them to rise level of their life. In 2012 the price of the product including the depreciation of money was 2,5 times lower than 42 years before. It should be noted, that in 2012 and 2013 prices were relatively high (around 2,300 and 3,500 USD per tonne) after a long period of low prices between 1990 and 2007 (around 500 and 1,000 USD per tonne) (ICE Cocoa Brochure 2012: 2).

15 The final product from the roasting and grinding of the beans.

Previously Ghana was only a producer of raw cocoa (Cocoa Barometer 2009: 8, 10).

In 1947 the Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod) was created. It was the colonial and later government body established for controlling the trade and production of cocoa (Ghana Cocoa Board: The history of cocoa and its production in Ghana 2013). Cocobod's monopoly in controlling this sector of the Ghanaian economy still exists. It fixes yearly purchase prices of cocoa for farmers, mediates in trade (it operates the biggest buying company in the country), and negotiates selling prices with international buyers. There are no official trade transactions that do not go through Cocobod warehouses. Since 1993 there are private companies that are approved to mediate in buying and selling cocoa between farmers and Cocobod (Ghana Cocoa Board: Internal marketing of cocoa 2013).

Cocobod's control of this sector of the economy has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it gives farmers protection from volatile international markets with changing cocoa prices, on the other it restricts the development of new trade and production initiatives, favouring large companies and organizations.

Also, bigger companies get an advantage in Ghana's internal market, thanks to this government system. To acquire a license for buying and selling cocoa, a company needs to prove that it has the potential to buy at least 2,500 tonnes per year (Ghana Cocoa Board: Sales Policy of Cocobod 2013). Nine of the biggest buying companies in Ghana (that includes the Produce Buying Company – owned by Cocobod) control 95% of the market (Klier 2012: 17).

There are several Fair Trade producers (cooperatives and companies) in Ghana. The biggest one (and one of the biggest in the world) is Kuapa Kokoo – a cooperative of 65 thousand members spread across 1,400 communities in the cocoa belt on the south and central part of Ghana.¹⁶ In contrast to Kuapa Kokoo, almost all other Fair Trade producers in Ghana are cooperatives or plantations with no more than a thousand members or employees. These produce not only cocoa, but also oranges, bananas, cashew nuts, pineapples, coconuts etc.

¹⁶ Based on the interview with Kwame Owusu, the Executive Director of Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union, 10.12.2012.

Fair Trade production in Ghana is dynamic and growing because there is an increasing demand for certified products in Western Europe.¹⁷ For example in the season of 1999/2000 only 3% of total production of Kuapa Kokoo was sold on a Fair Trade basis, whereas in the 2009/2009 season it was 27% (Kuapa Kokoo Union 2013) and in 2012 it was 54%.¹⁸

Communities in Fair Trade

Research has been conducted in 5 communities: one small town (Kwabeng; around 8 thousand people), two big villages (New Koforidua, Aponoapono; around 1.5-2 thousand people) and two small villages (Amankwatia, Attakrom; around 500 people). In all communities the main source of income for most households is the cultivation of cocoa. However in the town (Kwabeng) many members of the families have additional occupations.¹⁹ Inhabitants of the small villages have no possibility of finding work outside agriculture, and would have to leave the village to seek employment. Access to jobs in the bigger villages is limited.

In four out of the five communities there were members of Fair Trade cooperatives. In Kwabeng, the group of FT cooperative members consists of probably no more than 10% of all farmers, in New Koforidua the share is almost 50%, in Aponoapono 80%, in Amankwatia around 70%. Attakrom is the only community examined with no members of any Fair Trade cooperative.

Living standards of the inhabitants of the two small villages (Amankwatia and Attakrom) are similar. In both communities they have similar conditions of life, similar occupations, and have experienced the same changes in the development of their villages in the last 10 years (a new school), although in one case this was due to the government's actions (Attakrom), and in the second it was through Fairtrade premium funds (Amankwatia).

17 Especially for cocoa in the United Kingdom after some positive engagement in Fair Trade by some big food corporations, especially Cadbury and Nestlé.

18 Based on the interview with Kwame Owusu, the Executive Director of Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Union, 10.12.2012.

19 Many women are running small shops or selling on the streets, while men are taxi drivers, barbers, mechanics, etc.

Table 1: Comparison of the level of development of examined villages and towns

	Number of inhabitants	Number of households with agriculture as the source of income	Access to electricity in the house	Access to the water in the house	Number of new homes (built of concrete blocks)	Number of FT cooperative members in relation to the number of farmers
Kwabeng	8000	80%	50%	20%	50%	10% (Kuapa Kokoo)
New Koforidua	1500	90%	20%	10%	10%	50% (Kuapa Kokoo)
Amankwatia	530	100%	0%	0%	0%	70% (Kuapa Kokoo)
Attakrom	500	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Aponoapono	2000	100%	70%	0%	10%	90% (Aponoapono)

Source: Author's compilation based on field research (interviews and observations).

A comparison of communities where inhabitants are members of cooperatives benefiting from Fair Trade and those that are not is possible only at the level of small communities (around 500 inhabitants). Searching for differences in the level of development of small towns in Ghana as a result of Fair Trade is not possible, because there are no towns that have significant numbers of farmers who are members of FT cooperatives. A comparison of big villages is irrelevant, because there are no communities with a high number of FT members and sufficient experience of FT.²⁰

There was no significant difference in the level of development of communities of a similar size. There was only one major communal investment realised through the FT premium money (the secondary school in Amankwatia), although it should be noted that there has been a significant change in the flow of FT funds in Ghana in last 4 years and its impact might not be visible yet.

Farmers and their families in Fair Trade

Among the surveyed respondents were men and women (37%), young farmers (up to 25 years old), middle-aged and older people (up to 80 years old). The largest group were the owners of farms (mostly men over 50 years of age: about 40%). Among the respondents were also

20 In Aponoapono FT had operated for 2 years at the time of the research and the community were in the process of deciding how to spend the FT premium.

people who did not own their farms, but were employed as farmers²¹, getting their wages as a part of the harvest²². In the group of owners and other farmers some were connected to Fair Trade cooperatives and some were not.

Cocoa has two long periods of harvesting in a year. The first harvest is in 2-4 years after planting (depending on the variety of plant). It is cultivated for 15-20 years. All of the respondent farmers had other crops, cultivated mostly for food for their families. Most of the farms are small: 3-12 acres. Average annual income from farming, after deducting the costs of production is 500 - 700 Ghanaian Cedi (GHS)²³. One important thing to note is that those with larger farms don't enjoy significantly higher incomes, due to the high cost of hiring labour and very low purchase prices at the local market.

Fair Trade does not have a noticeable impact on the lives of the respondents. Much more important are other factors: the additional occupations of family members, place of residence (city, village, small village), access to local markets (to sell food crops), and education of the respondents²⁴.

The lowest incomes were those of smallholder farmers living in small villages. The annual cash income of the household there is estimated at around 500 USD, which means that the majority of families were living below the extreme poverty line set by the World Bank. What allows members of the households to survive in good health are the food crops they grow. Low incomes, however, create a barrier to financing the education of children or investing in other sources of income.

Families from medium size communities are in a better situation. They live closer to the market or have members of the extended family working in the cities. But even then their income is not significantly higher than members of households in small villages.

21 So-called shareholder or caretaker farmers.

22 Mostly younger than the owners, often related to them.

23 Equivalent to 262 - 367 US dollars – USD.

24 Higher education, especially English language literacy, allowed the surveyed farmers to look for information about improving the quality of crops and apply new techniques, which positively affected their profits.

Only a few households enjoy higher incomes. The typical pattern of the well-situated rural family is that the owner of the farm²⁵ is a retired government employee (teacher, soldier), which gives him an opportunity to provide his children with a proper education and the possibility of finding a good job in the city. Agriculture alone is not providing a good living for all of the respondents.

Direct benefits for farmers from participating in the FT system vary according to the type of cooperative that they are a member of. In case of Kuapa Kokoo, the benefits were mostly: one free cutlass a year (type of machete - in 14 out of 15 cases), premium for a bag of cocoa sold of 2.5 GHS (around 1.3 USD - normal price of a bag is 110 USD - 3 cases), wellington boots (7 cases), access to pesticides, fungicides or fertilizers (6 cases). Among the benefits for the local community the following were mentioned: a borehole in Kwabeng (1 incidence), a mobile clinic (1 incidence in Kwabeng), a one-time action to supply children's books (1 incidence in New Koforidua), a school in Amankwetia (all incidences in Amankwetia), program of loans for women (1 incidence in Amankwetia).

Most interviewees joined Kuapa Kokoo more than 10 years ago. The most important reason of joining the cooperative was the opportunity to sell to a Kuapa Kokoo storage facility which only takes products from member farmers. Most respondents participated in local meetings of Kuapa Kokoo irregularly. However, they complained that their voices are not taken into account, or that no binding decisions were taken at the meetings. Most respondents indicated also that they were participating in training provided by Kuapa Kokoo, which focused on the use of chemicals (pesticides or fungicides), how to cultivate the land and how to fertilize it.

All respondents in Aponoapono who were ABOCFA members evaluated the decision to participate in the cooperative positively. For them the particularly valuable aspects were the training sessions, especially on cultivation techniques. They also mentioned the benefits of the additional premium from the sales to ABOCFA²⁶. Access to cocoa tree seedlings with discounts was also mentioned twice as a benefit. However, training, sales bonuses and access to seedlings mostly did

25 Usually a man over 50 years old.

26 Part of it was a premium of Fair Trade - 2.6 USD for a bag of cocoa. Total bonus was around 10 USD for a bag of cocoa, but it was mostly for organic production.

not result from their participation in Fair Trade, but through organic production, as a functioning of the cooperative or through the involvement of Agro Eco (a supporting NGO). Nearly half of the respondents mentioned that they regularly take part in all the meetings of ABOCFA (3-4 per year) and training (the two are usually connected), especially young people and inhabitants of the central part of the village.

In both cases (Kuapa Kokoo and ABOCFA) benefits of Fair Trade were almost invisible. Quality of life of the members of cooperatives was at the same level as those from the comparison group. There were many other important factors that created differences in the living conditions of the households and lifestyles of their inhabitants. Fair Trade was not a noticeable factor.

However, benefits to ABOCFA members from participating in the cooperative life and its influence on the decisions of the organization are higher than in the case of Kuapa Kokoo. Also, usage of the Fair Trade funds are also of greater benefit for farmers in case of ABOCFA than it is in Kuapa Kokoo case.

Big Fair Trade cooperatives: Kuapa Kokoo

Kuapa Kokoo is one of the five largest Fair Trade cooperatives in the world. It is frequently cited as a Fair Trade success story. Since its founding in 1993 it has been growing rapidly, reaching as many as 65,000 members in over 1,300 communities in south and central Ghana (Wordpress 2013).²⁷

Kuapa Kokoo is organized at four levels: The Annual Delegates Conference, National Executive Council, District Executive Council and The Village Society. The Annual Delegates Conference is the most important body, which gathers members once a year for a large Annual General Meeting (AGM) - with 2 representatives from each community. At the AGM they decide about the budget and use of the FT premium. The National Executive Council consists of members of the boards of three administrative parts of Kuapa Kokoo (farmers trust, credit union and Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. - the private company owned by the cooperative). The District Executive Council and The Village Society Level have

²⁷ Based on interview with Kwame Owusu, representative of headquarters of Kuapa Kokoo in Kumasi, 10.12.2012.

regional authorities and consist of farmers²⁸ and professional workers of the cooperative (at the district levels) (Kuapa Kokoo: structure 2013). In all visited communities, local organizations are focused around the cooperative's cocoa storage facilities.

The role of Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. is almost exclusively limited to purchasing cocoa from farmers and delivering it and selling to the storages of Cocobod. This activity includes the additional responsibilities of product quality control, storage and transportation. The main source of income of Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. is the difference between the purchase price of cocoa by the state and the purchase price from the farmers (the difference is 9 GHS per bag of cocoa) and investment of the FT premium (e.g. the construction of a warehouse in the port of Tema) (Kuapa Kokoo Limited 2013). All divisions and departments of Kuapa Kokoo are managed by professional managers who are employed by the cooperative.²⁹

Such a complicated and complex structure makes the importance of individual members insignificant. It can be assumed that the real process of decision making at the AGM looks more like an expression of confidence in the steps taken by the office staff or initiative groups. Certainly at the AGM there is no room for constructive discussion or developing the best solutions. It is rather a presentation of the plans³⁰ and a vote on their acceptance or rejection.

A sense of a lack of influence on the actions taken by the headquarters of the cooperative is reflected in the statements of the respondents who are Kuapa Kokoo members. A small part of the respondents³¹ confirmed that representatives of the cooperative office discuss with the community members their needs regarding the use of the FT premium and other investments. Other respondents belonging to the cooperative had never participated in such discussions.

It should be noted that the involvement of members of Kuapa Kokoo in the functioning of the cooperative is usually minimal or none. This is due to not only the ineffectiveness of central office communication

28 Who are voluntary workers in Kuapa Kokoo storage houses.

29 Its office is quite extensive and covers several buildings near the centre of the second largest city in Ghana – Kumasi.

30 Including those for the use of the FT premium.

31 Only in the village of Amankwetia.

and its character, but also a low level of willingness to participate in community life and the low standard of members' education. The lack of motivation to participate in cooperative work is probably related to the lack of decision-making possibilities at the local level. A significant proportion of respondents who were members of Kuapa Kokoo did not seem to even know that they had any impact on the operation of the cooperative. They did not identify the membership with the ownership and the opportunity to influence decision making processes.

The Kuapa Kokoo cooperative has developed a group of people (mostly office employees) who have limited contact with ordinary members of the cooperative. This does not build empathy between employees of the cooperative and its poor owners (members). In practice, most of the members are treated as workers of the cooperative and office workers are treated and act like the management board of a private company. Kuapa Kokoo has a structure and size more similar to a corporation than a cooperative. It also operates more as a corporation than as a cooperative.

Small Fair Trade cooperatives: ABOCFA

ABOCFA is a small cooperative with approximately 400 members in the village of Aponoapono and surrounding hamlets³². It covers about 80% of farmers in the area. Preparation for the process of cooperation began in 2007 at the initiative of the Agro Eco Louis Bolk Institute - an organization based in the Netherlands, which focuses on promoting organic farming (Agro Eco 2013).

Members of the cooperative and its management are strongly associated with the activities of Agro Eco, especially in the area of training in farming techniques and business contacts in Europe. The cooperative sold some cocoa as an organic product for the first time in 2009. Since 2011 it is also a Fair Trade cooperative (the Fairtrade International scheme).

Unfortunately, due to the complex pattern of cocoa trade in Ghana, especially government regulations, the cooperative may not sell cocoa directly. Raw material from the farmer goes to the internal purchasing of ABOCFA, then to the business intermediary (before 2012: Yaya

32 12 nearby settlements

Glover, in 2013: Amayaro), who sells it to a government agency of Cocabod. The commodity goes then to the international dealer from whom it is finally purchased by Tony's Chicolone (the final manufacturer).³³

ABOCFA structure is simple. The main body of the cooperative is the AGM. It elects the board and makes decisions about the use of the FT premium. At the AGM meetings there are 200-300 people attending, so the representation is above 50%. The Board consists of at least five people. An important role in the community is played by the coordinator, who is not a member of the cooperative, but an employee of Agro Eco, and field officers, whose task is to be in touch with farmers. Members of the board and the field officers do not formally answer to Agro Eco, but informal supervision is visible - probably the result of Agro Eco's original leading role in the initiative.

Members of the cooperative get plenty of training, especially in organic farming techniques. Statements from the respondents show that the efforts of Agro Eco and management of the cooperative have resulted in increasing farmers' knowledge of organic farming. However, the level of participation in training is varied and far lower in communities distant from the central village. Also the knowledge transferred is not always remembered and put into practice, so farm productivity does not increase. It is likely that differences in access to training depend on personal contacts between members of the board and the farmer, and, in particular, between field officers and farmers.³⁴

It can also be assumed that the actual involvement of members in the life of the cooperative is small but diversified. Due to the low commitment of members and the lack of clear attempts to involve them in the decision-making, actual initiatives and decisions are made by the Board or groups of initiators and brought forward for positive approval at the AGM. Nevertheless, the representation of members at important meetings and their actual decision making power is higher than in the case of Kuapa Kokoo.

It should be noted that due to organic production, the FT premium is very high³⁵, which meant additional income for the cooperative of 22,000 USD a year. However, as much as 70% of this amount at

33 Based on the interview: Stephen Ashia employee of Agro Eco, Aponoapono, 22.12.2012.

34 Based on observations.

35 622 USD per tonne of cocoa, around 40 USD for a bag.

the moment goes to the organization Agro Eco, which is a reward for its contribution to the development of the cooperative and the community.³⁶


Small and big cooperatives – comparison

In terms of income, it is difficult to see how the farmers associated in the two forms of Fair Trade cooperative differ from each other. Their income is very different, but not dependent on membership in a cooperative. The Fairtrade premium per capita is slightly higher in ABOCFA (55 USD) than in Kuapa Kokoo (53 USD), but ABOCFA members have the direct bonus of the higher price per bag of cocoa sold (5 GHS) compared to Kuapa Kokoo (0-2.5 GHS).

However, in either case it didn't translate into a clear improvement in the living standards of farmers. It should be noted that it is difficult to expect any clear effects that Fair Trade can have on the lives of members of cooperatives, because in the case of Kuapa Kokoo sales of Fair Trade has only been a large share of the total sales since 2008, while in the ABOCFA case no earlier than 2011.

36 Based on interviews with representatives of Agro Eco - Willem-Albert Toose, Nuremberg, 13.02.2013; Steven Asihia, Aponoapono, 22.12.2012.

Figure 1. Comparison of small and large Fair Trade cooperatives



Source: Author’s compilation based on field research (interviews and observations).

It is clear that small organizations operate more effectively than big ones³⁷. They are more transparent and flexible, despite not having a professional office and administration. Also, individual farmers have more impact on the functioning and shaping of the cooperative. In small organizations, it is also easier to see the effects of actions taken or training delivered.

In large, corporate co-operatives, the influence of each member on the shape of the organization is minimal and complex decision-making

37 This observation is also confirmed in 3 other visited Fair Trade organizations: Ahafo-Ano South Citrus Growers & Marketers Association, Cannan Farms Cooperative and Bomart.

structures limit the impact of the majority, emphasizing the role of the minorities of the central authority and the office of the cooperative.

Unfortunately, in both cases there was a noticeable false understanding of the relationship between the farmers and the authorities of the cooperative. Office employees and management have a tendency to treat farmers more like employees than owners of the cooperatives. Also, farmers do not have a sense of ownership of the organizations, but feel subordinate to its authority. This trend seems to be stronger in the case of Kuapa Koko than in ABOCFA and in both cases is probably mainly due to cultural characteristics (low sense of citizenship in society in Ghana). However, in the Kuapa Kokoo case it is also due to the structure and size of the organization, so the problem is cultural as well as institutional.

Summary, remedies

Observations of 5 villages and small towns as well as interviews conducted resulted in the conclusion that there is no substantial difference in the standards of living between farmers who are members of cooperatives benefiting from Fair Trade and farmers from the comparison group.

In evaluating Fair Trade, many researchers³⁸ draw attention to the positive impact of the movement on local communities. In the case of Ghana, evaluation of the Fair Trade impact on communities is not possible due to the low representation of Fair Trade farmers in the local population as well as the large number of other important development factors.

The research resulted in the conclusion that small cooperatives and big cooperatives function differently. Small cooperatives are operating in the interest of their members, while big cooperatives are focused on creating business potential. The study reveals that small cooperatives provide more benefits to farmers while the big ones transform into ventures similar to corporations.

38 See Nelson, Pound 2013.

It seems that the best and easiest solution³⁹ to the problems of Kuapa Kokoo and other big cooperatives is to change the decision-making system around the allocation of the FT premium. I postulate the introduction of a guiding principle for big cooperatives that the details of the FT premium use should be decided at the lowest level of the organization structure (in Kuapa Kokoo's case, the Village Society Level), so that the decision-making process could include all members of the communities. At least 70% of the FT premium funds should be spent this way.

Also, a scheme should be developed to use the FT premium where cooperative members are making decisions - and to call on the advice of sustainable development experts (in the fields of agriculture and community development, for example). This would be of a greater benefit of local communities whose members would have more opportunities for more significant involvement in local life. This solution also leads to better self-governance and conscious citizenship.

The research shows that for long-term development of local communities, the most important factor is to improve crop yields in the long run by using the principles of sustainable development. It is important to organize not only training in cultivation methods, but also to invest in the basic education of the youth. The cooperative ABOCFA with its organic farming project could be a good testing ground in implementing the principles of sustainable development, closely allied to the idea of Fair Trade.

Finally, the main problem faced by cocoa farmers in Ghana is the low market price of the product. With cocoa prices this low, there is no possibility for much improvement in the farmers' quality of life. The great majority of cocoa farmers' families make a living, not from the money generated by their farms, but by the additional food crops they cultivate. The money generated by cocoa sales is not sufficient

39 Separate recommendations should be given for researchers that are conducting studies about Fair Trade. It seems to me that the exact naming of all the actors within the Fair Trade schema is beneficial for the movement. Firstly, it helps to promote good solutions and critique bad ones. Secondly it protects one from extrapolating from one case study to the whole Fair Trade movement. The given examples of a few FT cooperatives functioning in Ghana can be representative neither for whole cocoa sector nor for whole Fair Trade schema, but just for Fair Trade in Ghana and for activities of small and big FT cooperatives.

for survival. This situation won't change unless the price of cocoa for farmers doubles or triples.

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REPORTS

FUTURE AFRICA – CONFERENCE OF THE AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION IN GERMANY (VAD) – BAYREUTH JUNE 11-14, 2014

Petr Skalník

Bayreuth is one of the most prolific Africanist centres in the world, with a number of professorships concerned with Africa, from development via anthropology, literature, economy, linguistics, history, etc. As the president of the University of Bayreuth stressed in his welcoming speech, 33 disciplines in all six faculties are involved in African studies. Bayreuth's Institute of African Studies is one of the major centres participating in the network of AEGIS (Africa/Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies). Part of it is now well-known BIGSAS alias Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies which was recently supplemented by Bayreuth Academy of Advanced African Studies that invites established scholars to carry out research in a congenial atmosphere with all the desirable facilities.

The motto of the reviewed conference, namely "Future Africa", was taken from the Academy's main topic that aims at pointing out the potential of Africa becoming the laboratory of the future. The organizing team led by Georg Klute ably prepared and ran a conference which received nearly 400 paper abstracts. The keynote speaker invited by Klute was Dr Fatima Adamu of Sokoto's Usmanu Dan Fodiyo University. In her address she strived to answer the question "Is Africa Too Poor to Drive Its Future?" Her impassioned speech was received with ovations because she managed to persuade hundreds of listeners that Africa's stocks are increasing in value.

The biennial conferences of the VAD which has taken place since the late 1960s have developed into a major international Africanist event. The stress is on cooperation with Africa but specialists from other continents are welcome. This year about 550 participants arrived in Bayreuth, among them, for example, a substantial group of Indian

Africanists. They organized a special panel on India's involvement in Africa. However, there were 46 other panels at the conference, each attracting its own audience. As it is with most conferences, it was impossible to be present at all of the panels. I attended the above mentioned panel on India with 12 papers, 10 out of them presented by Indian scholars.

The topics varied from very general such as whether India, by its land grabs in Ethiopia and Madagascar, is a new imperialist in Africa, to specific relations of India with Nigeria, South Africa or Lusophone Africa. Related was a panel on Asian traders in Africa which discussed Chinese presence in different countries of the continent. Antoine Socpa reported about the competition between Chinese and African entrepreneurs in Cameroon. Alena Thiel described the ascent of street vendors in Accra who become transnational entrepreneurs in China, the new El Dorado.

Panel 13 convened by Alexander Stroh of GIGA, Hamburg, brought in papers dealing with the future of elections, political participation and representative democracy. Obert Hodzi revealed the commoditisation of elections in Zimbabwe while Irina Turner turned the attention of listeners to the free/born South Africans' deliberate disenfranchisement in South Africa's National Elections. What was very impressive was the workshops of young scholars who discussed questions connected with PhD supervision and mentoring, networking, research ethics and academic writing and publishing as well as the theorizing of social movements. There were also Round Tables concerned with the modernity of witchcraft, African agriculture, digitalization of Africa-related archives and libraries. What is also worth mentioning is the cultural programme which included the future of Nigerian theatre and future of arts, literature and culture in Kenya. The band "The Bigshots from Ghana" enlivened the conference with their well-attended concert. There was also a film programme featuring several pictures by African film makers.

I was fascinated by Panel 34 "Visions of the Future in the History of Africa and the Atlantic" convened by Christine Whyte and Achim von Oppen. John Lonsdale of Cambridge by comparing opposing views of Jomo Kenyatta and Louis Leakey tried to answer the question of Kikuyu ethnic reactions to modernity while Bruce Berman of Queens

University in Canada added Malinowski into the debate on what kind of modernity is/was suitable for Africa. Taking part in this panel prevented me in going to Panel 9 on “Travelling in Africa” convened by Kurt Beck and Rami Wadelnour. The first convenor spoke about technological dramas in the time of transition from absence of regular roads to highways with police patrols, driving licence and roadworthiness controls, road marking and the likes of formal motorism. The other convenor presented an account of the overload and ‘undifferentiated transport of passengers and load’ while travelling long-distances in Sudan. Other participants in the panel such as the Nigerian anthropologist Nnanna Arukwe spoke about Road Safety Law Enforcement in West Africa while Sidy Cissokho of Paris I discussed the reactions of professional unionized drivers to the reforms of urban transport in Dakar. Sebastian Wenz added his findings about the indispensability of fitters to African road transport while Hanna Lena Reich of Bayreuth shared with listeners her experiences of long-distance travelling by bus in Tanzania.

Panel 31 “African capitalisms” was well attended and was convened by Thomas Bierschenk of Mainz. The convenor pointed out that capitalist actors in Africa are under-researched and indigenous African capitalism is treated by Africanists as if it does not exist. The panel showed that the issue is far from settled. Toulouse researcher Anouk Batard examined the Nigerian film industry nicknamed Nollywood as an “unintended baby from the Structural Adjustment Programmes.” Chambi Chachage of Harvard reported about post-national capitalist class in post-Nyerere Tanzania. Michael Stasik of Bayreuth presented an excellent analysis of what he calls ‘vernacular neoliberalism’ on the example of his research of public transport entrepreneurs in Ghana. He showed that their self-regulating economic ingenuity ensured that their business was thriving even when others stagnated. Olabisi Shoaga of Bordeaux considered internet shopping in Nigeria where the standards of goods are unreliable and therefore consumers have to organize themselves into networks of online consumer activists. Florian Schaefer of SOAS discussed new agrarian capitalists in Ethiopia who engage in large-scale coffee plantations and cut flower production. The paper concluded that the understanding of concrete capitalisms in contemporary Africa depends on the combination of empirical studies with the knowledge of history and political economy.

The variety of panels was astounding. Only when I turned all pages of a three hundred page conference catalogue did I notice panel “20 years after Afrofuturism in Aural and Visual Cultures”. Convened by Kerstin Pinther (Free University Berlin) and Hauke Dorsch of Mainz, this panel introduces the width of the concept of Afrofuturism which ‘interrogates the past, present and future in humanities, sciences, religion, and challenges the Eurocentric motifs of identity, time and space’. One only regrets that such fascinating topics might take years before they are published and made accessible beyond the conference presentations. Similarly, the panel called “African movements in globalisation and transnationalisation” convened by Bettina Engels and Melanie Müller ((both Free University Berlin) posed the question of social movements and political struggles in Africa. Engels shows that food price riots in Burkina Faso had an international framework. The conference took place before the recent popular revolution in Burkina and one wonders how Engels could have explained the success of it with reference to the mobilization against the high cost of living in that West African country.

To conclude the writer of the present report would like to stress that the VAD conference was a great success, not only organizationally but especially by exposing the wide spectrum of current African studies and the vocal place of German research on Africa in it.

REVIEWS

Review article: Political Partisanship in Sub-Saharan Africa. Elischer, Sebastian. 2013. *Political Parties in Africa. Ethnicity and Party Formation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 319 pages.

The issues concerning the theory of African political parties have managed to distinctively enter the awareness of professional public in the last decade. Provided that since the year 1961 when the pioneering work of Thomas Hodgkin titled *African Political Parties* was published there were only a few works devoted to African political parties (Morgenthau 1961; Sklar 1963; Coleman - Rosberg 1964; Zolberg 1964) then after the beginning of the process of democratization of the African continent at the beginning of the 1990s we can observe the gradual growth in the interest in these issues not only among the Africanists but also among political scientists and experts interested in the wider processes of transition, democratization and consolidation of democracy with which the establishment and activities of political parties are closely linked.

After being in existence for almost three decades, the one-party systems (one-party state), that de facto emerged in most of the African countries after they gained political independence, the establishment of multi-party political systems in the majority of African countries at the beginning of the 1990s served as a catalyst for their subsequent research.

Since the 1990s Africa has become a real laboratory of modern political science where both Western as well as African specialists study various phenomena of transition, democratization, elections and election campaigns, types of political regimes, processes of (un)fair governance, failed states, the institutionalization of political institutions including institutions of the modern African state and not in the least the political parties.

The current wave of theoretical literature about African political parties was first preceded by a large amount of case studies whose

authors analysed the establishment and development of a political partisanship in various African countries. Those were not always targeted empirical-analytical studies that aimed at capturing the whole (historical) development of a political partisanship. Attention of the authors was devoted to the selected political parties in power (or parliament), the creation of new political systems of evaluation and the political parties in individual elections.

It was only at the beginning of this century that the first attempts of theoretical summary on the establishment, development and character of African political parties from the previous decade have started to appear in specialized political science journals (*Party Politics, Comparative Politics, the Journal of Democracy, Democratization, the Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, etc.) and also in Africanist journals (*African Affairs, the Journal of African Elections, the Journal of Modern African Studies, African Studies, the Journal of Southern African Studies, Africa Spectrum, the South African Journal of International Affairs*, etc.).

Gero Erdmann, Matthias Basedau, Andreas Mehler, Alexander Stroh, Sebastian Elischer, Peter Burnell and many others try to verify some of the latest theories and concepts of political science using the example of African political parties. In connection with the attempt to create universalistic typology of political parties (Diamond - Günther 2001; Günther - Diamond 2003) several studies verifying the applicability of this theory using the example of African countries have since appeared (Erdmann 2004; Basedau - Erdmann - Mehler 2007; Fiala 2012b). The research of African party memberships has very clearly shown that the majority of types of political parties noted by L. Diamond and R. Günther was not much represented on the African continent.

On the top of that G. Erdmann in his research pointed at the necessity to clearly define the character of individual African political parties (e.g. clientelistic, honorary and ethnic parties), so that a misleading overlap of terms did not occur. These studies then opened the way for further discussion about the basic types of African political parties (Basedau at al. 2011; Basedau - Stroh 2012; Bogaards 2003; Bogaards - Basedau - Hartmann 2010) and the influence of ethnicity on political parties (e.g. Posner 2005).

The issue of political opposition is quite a popular topic among the current political scientists focusing on African political systems. This interest most probably arises from the situation that although one-party state has been more or less eliminated in Africa, it is a party system with one dominant or predominant political party (with a constitutional majority) that tends to be gaining ground in African countries (e.g. Olukoshi 1998; Hulterström – Kamete - Melber 2007). These topics are also dealt with in the latest publication by R. Dorenspleet, namely *One-Party Dominance in African Democracies* (2013).

If we carry out an analysis of all fundamental topics of research concerning political parties that have been looked into within the pages of scientific journals and publications then it is the issue of institutionalization of African political organizations that holds the priority.

This topic was opened in 1995 by a couple of researchers, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, who in the introduction of their eminent publication called *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (1995) offered and innovated methodology for the institutionalization of political parties that they have applied to Latin American political parties. Their foundations were in older works of Huntington (1967) or Panebianca (1988) and some other authors.

It is mainly a group of German Africanist researchers based at the GIGA Institute in Hamburg that belong to this category of authors who have been lately engaged in the research of the process of institutionalization of African political parties both in particular countries as well as in larger regions (e.g. Western Africa – mainly Basedau – Stroh 2008, 2009). The issue of institutionalization of African political parties has also been investigated by a number of other authors (Lindberg 2007; Fiala 2012b).

The attention of Africanist political analysts has currently turned towards the issues concerning political membership such as the transformation of national liberation fronts/rebellion movements into political subjects participation in regular free and democratic elections (such as MPLA, UNITA, FRELIMO, RENAMO, ANC, SWAPO, EPLF, etc.), or lately the discussion concerning ideologies of political parties based on the analysis of their political and election programme (van de Walle 2003, Erdmann - Engel 2007; Elischer 2012). The questions

of the relationship between African political parties, African elections and African party systems (Bogaards 2007) have also become a research.

Theoretical research into of individual African political parties and mainly the organization of regular free and democratic elections in many African countries (more than half of the sub-Saharan countries have arranged in the recent past three and more regular multipartite parliamentary and presidential elections in a row) have opened the way to analyse the process of formation and institutionalization of party systems (Bogaards 2004; Randall 2001; Engels 2005; Carbone 2013; Dorenspleet 2013).

Unfortunately other important aspects of the theory of political parties such as their functions, financing, organizational structure, the alternation of party leading elites, member base and other important questions connected with the existence of political parties and their functioning on the political scene currently lack the attention of the political scientists and Africanists. The main reason for this fact is the lack of a deeper knowledge of these issues or the inability of political scientists (and Africanists) to deal with the ideological range (pragmatism?) of African political parties, unclear financing of activities of political parties (this is not just a problem of the African political parties), a lack of knowledge of the practical mechanisms of selection and restoration of political elites and an independent chapter is formed by the (non)existence of political party structures and the lack of information about the member base.

Due to these gaps in research any new monograph that is devoted to the issues of African political partisanship is welcome. The above mentioned work that I would like to pay close attention to in my review article belongs to the latest contributions in the field of research on African political parties. The author is Sebastian Elischer, Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics in a not so widely known Leuphana University Lüneburg, who is also at the same time a research fellow at the above mentioned German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. As it has already been stated, Sebastian Elischer started his academic career in the Africanist department at the institute of GIGA in Hamburg, where he completed his Ph.D. studies. A group of Africanists (members of which include apart from Elischer Alexan-

der Stroh, Matthias Basedau, Andreas Mehler and others) has been created by the late Gero Erdmann who was the pioneer in the field of African political parties. The reviewed publication is then one of many research outputs of this Hamburg based Africanist school of political partisanship.¹

As the subtitle of the reviewed publication indicates, S. Elischer examines the effects of ethnicity on party politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly in Ghana, Kenya, Namibia and partly in Tanzania, Botswana, Senegal, Zambia, Malawi, Burkina Faso and Benin. Unfortunately the justification for the selection of these main three and other seven countries is missing from the introduction. The choice of Ghana, Kenya and Namibia, the three main case studies, covers three geographical areas: West Africa (Ghana), East Africa (Kenya) and South Africa (Namibia).

Also the selection of the other African countries is aimed more or less at these three regions. If we do not consider Botswana and Namibia that usually come under Southern African countries, then it would be the research of political partisanship primarily in the Republic of South Africa that would be worth attention. Central Africa and Horn of Africa (the political partisanship of the African islands would deserve individual attention)² is not covered at all.

The selection of African countries is clearly dominated by former British colonies (six countries) and French colonies (three countries). Namibia used to be under the trusteeship of United Nations that was carried out by the Republic of South Africa. Unfortunately any representative of Lusophone Africa is missing among the selected countries. From the point of view of the development of a party after political independence it is mainly the countries that have undergone the phase of one-party state but Botswana and Senegal represent countries with a multiparty system that has been in existence for a long time. In this selection it is Namibia that tends to stick out a bit because it is the only one that had to fight for its national liberation.

1 Here it is certainly necessary to point out that a similar line of research is also supported at the University of Hradec Králové, where several fundamental publications have come into existence in the last five years that are devoted to the origin and development of African party membership. (Fiala 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, Prouza 2010).

2 The first attempt of detailed analysis is represented by a publication by Fiala 2012c.

It is a speculative question whether the choice of the selected case studies has had somehow influenced the final theoretical findings of the reviewed publication. Nonetheless it has to be appreciated that no other current publications concerning African political parties deals with such a wide sample of countries.

The publication consists of seven main chapters. The first two are dedicated to the character of theoretical anchoring (“Comparative Politics and Political Parties in Africa” and “A New Framework of Comparison for Political Parties”). Three case studies (“Kenya: The Ubiquity of Ethnic Parties”, “Namibia: The Dominance of Non-ethnic Parties”, and “Ghana: The Ubiquity of Non-ethnic Parties”) are then connected to the two theoretical chapters. The sixth chapter called “The Diversity of African Party Politics” mainly tries to carry out a comparative analysis of political parties analysed in the previous case studies while the author widens his attention also to the most powerful political parties in Tanzania, Botswana, Senegal, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Zambia and Benin.

The last chapter “Explaining the Formation of Non-ethnic Parties” is mainly aimed at the verification of the hypothesis connected with the Ethnic Fractionalization Index (Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999), that means that countries which have ethnic core groups (Botswana, Senegal, and Burkina Faso) have a lower ethnic fractionalization index, thus according to the author non-ethnic parties can be expected to predominate in these countries. On the other hand, countries without the ethnic core groups (Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania), have a much higher ethnic fractionalization index, and therefore the ethnic core group parties can be expected to dominate the political partisanship. Nevertheless the research has shown that this hypothesis has been only partially verified (the leading Tanzanian CCM has a non-ethnic character, similarly the cases of Zambia and Malawi are ambiguous from the point of view of verification of the hypothesis ambiguous – p. 257).

The reviewed publication is completed by the Conclusion (“Political Parties in Africa”), in which S. Elischer sums up the fundamental findings of his publication. He also answers the research questions and hypothesis. Elischer comes to the most significant conclusion that the findings of this book shatter dominant assumptions about party

politics in ethnically segmented societies. Ethnic parties are neither inevitable nor ubiquitous. According to the author, “the African landscape is more diverse than conventionally assumed” (p. 261).

On the other hand Elischer does not deny the existence of the ethnic parties on the African continent (the case study of Kenya confirms this thesis), nevertheless he strongly believes that their transformation into a programmatic, catch-all party or other types of political parties is a question of further political development of African countries. In Elischer’s opinion the current “multiparty competition in ethnically segmented societies does not lead to ethnic polarization; rather, it causes parties to widen their social base.” (p. 263)

Further on Elischer denies the validity of the following argumentation that is often stated in literature that the formation of ethnic parties is frequently the lack of industrial revolutions and the ethnic diversity of nations. In his opinion “this proposition no longer holds, because in some countries, ethnic parties dominate, whereas in others, non-ethnic parties have become the norm.” (p. 263).

In the “Conclusion” Elischer devotes significant attention to the role of political parties in the process of democratization. Firstly he points out the cardinal changes in the role of European mass political parties after 1945, in order to come to define four basic features of African political parties in the process of democratization. Firstly he comments on the function of integration and comes to the conclusion that parties do not provide this representative function by incorporating “the people” at large, but by incorporating powerful individuals from the major communities that make up the state” (p. 266). Secondly Elischer claims (unlike many of the contemporary Africanists who have adopted a negative stance on the matter) that parties in Africa, even if programmatic ideas, do express the interests of their citizens (p. 266).

Thirdly Elischer proves by using empirical facts that African party politics is dominated by powerful individuals, not by ordinary party members and that informal elite arrangements are the key to who becomes the leader of a party (p. 266). But at the same time he also adds that the lack of truly democratic nomination procedures does not take away the fact that electorate structuration takes place in Africa

and that African parties provide their electorate with a choice between alternative sets of leaders (p. 267).

Fourthly in connection with ethnic parties Elischer comes to the conclusion that “no robust claim can be made about the relationship between ethnic party systems and democratic consolidation... More detailed research must verify whether ethnic parties are really that much more detrimental to democratization than other party types” (p. 267). Indeed it has begun to show that in some countries ethnic parties can play a positive role in the process of democratization, while in others their existence tends to lead more to the separation of the society. Probably the most significant is Elischer’s last conclusion according to which research on political parties requires a new and more global agenda (p. 267)

No doubt the theoretical anchoring of the reviewed publication is one of its very strong points. In the first introductory chapters the author very clearly deals with the specification of the issue (Comparative Politics and Political Parties in Africa) and the theoretical framework for the research (A New Framework of Comparison for Political Parties). The author’s leading thesis is the statement “that not all African parties are ethnic parties; instead, a wide variety of political party types shape the African political landscape.” (p. 1).

When looking at several hundred political parties and organizations (for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo which is not at all any extreme exception from the situation in other African countries), the above mentioned statement of the author cannot be agreed with. According to the author “a detailed assessment of political parties in several countries indicates that, over time, the political salience of ethnicity is decreasing.” (p. 1).

The author in the very first pages of his publication points out the basic reasons for insufficient scientific results of the research of African political parties. In his opinion scholars interested in African parties had no conceptual framework by which to identify and compare parties. The first phase of the research of African political parties consisted mainly of the research of political partisanship of individual countries that were grounded in the election results or survey data. A very big problem of the majority of the former (but also of some of the current)

research of political partisanship in African countries is the attempt to view them from the Euro-American point of view and by means of contemporary concepts of political parties that are based on the experience from the countries of the North. A major positive feature of the reviewed publication is the fact that the author is well aware of the downsides of the previous research and makes thorough effort to avoid such weaknesses. As far as logical structure it seems that the subchapter called “International party assistance and ethnic parties” does not fit very well. Personally I consider the international party assistance an interference of Euro-American donor structures into the inner political issues of individual African countries. Democracy (and the establishment of political parties) was exported and supported from abroad and by no means can it bring effective results and in the majority of African countries it tends to have a rather negative impact on political partisanship. In my opinion a large number of foreign donors try to play a civilizing role on the African continent though in good faith they do not take into consideration the local political situation, specificities of the African society and requirements for the establishment of democratic structures including political partisanship.

The result of their efforts (including the pressure of significant international organizations such as UN, EU, IMM, WB and leading powers) is the compulsion of African political elites to accept many of the principles of the functioning of a democratic society (political parties, elections, division of political power) without actually reaching the conditions allowing these to emerge in these countries. The last twenty five years in which the process of democratization on the African continent has been taking place provides testimonies of failures of these attempts while also countries that in the long run showed high indexes of success rates of this process (such as Mali) have afterwards totally collapsed.

The Euro-American world goes back to the times of the cold war when it tells the African political elites what to do and how to do it. I also do not know whether it is right that current political scientists speak highly about the successful fight with the ethnical character of African political parties (Elischer 2013: 4-5) and that extensive research, scientific studies and publications (e.g. Bogaards – Basedau - Hartmann 2010, 2012) are devoted to that issue. V.I. Lenin would no doubt be

happy with the current development and would in this context mention his thesis about the digression of some phases of social development.

It is mainly Elischer's sentence that "both Western donors and African governments are keen to create a political playing field in which ethnic parties are absent" (p. 5) that evokes my concern as the reviewer of the publication. Every researcher should ask the question what is the relationship between Western donors and African governments in the question of prohibition of African ethnical political parties. Are the African governments frank when accepting laws prohibiting ethnical political parties or are they only trying to fulfil some of the conditions allowing them to gain economic help or other advantages?

For a Euro-American researcher it is very difficult to gain really credible empirical data concerning African political partisanship that cannot be opposed. As some of the field research that has been carried out by the researchers of our Afro-Latin American department (University of Hradec Králové) in Togo, Ghana, Burundi or Zambia demonstrate it is often a very exacting task just to persuade the respondents to participate in the survey and very often the surveys are limited to in the participation of university educated or literate inhabitants. On top of that the respondents (particularly in the authoritarian regimes) clearly demonstrate anxiety about speaking openly and their answers often sound like the slogans used by political parties.

The three main case studies have similar structures. The chapters start by setting the historical background against which multiparty politics manifested itself from the early 1990s onward, which are divided into several observational periods by the author. With respect to the main goal of the research (the position and role of ethnic parties) the author in each of the three researched countries follows the total ethnical composition of the country and of individual provinces. Before the actual research of individual observation periods the author tries to determine the formation and the rise of the basic ethnic cleavage lines development of which he then follows in the following periods after the year 1990.

Within the research of individual observational periods the author then devotes special attention to legal acts that had an influence on ethnicity and he also examines the issue of factionalism within the

major political parties. The individual subchapters are then aimed at the development of these parties their election programmes, composition and restoration of party elites and internal conflicts for power.

The important empirical data that the author uses are mainly the results of individual parliament elections (referendums), the ethnical composition of the cabinet and data gained from the analysis of political party programmes and election programmes. The author's attempt to summarize the disaggregated results for all political parties where he gathers the information about the party goals, electoral strategy, organizational structure and social base from the point of view of the major political parties can be viewed as very interesting.

Probably the most fundamental question of reliability of the whole research is to answer the basic question of how to assess the "transition" of the originally ethnical political parties into catch-all parties. Mainly it is important to assess the character of the governing political parties that were originally established as ethnic (e.g. SWAPO, Kenyan FORD-K, NDP or SDP) or ethnic alliance parties (such as DTA, Ghana's NPP, Kenyan FORD-A) etc. some of which then transformed into catch-all parties (SWAPO, CoD, NPP, NDC).

In my opinion Elischer's findings concerning mainly SWAPO and partially Ghanaian NPP and NDC are strongly debatable. Generally the ethnic political parties display typically stable electoral and material support mainly in the core ethnic regions. If we really focus our attention to the electoral gains of SWAPO in the areas inhabited by Ovambo and non-Ovambo, then we find out that SWAPO gains almost the same electoral support within all observed periods.

Although SWAPO has been talking for almost 25 years about the countrywide character of its party and carries out so called Namibization of the society, it fails to increase its political gains in non-Ovambo regions. Also the data about ethnical composition of the Namibian cabinet clearly indicate a rising tendency towards Ovamboization (the rise of representation of Ovambo from 47% to 67%). On the top of that, not only in Namibia but also in other clearly ethnic party systems it can be witnessed that the (ethnic) governing political powers try to integrate into the executive also the representatives of other ethnic

groups, in order to “weaken” the ethnical origin of the government and make impression of the multi-ethnic character of the government.

“The countrywide character” of SWAPO is then enhanced by the fact that SWAPO was a national liberation front that led the country to independence and the fact that Ovambo represent 51% of the Namibian population. For these reasons it is not necessary for the leading political elites of SWAPO to overly emphasise their ethnic origin as it is completely obvious and understandable to all voters.

If we leave aside Kenya (in which the author confirmed the ethnical character of the governing political parties) then it is only Ghana that shows electoral gains of the most powerful political parties also in the areas that are not their ethnic core regions. Nevertheless these results could be questioned in Ghana as well when we consider the ethnic composition of individual provinces (a significant migration wave has influenced the multi ethnical character of the provinces).

My argumentation can then be also supported by the fact that the electoral support of neither the NPP nor the NDC in individual provinces has changed significantly. Of course it can be other than ethnic factors that play a role in the stable support of the NPP and the NDC but should for example programmatic values of the Ghanaian political parties play a more significant role than more significant fluctuations than +/- 2-3 per cent would have been registered.

Elischer supports his results with the analysis of political parties and electoral programmes but in the reality of politics it can often be witnessed that even clearly ethnic political parties suppress in their basic party documents their “ethnic origin” with the goal to gain as many electoral votes as possible and they speak for the whole national population.

Probably a more unbiased source for identification of “ethnicity” of (not only) SWAPO would be a research aimed at the ethnic composition of the lower state structures revealing who is the head of administration in non-Ovambo provinces and mainly how are the state resources divided between Ovambo and non-Ovambo regions. Another argument could be the finding how important are ministries occupied by non-Ovambo and how other departments of so called wider governments are allocated (including the position of vice-ministers, etc.).

Another problematic area of the research is the author's emphasis on only the most powerful political parties. Should he have incorporated in the research the majority of parliament (possibly also the non-parliament) political parties, then he would no doubt have reached the opposite conclusion that the ethnic and multi-ethnic political parties still play a very important role in the political process in Africa. In Namibia alone there are about 20 active parliament and non-parliament political parties from which the vast majority has undoubtedly an ethnic character without a shade of doubt (Fiala 2013b: 83-128).

Though having certain doubt about the overall credibility of some of the above mentioned conclusions, I have to state that the reviewed book it is one of the best and complex contemporary analyses of the political partisanship today. S. Elischer has chosen a very in-depth composed methodology for the research, he carried out a very detailed research of three selected countries (a less detailed one of some other ones) and he has presented some new daring conclusions that are based on the carried out analysis and comparisons of the gained data. It is very probable that his findings will be confirmed by the development of the political partisanship in future decades (the transformation of ethnic/multi-ethnic parties into catch-all, or programmatic parties) and that his work is going to be considered pioneering in the future. Nevertheless in my opinion we are at the beginning of the process of the transformation.

I strongly recommend the reviewed publication not only to the specialized Africanist academic community including students but to all interested in political partisanship not only in non-European areas, but mainly in the Euro-American areas. A long time of overlooking the African political partisanship has finished and world experts on political parties and party systems should focus their attention on this fast developing continent.

Vlastimil Fiala

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Klíma, Jan. 2014. *Dějiny Kapverdských ostrovů, Svatého Tomáše a Princova ostrova* (History of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe). Praha: Lidové noviny, 278 pages.

Although Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe are small islands in the Atlantic Ocean, their history represents an important fragment of the mosaic history of sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, the Cape Verde islands are unique due to the harsh natural conditions that formed the population imported there by slave ships from all the countries of Africa, which unified the Portuguese rule. São Tomé and Príncipe are unique due to the tropical nature and the history of slavery, which have in the past made it into a significant exporter of cocoa.

The history of each nation is an important source for understanding the present and for understanding what direction it will develop in the future. In this category we can include the *History of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe* by Jan Klíma, who is a prominent expert on the history of Portugal and the Lusophone countries in Africa, the Americas and Asia.

The book describes the history of two countries, therefore it is divided into two separate sections. The first describes the history of Cape Verde and the second the history of São Tomé and Príncipe. At the beginning of each section there is a geographic summary, which allows the reader to classify both destinations according to geography and by fauna and flora.

The book provides a chronological order of events from the discovery of the islands, which launched the beginning of the history of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe through a dark period of colonialism, represented by the African slave trade, the decolonization process, and finishes with the current situation. Jan Klíma managed sensitively to link the history of both countries with the history of their former colonial power Portugal which is further connected through European and world history. The reader is surprised by the amount of detailed information on the history of the two countries, which testifies to the excellent work of the author with archival materials. São Tomé and Príncipe have been the site of some major historical events (such as the massacre Batepá) and other events of a curious nature (the establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan). The

History of Cape Verde surprises everyone, its peaceful decolonization, as well as the smooth transition from a one party system to a democracy, in which the alternation of power as a result of free elections is a common instrument of change. For political scientists and social researchers the chapter on decolonization and contemporary politics of both countries are particularly valuable. Czech readers will surely appreciate the chapter on the relations between the Czech Republic and the Cape Verde Islands. The most notable event in this chapter is the fact that Cape Verdeans were inspired by the Czech Sokol gymnastic movement system.

Each separate section of the book is provided with extensive annotations. The book also includes a detailed extensive register and list of sources and literature, which contains mainly Portuguese sources. The text book is appropriately complemented by illustrative photos. The book of Jan Klíma *History of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe* combines an interesting text for readers with scientifically relevant information.

Petr Sobotka

Van der Waal, Kees (C.S.), ed. 2014. *Winelands, Wealth and Work. Transformations in the Dwars River Valley, Stellenbosch*. Ed. Kees (C.S.) van der Waal. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal. viii, 247 pages.

South Africa has been busy removing the injustices of the apartheid era for the past 20 years. The legacy of apartheid includes among others separate living of former population categories as they were defined and created by the apartheid regime. Separate living is closely connected with social class and income. In other words poverty and wealth have been distributed along the lines of divisions of population registration and group areas. As is well-known, “The New South Africa” instead of revolutionary expropriation of white capitalists chose a gradualist redistribution model combined with the adoption of the non-white elite into the neo-liberal capitalist system. Thus a minority of the formerly disadvantaged joined the middle and upper

classes while the overwhelming majority still languish in poverty, are unemployed and have low social status.

The apartheid legislation was abolished a quarter of a century ago. Theoretically people formerly classified as white, coloured, black and Asians may live where they like. But this is easier said than done. The present reality of South Africa is that the geography of poverty and wealth continues to largely overlap with the long abolished categories. Affordability of right is more powerful than the right itself. One has the right to live better, and anywhere, but cannot afford it. To give an example leading us to the book under review, people formerly classified as coloured and black further stay in separate townships around Stellenbosch while middle class people formerly classified as white continue to inhabit their spacy and comfortable houses and flats in Stellenbosch town. There has been hardly any movement to town from townships and certainly no movement from town to townships!

The volume under review results from an interdisciplinary research by a group of investigators gathered around Kees van der Waal, a seasoned anthropological fieldworker based at the University of Stellenbosch. The subject of their research are people living in several villages in Dwars River Valley. These are people formerly classified as coloured. The valley is situated to the north, in the immediate vicinity of Stellenbosch, a wealthy town with a mostly “white” population. The process under study is transformations, a term used in South Africa for the active surmounting of the vestiges of apartheid. In concrete terms the research was focused on the social experience of transformation of the Dwars River Valley inhabitants. They have been living in the villages of Pniel, Kylemore, Lanquedoc because they were settled there as former slaves and since their liberation in the 19th century as workers in agricultural estates owned by whites. Private landownership emerged as a result of conquest by white settlers who came to this part of the Western Cape at the close of the 17th century, i.e. soon after the establishment of the first Dutch colony of Cape Town. The main agricultural products were wheat and wine, while wine has been today exported around the world. The Cape Winelands, to which the Dwars Rivier Valley belongs, is one of the most beautiful parts of South Africa because the undulating vineyard countryside, created by human activity, is surrounded by wild rocky peaks. Wine estates and some houses in Stellenbosch boast old Dutch colonial architecture

which adds to the historical romantic impression of visitors. The latter are wealthy people, both South Africans and the ever increasing stream of foreigners.

While the transformation legislation has been aimed towards economic and social emancipation of the working population, the neoliberal capitalism following its inner logic opposes these official intentions and endeavours by actions leading to the financial maximisation of land use. The tendency is away from agricultural production towards lucrative recreational or permanent housing (gated communities), and land speculation. At the same time, some self-declared (white) philanthropists while developing highly profitable capitalist projects launch development schemes ostensibly aimed at improving the lot of (coloured) inhabitants of villages located on or near land estates owned by them. In the case of Solms-Delta Wine Estate, the paternalist owners went so far as making the workers co-owners of the estate. However, the decision-making remains firmly in the hands of Mr Solms and his partners.

The editor and the contributors to the volume under review are well aware of the ambiguities of both transformation and development concepts. The background for the implementation of socio-economic changes is continuous ownership of the best agricultural land by major private companies. The Boschendal estate comprising 9500 hectares changed owners three times during the last hundred years. Profitability has of course priority while improving the living standards of the workers living in the valley villages copies that what is politically correct in this or that time period. "Transition" for the present Boschendal owners does not really mean empowerment of the marginalized villagers but in fact boils down to enhancing profitability represented by property developments such as the Founders Estates, combined with the production of famous wines and some cattle breeding, in brief making the owners richer by way of orientating to rich customers, local and international. The opacity of neo-liberal meaning of "development" and "transformation" is obvious.

While the volume is able to reveal the perversion of post-apartheid South Africa in the example of Dwars River Valley, it seems to be satisfied with lamenting. No way out of the highly contradictory, in fact mutually opposed, predicament is offered or even attempted. This,

unfortunately, is the dilemma of South African academia. Academics are part of the local middle class and as such are unable to seek radical or revolutionary solutions.

Helplessness is not limited to the authors of the chapters, it is characteristic of the de facto segregated inhabitants of the valley villages as well. These people are pictured as seeking merely symptomatic remedies such as neighbourhood watch or female entrepreneurship. But these are at best small exercises in nascent empowerment. The underdog position remains unchanged, masters-landowners can continue with their sinister scheming. The excellent chapter by Tracey Randle documents certain social mobility features, especially in Pniel. “Slow violence”, the term coined by R. Nixon, is shown by Randle graphically in the case of retrenched forestry workers who applied for state-owned Meerlust Bosbou land on which their houses stood. Although the government supported this application and even planned to build additional 600 houses, the commercial farmers in the vicinity quickly formed a landowners’ association in order to prevent the social housing development under the pretext that the value of their properties would go down. These landowners, no doubt rich whites (the book carefully, and politically correctly, avoids using the apartheid population categories), won and the housing project was suspended. Randle nevertheless believes in “new futures and solutions” of the legacy of slow violence in Dwars River Valley.

Another chapter on slow violence of poverty is by a psycho-ethnographer Lou-Marié Kruger. This experienced researcher draws a vivid picture of what I would call the practice of poverty and wonders to what extent researchers reproduce and produce societal discourses and thus contribute to the misrecognition of the poor while economic liberalisation advances. The afterword by Steven Robins, professor of social anthropology at Stellenbosch, praises the book for showing the complexities of the historically evolved inequalities and cases of agency. Though whether sustainable development will indeed take place in Dwars River communities is a question for him. Personally I believe that dependency path of previous and current capitalism in South Africa does not allow more than a very slow process of empowerment by way of paternalistic interventions.

REVIEWS

The book is richly illustrated by colour and black and white photographs; there is a detailed index at the end of the book.

Petr Skalník

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https://portal.ff.uhk.cz/politologie/modern_africa_journal-425.html

Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society is a journal published by the Department of Politics in the Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové. It is a peer-reviewed academic journal published in English, which makes accessible original texts covering important political, social and historical themes concerning the continent of Africa. Its editorial policy encourages an interdisciplinary approach, involving the humanities and social sciences, including politics, history, sociology, anthropology, gender studies, environmentalism, development studies, etc.

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ISSN 2336-3274

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