



Univerzita Hradec Králové
Filozofická fakulta

Czech Association for African Studies

This issue is dedicated to the memory of Terence Ranger



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OBITUARY

How to write the history of Africa – Terence Osborn Ranger (November 29, 1929 – January 3, 2015)

To say that Terence Ranger was not always an historian of Africa would ring hollow, but it is true. His doctoral dissertation at Oxford was on Richard Boyle, first Earl of Cork, as part of the 16th/17th-century history of Ireland. Then, in 1957, he went to Southern Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe), where he joined the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as a lecturer to teach Early Modern and Late Mediaeval British and European History. He was well prepared to work in archives and started archival work in the National Archives at Salisbury, where he began to study the history of South-Central Africa, mostly the period 1896-1930.

From the beginning, he befriended many outstanding black politicians, such as Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and others, and became a member of the National Democratic Party. So he participated, together with his wife Shelagh, in opposition activities to the white government. He became a hero for his African students after he was once thrown by a white policeman into a water pool during a demonstration.

In 1963 he was deported from Rhodesia and went on to the University of Dar es Salaam in the newly independent Tanzania. He became a professor and head of the new History Department, where he initiated modern forms of historical research. Up until this time, European historians believed that black Africa did not have its own history as there were no written sources. One of those historians was Ranger's former supervisor from Oxford, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Professor of Modern History. Terence Ranger opposed this view and tried to form a national (or nation-oriented) history of Africa. Apart from finding written sources (there were not as many of them in Tanzania's archives as in former Rhodesia) he came to collect oral traditions of representatives of local ethnic groups with the help of his students. The other problem with African national history at that time was the so-called

Eurocentric point of view. Ranger was one of the first historians to diverge from this position.

It was exciting for me to meet him in Dar es Salaam on my way to Zambia in 1967. Terence Ranger was a good friend of Ivan Hrbek, my supervisor and one of the first Czech Africanists. Simultaneously, Zbyněk Malý, my friend from the Oriental Institute in Prague with an interest in the history of East Africa, was a member of Ranger's team for a short while. At the University there were also the best Africanists, such as the professor of political studies, David Kimble, who with his wife Helen edited *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Both gave us opportunities to publish reviews of newly published books on African history and very soon they published one of my first papers on the modern history of Rhodesia and Zambia.

From Tanzania Ranger went to the University of California, Los Angeles (African History, 1969-74), then to Manchester (Modern History, 1974-87) and finally to Oxford (Rhodes Professor of Race Relations, 1987-97). There I had my second opportunity to meet him in the year 1992 and spend a nice time discussing modern Southern African history with him. At the time, he was very optimistic about the political situation in those countries and the possibilities to write their national history. He was always very busy writing.

His bibliography is long and varied. There were many books and papers on modern history of former Rhodesia, such as such as *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7: A Study in African Resistance* (London: Heinemann, 1967), *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930* (London: Heinemann, 1970) and *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study* (London: James Currey, 1985).

His theoretical approach to African history is seen in his and Eric Hobsbawm's famous edited volume *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

There were many other books and papers, written and published mostly after Ranger's retirement in 1997 and his partial return to Zimbabwe to bolster the postgraduate education in the History Department at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare. During this time, and mainly at the beginning of the 21st century, he witnessed how the nationalist government in independent Zimbabwe carried out systematic atrocities

against the black citizens of western Zimbabwe and later against white farmers. Once again, Ranger found himself aligned with the victims of the state. He became very unsatisfied with the ideology of the ruling ZANU/PF and its policy to produce a so-called “patriotic” history. This policy went against his whole-life principle as it was explicitly antagonistic to academic historiography. We can see in Ranger’s last and rich literary production that he never betrayed his views as in his books *Are We Not Also Men? The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-64* (London: James Currey, 1995); *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999); *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the “Dark Forests” of Matabeleland* (with Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, Oxford: James Currey, 2000) or *The Historical Dimensions of Human Rights and Democracy in Zimbabwe*. Volume 1: *Pre-colonial and Colonial Legacies*; Volume 2: *Nationalism, Democracy and Human Rights* (edited with Ngwabi Bhebe, Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2001-03).

During this period he continued his research on Shona and Ndebele history, finding many new sources in archives. He also collected oral traditions, mainly in the Bulawayo suburbs among poor Africans. The result was his monograph *Bulawayo Burning: The Social History of a Southern African City, 1893-1960* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2010). Terry Ranger once said that he wrote his book as a tribute to the late Zimbabwean writer Yvonne Vera and her novel *Butterfly Burning*. His final work was *Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalism, 1957-67* (Woodbridge: James Currey/Harare: Weaver Press, 2013). I am confident that he dedicated his books to all Africans, not only to those in modern Zimbabwe.

Otakar Hulec

Editorial Note

See also: An Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) Tribute to Terence O. Ranger, compiled by Timothy Scarnecchia, Teresa Barnes, and Peter Limb, *ACAS Review* 89, April 8, 2015, incl. bibliography, URL: <http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/rangerbulletin1.pdf>

EDITOR'S NOTE

With this issue we enter the third volume of *Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society*. We are slowly coming of age. The texts submitted multiply and we are sometimes struggling to find suitable anonymous reviewers which delays the preparation of an issue for the printer. We settled with Oftis, located in the eastern Bohemian town of Ústí nad Orlicí. The suggestion sent to the Institute of African Studies at Bayreuth to cooperate in the production of the journal was not accepted, so for the time being the Hradec team is solely responsible for the editing while the webpage is further cared for by Bayreuth computer wizards, led by Georg Klute who is a member of the editorial board. I went to Paris to attend ECAS 6 and I used that occasion for promoting the journal among the more than a thousand Africanists present there. We launched a subscription drive so that we can at least to some extent cover the editorial and printing expenses.

This issue is dedicated to the memory of Terence O. Ranger, a great historian of Africa, and especially Zimbabwe, who died early this year. Otakar Hulec volunteered to write an obituary. The five articles included in this issue are a varied evidence of Africanist scholarship of mostly young researchers from Africa and Europe. Matthew Sabbi puts to scrutiny the local government in Ghana through the analysis of local political actors and their competition. Gabriel Szuma broaches a very burning topic of modern maritime piracy with special emphasis on Somalia. Aneta Kříčková, our assistant executive editor, examines the socio-economic effects of the South African Reconstruction and Development Programme implemented during the presidency of Nelson Mandela. Tamer Abd Elkreem critically examines the controversial Kajbar Dam project on the Nile north of Khartoum. Finally, Erika Dahlmanns submits to scrutiny the use and abuse of the Intore warrior tradition in present-day Rwanda. The articles are followed by two reposts about the conferences which took place this year. Reviews are still not numerous but I would like to thank those publishers and institutions who began to send us review copies of their recent publications and express the hope that the reviews of them will appear as soon as possible.

To conclude, let me say that *Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society* slowly but surely gains prestige as a journal which discovers young talents and confirms tested standards in African studies.

Petr Skalník

THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF LOCAL POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE MAKING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GHANA

Matthew Sabbi

Abstract: There have been enormous institutional reforms in the Ghanaian local public administration with the stated aim of the active participation of local actors in the development of decision-making. Yet the institution-building discourse and practice do not often emphasize the role of local political actors in the institution-building and development processes. Indeed, the roles played by these local political actors, viz. assembly members, who shape and negotiate the institutional reform processes have not been properly explained and our understanding on how they influence the task of the local administration remains limited. This paper analyzes the roles played by these actors and the extent to which they shape the local public administration and its institution-building processes. Empirical data from two local government structures in Ghana show how these local political actors, straddling between the twilight of their private-political interests and the local administrative structures, exert pressure, lobby but also contest bureaucrats who perform the everyday tasks of their local governments. This complex interaction of actors and their interests makes the tasks of the local public administration difficult and the very idea of institutional change remains increasingly problematic.

Keywords: *Local political actors; bureaucrats; local government; institutional reforms; competing interests*

1. Introduction

Institution-building in developing countries constitutes an important agenda in contemporary development policy (Johnson 2001; Smoke 2003; Romeo 2003).¹ In Ghana as elsewhere in Africa, reforms in

1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the Conference of the African Studies Association in Germany (VAD) on Future Africa in June, 2014 in Bayreuth, Germany. I am

local public administration were framed within the international discourse on good governance and participatory development following the crises of state over-centralization in the 1980s (see Thomi 1999, 2000b). Subsequently, these reforms have been substantial (Gilbert, Hugounenq and Vaillancourt 2013) and are intended to enhance the participation of local level actors in development decision-making. While the promise of participatory development is becoming increasingly difficult to keep (Crook 2003; Crawford 2008; Awortwi 2011), different actor groups exploit opportunities and ambiguities in the structure as alternative modes of participation in various ways. Therefore the norms in form are very different from those in operation (Lowndes and Leach 2004) for the local public administration. Public administration is used here to describe the ability of the local state bureaucracy to employ available resources to meet the needs of local residents.² In Ghana, the local public administration comprises admixtures of bureaucrats and local political actors (e.g. assembly members and unit committees) and although the latter shape and negotiate the reform processes in myriad ways, their influence has largely been obscured and less explained. Their influence is expressed, for instance, in their persistent rejection of presidential nominees as heads of their respective district assemblies (DAs) as well as the constant strife between the DAs and their executive units throughout the country.³ These behaviors are competing because they challenge and sometimes subvert the local administrations in the performance of their everyday tasks. Against that backdrop, this paper elaborates on the roles played by these ‘semi-periphery actors’⁴ and the extent to which they contest and shape the content of the local administration and its institutional reforms. The paper proceeds with a discussion on changes in the local government system and situates them within

grateful for the helpful comments by panelists on the Competing Development Paradigms and the Future of Good Governance in Africa.

- 2 Nicholas Henry’s (1975) article on the complexity of defining the subject within the domains of administrative sciences, political sciences, and public administration is very informative.
- 3 Between 2013 and 2014, the local media carried information on the practices of the local political actors across the country: “Kassena-Nankana assembly rejects president’s nominee for DCE,” 2013; “Upper Denkyira West assembly rejects DCE,” 2013; Zoure 2014; “Wa East district assembly fails to confirm DCE,” 2014; “Dormaa East assembly fails to confirm chief executive,” 2014) as well as tensions between assembly members and DCEs or local government ministers (see e.g. Freiku 2013).
- 4 Following closely Lund’s (2006) concept of twilight institutions, we use semi-periphery actors to describe these local political actors to the extent that they straddle between the twilight of formal institutions and informal norms in pursuit of their personal-political interests.

an institutional frame of reference. After briefly describing the data and methods, the roles and competing interests of the political actors vis-à-vis bureaucrats in the daily routines of the local administration are examined. Some perceptions of the public regarding the local government system conclude the discussion.

2. The Local Public Administration and Institutional Reforms

Local government and decentralization are concepts that have been used interchangeably but in this paper, we distinguish the two to reflect local government as the structure that defines the roles and expectations of participants in local public administration while decentralization simply put is the policy that gives political and administrative authority for managing the activities of the former (see Olsen 2007). Indeed, local governments thrive, to a large extent, on the amount of deconcentrated and devolved authority assigned to them (Johnson 2001). Local governance in Ghana could be traced to the colonial system which organized it around chiefdoms (Gilbert et al. 2013) but its modern character emerged only in the post-independence era when successive governments made efforts to devolve authority to sub-national and local units. Even so, the programs involved highly centralized devolution at regional and district levels to the neglect of communal participation. Local government took on a new look only in 1988 when the government embarked on a comprehensive policy to decentralize with the enactment of the Local Government Law, 1988 (PNDCL 207), Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) and supported by other laws and legislation instruments (LIs).⁵ The policy sought to devolve power, competence and resources to local units while the local government ministry exercises a supervisory role (Thomi 1999; Kumi-Kyereme, Yankson and Thomi 2006). However, there has since been an unending cycle of reforms in the local government setup and a few examples will suffice to highlight this point. In 2003, the Local Government Service Act (Act 656) separated the local government setup from the core civil service. In 2004, the Local Government (Establishment) (Amendment) Instruments sought to re-organize

5 Supporting legislations were the 1992 Constitution, such as the Civil Service Law, 1994 (PNDCL 327), the National Development Commission Act of 1994 (Act 479), the National Development Planning Systems Act, 1994 (Act 480), and the District Assemblies Common Fund Act, 1993 (Act 327).

the sub-district structures in three metropolitan assemblies with LI 1804; LI 1805; LI 1806 for Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi respectively. In 2009, the Local Government (Department of District Assemblies) (Commencement) Instrument (LI 1961) sought to bring all decentralized departments in a district under the authority of the DA. In 2010, the Local Government Creation of New Districts Instrument (LI 1983) sought modalities to carve out new districts from existing ones. Although the DAs and their institutional reforms were initially received with enthusiasm, the development and poverty reduction hopes have remained far-fetched (see Crook 2003; Crawford 2008).

2.1 The Local Government and Participatory Development

The DAs are the main arena for devolved authority and thus the focus of local government analysis. Within the regions, the local government structure comprises three main institutions namely the regional coordinating council (RCC) at the apex on the regional level, the district assembly at the intermediate level, and sub-district structures of sub-metropolitan district councils, town-zonal-urban-area councils and the unit committees (see Figure 1).⁶

6 The regional coordinating councils are at the apex of the local government structure but they only have supervisory roles; the districts assemblies are the only bodies with mandate to make autonomous and decentralized policies for the local administration.




Figure 1: Structure of Local Government in Ghana

Source: Author’s construct based on legislations in use since 2012

Participatory development and poverty reduction remain central to the creation and reforms of the local governments. The legislation establishing the local government (Act 462) empowers the DAs as the principal entities responsible for development planning, regulation of infrastructure, local economic activities, sanitation issues and general delivery of local public goods and service. Development plans (including those of the sub-district structures) and budgets of the district are prepared in collaboration with the RCC and approved by central ministries and their agencies. The DAs receive remittances from the central government (i.e. the district assemblies’ common fund) but their ability to generate local revenue to finance their development plans and the needs of local residents is central to their existence. Act 462 again enjoins the DAs where appropriate, to delegate any of its functions to the substructures namely sub-metro district council,

town, area, zonal or urban council or unit committee or any other body or person determined by the DA. Yet the same Act allows the DAs to inhibit the participatory functions of their substructures because the latter, on the one hand, are supposed to be the local arena for popular participation in development decision-making. They are to identify taxable individuals and items in their locality, raise voluntary contributions for development and make local action plans for inclusion in their DA's development plan. However, they have no independent legal status (Ayee 2000; Crawford 2008) and their functions are based on the prerogative of the DAs. The substructures are thus often reduced to revenue collection units for their respective local governments.

2.2 The District Assembly and its Composition

The term 'district' designates a geographic precinct over which a DA exercises its jurisdiction (see Act 462). Three classifications of DAs are made based on their demography and degree of urbanization and they are presently composed as: a four-tier metropolitan assembly (6) with a population of more than 250,000; a three-tier municipal (56) and district assembly (154) with populations of more than 95,000 and up to 75,000 respectively. Taken together therefore, there are 216 DAs and thus depicting a dramatic increase from 110 in 1993, 139 in 2004 and 170 in 2008. The sub-district structures viz. sub-metropolitan district council (only in the metropolitan assembly); town-zonal-urban-area councils; and unit committees are mainly administrative sub-divisions without an independent legal status (Ayee 2000) to make binding decisions which have implications for their functions relative to the DAs. The local government structure has two strands of authority namely the general assembly and the district administration. The general assembly is semi-elected and composed mostly of elected representatives (70%) and the rest (30%) is appointed by the president.⁷ DA elections are held every four years and a presiding member (PM) is elected for a two-year (re-renewable) term from among the members of the DA. Apart from presiding over the general assembly, the PM's functions are largely honorary and ceremonial (Gilbert et al. 2013).

7 The appointees were supposed to be professionals, e.g. educationists, lawyers, engineers, etc. whose expertise would complement the local development policy making of the DAs. The current practice often involves the appointment of followers and sympathizers of the incumbent government who have little or no professional skills (see Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2007).

2.2.1 The District Administration

Within each DA, the executive and administrative functions are performed by an executive committee whose members (composed of up to one-third of the total number of assembly members, excluding its chair person) are elected by the DA members. The executive committee is chaired by the district chief executive (DCE)⁸ with the district coordinating director (head of the public servants) as secretary. The DCE is appointed for four years by the president (i.e. a central government representative) and approved by two-thirds of the DAs' voting members. The executive committee coordinates the work of the various subcommittees of the assembly e.g. development planning, works, security, finance and general administration. It also executes the decisions made by the general assembly, supervises the running of district services, and executes the development plans of the substructures. As the chair of the executive committee and the political head of the district, the DCE wields considerable power in the assembly. The full-time status of the administration (and the executive committee) and the honorary, part-time status of the DAs breed a sense of domination of the later by the former (Thomi 2000a). This complexity is a major source of tension within the local government structure and reinforces the perception of its ineptitude. Indeed, reforms in 2009 (LI 1961) attempting to re-organize all decentralized departments from central government ministries to the DA have been resisted by some professional groups. Many of the departments in practice continue to operate as deconcentrated departments sharing much of their responsibilities with their parent ministries and regional directorates⁹.

2.3 Assembly Members and Participatory Development

The general assembly of the DA has two categories of assembly members: elected and appointed members. Elected members serve a four-year term and are eligible for re-election for as long as they wish. The assembly members, as liaison officers between the electoral area and the DA report the needs, aspirations and grievances of the elector-

8 This title designates the executive head of a district; metropolitan and municipal chief executives are eponyms for heads of metropolitan and municipal assemblies respectively.

9 Attempts at integrating the deconcentrated departments into the local government structure have been met with fierce resistance by professional groups such as teachers, medical doctors, forestry officials, etc.

ates to the assembly. They, in turn, communicate the decisions of the DA to the electorates through meeting forums with productive and economic groups in their electoral areas. They are supposed to organize and participate in communal and development activities in their electoral areas. Assembly members are legally entitled to serve on the sub-committees of their DA. Starting from 1988 six district level elections have been held: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010. To strengthen their participatory development functions, reforms in 2010 (LI 1983) sought to streamline local political actors (e.g. assembly members and their unit committees) to participate actively at the substructures. However, the reforms have often lacked clarity especially with regards to the composition of the sub-metro district councils and the tenets of popular participation means in development decisions they have largely been obscured. The promise of participatory development thus remains only remotely plausible (Crook 2003). Indeed, with most of the sub-metros dominated by political appointees, the rationale for these appointments as professional with specific expertise seems to have been systematically abused; a trend labelled the 'appointment of party foot-soldiers' (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2007). Given that the DAs are the arena for devolved policy making, it is important to understand how these shifts in authority affect the interaction between the bureaucracy and elected officials in the local administration.

3. Analyzing Institutional Reforms in Local Public Administrations

Discussions on local government institution-building are often premised on making the institutions perform better but this is not always the case. The factors that inhibit change lie much outside as within the local political setting. Institutional change is particularly difficult because institutional actors have the ability to enact and exploit ambiguities in their own favour; institutions thus rather stay somewhat the same (Lowndes 2005; Lowndes and Leach 2004). From neo-institutional arguments, institutional reform ideas and change processes in developing countries spread through the global world culture but their adoption is not meant for efficiency and effectiveness as often conceived (see Meyer and Rowan 1991). The institutional ideas are rather adopted for achieving more legitimacy in their institutional environment. However, incoherencies between the daily routines

and the adopted ideas result in decoupling of the change models i.e. adopting the new reforms but deliberately keeping them from their action-structure so the reforms do not affect their decision-making. Decoupling is seen as endemic (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) in world society (Meyer 2010) especially in developing countries because they adopt complicated reforms that they are unable to implement (Brunsson 1989, 2006; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, and Røvik 2007). A complex interaction between actors that shapes the change processes and enhances decoupling is rather explicated by the actor-centered institutionalism. This approach posits that institutional actors have varied self-interests which are tied to specific behavior strategies based on expected outcomes (Scharpf 1997, 2008). Actors may opt for outcomes that address their self-interests when faced with constraints of choosing between optimal organizational outcomes and individual interests. This tendency on the part of institutional actors mean institutional change processes could only yield sub-optimum outcomes (Scharpf 2008; Lowndes 2005). The institutional approach is used to analyze the complexity of change in the Ghanaian local administration with multiple institutional actors who pursue different interests.

4. Methods and Data

The study used multi-sited and multi-level approaches to gather data in two administrative regions in Ghana namely Ashanti and Upper West. This selection was informed by their location and experience with local administration (Aye 1996) and focused on two local government structures: Kumasi metropolitan assembly (KMA) and Wa municipal assembly (WMA) (details in Table 1). The Ashanti region, located in the middle belt of Ghana has a long-standing experience of civil administration which dates back to the colonial period compared with its Upper West counterpart, a relatively young region in the northern belt created in 1983¹⁰. An extensive fieldwork project was conducted from June to October, 2013 and August to October, 2014 and employed multiple methods including in-depth interviews to understand the

10 The main study from which this paper is derived compares the regions' experiences in the implementation of administrative reforms. The focal organizations include the regional coordinating councils, decentralized directorates of agriculture and health, the local government ministry and the local government service secretariat. However, only views from the political actors and bureaucrats within the DA structures are discussed here.

interface between reforms, actors’ interests and the tasks of the local governments from well-informed actors. Again, actors in the sub-metropolitan district councils, zonal councils, town councils and unit committees from the two assemblies were interviewed.

Table 1: Summary Information on the Local Administration Structures

Local Government Structure		
District Characteristics	Kumasi	Wa
Region	Ashanti	Upper West
District Population*	2,396,458	127,284
District Type	Metropolitan	Municipal
Substructures	9 Sub-Metro Councils	1 Urban Council
	21 Town Councils	6 Zonal Councils
	92 Unit Committees	72 Unit Cttees

Source: Field Research, 2013/14 [* figures based on 2013 estimates]

In general, the opinions of 73 well-informed actors in the two local governments are analyzed in this paper. They include 58 (79.5%) from the KMA and 15 (20.5%) from the WMA. The actors comprised 52 (71.2%) local political actors (i.e. assembly members and unit committee members) and 21 (28.8%) bureaucrats (and or technical personnel¹¹) who implement the day-to-day tasks of the local administrations. Of the 52 local political actors, 41 (78.8%) were elected to

11 Technical personnel or technocrats are civil servants with specific technical skills and expertise such as engineers, spatial planners, etc unlike the traditional conception of administrators or bureaucrats.

their position while the remaining 11 (21.2%) were appointed by the president. In addition to the data from in-depth interviews, data from existing documents on the institutional reforms, voting patterns of constituents in the study DAs in district level elections, and newspaper publications on the conduct of the local political actors in the DAs were analyzed. Furthermore, a period of internship and participation in seminars and workshops in the two DAs provided insights into how reforms and local administrative tasks are organized.¹²

5. The Local Government as an Arena for Contestation

5.1 Competing Authority Claims and Interests

The everyday task of the local administration is performed by the bureaucrats (or technocrats) who are civil servants working within the administrative structure. Nonetheless, their attempts to implement decisions locally are met with competing authority claims from assembly members over space and content of the projects being implemented that strain relations in the already politically-charged assembly structure:¹³

The bureaucrats or technocrats do not want the system to work; even in the sub-metro, we are the political leaders and they are supposed to inform us about what is going on but they don't. (...) sometimes they see the assembly members as inferior; some think they have higher education and are not willing to submit to assemblymen. They don't even inform us about the projects going on in the sub-metro because of the mischief and their personal interests in the projects [interview with an assemblyman, Suame Sub-metro, Kumasi, 19.08.2013].

These claims often center on the perceived disregard of the assembly members by the bureaucrats until something goes wrong in the implementation of the projects and also the inherent distrust that the

12 This three-month research internship was participatory mainly in the activities of the two district assemblies and the two regional coordinating councils including budget reviews, fee-fixing, mid-year reviews, etc. organized by the local governments.

13 These claims should be situated within the context of increasing involvement of public servants in partisan politics (see Aye 2013) and thus raising doubts about their neutrality in delivering public goods.

administrative strand has an interest in sending specific projects to certain areas.

One source of these competing claims is informed by the prejudice around the caliber of persons who formed the local governments during the reforms in 1988. There was a widely held notion that the position of an assembly member was unattractive and somewhat reserved for low status individuals. They were considered 'less intelligent' at the time and some assembly members believe the bureaucrats still hold such stereotypes and do not take the assembly members seriously. But the current crop of assembly members is very mixed with some highly educated and established individuals who want to reassert and correct that erroneous impression about their position:

You see, when we mention the assembly system, technocrats are at the bottom they are like our subordinates; assembly members take decisions. The problem is that because assembly members are not paid salaries and that some are illiterates they are not aware of their roles; some assembly members cannot even read the laws and the LIs. If the technocrats realize that the assembly members do not know the rules and the LIs, they take them for a ride and decide for them [interview with an assemblyman, Suame Sub-metro, Kumasi, 20.08.2013].

Some of the assembly members have become vocal against the 'dis-respect' from the bureaucrats. They argue that although the assembly system began with pensioners and less 'educated individuals', most people still hold that impression. At the moment, however, many of them are rather young and highly educated with university degrees. But these tensions over status would likely persist because there is no required educational qualification for contesting that position and some of the assembly members have no formal literacy skills; people contest based on their popularity in their electoral areas. However, bureaucrats do not just reject those claims but rebuke assembly members for using such claims to seek their own interests. Some even believe the claim is insincere because it is rather the assembly members who abuse the law and the processes because they need to appease voters and thus support and encourage unlawful practices in the communities:

Sabbi, Matthew: **THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF LOCAL POLITICAL ACTORS**

Sometimes some of these assembly members could direct some residents to place containers and other structures at undesignated places. When technocrats then carry out their lawful duties, the assemblymen will now confront us. The assembly members make the policies of the assembly so they think they have 'posts' (power). Once I went to an electoral area to distribute letters to some rate defaulters and the assemblyman came that I should have contacted him before doing that. But I have never seen any regulation saying the administrator should consult the assembly member before doing his lawful duty [interview with an administrative official, Suame Sub-metro, Kumasi, 19.08.2013].

The observation points to the fact that some of the assembly members harbour personal political interest and quite often, they attempt to project themselves as being in control within their electoral territory. They often use personal aggrandizement rhetoric; promising voters more support than could be delivered and resorting to whatever means available to win more votes, placing them between the twilight of local legislators and project implementers. These competing claims have long been a source of conflict over domination; the technocrats, as professional, full time public (civil) servants believe they could not be controlled by part-time honorary political actors (see Thomi 2000a) and these contestations become the basis for the various sources of distrust from the assembly members.

5.2 Distrust of the Formal Bureaucracy

Trust among members remains a prerequisite in the conduct of the local administration tasks but a tense situation of distrust rather pervades assembly members' suspicion and perception of being dominated by the administration and the executive in particular. Indeed, any undertaking by the administration without the assembly's involvement is perceived as dubious, corrupt, and intended to meet the former's personal interests and gains. Some assembly members have lost trust in the formal structures to the extent that some described the bureaucracy as a façade:

The technocrats seem to know the concepts very well but they don't follow it to the letter. I sent my project requests to the planning department only for a colleague assembly member to tell me if I had copies of my letter, he could take it to the executive committee so that the projects would be

considered. I was very surprised (...) why did they ask us to send the letters to the planning unit? That means some people who accessed the planning unit will not get any projects; so you don't get projects if you do not belong to their side [interview with an assemblyman, Asokwa Sub-metro, Kumasi, 20.08.2013].

This distrust is well known by the bureaucrats who attempt to circumvent it by engaging the local political actors in several ways. Some of the bureaucrats revealed that it becomes easier for the conveners of the sub-committees who are assembly members to present decisions and plans to the executive committee and the general assembly because it is easily accepted by their colleagues than when bureaucrats have to do that. The assembly members felt more convinced than when technocrats had to do that presentation and sometimes the former doubted whether the latter were even telling the truth. In avoidance of doubts, the conveners are groomed to make a presentation at the executive committee.

The distrust of the executive and administration obtains at two levels. First, one observes distrust in instances whereby activities are thought to be dubious because the administration does not follow the procedure and they do so to meet their personal interests. Some assembly members argued that people blame politicians instead of the technocrats but it is the latter that connives with people such as developers to put up unauthorized structures at night and also over the weekend. A corollary to the above is when perceived dubious and corrupt practices are not intended for immediate monetary gains but rather for some personal interest such as streets constructed to their residential areas, etc. The distrust deepens when the perceived gains are skewed in the favour of the bureaucrats:

Once at assembly meeting, one member talked harshly to a bureaucrat and we were all annoyed for the disparaging remarks about the bureaucrats accusing him of corrupt practices. Sometimes the assembly members are part of the problem but some of the bureaucrats also benefit from the projects and if the assembly member thinks they have been overlooked (in terms of benefits) then they become very angry [interview with an assemblywoman, Oforikrom Sub-metro, Kumasi, 20.08.2013].

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The other source of distrust is where the head of the executive committee attempts to use the appointed assembly members as patronage networks to check the influence of the elected members. Some members see this as a genuine attempt to create confusion within a group that otherwise has good interpersonal relationships:

The executive tries to force that tension on the assembly when it does not exist because the appointed and elected members are always together. What happens rather is management always does everything possible to put a 'crack' between the assembly members. They always want to divide and think they can pass it through the appointed members because they have control over them. Sometimes at meetings, management will call the appointed members and try to convince them so that they will get the appointed members' support [interview with an assemblyman, Wa Urban Council, 28.08.2013].

That the political appointments are largely used for patronage purposes is not far-fetched in terms of policy decision-making processes of the DAs. The appointed assembly members held loyalty and commitments values towards the governing party and the DCEs during negotiations on local policies and projects. Indeed, most of the appointed members were unambiguous on the issue that they try to reciprocate their appointments by being loyal to the government and the DCE who appointed them:

We were appointed by the MCE on behalf of the president (...) so we are there to support the government and its policies. If we have to vote on certain issues, we side with the government's position (...) [interview with an appointed assemblywoman, Wa Municipal Assembly, 18.09.2014].

In Metropolitan assemblies with sub-metro district councils (e.g. the KMA), the distrust is further deepened by perceptions that the chairpersons of the councils use their influence to sustain patronage networks in the sub-metros. Indeed, institutional reforms in the sub-metros have been the bone of contention between the main assembly and the local administration.

Table 2: Composition of Selected Sub-Metros in the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly

Council Composition					
Sub-metro Council	Current (LI 1614)		Probable (LI 1805)		
	Elect (%)	Appoint. (%)	Elect. (%)	UC (%)	Appoint. (%)
Asokwa	12 (40.0)	18 (60.0)	12 (40.0)	10 (33.3)	8 (26.7)
Bantama	8 (26.7)	22 (73.3)	8 (26.7)	10 (33.3)	12 (40.0)
Kwadaso	9 (30.0)	21 (70.0)	9 (30.0)	10 (33.3)	11 (36.7)
Manhyia	13 (43.3)	17 (56.7)	13 (43.3)	10 (33.3)	7 (23.3)
Oforikrom	15 (50.0)	15 (50.0)	15 (50.0)	10 (33.3)	5 (16.7)
Suame	9 (30.0)	21 (70.0)	9 (30.0)	10 (33.3)	11 (36.7)

Source: Author’s computation based on information from the secretariats of the sub-metros Note: Elect=elected members; Appoint=appointed members; UC=unit committee members.

With most of the sub-metros dominated by political appointees (see Table 2), the assembly members often argue that the bureaucrats play to the tune of the executive and are unable to implement reforms:

There is a problem with the sub-metro structure but the appointed NDC are resisting any solution. Thirty percent of the council is to be appointed by the government but this is not followed because there is a problem with the two LIs, 1614 and 1805. The 1805 does not favour them so they have gone for the old one, 1614. At Bantama, elected members are eight and the appointed members are 22 making up the 30 members so if we go there, we the elected members are ‘nothing’; definitely, a party man will become

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the sub-metro chair and they use that place as the party office and it cuts across; most of the chairmen (of the sub-metros) are NDC constituency chairpersons who use the sub-metro (secretariats) as their offices [interview with an assemblyman, Bantama Sub-metro, Kumasi, 18.09.2013].

That most of the sub-metro councils are dominated by political appointees chaired by party constituency chair persons is a fact (The Ghanaian Chronicle 2011) but the issues regarding the composition of these councils are quite complicated and involve local government reforms in 2004 (LI 1805 for KMA) under the NPP government.¹⁴ The new LI 1805 meant for 10 sub-metros was strongly castigated by the opposition NDC at the time for its lack of clarity (see Ahwoi 2007) and it became obvious that any changes in government would imply major changes or total rejection of that legislation. Such ambiguities allow central government politicians and bureaucrats to dominate the local government system (Wunsch 2001; Awortwi 2011). The ambiguities are designed on purpose for exploitation by whichever regime is in power (Crawford 2008) but they also reflect the principles upon which the local governments were founded. The structures, as Crook (1999) observes were carved in a populist, non-partisan framework which allowed the central government to have a firm hold of them. In the current multi-party setting, such virtues are remotely possible and the incumbent governments exploit all possible ambiguities to dominate the DAs. The general suspicion of domination that engenders the distrust in the DAs is not new and could be traced to the reforms in 1988 subsumed the hitherto purely bureaucratic entity under an elected authority (Crook 1994; Thomi 2000a). The impact was felt on the formal structures as bureaucrats had to either report to or work in sub-committees with elected officials (Crook 1994). However, the impact has been exacerbated by factors such as the numerous reforms, the assembly members' clamour for their own interests and their attempts to exploit the administrative structures to achieve those interests.

14 National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) are major political parties in Ghana. In 2007, Kwamena Ahwoi, a former minister of local government in the NDC heavily criticized the LI 1805 enacted for 10 sub-metros and it was obvious the system would be thrown into confusion once the NDC government came back to power. This was spurred further by the elevation of one of the 10 sub-metro district councils to a municipal status.

5.3 *Self Aggrandizement and Communal Expectations*

Assembly members quite often project an image of themselves as being the most important actors in the local administration setting. These self-aggrandizing tendencies to enhance their reputation but also exaggerate their self-worth reflected in statements such as: 'we are the board of directors' and 'we make laws for the technocrats to implement' by, some of these local political actors. Some of them even compared their worth to members of parliament:

We are the real agents of development for the communities because we campaigned based on our individual achievements not on inanimate objects. We did not use party symbols to campaign. I used my name to campaign so people respect us more than the MP because even if I have a criminal record and contest in the strong hold of a party, I am certain they will vote for me [interview with an assemblyman, Kwadaso Sub-metro, Kumasi, 12.09.2013].

This sense of self-worth influences their promises when seeking political authority from their constituents. They spend lots of money and resources on expensive campaigns and advertisements (mirroring national election practices) for an honorary position that comes with no salary but meeting allowance. With their aggrandizing rhetoric, they show why their communities matter and make promises of getting development projects to these communities.¹⁵ Projects such as roads, public toilets, schools, job opportunities, etc are promised against the backdrop of knowledge that the DAs could not offer and that the rhetoric is empty. Most of the interviewees pointed out that the promises are the only ways to win elections being well aware that they could offer very little in terms of development projects:

The assembly member's position is honorary; some people think it is very lucrative but that is false; it depends on what we promise during campaigns; you know that it is not possible to do all that not even a quarter but we say all those things [interview with an assemblyman, Wa Urban Council, 19.09.2014].

15 See Adema (2009) for a discussion on how individuals use personal and communal aggrandizement to show the worth of their communities. The second phase of the field research coincided with preparations for nominations towards the 2014 local government elections. However, some aspiring and incumbent assembly members had already launched their campaigns.

The reason for self-aggrandizement by these local political actors is intriguing. Ordinarily, they would point to an altruistic desire to serve their communities given that their position is not full-time. Further probing reveals private-political interests more than their civic altruistic values to serve their communities. Most of them harboured higher political ambitions and they use the DAs as the 'launch pad' for such career dreams. It was even compelling that some of them have been sponsored by major political parties to 'test the water' to see how those parties would fare in national elections. Nonetheless, these personal attributes and self-worth heightens further the expectations from their electorates who seek development projects (and not necessary policy making). Most of the assembly members thought that the electorates see them as truly elected representatives only when 'you strive to bring development to your electoral area'. The aggrandizing image of these local political actors is reminiscent of the 'Big Man' phenomenon in African politics (Nugent 1995; Utas 2012).¹⁶ However, only a few influential assemblymen with connections to those in higher positions could succeed in getting these patronage resources to their areas (Crook 1994). Within the constraints of resource and realizing they are likely to disappoint, they move behind the formal bureaucracy to backstage activities and lobbying for a share of the patronage resources. This is in reaction to their promise of bringing development projects to the communities and the fear of losing out in future elections should they contest.

5.4 Backstage Activities: Cutting Corners and Maneuvering

Community members believe a true assembly member is 'one who brings projects to their communities' as was pointed out by some of the informants. However, the precarious nature of available resources and the numerous demands placed on the DAs mean most expectations cannot be realized at least from the formal bureaucracy. To meet their demands, influential actors (e.g. assembly members) resort to techniques to get

¹⁶ The aggrandizing rhetoric of the elected assembly members mirrors Nugent's (1995) discussion of the Big Men phenomenon in Ghanaian politics. The Big Man, often a political figure with opulence was accorded such status on their ability to occupy Big Man role set by some social criteria. The Big Men sought political favour with the promise of letting part of whatever wealth they made trickle down to their electors. In contrast to national politicians, local political actors, though behaving as Big Men, often lack the patronage resources to meet their promises. For a detailed case study description of the Big Man phenomenon in African politics and particularly in post-conflict contexts see Utas (2012).

development projects to their electoral areas through a backstage approach termed ‘cutting corners’ in local administrative parlance. This approach is even popular with bureaucrats at the substructures. Informants pointed out that not every decision from the sub-metro councils are implemented so they have to negotiate both the administrator and the assembly members concerned. They have to ‘cut corners’ by writing letters, doing follow ups, and lobbying; ‘one has to weave their way through’. It is even more prevalent among assembly members:

One cannot rely on the formal structure because the MCE, the administration, and the technocrats could not be trusted. The bureaucrats connive with the MCE to delay and blur things so there is no transparency; one cannot depend solely on the administration. For my electricity project, I had a friend who connected me directly to the one in charge at the electricity company. I did not go to the MCE for streetlights. If I need something and I pass it through the sub-metro to the KMA, I know they will abandon it so I make sure I go there directly to the appropriate officer and get the things done [interview with an assembly member, Kwadaso sub-metro, Kumasi, 13.09.13].

This idea of “cutting corners” or “backdoor” (i.e. using unofficial channels) somewhat yields results but it also provides a telling example of how these semi-periphery actors create and reinforce their description of the bureaucracy as a façade. The lobbying of specific bureaucrats comes with costs; assembly members have to give some ‘tips’ (tokens) to public officials to get projects to their electoral areas. It is not surprising that some of these political actors compete with bureaucrats in the implementation of projects and apparently to get “tips” from contractors in order to defray their campaign costs and meet the demands they imposed on themselves. This practice, however, dissipates the trust people have in public organizations to wit the fact that the structures are there for other purposes instead of public interest. It also reflects the general institutional practices in Ghanaian public bureaucracies.

5.5 Perception of the Local Public Administration

Although the central government is viewed with some skepticism, the general apathy towards the local governments is enormous and in fact well-known by local government actors. While the euphoria that

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followed the introduction of the district assemblies was high (Crook 1994), that seems to have waned over the years considering the level of participation in local government activities such as voting/elections (see Table 3).

Residents accessing the DAs' services quite often find out that the structures cannot help them and they become disillusioned with the DAs structures. This provides the basis for dis-interest in the services and activities of the DAs (Thomi 2000a) as was expressed by some senior bureaucrats:

Sometimes people come with genuine issues but the sub-metro cannot take decisions and if you refer them to the main assembly, the issue is no longer pursued and the people become frustrated. If you should organize a durbar, it will surprise you nobody will turn up especially in urban centers. People think that the assembly does not care about them and they are developing resistance to certain things like property rates because they do not benefit from it; they tell you that they will not pay and you can take them to court. Some community members mock the secretariat by asking what we do here [interview with an administrative official, Manhyia Sub-metro, Kumasi, 19.09.2013].

Table 3: Voter Turnout in National and Local Government Elections, 1992–2012

National Election (Year)	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Voter Turnout (%)	50.2	78.2	60.4	81.5	69.5	80.2
Local Government Election (Year)	1988/89	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010/11
Voter Turn-out (%)	59.3	29.3	41.6	32.8	44.0	35.3

Source: Author's compilation based on multiple sources [Electoral Commission; Crook 1999; Awortwi 2011; Obeng-Odoom 2013]

The disenchantment with the DAs finds expression in many dimensions that relate to the local government system. It is even more compelling when applied to election trends in DAs compared with national trends which clearly elucidate this disillusion as shown in Table 3. Indeed, whereas voters’ enthusiasm seems to surge with national elections, the opposite is true for the local government counterpart especially in the two study areas (see Table 4) despite the numerous institutional reforms to involve more local actors in pursuit of locally relevant development programs. That lack of interest in the DAs goes to express residents’ disappointment with the sort of development taking place in their localities (Crook 2003).

Table 4: Participation in Local Government Elections in the Study Areas, 2006 and 2010

Classification	Location	Election Year/Turnout (%)	
		2006	2010
Region	Ashanti	39.5	36.1
	Upper West	51.7	51.7
Local Government	Kumasi Metropolis	24.3	21.9
	Wa Municipal	38.2	45.7

Source: Author’s compilation based on information from the Electoral Commission, Ghana

6. Concluding Comments

The foregoing analysis has shown the complex interaction and suspicion that penetrates through a group that otherwise should work in harmony to bring development to their local communities. The fact that assembly members do not trust the bureaucracy that serves the local political structure which they (assembly members) belong as well as the public’s disinterest in the activities of the local administra-

tion raises questions about the DAs' promise of good governance and participatory development in local settings. It suggests also that the tenets of good governance within the local government institution-building process are untenable and consistent with Cook (2003) and Crawford (2008), the local people are not happy with the momentum with which the local political administration approaches and pursues development in their communities. It is however pertinent to note that the factors that inhibit the local administration in delivering a good service to the local public lie much outside as they are within the local setting. More importantly, the very idea of institution-building in the local government setup must be situated within the international development system in which institutional ideas spread to local settings. Yet institutional actors at both the national and local levels are capable of manipulation and exploiting the institutional change ideas in their own favour which makes institutional change highly difficult (Lowndes 2005). The discussion in this paper therefore highlights the inherent myths in the debate that local governance leads to participatory development. Although the pros and cons of this debate are not new (Thomi 2000a), there is evidence to indicate that attempts to reduce the complexity in these institutional structures has rather created more complexities (Kühl 1998). The pursuit of individual interests in conflict with formal institutional rules is properly explicated from an institutional perspective. Indeed, local political actors whose activities straddle between the formal bureaucracy as representatives and their private-political interests, under the guise of institutional reforms, produce consequences that affect the bureaucracy itself as well as the local political structure. Motivated by their individual and political interests, the elected assembly members in particular, project a 'Big Man' image of themselves (Nugent 1995) despite the mismatch between their rhetoric and their resources to fulfill that status. Their subsequent actions tend to stand in the way of an already complex, centrally-dominated and precarious bureaucracy of the local state. These features of contemporary institutional reforms in the local government system are difficult to evade but they account for the discrepancy between the promise and reality of participatory development. Consequently, they make local residents lose interest in the very idea of local government, its reform as well as its products.

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ANALYSIS OF MODERN MARITIME PIRACY WITH A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

Gabriel Szuma

Abstract: Piracy is one of the oldest known illegal activities, and its very existence endangers the international arena due to its lawless nature and ruthless methods. Today's piracy, particularly prominent in Africa and Asia, has contemporary political and social implications, and is viewed as a new threat to international order. The aim of this article is to present piracy as both local and regional issues, and an international problem. It analyses how modern-day piracy operates, where it thrives, and what are its geopolitical impacts. The text argues that the role of states, their sovereignty, and their lack of it are closely connected to piracy.

Keywords: *Contemporary piracy, pirates, sovereignty, maritime crime, geopolitics, state failure, Somalia, Horn of Africa*

1. Inside the mind of contemporary piracy

This article provides a critical analysis of contemporary piracy and its inner workings. This article re-visits causes for piracy and expands on the subject by discussing incentives to become a modern-day pirate. Also, it looks at ways in which piracy operates, various business models, and strategies. It will be investigated what socio-economic, political and legal implications occur, as a result of pirate activity. These issues will be analysed both locally and internationally, and, lastly, through a case study, focused on Somalia.

1.1 Inner workings of piracy

The first sub-section describes conditions in high-risk areas that allow piracy to take place, and it addresses the motivations behind the criminal activity, as well as how a pirates' business models works in practice. The aim is to analyse the internal mechanisms of piracy, which vary from the much broader international geopolitical view.

1.1.1 Causes, incentives and prerequisites

Pristrom, et al. (2013) argues that piracy is predictable, based on an idea of piracy high-risk areas (HRA); that is, piracy requires a proximity to areas with high maritime traffic, as well as an accessibility to safe heavens. For example, the Malacca Strait provides many disclosed islands, the Gulf of Guinea offers a number of suitable ports, and pirates of the Gulf of Aden make use of coastal strips and villages of Somalia (Payne 2010). Moreover, piracy-stricken areas exemplify insufficient law enforcement, from coastal guards and surveillance, to a functional jurisdiction system. Hence, pirates are not likely to be captured, and if so, they are unlikely to be punished.

In the Strait of Malacca, Marley (2011) argues that the major cause of today's pirate activity is China's new capitalist expansion, as well as the newly emerging economic significance of Singapore and Hong Kong. More generally, South-East Asia provides 'a patchwork of strong and weak, rich and poor countries' (Hastings, 2009, p.220) surrounded by water, and disadvantaged by limited cooperation. In West Africa, piracy is largely driven by the region's oil production, particularly from Nigeria. Pristrom et al. (2013) say that 'the nations of that region produce 5 million barrels of oil on a daily basis' (p.682), and, not surprisingly, oil tankers are the most frequent target. Finally, in the Horn of Africa, some believe piracy began as a reaction to foreign trawlers, and to the illegal dumping of toxic waste in Somali territorial waters. This issue will be examined in detail in the case study part of this article.

Another favourable element for pirates is the use of 'flags of convenience'. By adopting 'flags of convenience', that is, registering ships in countries, which require little operational standards, ship owners avoid extra costs, from tonnage fees to taxes, and they have less responsibility associated with cargo transports (Gómez, Ángel and Navarro 2013). The most notorious countries that offer their flags are Panama and Liberia. Marley (2011) argues, that more than 50% of all merchant ships are registered under these 'impotent' flags (p.34), and Panama alone is responsible for more than a half of all registered vessels (CIA 2008).

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of today's occurrence of piracy is an incentive to become a pirate. There is 'a direct causal link between poverty or lack of employment opportunities' (Bueger 2013c, p.n.g.), creating an economic dislocation of a region, due to globalisation and unequal world development. Lucas suggests that, presently, "even a low-ranking member of a pirate organization can earn as much as \$20,000" (Lucas 2013: 56) from one successful attack. Hence, individuals seek out illegal opportunities, in order to financially profit, as well as to help their communities out of poverty.

Bueger (2013b), however, finds an additional social factor. He highlights cultural accessibility and individual skills, which make piracy possible and socially acceptable to certain groups and regions. According to him, piracy gains legitimacy through a narrative, which describes pirates as protectors or heroes in local communities, in which, in turn, they find food, a shelter and a logistical support. A particular example from Somalia will be described in section 1.4. Hence, pirates are not only viewed positively, but also recruited more easily. Moreover, pirates are often drawn to the profession due to their previous skills, such as swimming, navigation or an ability to handle weapons. The last example, of course, goes hand in hand with locations that are not stable, often exposed to violence and civil unrest for decades (Bueger 2013c).

Thus, contemporary piracy makes use of internal instability in various regions, where sovereign states lack control over their entire territories. Moreover, as a result of insufficient economies, piracy, similarly to other crimes, becomes a symbol of failure, not only of nations, but also of groups and individuals. Triggered by external phenomena, such as oil export or capitalist interests on sea, pirates respond in their own way to the missing rule of law.

1.1.2 How piracy operates

According to Bahadur, 'piracy is not so much organized crime as it is a business' (Bahadur 2011: 43), and, as Bueger explains, 'a business plan has to be developed. Hence, a considerable driving force of piracy will always be criminal-minded entrepreneurs' (Bueger 2013c, p.n.g.). Pirates are thus a sophisticated brand of criminals, able to plan and

make use of regional resources, developing economically well-functioning business strategies. In this way, they offer an alternative to an official state-based system, developing their own norms and rules.

In Southeast Asia, most attacks remain within territorial water, whereas in East Africa, pirates venture further away to high seas. This trend can be ascribed to a relatively recent use of mother ships, allowing the pirates to travel longer distances, and for longer periods of time. Pirates are always equipped with some kind of weapons, yet these are not always used. In Southeast Asia, weapons used by pirates, such as knives or machetes, are less sophisticated than military assault rifles, AK-47s, or rocket-propelled grenades in East and West Africa (Bradsher 2014). Nevertheless, pirates all over the world are gradually better armed, resulting in increased levels of violence. In terms of ship boarding, numbers have been growing. Whereas in 2010, there were 196 boarded vessels, in 2013, given the significant drop in pirate attacks worldwide, there were 202 vessels boarded (IMB 2011; 2014a; 2014b). This suggests the pirates' growing boldness and confidence, and an ability to form homogeneous groups, able to grow in otherwise decayed conditions.

In the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, a typical tactic is to rob an anchored vessel, and instances of either violence or hijacking for ransom are less common (Pristrom et al. 2013). In the Gulf of Guinea, pirates attack anchored or slow-moving vessels, and their primary goal is to seize oil tankers, syphon the oil, and leave (Gabbatt 2013). However, since 2012, the pirates of West Africa, as well as in Southeast Asia, have started to adopt the techniques of Somalian pirates. Thus, whereas in 2012, there were 206 hostages in the Gulf of Guinea, in 2013 there were already 279, suggesting that 'West African piracy is increasing in scale and (...) in organization' (Bellish 2014:12). Furthermore, Nigerian pirates are increasingly more violent, and their share on Africa's piracy grew from 17.3% in 2008 to 66.7% in 2013 (UNCTAD 2014). On the other hand, in the Malacca Strait, pirates attempt to avoid any interaction with the crew (Twyman-Ghoshal 2014). The case study below will look in detail at the East African region. There, Somalian pirates focus on hijacking for ransom, and are less likely to board a ship. Lastly, in relation to terrorism, terrorist-related attacks are extremely rare. According to Asal and Hastings, they form

'199 out of 98,000 attacks in 40 years, which is less than 0.2% of the total' (Asal and Hastings 2014, p.n.g.).

Today, pirate strategies are ever more efficient, allowing this profession to remain successful, even after Somalian piracy has rapidly decreased. This impressive business model is shown through the pirates' financial arrangements. There are organisers, suppliers, individual 'foot soldiers', businessmen, negotiators, and an array of people who will ultimately financially benefit from an attack, each having a different share, based on his role (Stockbruegger 2011a).

Pirates thus exemplify a kind of prosperity, and perhaps also a sense of order in a disordered environment. While, from a distance, they appear to contribute to anarchy and a state failure, from another point of view, they show impressive abilities to adapt, improvise and rise. In their world, piracy provides a new profession, marked by planning, cooperation, and a profit, not so different from a fledgling business of the Western world.

1.2 Socio-economic implications

Nevertheless, piracy is a great threat to the international order, and also to economic stability and global trading (World Bank 2013). It not only challenges individual ship owners, but the entire workings of the modern economic market, as well as the regions where pirates come from. Estimates on the costs of piracy show 'wide discrepancies in the number of attacks and total losses' (Elleman, Forbes and Rosenberg 2010: 20), due to different definitions of piracy, reported and unreported cases, or illegal activities associated with it. Moreover, large numbers of people can actually benefit from piracy, and its regional effects on economies are not necessarily in accord with the global economy. This section will discuss all these ideas, and give a general view on the widespread and domestic impact piracy has today.

1.2.1 World-wide implications

According to UNCTAD (2014), piracy results in direct and indirect economic costs, varying between 1 to 16 billion dollars a year, and the World Bank (2013) suggests an annual cost of 18 billion dollars. These

financial losses to the world economies come from localised incidents, and expand to other regions and parts of the world, ultimately affecting a large number of people and areas.

Directly, piracy affects both public and private sector, resulting in losses, far beyond the immediate pirate activity. For private companies, piracy means the extra cost of security equipment, and protection technologies, estimated to cost between 1 and 2 billion dollars a year (Hallwood and Miceli 2014; OEF 2011; OEF 2012). Insurance costs, which are 'the most significant barometer' (Chalk, Smallman, and Burger 2009: xi) of the costs of piracy, depend on banks and insurance premiums. An insurance price for a single voyage has risen from 500 dollars in 2008, to 20,000 dollars in 2009, and up to 150,000 dollars in 2010 (OEF 2011; Gilpin 2009). As a result, Hastings (2009) believes that pirate incidents are underreported, since reports would raise a companies' insurance premium. In addition, the reason for this incredible jump since 2008 was that the Lloyd's Market Association (LMA) declared the Gulf of Aden a war risk area (OEF 2011).

Moreover, military operations are another expensive result of pirate activity. According to Marley, 'deploying a single frigate into the Horn of Africa amounts to about \$1.3 million a month' (Marley 2011: 72). Furthermore, an initial budget for just one operation, the EU's Operation Atalanta was 450 million euros (Marley 2011). Thus, UNCTAD (2014) estimates the incredible sum of 2 billion dollars is invested into overall naval forces and military operations in 2010, and a lower, yet still high cost of 1.9 billion in 2012.

In addition, payments of ransom have risen from tens of thousands, to hundreds of thousands, 2 million dollars in 2009 (Payne 2010), and, in 2010, the average ransom price was already 5.4 million (Bellish 2014). UNCTAD shows that between 2005 and 2012 ransoms reached '\$339 million to \$413 million' (UNCTAD 2014: 15).

Further financial losses, even more difficult to account for, are the indirect investments and costs, ranging from the macroeconomic impacts to those whose lives are affected by it in many parts of the world. In piracy-affected areas, ships are forced to travel at high speed, thus spending more money on fuel (Hallwood and Miceli 2014), while, on the other hand, re-routing, such as through the Horn of Hope instead

of the Gulf of Aden, means not only additional fuel costs, but also extra time for travel. Mbekeani and Mthuli (2011) believe that between 2 to 3 billion dollars are annually spent on re-routing, increasing demands on worldwide import and export, and the topping up of commodity prices for customers. Trade-related impacts also create international trade losses and changes in foreign investments. Finally, there are the mental and emotional costs for crew members on ships, hostages, their families, and also families of pirates, and these losses cannot be put into real numbers, or sufficiently measured (Abila and Tang 2014).

1.2.2 Local and regional implications

Economic losses are important exactly because the states suffering from piracy are developing or failed states, with a need for economic stability. However, there are tensions between the principle of weak or failed states, pirates' financial influx, and a possibility to tackle this illegal activity.

On the one hand, piracy perpetuates economic instability and poverty, and, in weak states, it is a significant player within regional economies. Due to piracy, affected areas have fewer investments, and their contribution to the global economy is limited. Piracy onshore also causes 'price inflation which has sent the cost of food and other commodities soaring' (Murphy 2012: 9). This the trend is directly linked to an idea of stationary and roving bandits, where roving bandits only care to steal, with little interest in the economic stability of the whole region (Olson 2000).

If this is the case with pirates, how can they operate in one place, instead of moving to another? Pirates need an environment where they can sell their stolen goods, acquire weapons and other necessities, and at least some support from local communities. This is where the idea of stationary bandits comes to play. Stationary bandits, attempt to maintain their power structures and operation fields, thus contributing to a betterment of the region, at least to some extent. With these principles in mind, do pirates undermine the regions' economic potential, or do they have anything to contribute?

Pirates cannot function without some degree of stability. As mentioned in chapter two, some coastlines gain wealth and prosperity due to the

presence of piracy. According to the UN Office on Drug and Crime, ‘Somali pirates brought in an estimated US\$150 million in 2011, which is equivalent to almost 15% of Somalia’s GDP’ (UN Office on Drug and Crime 2013: 1). Consequently, pirates maintain an influx of capital within the states and regions involved, which would otherwise be unavailable, and contribute to their economic development. In a manner, similar to the mafia, pirates distribute certain amounts of resources, provide security, and bribe when necessary, thus keeping themselves connected to their environments (Bellish 2014). Therefore, it can be said that they operate in a manner of stationary bandits, and so it seems that piracy-stricken regions are actually on the way towards more stability; more so than, for example, opportunistic rebels in Kenya, who strongly resemble roving bandits (Olson 2000).

According to Olson’s *Power and Prosperity* (2000), the presence of stationary bandits suggests a trend towards democratisation. Thus, it is feasible to imagine that the presence of pirates may have some long-lasting positive effects on local developments. Kamola goes as far as to suggest that international efforts to eradicate piracy in territorial and international waters are really an attempt to preserve existing capital circulation, thus not attempting to aid regions at all. Pirates ‘attack agents whose industries have damaged coastal economies, as well as those shipping vessels that yield economic value when ransomed’ (Kamola 2011: 3), thus creating a new, home-grown economic market, a ‘pirate economy’, which is, of course, in opposition to global capitalist interests. Hence, pirate businesses are of great economic value and significance, and it can be argued that, along with the political effects, the financial aspects of piracy are the most important ones.

1.3 Political and legal implications

This section discusses political and legal issues related to piracy, and their effects in practise. According to Murphy, ‘piracy’s political significance has generally exceeded its economic impact’ (Murphy 2012: 5). Therefore, it is crucial to address the issue of a pirates’ status. This part will discuss existing law enforcement problems, and what juridical implications apply in global, as well as local and regional terms. The purpose here is to address the current standing of pirates in terms

of a prosecution, in order to better understand the socio-economic factors discussed earlier.

1.3.1 World-wide implications

The act of piracy challenges the authority of states or governmental legitimacy, and the international community as a whole. However, there are political and legal difficulties, regarding how to deal with this crime, and how to limit its impacts. Although pirates are ‘the enemies of all’, the UNCLOS provides the only legal base for handling piracy, and each nation views this crime differently, with different ideas on its elimination. Ultimately, the quality of law enforcement in global terms is extremely weak (Bellish 2014). As Bueger argues, ‘good law is not the same as good law enforcement’ (Bueger 2013d: 11).

Many argue that, in order to deal with piracy effectively, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the responsible jurisdiction over global heinous crimes, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, should incorporate piracy as well. However, the ICC would have to undergo substantial changes, and currently excludes piracy (Hallwood and Miceli 2014). Moreover, on a local scale, pirates do not cause any immediate danger to local communities, and their activity targets perspective sources of money rather than individuals.

Another issue, from a legal perspective, is that, due to coastal states and their interest in maritime resources, the UNCLOS now allows for the EEZs almost two hundred nm, and the high seas are further away from the coastlines, thus making “certain acts against shipping that had previously been in the jurisdiction of all states (...) mere criminal or civil offences under the coastal state’s municipal laws” (Elleman, Forbes and Rosenberg 2010: 28).

Furthermore, once a pirate ship is captured on high seas, it is difficult to go any further. Pirates are often released because problems associated with a proper prosecution practices are much greater than the benefits of a trial, which would set an example (BBC 2011). Hence, most prosecutions ordinarily fall on individual countries, or mutual agreements among countries, such as in the case of Somalia and Kenya, and their results are extremely limited. Pirates are usually punished

according to criminal laws of involved nations, and ‘not under international law in an international tribunal’ (Marley 2011: 64).

Often, countries completely refrain from a trial due to the associated high costs. From flying the accused to the countries where the trial will take place, to incarceration and legal expenses, any one trial may cost millions of dollars (Hallwood and Miceli 2014). Distances between countries attempting a prosecution, and locations of committed crimes are often great. Also, given the uncertain results, to actually convict a pirate requires statements, evidence, witnesses from other countries and so on, thus proving the whole process too strenuous (Gómez, Ángel and Navarro 2013).

Lastly, one must question the very nature of a legal prosecution. What sanctions are adequate, and is punishment the way, how to tackle piracy? It may very well be that a well-executed trial, in proximity to the area involved, may set a good example and a lesson for active pirates, but, until there are templates to be followed, for example the ICC’s policy, piracy will not be threatened, and individuals involved will not be discouraged. An optimal enforcement of piracy requires cooperation, as no one single country is able, legally and otherwise, to do so (Hallwood and Miceli 2014). Accordingly, piracy remains standing in opposition to the international community as a self-determined criminal act, able to reshape and relocate at any given time.

1.3.2 Local and regional implications

Locally, it appears that piracy is perceived on a boarder-line between a benefactor and the villain for local and regional authorities, as well as entire communities. Despite state failures and flawed systems, “to include the territorial sea in the definition of piracy would (...) be a gross breach of state sovereignty” (Paige 2013: 148). Therefore, local governments are responsible for this crime, at least when it occurs in territorial waters. Nevertheless, due to the instability of the governments of nations where piracy occurs, it is unlikely that pirates can be dealt with through proper law enforcement. These countries, such as Nigeria, Togo, Benin, or Somalia, lack legal frameworks for piracy, or, at least, are not able to enforce existing laws (Murphy 2007). Also, there are no practical ways of dealing with pirates on the seas, espe-

cially since the EEZs were included to territorial waters, and no coast guard or police units are able to track pirates that far from the coast, or to constantly guard anchored vessels (Marley 2011).

In addition, most regional governments are too corrupt to provide a proper trial. Some law enforcement agencies, such as police, are dependent on bribes, in order to function at all (Hansen 2009). Pirates as small groups have an advantage in ruling territories precisely because they appear beneficial rather than selfish. Thus, to be perceived by the public as harmful predators, their wider networks and links to other criminal activities would have to be exposed, in order to gain a public image as self-interested networks, with no common good in mind (Olson 1975). Since 'maritime threats should hence be seen as interdependent' (Bueger 2013d: 9), piracy may lead to a perpetuation of other forms of violence and new illegal activities, such as prostitution in coastal cities.

Bellish (2014) proposes that, in order for local prosecutions to have any effect, they must focus on capturing the leaders of pirate organisations. He argues that there is a constant flow of willing individuals to enter these syndicates, existing as open systems. Thus, the most effective solution would be to establish law enforcement units in individual regions, such as in Somalian de facto state Somaliland, where 'local prosecutors may receive training and mentoring from internationally seconded staff funded by donor states' (Guilfoyle 2012: 105). Such a system would be more likely to work. However, there is a risk that if a pirate is caught by foreign forces and handed to local authorities, according to Islamic laws, he can be killed, as is the case in Kenya (Payne 2010). In these conditions, it seems that local and regional prosecution of pirates is just as complicated as it is in international terms, and, perhaps, the most viable solutions lie in international interventions.

1.4 Somalia case study

At this point, we finally turn to Somalia to examine particular examples of the above-mentioned issues, economic, legal and social effects, and local and regional relationships between people, authorities and pirates.

1.4.1 The Republic of Somalia

Somalia emerged as a failed state through historical processes. In 1960, as part of a decolonisation process, the country became a republic by merging former British Somaliland with Italian Somalia. As mentioned below, Somaliland aims for independence on the basis of its former sovereignty, and is recognised as such by about thirty nations worldwide. Between 1969 and 1991, the nation was under a dictatorship of Mohamed Siad Barre, and, after his demise, further conflicts followed (Leeson 2007). A civil war that intensified the region's poverty, and posed threats to international peace and security, Islamist power struggles, and clan-based disputes throughout the 1990s provided a fertile ground for criminal activities and, of course, piracy (Silva 2010). In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took over the capital, and, since then Mogadishu has experienced various riots, demonstrations and violence in general. In the twenty-first century, a coalition government was established, and in 2009, Shaik Sharif Ahmed was elected as a president. Nevertheless, the country remains fragmented, and, according to The Fund for Peace (FFP) (2014), Somalia is on top of the list of failed states.

It lacks a functional central government, and is unable to provide its citizens with basic security, as well as to maintain formal relations with other states (Potter 2004). Despite Somali homogeneous religious structure, the overall societal organization is still a major obstacle in the creation of an effective government (so far there has been sixteen attempts for a stable government), still heavily relying on clans and regional structuring, which, however, can provide a considerable amount of stability.

1.4.2 The rise and fall of Somali piracy

Somali piracy has always made use of the country's long coastline, as well as the Gulf of Aden's traffic, 'with more than 20,000 ships a year' (Bueger 2013c). Piracy first emerged in the region during the civil war, as a result of increased insecurity and economic dislocation (Wambua 2009). Somalia remains marginalised, and its collapsed economy contributes to increased poverty, unemployment, and a general backwardness. Somalia's law enforcement as a whole is weak

as well as corruptible, thus providing a limited oversight to illegal activities.

In addition, by the mid-1990s, Somali waters became overcrowded by foreign trawlers, who pushed out local fishermen, thus causing their bankruptcy, and a further sense of insecurity. As a result, Somali fishermen began to attack those ships on small boats, with basic weapons, demanding money, and making their own kind of 'justice' (Beloff 2013). Quickly, they realised the potential and the true value in these vessels' crews. By 2008, this model was given a narrative, legitimising Somali piracy for local communities. This 'grand narrative' depicts pirates as protectors of the Somali waters from intruders, who not only fish but also dump toxic waste. Thus, piracy became presented as 'the performance of quasi-state functions, and as orderly and rule-based' (Bueger 2013b: 117). Thus, contemporary Somali piracy emerged as a response to hyperinflation, a realisation of a viable business model (that is, hijacking for ransom), missing law enforcement, and a gradual legitimisation through the 'grand narrative'.

By 2010, out of 445 worldwide attacks, there were 219 attacks attributed to Somali pirates alone (IMB 2011). Their operation field has spread from "the Gulf of Aden, southern Red Sea, areas off Yemen and off Oman and the Arabian Sea, to the coastal waters off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, the Indian Ocean, the Indian west coast, and the Maldives west coast" (IMB 2011: 19).

By 2011, however, due to international efforts and military interventions, Somali attacks began to decrease and, within two years, they essentially disappeared. In 2013, there were only 15 reported attacks by Somali pirates (IMB 2014a). However, since this is mainly due to international efforts, rather than changes in Somalia, reasons for this change will be analysed in chapter four. Here, the thesis primarily comments on the Somali perspective and Somali experience of piracy. In addition, according to the IMB (2014b), there are still reasons to believe that Somali piracy may re-appear, because no internal changes within Somalia itself have been made.

1.4.3 The business model and economic impacts

Somalian piracy has a good organisation, socio-economic links, and a capable leadership. In practice, Somalian pirates use speedboats and mother ships, thus having an advantage over other vessels. Individuals take part in pirate business due to the lack of other opportunities, financial motivation, as well as due to a belief that piracy is ‘a tax on foreigners who are overfishing Somali waters’ (Hallwood and Miceli 2014, p.n.g.). Pirates have a sophisticated profit sharing model, keeping around 40% of ransom for themselves, using approximately 10% for bribes, and distributing some 50% to clan leaders and financial supporters. Overall, a single pirate may earn around 15,000 dollars (BBC 2012; Kamola 2011), and a clan leader can receive up to 100,000 dollars from a single kidnap.

Given the country’s GDP is extremely low, piracy supports Somalian fragile, yet increasingly more vibrant, economy, and also individuals and their families. A BBC report points to the investments in regional centres, indicating that ‘the benefits being shared out between a large numbers of people due to the clan structures in place’ (BBC 2012, p.n.g.).

The most famous pirate-entrepreneur, who managed to create a successful business, is Mohamed Abdi Hassan, known as Afweyne. Afweyne professionalised the kidnap-ransom model, created a cross-clan network, helped the local economy, and established a ‘pirate stock exchange’, allowing individuals to invest in pirate ventures, and providing a culmination of money, as well as a cooperation among people (Bahadur 2011; Bellish 2014; Hansen 2009).

With regard to a prosecution, due to corruption and a general sense of protection from pirates, Somalia shows little interest in punishing this crime. The present government tries to cooperate with the international community, but, as mentioned above, its law enforcement abilities are very weak. Therefore, the greatest authority remains with clans and clan leaders, who, of course, do not wish to turn against these criminals for social as well as financial reasons.

1.4.4 *The question of a failed state and piracy*

Thus, it is questionable whether the collapse of the Somali state is further perpetuated by piracy. Rather, it appears that Somalia as a state will always remain lawless, because “to even speak of Somalia as a uniform entity is a mischaracterization” (Bahadur 2011: 17-18). By observing individual units of this failed state-system, one notes a significant degree of sovereignty and stability. Piracy is, indeed, a result of the state’s failure, but it also has a positive impact on local developments.

Based on the clan-system and local governments, Somaliland and Puntland are two regions able to function effectively, given the overall destabilisation of the country. Somaliland, with its own constitution, strives for complete independence, currently representing a de facto state. Puntland, the infamous stronghold of pirates, also shows a high degree of stability, and, as Johnson and Smaker (2014) argue, a gradual process of democratisation.

Hence, in Somalia, there is “a kind of highly-ordered lawlessness” (Guilfoyle 2012: 88), which, in certain parts, exemplifies ‘security, stability, and some degree of democratic consensus’ (Johnson and Smaker 2014: 12). Therefore, the nation should not be viewed in a paradigm of a state failure, but rather as an entity in the making, where piracy is an element of this process, and not a cause of lawlessness.

Piracy’s internal characteristics are of crucial importance in Somalia and elsewhere, as they ultimately determine the nature of this crime, its future and its international status. One cannot speak about Somalian piracy without discussing its elaborate business model, and, in the same manner, it is vital to understand the inner workings of piracy, and to separate them from an international viewpoint on maritime crime.

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RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AS A TOOL OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

Aneta Kříčková

Abstract: The article offers an overview of the post-apartheid development in South Africa with a special focus on a policy promoted by the African National Congress (ANC) to mitigate socio-economic inequality within South African society. In this sense, the key strategy of the ANC was the economic platform, of which the goal was to achieve poverty reduction and the strengthening of the economy. For this purpose the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was adopted in 1994. The main aim of the article is the ANC's strategy in the field of the RDP that can be considered the specific tool of socio-economic transformation because the RDP was essentially a basic-needs programme which focused on the provision of infrastructure, housing, free and compulsory schooling, electricity, running water and toilets, health care and land to the poor.

Keywords: *African National Congress; socio-economic transformation; Reconstruction and Development Programme; land reform.*

Introduction

After the fall of apartheid in 1994 all discriminatory laws, which racially disadvantaged the black population, were abolished.¹ There was a widespread belief that a new era would bring equality, where all ethnic groups would be able to live next to each other. Mandela's

1 In 1948 National Party won the elections and enacted some crucial laws in 1940's and 1950's, which meant the institutionalization of the race segregation regime. The entire classification process was legally imposed and ascribed, more specifically on the basis of the 1950 Population Registration Act, and often arbitrarily implemented (Harries 1989: 110). The act distinguished four major racial categories, namely white, black, coloured and Indian/Asian. The apartheid regime indeed did not limit its racial classifications to black and white but also further subdivided the overwhelming non-white majority in three sub-groups namely Africans, coloureds and Indians/Asians (Carrim 1996: 47, 50).

vision was one of racial equality and racial reconciliation. Here some rhetorical questions arise: Is it even possible to overcome the legacy of apartheid and begin to live up to the 'non-racial' ideal of South Africa? And is it possible to fulfil Nelson Mandela's idea and demand for the co-existence of a 'rainbow nation'? How does reality differ from the vision of a 'non-colour' society?

The important ANC's strategy was also the economic platform that was adopted by the subsequent Government of National Unity. The name of the platform was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Achieving poverty reduction and strengthening the economy in the context of the RDP are seen as goals that are interconnected and influence each other. However, development without economic growth would be financially unsustainable and economic growth without development would not bring the coveted conversion of obsolete structures and the redistribution of property within South African society. For this reason, the RDP sought to combine economic growth (such as; through the tax system changes, efforts to reduce public debt and the liberalization of trade), with social programs for the poor.

The RDP quickly ran into problems. Therefore the government adopted a new Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in 1996. This strategy brought bigger financial discipline, but it failed in key regions. Instead of the creation of new job positions, unemployment rose and economic growth did not achieve the planned goal. The great expectations of the poor (black) South Africans could not be satisfied enough, because of the relatively slow economic growth. Other government economic priorities were attempts to integrate black South Africans into running the economy. From this initiative the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which e.g. supports the training of black employees and promotes them to management posts, was developed. The BEE's plan was to transform the economy in such a way to demonstrate the demographic representation of the country.

Simeon and Murray have pointed out that the ANC leaders were acutely aware of the immense developmental tasks that would face a democratic, non-racial South Africa. Who could address the challenges of educating South Africans, and of providing them with housing, water, electricity, and health care? Who could engineer the redistribution

of wealth in one of the world's most unequal societies (Simeon and Murray 2009: 9)?

The article will discuss a policy promoted by the ANC to mitigate socio-economic inequality since the end of apartheid in 1994. Taking the 1993 situation as the point of departure, it gives an account of the path leading to the formulation of the major policy documents. A special focus will be dedicated to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

The article did not include the issues such as HIV, poverty or electricity because of the limited framework. That is the reason why the article does not include in detail other areas that the RDP addresses. The article only provides a brief overview of the achievements and failures in these other areas. The article pays attention to one issue that is of land reform which is developed in detail.

The main reason why special attention is paid to land reform is that through the land reform the social and economic relations are meant to be transformed. This is a central aspect of the national democratic struggle to transform the colonial class formation in South Africa that has combined capitalist development with national oppression. Land reform in South Africa is considered by many researchers as the ultimate challenge to the social, political and economic transformation of the country. In developing countries, the soil is the primary source of livelihood and access to the agricultural land can be seen as critical.

The main object of the article is to answer two research questions that are as follows: What principles is the RDP based on? What is the link between the RDP and the socio-economic transformation of South Africa? In the article the following methods are used: a content analysis of selected documents and a case study. The work will be processed as one-case study. The advantage of one-case study is a detailed analysis of a case and it obtains reliable information about the broader category of phenomenon. During the processing of the article the retrieval compilation method (collecting and assembling of the data and information relevant to the subject and their subsequent analysis and interpretation) is mainly used, and to a lesser extent also the analysis of statistical data. The article relies mainly on book publications and internet resources. During the processing of the

parts on the equalized programmes of economic, social and political differences between racial groups carried out by the black majority government, it is possible to rely on official government documents published on the website of the South African government, ministries and the parliament. Other valuable sources of information are annual reports of governmental programmes and documents from the United Nations and the World Bank. Finally, it must be mentioned the publications published on the website of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Other sources of information and data are various periodicals, such as the *Journal of Political Science* and articles freely available on the internet, that are devoted to the topic of post-apartheid development in South Africa.

From the main object of the article is thus possible to create an internal structure of the article which is divided into two main parts. The first part is devoted to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and its goals. The following part deals with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as the basis of socio-economic transformation. Therefore, attention is paid to the Land reform and its implementation. The conclusion tries to summarize the main information and to answer the research questions.

1. Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

The year 1994 marked a historical political turning point in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) won the elections. The ANC did not have much of an economic programme when it was legalized. According to Lundahl and Petersson it was obvious that South Africa had two main economic problems to solve at the beginning of the 1990s: increasing the growth rate and improving the distribution of income, wealth and social services. A document called *Making Democracy Work* (MERG 1993) produced during a conference held by a network of macroeconomists loosely connected with the ANC together with political representatives of the latter. The document was incoherent but in the end it served as one of several inputs in what would become the first post-apartheid economic strategy in South Africa (Lundahl, Petersson 2009: 3).

The strategy that finally emerged was orchestrated by the ANC, it served as the economic platform of the party during the 1994 elections.

The name of the platform was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It was essentially a basic-needs programme which focused on the provision of infrastructure, housing, free and compulsory schooling, electricity, running water and toilets, health care and allocating land to the poor.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was adopted in 1994 after several months of discussions and negotiations between the ANC, South African Communist Party and the influential South African Congress of Trade Unions. According to Mandela the RDP would be “an all-encompassing process of transforming society in its totality to ensure a better life for all” (Dowden 2008: 395). The RDP supporters argue that the program was able to help in the most deprived social areas.

The RDP was to be financed out of the regular budget revenue. It aimed for a growth rate of up to 5 per cent at the turn of the millennium and the creation of some 300,000 new jobs every year, through trade liberalization, increased competition, support of small and medium-sized business establishments, education and technological change (Lundahl, Petersson 2009: 4).

The ANC² government tried to create a political framework that would successfully wrestle with the structural and economic crisis inherited from the apartheid regime. In 1994, Parliament introduced the “RDP White Paper”, which identified the economic, social, legal, moral, cultural and environmental problems of the country.

The RDP’s aim was to reduce the problems caused by socioeconomic consequences of the apartheid regime, in particular poverty alleviation and improving access to social services. Achieving poverty reduction and strengthening the economy in the context of the RDP are seen as goals that are interconnected and influence by each other. But

2 The ANC was formed at a time when South Africa was changing very fast. Diamonds had been discovered in 1867 and gold in 1886. Mine bosses wanted large numbers of people to work for them in the mines. Laws and taxes were designed to force people to leave their land. The most severe law was the 1913 land Act, which prevented Africans from buying, renting or using land, except in the reserves. Many communities or families immediately lost their land because of the Land Act. For millions of other black people it became very difficult to live off the land. The Land Act caused overcrowding, land hunger, poverty and starvation (African National Congress 2014).

development without economic growth would be financially unsustainable and economic growth without development would not bring the coveted conversion of outdated structures and redistribution of property within South African society. For this reason, the RDP sought to combine economic growth (through tax system changes, efforts to reduce public debt and liberalize trade), with social programs for the poor.

The program is based on six core principles, which are linked together and they should provide a compact implementation of the programme. The RDP is “an integrated programme, based on the people, that provides peace and security for all and builds the nation, links reconstruction and development and deepens democracy - these are the six basic principles of the RDP” (RDP White Paper 1994):

An integrated and sustainable programme: The RDP brings together strategies to harness all resources in a coherent and purposeful effort that can be sustained into the future. These strategies will be implemented at national, provincial and local levels by the government in collaboration with civil society, non-governmental organizations, and economic entities working within the framework of the RDP.

A people-driven process: Very important is the participation of citizens, regardless of race or sex, or whether they are rural or urban, rich or poor. For that reason the government demanded the active involvement and the increase of empowerment. The citizens should also be involved in forums, peace structures and negotiations so that they are included in the process.

Peace and security for all: The next principle promotes peace and security that involve all people and must be built on and expand by the National Peace Initiative. At the beginning of the reconstruction process and development, security forces must be established. These forces would reflect the national and gender character of the country and must be non-partisan, professional, and uphold the Constitution and respect human rights. This will have a positive impact on attracting foreign investors and economic development.

Nation-building: The commitment of all political parties to support the RDP will stimulate the task of building a new nation, where nation-building is the basis on which to build and it can support the develop-


ment of the Southern African region. The RDP develops economic, political and social viability that can ensure national sovereignty.

Link reconstruction and development: The RDP is based on reconstruction and development being parts of an integrated process. Growth - the measurable increase in the output of the modern industrial economy - is commonly seen as a priority that must precede development. Development is portrayed as a marginal effort of redistribution to areas of urban and rural poverty. In this view, development is a deduction from growth. The RDP breaks decisively with this approach. The RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a unified programme. The key to this link is an infrastructural programme that will provide access to modern and effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, health, education and training for all citizens. This will lead to an increased output in all sectors of the economy, and by modernising the infrastructure and human resource development.

Democratisation of South Africa: The success of the previous five principles will facilitate the introduction of the sixth - democratisation. Minority control and privilege are the main obstruction to developing an integrated programme that unleashes all the resources of the country. Democratisation must begin to transform both the state and civil society. Democracy is not confined to periodic elections. It is, rather, an active process enabling everyone to contribute to reconstruction and development.

The principles are linked to the strategies that show the way how to achieve their successful fulfilment: meeting basic needs; developing our human resources; building the economy; democratising the state and society. These five strategies or policy programmes are mutually connected and mark the process in which the last and the most important step is to implement the RDP. The next condition is the creation and active involvement of democratic structures (RDP 1994).

Figure 1: The principles and the key program of the RDP

The principles	The key program of the RDP
An integrated and sustainable programme	Meeting basic needs;
A people-driven process	Developing our human resources;
Peace and security for all	
Nation-building	Building the economy;
Link reconstruction and development	Democratising the state and society;
Democratisation of South Africa	Implementing the RDP

Source: Created by author; based on information gained from the RDP 1994.

2. The RDP as a tool of socio-economic transformation

With the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, South Africa’s new democracy faced a principal challenge: dramatically increasing the government’s role in the provision of social services to its citizens in a way that would not compromise macro-economic stability. According to Coulibaly and Logan, by most measures, post-apartheid policymakers were successful in maintaining macroeconomic stability, but progress on meeting the social demands has been slower. The discontent with the slow pace of social progress gave rise to a new tone in public policy spearheaded by Jacob Zuma (standing president of South Africa since 2009) who has signalled that South Africa may tilt its policy priorities toward social spending programs in the coming years (Coulibaly, Logan 2009: 2).

Economic and social well-being addresses fundamental social and economic needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiating an

inclusive and sustainable development program. Often accompanying the establishment of security, well-being entails protecting the population from starvation, disease, and the elements. As the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development (Hamre, Sullivan 2002: 91–92).

Economic recovery depends on the success of the transition and on the rebuilding of the domestic economy and the restoration of access to external resources (World Bank 1998: 4–5).

As stated in the RDP, “economic transformation and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in combination will lead to sustainable growth” (RDP 1994). The goal of economic transformation³ is: to address the scope of economic needs through job creation; to alleviate and to eradicate chronic poverty; to address economic inequalities and structural problems in, inter alia, industry and trade, mining, the agricultural, financial and labour markets; integration into the international economy; the phasing out of any discriminatory employment, training and promotion practices in the economy; the development of human abilities as a production factor in the economy; the democratization of the economy; and the development of a growing and balanced regional economy (RDP 1994).

Supporters of the RDP argue that the program was helpful in the most pressing economic and social areas. Lodge reported that there were many critics, who reacted to published official statistics negatively, arguing that the reality is a little different than the government claims. The criticism concerned primarily the quality of homes and water supply, health care and agricultural reform, and the unequal participation of men and women in projects (Lodge 2002: 56).

The balance between economic stability and social demands has been a constant policy dilemma for post-apartheid policy makers. The eco-

3 The foundations and tools for transformation processes may be found within the systems themselves where the parties are subject to change. Therefore, solutions are sustainable only when they are generated by the parties to the conflict themselves (Wils et al. 2006: 4). According to Ropers “the causes and effects in social systems are connected in a rather complex way and can be separated substantially by distance and time” (Ropers 2008: 3).

conomic stability objectives have generally been achieved, but progress on social demand has been slow and below the expectations of South Africans. Social demand indicators for South Africa are generally below those of its economic peers.⁴ The slow progress to eradicate the social needs has tilted the balance of power in public policy in favour of Jacob Zuma, portrayed as a populist who will increase spending on public works and social demands, and undermine economic stability. As Zuma assumes power, the main question looming over his mandate would be whether and how he will shift the balance of these two policy objectives.

The status of existing property rights (including agricultural land) was a central factor in the negotiations that led to the political transition. White farmers and industrialists successfully lobbied to ensure that commitments to transformation in the 1993 interim constitution and the final 1996 constitution were tempered by a 'property clause' that recognised and protected existing property rights. The interaction of a number of factors ensured that a programme of land reform was adopted. Among these were mobilised rural communities, drawing on the militancy of their resistance to forced removals – and the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civics and church groups that supported them – who demanded that their land be returned to them. Land reform performs an important symbolic function in South Africa as tangible evidence of a nation addressing a historical injustice as part of a wider process of nation-building. It also has the potential to form the centrepiece of a programme of rural restructuring: to transform social and economic relations and provide a structural basis for broad-based pro-poor development.

2.1 Land reform

Through land reform the social and economic relations are to be transformed. This is a central aspect of the national democratic struggle to transform the colonial class formation in South Africa that has combined capitalist development with national oppression. Land reform in South Africa is considered by many researchers as the ultimate challenge to the social, political and economic transformation of

4 For major indicators that show increasing frustration regarding the slow pace of socio-economic transformations, see Table 1.

the country. In developing countries, the soil is the primary source of livelihood and access to the agricultural land might be seen as critical. Therefore, the land reform can be perceived as the way in which past racial exclusions and inequalities are being addressed.

In the 20th century, many countries attempted to initiate state-controlled land reform. According to Deininger, the governments in post-colonial countries were due to the implementation of land reforms under pressure, because they had to take control over fertile lands and make them available for development purposes (Deininger 2003: 7). Governments responded to the interests of both traditional and the newly emerging elites, and the needs of most rural people. In many African countries the governments have introduced their own independent and often very radical forms of land reform. Such as in the 70th of the 20th century when the Marxist regime in Ethiopia cancelled the feudal system and nationalized the land, which was then distributed to all who were willing to work on it. The land was nationalized also in other African countries such as Tanzania, Guinea, Sudan, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Congo (Zaire), Uganda, Somalia, or Zambia (Wegerif 2004: 4–5).

The first efforts to regulate land ownership appear in the new Constitution⁵ and later in the RDP. This program became the ANC election manifesto and it is possible to pick out certain recommendations of the World Bank in this programme. It was also strongly influenced by the compromises that have been negotiated for the purpose of a peaceful regime's transition. Requirements included in the Freedom Charter of 1955, such as that the land should belong to those who work on it, do not occur in the RDP.

Land reform is critical in terms of providing historical redress for centuries of colonial settler dispossession.⁶ In order to address the legacy

5 Article No. 25 of the Constitution refers to the property and land rights. With regard to the expropriation of land, it might be carried out only in the public interest and with fair compensation to the owner. However, public interest includes the commitment to land reform. The State also undertakes to ensure legislative and other measures to protect the land reform (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996).

6 The land acts and other related land laws, settlement planning, forced removals contributed to overcrowding in the former homelands. It is estimated that more than 3.5 million Africans were forcibly removed and relocated to the homelands and black townships between 1960 and 1980 (Horáková 2007: 56).

of forced removals and racially based land distribution practices⁷, the post-apartheid government's land reform programme, according to Donaldson and Marais, is based on three related components namely: (1) the restitution of land to people dispossessed of a land right after 1913 in terms of racially discriminatory laws and practices, (2) the redistribution and provision of land for the disadvantaged and the poor for residential, (3) and productive purposes and tenure reforms that would improve tenure security for all South Africans (Donaldson, Marais 2002: 12). The aim of land redistribution is to broaden the ownership of land amongst the previously disadvantaged groups of the South African population, while the tenure reform is an attempt to prove a more secure form of land tenure to rural communities.

According to Platzky and Walker, the 1913 Native Land Act, the Group Areas Act (1950) and the accompanying apartheid legislation led to the forced removal of about 3,5 million people from the land and business sites with little or no compensation. This resulted in a racially skewed pattern of land ownership and distribution where 87% of the land was owned by the white minority while 13% was occupied by the black majority (Platzky and Walker 1985: 130 – 132).

In early 1999, thanks to a government grant (SLAG)⁸, about 39 000 families settled around 355,000 hectares of land. It was, however, a very weak success in connection to the objectives of the RDP. Moreover, some farm subsidies were abolished and that caused massive job losses. Between 1994 and 1998, the number of commercial farms' workforces decreased from 1,4 million to 637,000 (van den Brink, Thomas, Binswanger 2007: 152–201), although the government proclaimed the creation of new jobs.

The land reform process is based on three main pillars, mainly restoration of rights to ancestral land, acquisition of land and securing tenure

7 The Land Act and other laws and taxes forced people to seek work on the mines and on the white farms. While some black people settled in cities like Johannesburg, most workers were migrants. They travelled to the mines to work and returned home to the rural areas with part of their wages, usually once a year. But Africans were not free to move as they pleased. Passes controlled their movements and made sure they worked either on the mines or on the farms. The pass laws also stopped Africans from leaving their jobs or striking. In 1919 the ANC in Transvaal led a campaign against the passes. The ANC also supported the militant strike by African mineworkers in 1920 (African National Congress 2014).

8 SLAG is an acronym for Settlement Land Acquisition Grant.

to land. Land reform was within the RDP perceived as the main driving force for rural development. The main goal was to redistribute 30% of agricultural land during five years. This goal was first proposed by the World Bank in 1993. The World Bank promoted its own 'market-led' model of land reform and argued that redistributing land and creating a class of black smallholders was necessary to avert social and political instability, as well as to promote rural development (Hall 1998). The African National Congress (ANC) committed itself, as part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to a land reform to redistribute 30% of agricultural land to the poor and landless over a period of five years. The World Bank advisors had proposed this target as feasible, noting that 6% of agricultural land is transacted each year – and thus appearing to hold to the incredible notion that all, or nearly all, land on the market would be bought for redistribution (Aliber and Mokoena 2002: 10).

2.2 Implementation of the Land reform: Problems and Prospects

We can find the main objectives of the land reform: redress the injustices of apartheid; foster national reconciliation and stability; underpin economic growth; improve household welfare and alleviate poverty. More specifically, the RDP's land reform goals had three broad thrusts:

- 1. Land restitution** was to be made to those who could prove that their or their family's land had been stolen under Apartheid;
2. Strengthening of **tenure rights** for the rural poor;
- 3. Redistribute** 30 % of agricultural land to the rural poor.

Each of these three components of land reform in South Africa is mandated by the Constitution, which not only empowers the state to pursue a programme of land reform, but also obliges it to do so. All three goals were to be achieved before the year 2000. More than a decade after this deadline, none of these goals have been realized.

2.2.1 Land Restitution

The land restitution promised that people who were forced off their land from 1913 (when the Native Land Act was passed) until the end of Apartheid would have their property rights reinstated or be given adequate compensation. The institutional machinery to implement the program includes provincially based restitution commissions and a land claims court that acts as final arbiter in restitution cases.

A restitution programme was adopted in 1994 as a separate process of redistributing land rights from white to black South Africans, to restore land rights to people dispossessed of land since the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913. Claimants could return to their land or demand cash compensation. A Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) was established to assist claimants to make their claims, to investigate claims and prepare them for adjudication by a specially constituted Land Claims Court (LCC).

According to the White Paper⁹, the government had set itself targets for the finalization of restitution as follows: a three year period for the lodgement of claims, from 1 May 1995; a five year period for the Commission and the Court to finalize all claims; and a ten year period for the implementation of all court orders (White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997). Therefore, the program should be completed by the year 2005. Between 1996 and 1999 about 41 claims had been settled, benefitting 3,508 households, in the following four years 36, 645 claims were settled (about half of the total number claims) benefitting 80, 153 households. According to the statistics issued by the Land Claims Commission, as of February 2004, 48 663 or 61% of all claims have been settled, benefitting 117 326 households. About 76 368 land claims relating to 2.9-million hectares of land under the Land Restitution Programme were settled. A total of 712 of these claims, for 292 995 hectares, were settled between 2009 and December 2011, against a target of 1 845 claims for the period (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2010: 20–28).

9 The government published a White Paper on South Africa Land Policy in April 1997 with the aim of providing an overall plan for land reform dealing with restitution, restoration and tenure reform.

A serious obstacle to land restitution is that rural claimants insist on returning to their land and in a handful of cases have staged illegal occupations of the land in question to highlight their grievances over delays in finalising their claims. It remains to be seen how the state will navigate the contradiction between black communities' historical claims to land, and the property rights of its current owners.

2.2.2 Land Tenure Reform

The land tenure reform is designed to provide security to all South Africans under diverse forms of locally appropriate tenure. It includes an initiative to provide legal recognition and to formalize communal land rights in rural areas; it also includes a program to strengthen the rights of tenants on mainly white-owned farms. The object of the reform is to provide a legitimate property right of land to six million families (from which about 3.9 million live in the former Bantustans and 1.3 million families live in shacks in urban areas) (White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997: 11; 16–18). A national conference on land tenure was held in 2001 to consider all problem areas and options to address outstanding issues. A wide range of resolutions were adopted by the conference dealing with matters such as achieving a balance between community and individual tenure rights, taking into account customary law and requirements of the constitution, accountability of community structures and the relationship between traditional leadership and other levels of government.

Several laws were adopted but the legislative process of land tenure reform slowly trudged on for several years, until President Mbeki in June 2004 signed the Communal Land Rights Act. This law covered a total of 72% of the population that lived in the former homelands (about 14 million inhabitants). These people managed land that they did not receive through a legal process, but by its economic usage. The purpose of this Act is to legalize their land tenure in areas of the former homelands and to ensure that this land cannot be revoked, or used without their consent. Against the law sharply protested many experts, land organizations and activists from the movement Landless People's Movement (LPM)¹⁰.

¹⁰ Landless People's Movement is independent social movement. It was founded in July 2001 by combining several local organizations formed by people without access to land and mainly rural residents who live in the poor slums on the periphery of

Some experts argue that the possession of property, which according to Kariuki (2004) has its roots in Western jurisdiction, contributes to a greater development of agriculture, than systems based on a common possession, which are in the framework of the economic development seen as counterproductive (Kariuki 2004: 5–7).

Another point of contention is the fact that the law reinforces existing gender inequalities in land ownership. Women in this direction are facing serious problems, since the land is allocated exclusively to men. Women can gain access to land only through their husband. However, in the case of divorce women lose the entitlement to land. This includes loss of housing, because the house is mostly bound to the land. In the event of the death of her husband, who did not make a will, the land (and the house) is inherited by male-relatives, while the widow (or daughter) is not entitled to gain anything. This reinforces the fact that decisions about how the land is farmed during the marriage is only made by men.

This unequal treatment between men and women has its base, according to Kariuki, in the historical context and for this reason it would be very difficult to create a balance with regard to gender inequality (Kariuki 2004: 14–19). Unfortunately, the law did not change institutionally entrenched discriminatory rules that already exist for a long time in public institutions. Moreover, tenure reform does not solve the question of how to overcome the divide between the overcrowded and under-resourced communal areas, and the wealthy commercial farming areas.

2.2.3 Land Redistribution Programme

Land redistribution is aimed at providing the disadvantaged and the poor with access to land for residential and productive purpose (White Paper On South African Land Policy 1997). The system of redistribution is focused on the change of property rights. It should be implemented on the basis of supply and demand, where the sales would follow market prices. In the first phase of redistribution (1995) the

cities (Greenberg 2004: 1). In the 2004 election, the movement established a nationwide initiative „No Land! No House! No Vote!“, which boycotted the elections, particularly the government policy, which according to them is unable to provide the basic human needs such as access to land.

Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs established the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which should assist the poor people to purchase land. The SLAG was in 2000 replaced by a program Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD), which removed the criterion of poverty and more focused on creating black commercial farms. This shift was consistent with the changes in national economic policy, which was focused on economic growth in line with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR).

The White Paper on South Africa Land Policy (1997) laid out an approach to land reform based on market and the limited role of the state. The role of the state was to assistance in the purchase of land, and the state could not be the buyer or the landowner. It preferred to provide financial support for the purchase. The first program of land redistribution was financially supported by a Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which the government provided to families with incomes of less than 1,500 rand per month. The target group were primarily poor residents. The government has made it clear that the main aim of land reform is poverty reduction (Grants and Services Policy of the Department of Land Affairs 2001: 2). A survey by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs between 1998 and 1999 revealed a number of weaknesses in the implementation and quality of group projects that were created within the SLAG. In June 1999, a new Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs Thoko Didiza was appointed, based on this survey, she immediately declared the necessary changes in the concept of redistribution and immediately ordered the postponement of other projects within the SLAG. In February 2000, the Minister issued a press statement in which she criticized the procedure of the SLAG. Primarily she focused on the poorly defined goals, over-reliance on market forces, which did not yield the expected results, and the grants which appeared as inappropriate for the creation of a new group of black commercial farmers (Baregu, Landsberg 2003: 99). She also proposed a new approach to land redistribution, namely the program of Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). The LRAD program was launched in August 2001 in the province of Nkomazi Mpumalanga.

The LRAD¹¹ is not like the SLAG exclusively bound to the laws of the market but it is adapted to the proposals of the World Bank and its experts were also involved in the development of this programme. This move follows the opening of the domestic market and creating an attractive investment climate within the GEAR policy, which was introduced in 1996. The LRAD places greater emphasis on ensuring the economic benefits of redistribution of land and supporting black commercial farming. At the same time as SLAG, it aims to improve living standards, incomes of the poor population and change the land tenure inherited from apartheid.

Under the SLAG and LRAD programmes, a total of one million hectares was transferred between 1994 and 2001. However, the LRAD's critics argue that the objectives to realize the land redistribution failed and from the programme a small group of privileged people benefited (Moyo 2004). Wegerif argues that such models can never bring important changes in the land tenure because only the rich people are able to enter the market and catch the opportunities that the programmes offer. Moreover, the LRAD does not deal with the land rights of women (Wegerif 2004: 6–8). In addition, it lacks specific competencies for local governments and especially the links between the wider subsections of land reform and rural development.

The redistribution programme is also criticised for being very slow. The target of transferring 30% of commercial farmland by 2015 would require a sevenfold increase per annum of transfers under the redistribution scheme (Hall 2004: 25).

There was a significant liberalization of the agricultural sector and the promotion of free trade in agricultural commodities. Wegerif states that during the 80^s, the government provided financial assistance in the form of grants (more than 4 billion rand) to 27 thousand white farmers. At the end of the 90^s the government's subsidies, financial support and other protection were removed and the South African agricultural market has become one of the most unprotected in the world (Wegerif 2004: 18–24).

11 The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development programme was designed to help previously disadvantaged citizens from African, Coloured and Indian communities to buy land or agricultural implements specifically for agricultural purposes. (LRAD 2001).

Critics argue that the liberalization of the agricultural sector only increases the leadership of those who firmly hold the reins of the economy, specifically white citizens. Therefore, the support of a competitive fight requires a redistribution of positions of dominant firms that supplies mainly food, tobacco and alcohol. Without this control and tariff protection many South African farms would find it difficult to compete with American and European farmers that receive generous subsidies from their governments. For small black farms it is almost impossible.

Many experts are questioning, whether the land reform based on market principles of supply and demand, could bring the desired change in land tenure rights. In this regard some of them require the more stringent approach of state intervention (see Wegerif 2004).


Proposals to radicalize land reform were officially declared during the Land Reform Summit, held in Johannesburg in July 2005. They demanded accelerated expropriation of farms whose owners do not want to cooperate within the controlled sale based on supply and demand (Horáková 2007: 56). The main difficulty in the purchasing of the farms is currently assessing their values. Farm owners and their association Agri-South Africa promote the assessment according to market prices, but the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing adheres to assessing the value according to the productive prices. Reform is hampered not only by a lack of funds, but also the lack of skilled bureaucrats at relevant offices. The strongest argument for land reform is the idea that it can create a positive environment for the growth of agricultural production, which will spur economic growth and help reduce poverty. But the fact remains that a large part of the previously white farms that were divided among new black owners are no longer effective.

3. The future of the land reform

In 2013, South Africa marks the centenary of the Natives' Land Act that excluded 'members of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa' from the occupation or ownership of about 90% of the country's land. Two years after the end of apartheid, in 1996, about 60,000 white commercial farmers owned almost 70% of land classified as agricultural and leased a further 19% (Statistics South Africa 2014; Africa Research

Institute 2013). In 2013, the original 1999 deadline for the redistribution of 30% of agricultural land to black South Africans was again postponed from 2014 to 2025. According to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (RDLR), an estimated R29.7 billion (US\$3.2 billion) was spent on the land reform programme between 1994 and 2013 (ANC 2014). Since the 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act initiated the process of compensation, by 2013 about 77,148 restitution claims had been settled nationwide, where more than 80% of claims were related to urban land and settled by 2006. A vast majority of beneficiaries – 92% – opted to receive financial compensation at a cost of R6 billion (US\$652m). To satisfy successful claimants demanding the return of land, 1.44m hectares were acquired for an estimated R10.8 billion (US\$1.2 billion) (ANC 2014). As mentioned RDLR Minister Gugile Nkwinti points out that these numbers clearly show who has benefited from the land restitution programme (ANC 2014). With regard to redistribution, since 1994 there was a long evolution of the programmes and the means by which land was redistributed. The Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG, 1995-2000) was followed by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Programme (LRAD, 2001-10) and in 2006, the government adopted the Pro-active Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), which leases high-potential land to chosen beneficiaries with the option of future purchase. The following alterations to land reform brought the long-awaited 2011 Green Paper which included a new four-tier structure of land tenure. However, the Green Paper faces many problems. Critics especially predict more red tape, lengthy legal challenges from landowners, and the alienation of commercial farmers. The state itself cannot provide much more extra land. In 2013, the completion of a land audit established that 78% of South African land is private and 22% state-owned. The RDLR blamed the inability to provide further, much-needed detail on an “institutional challenge” (The New Age 2013).

Figure 2: Land redistribution and land restitution by hectare, 1994–2010



Source: Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2014

At this point it is possible to compare the process of land reform in South Africa with experiences that took place in Zimbabwe. Both countries had similar demographical and historical backgrounds and they implemented the same market-based land reform. However, there are two main differences between these two countries that are connected with institutional structure which was not predictable in Zimbabwe, as there were fewer assurances against abrupt changes. On the other hand, South Africa's democratic and more mature institutional practise

indicated the possible success of the land reform. However, both countries experienced slow progress as a result of high costs and politicians often made public threats toward coercive measures. Each country's land reform involved multiple parties and multiple attempts to amend land reform. Both Zimbabwe and South Africa initially implemented a market approach "willing buyer, willing seller" (WBWS) which is based on a transfer of land ownership only when sellers and buyers agree on the land price (Department of Land Affairs 2006: 4–5). In Zimbabwe a willing buyer, willing seller programme outlined in the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement aimed to resolve the imbalance in landholdings. This agreement dictated the terms of land reform to be 'willing buyer, willing seller' for the next ten years, and in exchange, the Zimbabwean government was promised the subsidization of half of land reform costs by the UK (Palmer 1990: 163–181).

But the Zimbabwean process of land reform was slow, expensive and poorly planned. Moreover, it was clear that some changes would be made after the Lancaster Agreement expired. In 1992, compulsory acquisition with compensation was introduced. By 1996, 3.5m hectares had been shared among 71,000 households – far below the target of 8.3m hectares and 162,000 households. Only 19% of the transferred hectares were classified as prime agricultural land (Statistics South Africa 2014).

In Zimbabwe the transfer of land was effected through violent means, especially after the 2000 constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections. Incursions onto white-owned farms commenced in 1999, against a backdrop of discord between donors and the government over how to implement land reform. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), launched by the ZANU-PF government in 2000, legalised land invasions. About 10m hectares of white-owned agricultural land were expropriated and redistributed amongst 175,000 households. By 2011, 70% of Zimbabwe's agricultural land was cultivated by smallholder producers and 13% by medium-scale farmers (Moyo 2011: 493–531). The outcomes of land reform are different because it mainly depends on geography, quality and size of land, and local politics. But generally it can be argued that the land reform was not as successful as it was expected. Commercial agricultural production fell by more than 60% between 1998 and 2008, and an estimated 150,000 black commercial farm workers lost their jobs. In 2010–2011,

maize production was 1.5m metric tonnes, only marginally short of the average in the 1990s (Africa Research Institute 2013). Nonetheless, some authors accept that the Zimbabwean restrictive policy options became a source of certainty for the policy, and thus Zimbabwe's land reform process was speedier and more coordinated than in South Africa. Based on this argument, we can claim that the ANC lacks a political leader with dictatorial tendencies like Robert Mugabe who would carry out a radical form of land reform. The existence of radical groups of landless people, specifically the Landless People's Movement (LPM)¹², shows us that some sections of South African society are prepared to take the land by force. However, their major weakness has been the lack of political support. This situation has changed in the last two years with the rise of the personality of Julius Malema, the leader of the political party Economic Freedom Fighters.

Julius Malema's priority is land reform without compensation. In order to fulfil this plan, Malema needs to change the constitution. Together with the ANC that in the last elections received a little over 62 percent and with the EFF's 6 percent it will be possible to change the structure. But there is also another problem that could influence the whole process of the land reform. The government does not know exactly how much land is owned by the state or white people. A land survey in 2012 showed there was more land owned by government than actually it was claimed. However, Malema said: "*The settlers committed a black genocide and made the black land owners into slaves. We'll pay whatever price for this land. If the leaders of this revolution are not prepared to fight for this land, the economic freedom fighters will.*" (Mail Guardian 2012). Therefore, it can be expected that Malema's priority is to solve the issue of land reform in an even more forcible way.

Despite all the plans as mentioned above, the question of land reform in South Africa is still unresolved and the government deals with the little transfer from whites to blacks. The majority of South Africans continue to be landless or with insecure land rights. These include those who live in communal areas especially in the former homelands and Self Governing Territories. Land dispossession in South Africa produced negative consequences such as the consignment of the

12 The Landless People's Movement (LPM), loosely inspired by *Brazil's Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST), emerged in 2001 as an initiative of the National Land Committee (NLC) (Greenberg 2004: 15-18).

majority to the most unproductive land, the inequitable distribution of land ownership largely in favour of a minority racial group, the dislocation of the social and economic systems of the indigenous people in relation to land use, and tenantization through labour tenancy (Arrighi, Aschoff and Scully 2010: 410–438). Although, the promise to create a million agriculture-related jobs by 2030 might suggest that the ANC recognises the opportunity in agriculture. However, the current model is not compatible with a critical need to create more rural jobs. Between 2006 and 2012, the number of South Africans employed in agriculture fell from 1.09 million to 661,000 (Think Africa Press 2013). Since the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle was abandoned it has led to the inflation of land prices, new legislation was accepted. Especially, the Expropriation Bill in 2013 which should provide the expropriation of property for a public purpose or in the public interest (Expropriation Bill 2013: 2). It is expected that expropriation through just and equitable compensation could lead to speed up land transfers and succeeded in the areas where the WBWS approach failed, specifically the inflation of market prices which made purchases disproportionately expensive.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a greater financial and political reform programme for land reform, and without a restructuring of the rural economy, meandering land and agrarian reform will become increasingly susceptible to political radicalism, which we can see nowadays, and which gains its supporters mainly from among the landless and poor citizens in rural areas.

Conclusion

The theme of the article was the transformation of South African society through the RDP. In this way, the central idea that interconnects all parts of the article is the transformation process that occurred in South Africa after the fall of apartheid. This process, which was realized in socio-economic and political fields, was crucial for the creation of a society that would be free from racial intolerance and prejudice.

The part that deals with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) provides the answer to the first research question: What principles are the RDP based on? The program is based on six core principles, which are linked together. The first principle brings

strategies to harness all resources in a coherent and purposeful effort that can be sustained into the future. The next principle demands the participation of citizens, regardless of race or sex, or whether they are rural or urban, rich or poor. The RDP was also based on a peace and security that would involve all people and must be built on and expand the National Peace Initiative. Nation-building is the next principle and therefore the RDP would develop the economic, political and social viability that can ensure national sovereignty. The RDP also relies on reconstruction and development, where development is portrayed as a marginal effort of redistribution to areas of urban and rural poverty. In this view, development is a deduction from growth. The key to this link is an infrastructural programme that will provide access to modern and effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, health, education and training for all citizens. This will lead to an increased output in all sectors of the economy, and by modernising the infrastructure and human resource development. The last principle deals with the democratisation of South Africa that must begin to transform both the state and civil society, and it contributes to the reconstruction and development of the country. These six principles are linked to the strategies that show the way how to achieve their successful fulfilment: meeting basic needs; developing our human resources; building the economy; democratising the state and society.

The second research question was answered by the part that examined the RDP as a tool of socio-economic transformation: What is the link between the RDP and the socio-economic transformation of South Africa? The RDP as an instrument of socio-economic transformation addresses economic inequalities, the democratization of the economy and structural problems. In this way, the RDP is, amongst other things, an economic strategy that should ensure and underlie the disciplinary force for the market and private sector, and sustain the high growth and development of the country. In 1994, the RDP was adopted and its aim was to reduce the problems caused by the socioeconomic consequences of the apartheid regime, in particular poverty alleviation and improving access to social services. Achieving poverty reduction and strengthening the economy in the context of the RDP are seen as goals that are interconnected and influence each other. This strategy brought greater financial discipline, but it failed in key areas. Instead of creating new jobs, unemployment rose and economic growth also

lagged behind the stated expectations. The economic stability objectives have generally been achieved, but progress on social demand has been slow and below the expectations of South Africans.

Land reform is one of the ways in which the past racial exclusions and inequalities are being addressed, and through land reform the social and economic relations are to be transformed. This is a central aspect of the national democratic struggle to transform the apartheid system in South Africa. In this way, land reform in South Africa is the ultimate challenge to the social, political and economic transformation of the country. In developing countries, the soil is the primary source of livelihood and access to agricultural land might be seen as critical.

Land reform was conceived as a means by which the South African state would provide redress for the past injustices and promote development. It would pursue these two goals by restoring land rights to those dispossessed by segregation and apartheid through a land restitution programme, securing and upgrading the rights of those with insecure rights to land through a land tenure reform programme, and changing the racially skewed land ownership patterns through a land redistribution programme. The limitations of land reform relate not only to its scale but also to how resources are to be allocated, for what purpose, and to whom. However, the National Department of Agriculture (NDA) and its provincial departments have been widely recognized as failing to re-orientate their services to meet the needs of a new clientele and to provide these services to poorer land reform beneficiaries (White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997).

The question of land and agricultural reform in South Africa remains largely unresolved. This issue is connected and influenced by other problems of the country such as substantial job losses. Into this growing divide between rich and poor, HIV/Aids is a largely unaccounted factor which appears to be rapidly changing the profile of households, and the structure of the labour force, in ways that underline the vulnerability of the poor. A huge dissatisfaction within South African society is also manifested by the Landless People's Movement (LPM), influenced by the Landless Workers' Movement (MST) in Brazil. This movement was launched at the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in 2001 with a campaign entitled "Landlessness = Racism". Its 'Week of the Landless' during the World Summit on Sustainable Development

(WSSD) in 2002 showed the extent to which its slogans demanding land, food and jobs resonated with thousands of rural people, bussed in from all provinces, but also with residents of Johannesburg's townships and informal settlements (Greenberg 2002). Land reform, food security, market reform and access to a balanced diet are each distinct aspects of the same problem, none of which have been adequately addressed, let alone resolved. Therefore, the success of land reform is largely dependent on the resolution of other issues and cannot be solved in isolation from wider changes in the political economy.

In 1996 less than 1% of the population owned over 80% of agricultural land in the country, so the government of the ANC committed themselves to land reform. They carried out this task through three goals: land restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution. All three goals were to be achieved before the year 2000. More than a decade after this deadline, none of these goals have been realized. In some areas some of the goals were achieved, but reform is still hampered by a lack of financial resources and by a lack of skilled bureaucrats. The black majority remains poor and they are getting frustrated because of the unfulfilled promises of the government. In this sense, education can be seen as the base of prosperity, or at least an escape from poverty. The transition of the population from poverty to prosperity may ensure only quality education, health care and employment aid, all supported by economic growth. For that reason, the government should in the coming years focus primarily on the fight against crime, corruption, and especially against AIDS. In the light of events and the process of land reform in Zimbabwe, there is a growing conviction that the delivery of land reform must be accelerated, thus a widespread public debate is urgently required as to what kind of land reform South Africa needs.

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Appendices

Table 1: Major indicators that show increasing frustration regarding the slow pace of socio-economic transformation

<u>Indicators</u>	
<u>Poverty</u>	<p>In 1994, an estimated 17 million South Africans were living in poverty, corresponding to between 35 and 40 per cent of the total population. Twenty years later, it is estimated that between 45 and 55 per cent are living in poverty, which represents an increase both in absolute numbers and proportion since 1994.</p>
<u>Unemployment</u>	<p>Public works program, established in 1994, has provided during five years a work for almost 240 thousand people. It was mainly the construction of sewerage system and hospital facilities, especially in KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. This program has been reviewed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as a very successful (ILO 2007). At the end of 2009, the official unemployment rate was 24 per cent, but the expanded definition, which includes those of working age who have given up looking for work, was much higher. Furthermore, an estimated one in five workers is employed in the informal sector, which often involves low and haphazard income. At the end of 2012, the unemployment rate was 24, 9 per cent. Compared to the same period in 2011, a net increase of 80 000 in employment was observed in the 4th quarter of 2012. This was mainly due to growth in Community and social services (126 000), Finance and other business services (65 000) and Agriculture (55 000). However, job losses were observed in Trade and Manufacturing (139 000 and 59 000 respectively) in the same period.</p>

<p><u>Access to water</u></p>	<p>In 1994, there was estimated that about 12 million South Africans lacked access to water and 21 million lacked sanitation services. In 1998, aqueducts began mainly in rural areas, collectively build. Nearly 1.3 million people who previously used water from wells or bought it from trucks, gained access to clean drinkable water. In March 2000, after almost two years the number of people with access to drinking water almost doubled when it was completed a total of 236 projects. Statistics South Africa Census shows a significant improvement in access to piped water in South Africa, with the number of households with no access dropping to 8.8% in 2011 from 15.6% in 2001. Nearly half, or 46.3%, of households have tap water inside their homes (up from 32.3% in 2001), according to census 2011, while 27.1% have tap water inside their yards (down from 29.0%), 11.7% have tap water on their community stand less than 200 metres from their homes (up from 10.7%), and 6.2% have to walk more than 200 metres to reach tap water on their community stand (down from 12.4%). With the current development it is estimated that about 2030 every citizen will have an access to clean water.</p>
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<p><u>Electrification</u></p>	<p>From 1994 to May 2000 about 1.75 million inhabitants were connected to the national grid and another 600.000 were planned to connect in the next 3 years. Most of the electrical distribution systems led directly across rural areas. In that same period, the share of electrified rural dwellings increased from 12% to 42% and in 2004 it was already 51%. In 2007, electricity was introduced in 64% of all households in the country. However, more probabilistic is that at the end of 2012 about 80% of all households in South Africa will be electrified. According to the South African Bureau of Statistics (2007) between 1996 and 2007, the proportion of households that use electricity for lighting increased from 57.6% to 80%. According to the census, conducted in October 2011 by South African Bureau of Statistics, 84.7% of South African households use electricity for lighting (up from 70.2% in 2001), 73.9% use electricity for cooking (up from 52.2%), and 58.8% use electricity for heating (up from 49.9%).</p>
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<p><u>Housing and household sanitation</u></p>	<p>In 1994, there was an estimated backlog of at least three million houses. Despite significant progress, the housing shortage was still between three and four million units in 2005 and 40% of non-urban households still had no access to clean water. Lodge (2002) reported that between 1994 and 2001 was built due to government subsidies more than 1.12 million houses, which received 5 million (out of 12.5 million) of people without proper shelter. The pace of construction reached a peak in 1997, after this year already decreased. In 1996, to support housing it was spent 3.4% of the state budget, while at the turn of 1999/2000 it was only 1.4%. However, since 2001 can be seen an increasing number of households living in formal dwellings, from 68.5% to 77.6%, while the number living in traditional dwellings dropped from 14.8% to 7.9% and the number living in informal dwellings dropped from 16.4% to 13.6%. Census 2011 also showed a marked improvement in household sanitation in the country, with 60.1% of households using flush toilets (toilets connected to the public sewerage system) in 2011, up from 51.9% in 2001.</p>
<p><u>Inequality</u></p>	<p>South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in the world. In 1994, 5% of the population – mostly whites – owned 88% of the nation’s wealth. In terms of income inequality, the Gini coefficient in 1996 was estimated at 0.69, in comparison to an average of 0.43 for industrialized countries. Since 1994, inter-racial inequality has diminished. The incomes for black households increased an average 169% over 10 years (since 2002), their annual earnings are 60,613 rand (\$6,987), or a sixth of that for whites. Incomes for white households increased 88% to 365,134 rand in the past decade, the data shows. Racial inequality is compounded by significant gender and geographic inequality.</p>

<p><u>HIV/AIDS</u></p>	<p>HIV prevalence among women attending antenatal clinics increased from one per cent in 1990 to 25% in 2001, translating into an estimated infection rate of one in five adults. Here, too, women are disproportionately affected, and there are also significant provincial disparities. Between 1995 and 2000, mainly as a result of the AIDS pandemic in the country, decreased life expectancy from 64.1 to 53.4 years. According the census (2011) South Africa’s population increased 16% since the last census was conducted in 2001 and compares with 50.6 million estimated in mid-2011. About 9% t of the population is of mixed race, 8.9% white and 2.5% Asian. About one in nine people in South Africa are infected with HIV, the virus that causes the disease, according to the government. The census found 3.37 million children under the age of 17, or 19% of the total, had lost one or both parents, with AIDS cited as a major contributor. The reform of public health care, which was open to all citizens, hit a deep crisis. This may be demonstrated by child mortality rate under the age of 5 years. In 1990 it reached 64 per 1.000 births, in 1994 was 51, in 1998 dropped to 45, but in 2000 it climbed to 59. In 2012 the infant mortality rate was 42.67 deaths/1,000 live births and maternal mortality rate 300 deaths/100,000 live births (UNICEF 2013). Another example is the settlement of Soweto, where in 1994 the local clinic visited nearly 950.000 patients. In 2000, the number of patients increased to 2 million, but number of medics dropped to 500 from 800.</p>
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Source: Asaf, Cato, Jawoko, Rosevear 2010: 22; Lodge 2002: 56–70; UNICEF South Africa Statistics 2013; Statistics South Africa 2013: 1–2.

Table 2: Key labour market indicators¹³

	Oct-Dec 2011	Jul-Sep 2012	Oct-Dec 2012	Qrt to Qrt change	Year on year change	Qrt to Qrt change	Year on year change
	Thousand				Thousand		
Population 15–64 yrs	32 870	33 018	33 128	110	458	0,3	1,4
Labour force	17 741	18 313	18 078	-235	337	-1,3	1,9
Employed	13 497	13 645	13 577	-68	80	-0,5	0,6
Formal sector (non-agricultural)	9 616	9 663	9 611	-52	-5	-0,5	-0,1
Informal sector (non-agricultural)	2 134	2 197	2 205	8	71	0,4	3,3
Agriculture	630	661	685	24	55	3,6	8,7
Private households	1 118	1 124	1 076	-48	-42	-4,3	-3,8
Unemployed	4 244	4 667	4 501	-166	257	-3,6	6,1
Not economically active	14 929	14 705	15 050	345	121	2,3	0,8
Discouraged work-seekers	2 315	2 170	2 257	87	-58	4,0	-2,5
Other (not economically active)	12 614	12 535	12 794	259	180	2,1	1,4
Rates (%)							
Unemployment rate	23,9	25,5	24,9	-0,6	1,0		
Employed/population ratio (absorption)	41,3	41,3	41,0	-0,3	-0,3		
Labour force participation rate	54,3	55,5	54,6	-0,9	0,3		

Source: Statistics South Africa 2013: 1

13 Approximately 4,5 million persons were looking for work in the 4th quarter of 2012, of which 3,1 million (or 68,0%) have been looking for work for a period of 1 year or longer. Furthermore, 61,3% of the job seekers did not have matric. The unemployment rate remains high among the youth aged 15-24 years (50,9%) and this group is likely to put more pressure on the labour market because approximately 3,3 million (31,6%) of the 10,4 million in this age group are not in employment, education or training (Statistics South Africa 2013: 1).

WHOSE DAM? THE DANGER OF NARROWLY DEFINED DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF KAJBAR DAM, NORTHERN SUDAN

Tamer Abd Elkreem

Abstract: The costs and atrocities of authoritarian development have always been justified by the promised material outcome. There is an English proverb that says, “You cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs.” In some contexts, this saying can dangerously misinform the development intervention, because it perceives the cost of making an omelet (i.e. the achievement of anticipated goals) can be paid only by breaking the egg (the narrowly calculated costs of development). It takes for granted that there is a well-founded and strongly built kitchen (with the kitchen I refer to the state in this article) in which to make the omelet. The main question I raise is: what if the kitchen is so poorly constructed that it collapses the moment we break the egg? In other words what if the omelet making has hidden, unrecognized and downplayed costs that go well beyond breaking eggs to include the potential collapse of the kitchen. My contention is that the state in most of development literatures is assumed to be a legitimate agent of undertaking development but in fact is rarely analyzed and contextualized. Contrary to these widely held beliefs, the case of Kajbar Dam proves that when the promotion of citizenship through enthusiastic participation is compromised in favor of developmentalists’ dogma in economic growth, neither is achieved.

Keywords: *Authoritarian development, Kajbar Dam, resistance, Sudan*

Introduction

Most development literature in general and literatures of dam construction and resettlement in particular (Cernea 1997, Colson 2003; Scudder 2006) open with a normative perception of the state as a development agent and then build on its assumed role. This problematic trend is particularly clear in arguments articulated by proponents of

the developmental state paradigm, which is gaining momentum in Africa¹ (Mbabazi and Taylor 2005)².

I argue that in the context of the distrustful relationship between state and society, any authoritarian development intervention provokes conflict, which sometimes escalates to threaten the existence of the state as a whole). Moreover, this approach can reveal the potential danger of narrowly defined development, which subordinates local enthusiasm and participation in projects deeply connected to their life. To substantiate this approach, I analyze the ethnographic case of the Kajbar³ proposed dam in Northern Sudan. I show how local Nubian perception of this state-led development program is inextricably linked to their perception of the state itself. To clarify this point, I compare two versions of the Kajbar project, the locally accepted version that was introduced and pursued through local initiatives and the version that was rejected or resisted when nationalized by the current regime.

In this paper, I depart from the normative perception of the state's role in the state-led development intervention. I do not argue that the state has been normatively perceived. In fact, the African post-colonial state has been analyzed thoroughly from the perspective of its empirical function and role in people's everyday lives (Bayart 1993; Bierschenk and De Sardan 2014), its commandments and conviviality's (Mbembe 2001) and the neo/patrimonial political cultures that underpin its legitimacy (Schatzberg 2001)⁴. Haider (2011) offers an interesting

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- 1 The idea of unilinear line of development, which at some 'early stages' can, or to make it even worse should, compromise participation and political engagement of the citizens for the sake of quick economic growth, is still propagated by concepts like benevolent dictator and pilot agency, etc.
 - 2 However I do not intend to extrapolate this Sudanese case onto Africa. My aim is rather, focusing on Kajbar case, is to show how local unacknowledged development intervention causes conflict in the case of a fragile state like Sudan.
 - 3 This paper is based on 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork that I have conducted during my MPhil and PhD researches in Sudan. I have carried out multisite fieldwork, observing and interviewing the locally affected people, the leaders of Anti-Kajbar movement and government officials and planners of the project. I have also collected rich secondary data ranging from exchanged letters, plans, reports, newspaper articles etc.
 - 4 Running into the internal differences in methods, focuses and conclusions between these writers is beyond the scope of this paper. I aim to describe empirically what happens to the patronage bases of political legitimacy during locally unacknowledged and suppressive 'development' intervention and the concomitant resistance it creates.

description of the state-society relationship (in contexts that resemble Sudan's case). He argues that in many fragile and conflict affected states, relationships are based on patronage and a lack of accountability. The prominence of informal institutions and relationships and unofficial processes result in divergences between formal systems and rules and actual practice. Political elites, who benefit from patronage and income from natural resource rents and criminal activities, often have little incentive to engage with citizens and to build an effective public authority (Haider 2011: 7). Literature on neopatrimonialism explain how the state functions and how it is experienced under "normal circumstances". However, they do not explain what happens to this routinized statecraft during conflict-ridden moments of contested developmental intervention.

My approach contextualizes the contested Kajbar Dam project within the wider state-society relations in Sudan through critical ethnographic analysis that transcends the formalistic perception of the state and considers citizens' sense of belonging and how they see and are seen by the state. This approach provokes critical questions that remain unasked. For instance, in the World Commission on Dams (2000) report and in the World Bank's criteria for resettlement, we see that one of the most crucial requirements for dam construction to be met is "prior informed consent of the affected local people". The entity assumed to be in charge of informing the locals here is the state. Recently in post-structuralist critical reflection on development (Arce 2000; Cheshire 2006; Deb 2009; Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994), it has become clear that local communities can be manipulated by the very nature of this informing process. We must ask: How is information channeled in a situation where the state is seen as an alien entity that should be treated adversely rather than cooperatively? What if the locals, 'the citizens', are not passive consumers of information but active producers of counter knowledge? How can the state inform locals in a context where it is largely delegitimized? How can this informing process be realized and experienced, if the main features of state-society relations are antagonistic and cynical?

Situating the Locally Initiated Kajbar Dam within the Wider Background of the Mahas - State Relationship

The proposed Kajbar Dam is scheduled for construction on the third cataract of the Nile River, in the very northern part of Sudan in a region known as Mahas. Mahas is the name for both the sub-Nubian ethnic group and the area it occupies. The site of the proposed dam is located in this Mahas area, in the heart of the Nubian homeland. Its construction started as a local initiative, mainly to irrigate 15,000 acres of land and to generate 85 megawatts of electricity for local consumption. The technical, hydrological, soil, legal and social studies for this plan were all carried out under the supervision of the Mahas Development Committee from 1969 to 1970, and were modified at the Mahas Co-operation Conference in 1988. The Mahas Development Committee's studies concluded that these projects would not need a dam more than three meters high, so no villages or palm trees would be affected, except some fields that are very close to the Nile that would be submerged. The total area of the fields targeted by the project in the Nubian homeland would eventually increase to 50,000 acres. The aim of the Mahas Development Union was to increase the production of wheat and other winter crops and to produce electric power for the area. The overarching aim was to cut the high rate of outmigration and facilitate the return of people who had already left the area. This idea was locally supported, and Nubians in their homeland and in the Diaspora have paid generously for this project (Salih 1996).

In Mahas, enthusiastic engagement of the local community is a well-established trend. Almost all village public utilities and services, such as common agricultural schemes, small clinics, schools, village water tanks, tractors and other facilities, are discussed and managed at the weekly Friday prayer congregation. If, for example, a village hospital or school requires maintenance or the village needs a new public utility, these and all related issues are discussed at the mosque. Questions of cost and its division among families, methods of payment, how much to solicit from the village associations in the capital city and abroad, who becomes in charge of contacting Diaspora associations and establishing committees for different reasons, are raised during these meetings. Decisions made at these gatherings are respected by all village members. Because of the socio-political significance of this

congregation, even those who do not perform other prayers make sure to perform this particular one. No respected man⁵ in the village would miss these gatherings. By the time the committee starts to collect shares from the families, the village members, and elsewhere, the expected amount is already calculated in advance. Almost every house has at least one male migrant abroad (mainly in Arab Gulf countries); thus their contributions always exceed local collections. This process lends the village semi-autonomy; it yields a political community founded on customary rights and duties. Committees always endeavor to provide the village with the best services and utilities. This process has been the main engine of village material progress in Mahas. Since the sixties, some villages in Mahas had already built elementary schools and small clinics; at the same time grinders were introduced instead of manual grinding. Contrary, to these small village-based projects, the proposed dam's costs and benefits necessitated the collaboration of more than 57 villages in the Mahas region, under the umbrella of the Mahas Development Union.

Notably, decisions about public utilities and services are negotiated and, once made, respected collectively. Changes are negotiated, each member's participation and rights and duties are satisfactorily met, and no committee member dares abuse this public trust.⁶ The very notion of self-help by improving the material conditions of the village has become a long standing tradition among the villagers. The village as a semi-autonomous socio-political system provides security; any member experiencing difficulties feels entitled to his fellow villager's support. These relations of rights and duties have a strong moral base in a collective perception and a strong notion of belongingness. The idea that the state government should provide for their needs is atypical.

Nevertheless, if any village member or friend has a high position in the government, he is approached for financial support. No matter

5 These are masculine spaces, and decision making processes are highly informed by the patriarchal norms of the community.

6 I encountered only one story of misuse of trust: A man did not deliver an amount of money collected from members of a village association in Saudi Arabia to the village committee, as promised. Rumors about this man's misbehavior have circulated throughout all corners of the village, about how the cities and diaspora's have corrupted some of their fellows. Of course methods of holding such actors accountable are not followed, but the strength of morality and graveness of such actions against the village in the collective perception minimizes corruption.

how big the contribution, this official's payment is not regarded as support from the state but as a sign of that official's "generosity". Channeling resources, in most cases, depends more on the notion of begging citizens and bigheartedness of the officials than on well-defined and institutionalized rights and duties. The latter mainly exists to deter unwanted beggars. This adversarial relationship between state and society, mediated by the brokers who fill the interlocking spaces, is the root cause of the citizenship crisis. For example, since 1989, the current Islamist regime in Mahas has excerpted this space to empower its local membership, eventually gaining popularity by exploiting these same dynamics between the begging society and the donating government official. What makes this relationship even more provoking is the fact that not all Sudanese societies and individuals are able to solicit government officials because of the serious crisis of hierarchically ordered citizenship (Abdelkarim 2005; Elnur 2009; Gallab 2013; Khalid 1993, Sørnbø and Ahmed 2013). Accessibility of the state institutions and 'generous' officials is highly defined by the socio-cultural, ideological, and political background of the person who wants to access it.

In Mahas, community members feel a deep belongingness not to the state but to the village. This allegiance is supported by the security that each member receives or expects to receive from this relationship, which is defined by a strong moral obligation to one another at the village level. Here I refer to ontological security in a wider and deeper sense that implies a systemic reliability (Giddens 1991), not the kind of state security associated with images of torture, threats, humiliation and intimidation. Unlike other services, the government in Mahas provides police, security and judiciary services, but locals do not show an interest in utilizing them. Discourses of being marginalized by the state are relatively new. A few decades ago, the idea of being connected to the state was rare because there were no strong bases for identifying with the state and no expectation of rights in return. There were some duties, like paying land taxes, which citizens performed as grudgingly as possible.

The idea of a relationship between state and subject is not deeply rooted in Mahas history. Of course, kingdom states thrived thousands of years ago in this part of the world (see Adam 1977), but these are different from the notion of the modern state. The impact of the colonial

and neocolonial legacy cannot be overlooked in any serious analysis of the emergence and continuity of the extractive state and its adversarial relationship with its citizens (Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2001; Ekeh 1975). In other words, the state, in this postcolonial perspective, is an entity that should be avoided as much as possible when it comes to duties. At the same time it should be the first target for direct material gain, with the shortest route running through local bureaucrats, who are not only corrupt government officials but the legitimate offspring of this adverse state-society relationship.

In his widely quoted classic sociological analysis of the African state, Ekeh (1975) points out that there are two clearly distinguishable publics: the primordial public (ethnic, village, locality, religious, group, etc.), which defines citizenship in moral terms and which the individual has a strong moral obligation to maintain and develop; and the civic public (belongingness to the state), which defines the relationship in amoral terms through only material gain. This background of state-society relations is important in understanding state intervention in the Kajbar Dam project in Mahas. While the community supported the dam's first proposal for construction, which was local, it strongly rejected what later became a nationalized version.

The Case of the Locally Resisted Kajbar Dam

In Sudan in 1995, after the current Islamist⁷ regime of the National Congress Party (NCP) came to power, the scale of the Kajbar dam project shifted from local to national, to produce 360 megawatts with the expected submergence of 30 to 99 villages⁸. The idea of this na-

7 By the Islamist I mean the political ideology and movement of Islamic brotherhood. The ideology that entails a particular interpretation of Islam, should guide all aspects of the Sudanese life. It is a political agenda which has been evolving in Sudan since colonial eras (for historical analysis, critique and deeper understanding of this movement see An-Na'im 2008, Gallab 2008). The movement took several names during its evolution under its leader Al-Turabi, for instance from 1970s till the movement it split in the late 1990s it was known as the National Islamic Front (NIF). After the split the ruling party renamed itself the National Congress Party NCP. The Islamists came to power through a military coup in 1989.

8 These discrepancies are according to different versions of stories that come from; the government underestimation against Nubian resistance overestimation of the submergence level. On the one hand the government rhetoric underestimate the ecological and social effects without disseminating concrete figures. The length of the Kajbar reservoir is 55Km and this is the only information mentioned in a

tionalization was overwhelmingly rejected by a majority of the affected local communities, who immediately began to resist the new NCP.

Nubians are sensitized to the negative impacts of dam construction, displacement and impoverishment, as they have experienced it four times with the Aswan Dam in 1912 and its two heightenings and the High Dam in 1964 (see Hashim 2006; Hopkins & Mehanna 2010). These traumas left unforgettable fingerprints in Nubian collective memory and are represented in song, poetry, writing and popular culture. This historical memory was a strong anti-dam mobilizer. For most affected Nubians, what they saw as sacrificing their homeland for the state did not carry any conviction. A local primary school teacher interviewed by the BBC said, "I belong to this area before my belongingness to Sudan and if I am taken from here against my will I do not mind to take up arms against Sudan"⁹. The Kajbar Dam project is defined through language of 'sacrificing for the state' because of the established perception that nothing can be gained from a state-led initiative. Therefore, community members immediately established committees to oppose the state plan to build the dam.

During their first decade in power, Sudanese Islamists were euphoric with the establishment of an Islamic state. The regime's core ideology was to Islamize and re-Islamize not only the nation but also the region to counter-balance Western hegemony. The economic independence of countries of these regions, mainly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, from America and other Western countries was a priority to be achieved by investing oil money from the Gulf countries in Sudanese land and water resources. An old slogan, 'Sudan as the Arab food basket', was revitalized (Verhoeven 2015).

released infotainment from the Dam Implementation Unit in 2008. On the other hand the Nubian resistance overestimates the submergence levels. Underestimation and overestimations of both costs and benefits is at the heart of the dynamics of power relations over the project. The government tries to assure the locals by propagating lower costs and higher benefits from Kajbar, and on the other hand resistance is mobilized by advocating the contrary. The gap of appropriate information about Kajbar from the government side is being invested upon by the resistance. The resistance fills this gap by its own version of discourse that rebuts the hegemonic government's self-serving-developmental ideology. This is how a lack of participatory engagement is connected to 'development'-induced violence (for deeper understanding of development reductionism and its concomitant violence see Shiva 1991 and Oliver-Smith 2011).

9 See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D07BdJsAXww>

The leading person behind the nationalization of the project was the Islamist engineer and Head of the National Electricity, Mahmoud Sharief. After Sharief died in the war against the southern rebel movement, the Kajbar file was handled by the Sudanese Vice-President Zubair. Zubair was the first high government official to visit the affected area for the purpose of 'enlightening' the locals (*tenweer el-ahali*) on the benefits of the project. Naturally, this first encounter between the central government and the Nubians was already full of distrust. Most locals went to this public meeting only to show their total opposition to the idea of submerging their homes. The vice president perceived this attitude as a challenge to state power and responded arrogantly saying, "Sit down and listen to what I came to tell you. America could not frighten us, let alone your sign boards and quarrels". With this provocative statement, the vice president solidified the people's resentment of the state-led project. However, the vice president did not totally silence local opposition but called for calm and for negotiations between local citizenship and the state government. He promised that the government would not violate anyone's rights.

In response, the local committee established four sub-committees to evaluate project feasibility, evaluate costs and benefits, examine alternatives and lastly assemble the relevant statistics in case the project was accepted. The government did not consider seriously these committees and immediately began to enumerate properties for compensation purposes. The governor replied to the committees' evaluation work, submitted to him in a meeting with representatives, saying, "These are far-fetched demands; go and live where the reservoir stops". This dismissal became a turning point in the history of the Kajbar anti-dam resistance. The committee soon changed its name from "Kajbar-Dam Affected People's Committee" to "Kajbar Anti-Dam Committee". The second name connotes clearly an uncompromising position.

This predictable impasse is the result of manipulative negotiations and crafty engagement on both sides. On the one hand, most of the locals were not convinced by the very idea of the project and accordingly over-evaluated their properties anticipating government rejection. Many local negotiators' tactics were mere maneuvering tactics toward this bottleneck. The local committee itself was under pressure from fellow village men and women, for any sign of progress in negotiations

with the government would be interpreted as betrayal. On the other hand, the idea of local consultation is totally different for the Islamist regime. The Islamic notion of *shura* [consultation] is interpreted as a discussion with the “righteous” powerful men instead of the critical mass. These benchmarks of legitimate leadership, as perceived by the government, can be found only among its local loyalists. These members are politically socialized not to be critical of their leader’s policies; otherwise, they can be perceived as being disloyal to the Islamists and their party membership questioned. The bottom line is that the government created and empowered these leaders to be consulted eventually. This notion lies at the heart of the NCP political culture and is manifested in the regime’s response to local distrust and resistance.

During this critical time many Nubian non-governmental organizations in the capital city and in the Diaspora, Nubian student associations, intellectuals, and Nubian cadres in the opposition political parties alongside the local anti-dam committees constituted a strong resistance network. The strongest unifying slogan was that Nubians should merge their resistance efforts in the face of targeted attempts by the pro-Arab Khartoum regime to eliminate their unique non-Arab culture. Submerging their history was interpreted as a manifestation of the Arabization policy of the regime through population engineering (Hashim 2006). Consequently, Nubian identity took a sharp political connotation; some extreme voices (e.g. the Kush Liberation Movement) called for armed struggle rather than ‘unfruitful’ peaceful resistance in an attempt to preserve their land and culture from state encroachment. With this escalating local resistance, accompanied by other regional factors and international economic sanctions on Sudan, the idea of the project faded from the public screen.

Nubians were misled by the perception that their resistance forced the government to retreat from the Kajbar Dam issue. But in 2007, Kajbar was re-introduced in a more authoritarian manner. The locals felt the strange movement of heavy machinery at the dam site. The old anti-dam committee members reorganized and contacted different government levels inquiring about the area, holding them accountable for the consequence of any reactions from frustrated villagers. They realized that even the prefect of the locality and the governor of the state did not know about the ongoing activities at the dam site. Then

the villagers organized the biggest protest march ever seen in the area. Thousands of village men and women marched to the dam site to show their opposition and attempt to halt the activity there. In the middle of their path police and security forces cracked down on the protestors with tear gas and live bullets, killing four and injuring about twenty¹⁰ (Hashim 2006). Journalists were prohibited from covering the event; resistance leaders were arrested and taken away. In some villages, security members remained for several days so as to protect the machines and “preserve the clout of the state”, as the governor argued. People were prevented from going to their farms; they were retained and checked in a humiliating manner. In other villages, angry protestors managed to eradicate government officials, forming what they called “liberated land”. Thus, villages were either occupied by or liberated from the state during the few days that followed the event.

When the Kajbar project was introduced in such a locally unacceptable way yielding these violent confrontations, many local NCP members took explicit or implicit opposing attitudes. Many sided with their relatives’ and not only opposed the project but also joined the local anti-dam committee. Expectedly, this category was targeted by the government. In an interview, the former governor explained, “The loyalty of some of the Nubians who held prominent positions has been severely tested during those days. Some of them supported the government but others returned to their relatives”. The deputy governor and the prefect of the locality immediately resigned, arguing that they had been humiliated among their relatives by this Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) intervention. The loyalists still engaged in pro-dam activities (locally known as *karazayat*¹¹) were effectively ostracized. For instance, the sister of a former governor consultant called her (prominently pro-dam) brother and asked him never to come back to the village, confirming how much shame and disgrace he brought to the family: “If you appear in the village, I will throw myself into the Nile and commit suicide”, she said.

10 Part of this violent encounter is videotaped, see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdzJJY2l-Ss>

11 From the name of Hamid Karzai, the Afghanistan former president, who is widely believed, in that part of the world, to be empowered by the United States to work for its own interest not in the interest of Afghan citizens. In the context of Mahas, this powerfully analogizes working for the Sudanese government by spying and working for a foreign country.

Tension over the Kjabar project escalated, local NCP members faced conflicting loyalties, the interlocking space between the state and society shrunk and some NCP members supported their relatives, a position considered unfriendly to the government. Under these new circumstances, the internal restructuring of the NCP became unavoidable. But this reordering of the internal ruling party's house took an authoritative line in accordance with project loyalty. This new criterion provided momentum for newly joining members, who had no longstanding resources of power within the NCP, to compete with old members. Changing the rules of the game was not accepted by old members, who resisted this new competition. NCP members believed that they were in a position to be taken seriously, but they were as uniformed as the villagers, which put them, as government officials, in the excruciating position of being unable to explain what was going on and answer their relatives' pressing questions, like: What activities are going on around the dam site? *Uoga fakidachina* [Are we being drowned]? *Uoga fa nachil foagjina* [Will we be thrown into the desert? Why is the government ignoring us? Have local NCP members been paid to betray us?

The anti-dam activists, among young generations in particular, further fueled suspicion with intimidating speculation and rumors. They perfectly capitalized on the gap created by the government's lack of transparency. Their speculation found a receptive audience. In this uncertain and distrustful climate, the most pessimistic rumors became the most quickly circulated and believed. No one dared defend government action. As a result, the DIU's authoritative actions opened more space for the local anti-dam activists to shape local attitudes toward the project than the one left to NCP members.

Because of the nature of its establishment with wider authorities, the DIU downplayed the local Islamist's role in softening the friction, had they given the needed resources like time, information and participatory space. Even the government loyalists, whose support does not require serious engagement by the virtue of patronage norms, were taken by surprise equally with their fellow villagers. If these compromises had taken place, describing it as authoritative intervention would lose ground. That means the 'local leaders' whom the government created and generously empowered to be eventually consulted by *shura*, were themselves discounted. The point here is that, as far as the

Kajbar case is concerned, the Islamist regime could not commit itself even to implement its own manipulative participatory model of *shura*.

The Northern State Government (NSG)¹² faced the same challenges, rooted in its role as mediator between the two conflicting camps, neither of which acknowledged the NSG legitimacy. Worse, the NSG was trying to navigate these opposing visions without possessing the legitimacy to question and modify each side's position. The NSG executives end up negotiating for their own legitimacy within this troubled local-DIU relationship. Locals knew that the DIU is powerful and that the NSG would not jeopardize its position by getting into serious disagreements with the DIU. They also knew that even if the governor would take such a risk, he would immediately be replaced by another willing to implement DIU policies. Thus for the locals, who are aware of these facts, the governor's reassurance that their rights would not be violated was perceived as an empty promise. The former governor acknowledged that his government was not informed or consulted. When I asked how and why he tried to reassure the locals when he, as a governor, was not certain about how things would go, he replied:

In the DIUs' plan, Kajbar was the next project after Merowe Dam. But they have never learnt from the Merowe experience and the same mistakes have been repeated in the approach to Kajbar. Until they started there was no resistance. The way they have started has escalated the resistance. Their approach has even created distrust of those who were ready to accept the project. The DIU perceives itself as a federal unit and tries to enjoy the vertical relations between the federal and state level. Federal plans and decisions overrule the states, but the relations should have been coordinated in a smooth way to avoid such disputes. We did not face problems with other federal ministries' programs as we faced it with the DIU. When they started in Kajbar we did not have any prior information. The project started, and naturally the local felt the movements and contacted the prefect, and he contacted me. I contacted the DIU and told them that when they start such a project they should have let us be informed, because

12 Since 1991, Sudan has adopted federalism as a political system to solve issues of diversity management, power sharing and problem solving that suits Sudan's multi-tiered heterogeneity.

it has security implications and we are responsible for the state's and your own worker security¹³.

Though the governor acknowledges that the DIU took 'the wrong approach', he did not try to reverse or modify it; when he contacted the DIU he focused more on his role as a security provider. But what does security mean in this context? Who is being secured from whom and how? The 'security' necessitated sending more armed forces to the area to protect the workers and their equipment on the dam site against the 'ungrateful' locals. This securitized approach is what led to the violent confrontation, which the governor justified as "to preserve the clout of the state". But, what has long continued to be a latent function of the ideology of development, which is controlling with impunity through coercion and exploitation, has created an epistemological ground for the local people, through which both the state and its development projects are processed. In other words, the historical overspill of what Ake (1996) calls latent functions of the ideology of development constituted the main impediment to both development and the functioning of the state, which are both seen through the lenses of hostility and distrust (See Suleiman 2000 and Gertel, Rottenburg & Calkins 2014 for more conflict-laden cases from other parts of Sudan). It is the perspective from below which the Kajbar case adds to Ake's (1996) emphasis on the mismanagement of both state power and development from above.

Conclusion

The Kajbar Dam debacle teaches how local perception of development can be inextricably linked to the perception of the state. The ethnographic analyses of the state-society relationship in the context of Kajbar reveal how different degrees in citizenship, sense of belongingness, trust, reliability, loyalty, ownership and entitlement produced different ways of the local community engagement with the project. The local oriented version of Kajbar, which enjoyed stronger relations (measured in terms of the above mentioned substantive qualities) with its social base, displayed enthusiastic engagement with the project. In contrast, the nationalized version was resisted mainly because of local distrust, which shaped the perception of the outcome of the project

13 Interview conducted, by the author, with the former governor of the Northern State in 2012.

as destructive and impoverishing. The state's authoritarian intervention and its implementation at different levels intensified this distrust and escalated resistance. In sum, in this context, a more authoritative development approach that compromises serious engagement with local communities leads to resistance more likely to escalate into a civil war threatening the existence of the whole country. That means, going back to the metaphor of the omelet, the kitchen which was taken for granted to be so strongly built, might very likely fall apart before its occupants enjoy the omelet.

The inherent problem of development in Sudan is threaded together by the crisis of legitimacy of the state institutions that implement them. The paper thus ethnographically unpacks the nature of the state which itself can be a hindrance to development let alone being an unquestionable developer. To this end, I argue that development cannot be understood without considering its implementation within a larger state-society context. The seeds of the state's legitimacy are problematically sown upon the ground of its duty 'to develop' the nation rather than the fertile soil of non-discriminatory contractual relations with its citizens. Development, whether real or imagined, becomes the omnipresent justification for authoritative and exploitative manifestations of the state. The state becomes the bureaucratic apparatus, which facilitates subjugation of the people and their resources, depending on their position in the citizen's hierarchy, for the winning alliances. The quest for development, as a political discourse, is the most dominant feature of postcolonial Sudan. In both colonial and postcolonial Sudan, development has been instrumentalized efficiently to perpetuate, create and consolidate social injustice and the uneven distribution of rights and duties as well as 'development' costs and benefits. As a result, Sudan affords preferential treatment to citizens on the merit of their ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, intellectual, ideological and geographical positions. The illegitimacy of the state and its manipulatively implemented development projects yield an adversarial state-society relationship in which neither state nor its projects of development are trusted. How the Kajbar project will continue to unfold in light of these conditions remains to be seen.

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NEW COMMUNITY, OLD TRADITION: THE INTORE WARRIOR AS A SYMBOL OF THE NEW MAN. RWANDA'S ITORERO-POLICY OF SOCIETAL RECREATION

Erika Dahlmanns

Abstract: In Rwanda, the state-driven program, Itorero ry'Igihugu, revives an old military institution, Itorero, of the pre-colonial kingdom's Tutsi elite warriors, Intore [the chosen ones]. By building a new national community of "chosen people" through civic education and cultural adjustment trainings (promoting 'Rwandan values') the program aims at countering the impact of experienced collective violence and inner division to ensure the success of the national development plan, Vision 2020. Introduced as an endogenous instrument for post-genocide national rehabilitation, Itorero is currently the most far-reaching governmental program, and the first one aimed at profound societal transformation through a new interpretation of an old tradition. Its approach challenges globalized norms of peacebuilding and raises questions concerning debates on 'divided communities' and 'national reconciliation'. Drawing on field research as well as on the historical genesis and local meanings of the tradition, the paper provides insights into the program's image of man and into its own logic of social reconstruction beyond the normative views of peacebuilding.

Keywords: *rwanda, Social Reconstruction, Conflict, Conflict Transformation, Reconciliation, Nation-Building, Tradition, itorero, intore*

Introduction

In the past twenty years, the use of »cultural traditions« has been central to Rwandan government policies promoting nation-building, national reconciliation, and development.¹ Introduced as an endogenous instrument for post-genocide national rehabilitation in 2007

1 So far research has concentrated on *Gacaca* (see Moolenaar 2005; Schilling 2005; Clark 2009) and *Ingando*-Camps (see Mgbako 2005; Dahlmanns 2007; Prudekova 2011), being the most popular examples.

and implemented country-wide since 2012, the state-driven nation-building and development program, *Itorero ry'Igihugu*, is currently the most far-reaching government program in Rwanda, and the first one aimed at profound societal transformation through a new interpretation of an old, originally military tradition. The program that targets the entire population revives an old military institution, *Itorero*, of the pre-colonial kingdom's Tutsi elite warriors, *Intore* ('the chosen ones'), whose spectacular war dances have survived as a relic of the old *Itorero* tradition in popular culture to the present day. By 'building new Rwandan citizens' (NURC 2009a: 27) and a new national community of 'chosen people' through civic education and cultural adjustment training (promoting a new guiding culture based on 'Rwandan values') the program aims at countering the impact of experienced collective violence and inner division to ensure the success of the national development plan, *Vision 2020*. *Itorero ry'Igihugu* challenges globalized norms of peacebuilding related political practice and raises a number of questions: What is it that renders the *Itorero* tradition attractive to the government? How could a new interpretation of an originally military tradition, once associated with the Tutsi elite, support an integration of all segments of the population into a nation, a shared sense of citizenship and belonging? How does it resonate with the government's aim to promote a peaceful, democratic and development promoting culture? What kind of community and citizenship is to be created through the program's culture-bound approach? And what is the culture-bound political logic of societal recreation all about?

Drawing on results of first-hand research in Rwanda² as well as on the historical genesis and local meanings of the *Itorero* tradition, I will, in this article, examine distinctive features of the program's culture-bound political reasoning and practice from an emic and historically grounded perspective.

Popular approaches predominately favour analysing 'non-western' policies that draw on local traditions taking normative theories of peacebuilding, transitional justice, etc. as points of departure,³ thus inhibiting insights beyond our own normative conceptions. In spite

2 The research draws on material from empirical research on political imageries and practices of societal reconstruction in Rwanda (2006-2011) funded by Gerda Henkel Stiftung and BIGSAS.

3 Normative approaches have recently been criticized in the field of transitional justice studies (see e. g. Fletcher and van der Merwe 2013: 1-7; Hinton 2010).

of the growing academic interest in processes and policies of ‘national reconciliation’ and ‘home grown approaches’ dealing with the legacies of collective violence, however, empirical research on how tradition-inspired imageries and practices exactly shape national peace-building policies and reconfigurations of national orders remains scarce.⁴ Itorero ry’Igihugu can be considered as the government’s innovative solution to its challenges of nation-building and development in a society characterized by diverging ethno-nationalist ideologies, experiences of collective violence and severe poverty of large parts of the population. But how does the Government draw on the old tradition to meet these objectives?

Ever since the military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) brought an end to the war against the former government of Rwanda and the genocide against the Tutsi, the legacy of violence and the historically grown and politically instrumentalised diverging conceptions of collective identity, that defined Hutu and Tutsi as antagonists, constitute major challenges to the government’s nation-building effort (for the government’s perspective see Shyaka 2003). Whereas the RPF governments have succeeded in adverse conditions to consolidate “negative peace” and promote economic growth, their policy of national unity has considerably expanded into public and private spheres – this has been criticized e. g. by Straus and Waldorf (2011). The reworking of images of society, identity, culture and history are at the core of the government’s nation-building policy that with Itorero ry’Igihugu reached a new dimension. With the program’s reference to a military tradition and its encompassing nature Itorero ry’Igihugu does not only challenge ethnocentric perspectives on processes and policies of peace-building and societal reconstruction. Its analysis also becomes challenging against the background of a very different historical experience that bears the risk of leading the researcher into the trap of his or her own chrono- or ethnocentric perspective.

It seems, therefore, important to me to acknowledge the program’s effort to cope with the legacy of genocide and fight against extremist ideologies, for my own European and especially German historical background might lead to a misleading understanding of the program.

4 For anthropological approaches to analyse processes of social reconstruction see e. g. Foblets and Truffin (2004). On the anthropology after mass violence see de Lame (2007: 4).

In Germany, slogans promoting heroism, patriotism, sacrifice for the nation and the glorification of a Germanic tradition served Nazism and genocide, whereas in the decades following the Nazi regime critical debates fostered a negative connotation of the former 'German virtues' as well as scepticism toward national orientations and mobilisation for the nation's sake. The process of coming to terms with the legacy of the past in Germany cultivated suspicion against ethics and education for the good of the nation⁵ that also influenced German Peace and Conflict Studies (see Koppe 2010: 60). Whereas interrelations between war, heroism, sacrifice and crime – from a German perspective – seem apparent, they have not been discussed in the same way in neighbouring countries like Poland or France. There, the memory of the fight against Nazism and Genocide is a positive memory of fight, heroism and sacrifice, celebrated on the national Victory Day in many European countries. As a German anthropologist, I would give an embarrassingly perfect example of ethnocentrism by (inappropriately) judging the Polish or French as being militarists or fascists for celebrating the abolishment of Nazism with military parades and a heroic language. In Rwanda, the military victory of the RPF bringing an end to the genocide is celebrated as a heroic deed on Liberation Day every 4th of July. We should keep this specific context in mind when we try to appropriately understand Itorero's revitalization and the promoted vision of a heroic nation.

One particular challenge to the RPF government's nation-building effort is the divided perspective among Rwandans, i. e., those who participated in the Liberation War and those were saved by the RPF celebrate the RPF's effort, as opposed to others, (some of them) responsible for participating in genocide, who perceive the RPF's victory as defeat. Against this background, one may speculate if or in how far the national remembrance of the military victory, celebrated on Liberation Day, and the memory of a heroic military tradition (transmitted with Itorero's revitalisation) relate to one another and may serve nation-re-building.

In Itorero ry'Igihugu, we observe the glorification of a military tradition in Africa, which on the one hand is to be transformed into a peaceful form to serve economic, social and moral development, yet

5 For early critical contributions see Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno und Max Horkheimer.

on the other hand is continued by promoting ideals or virtues like heroism and sacrifice for the nation.

One issue I see regarding the programme's analysis in this regard might be a typically German problem, as Germans, for historic reasons, are indebted to overcome military heroism and collectivism, as negative aspects of German culture and obstacles to democracy. The challenge is also one specific to cultural anthropologists as we aim to contrast ethnocentric generalisations of our own values with and understanding of different ones "to grasp the native's point of view" (Malinowski [1922] 2003: 25), as Malinowski once expressed it in a now somewhat old-fashioned sounding manner. The following pages can be read as an attempt to deal with this dilemma, which can never be completely solved, but (at least) drawn attention to it.

After introducing into Government debates and narratives on the nation's state, its history and the Government's understandings of culture crucial to the introduction of the new program, I will provide background information on the program development and subsequently retrace the historical genesis of the Itorero tradition. By taking a look at its historical changes in its interplay with changing political contexts since colonial times I will reflect on the political relevance of the Itorero tradition, its continuity, and potential function as the symbolic expression of a collective self. Furthermore, I will try to understand why the spectacular dance performances of the Intore continued to exist as a popular element of national culture even after the abolishment of the Tutsi monarchy and in view of the marginalisation of the Tutsi court culture. At the centre of my considerations are the specifics of the tradition and explanations regarding its attractiveness to the present Government.

Against this historical background, I examine the Government's new interpretation of the old tradition, relevant to the programme's legitimation, the related definition of a new guiding culture (Leitkultur) and the program's image of a new Rwandan citizen, symbolised by the Intore warrior. Besides describing central structures, educational practices and contents of the program, I will take a look at the political symbolism of speeches, poems and collective performances at celebrations on Itorero ry'Igihugu Day. On this basis, I seek to examine

the culture-bound logic and practice of societal recreation and the Government's vision of a new nation.

Development of the Program

How do Rwandans envisage their future? What kind of society do they want to become? How can they construct a united and inclusive Rwandan identity? What are the transformations needed to emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory social and economic situation? These are the main questions Rwanda Vision 2020 addresses. [...] Vision 2020 is to be achieved in a spirit of social cohesion and equity, underpinned by a capable state. Rwanda's ongoing development will have, at its core, the Nation's principal asset its people (Vision 2020, MINECOFIN 2011: 3-4).

At the Akagera Conference, held in February 2007, the Rwandan Government decided to setup a new kind of program as the basic findings of the government on the nation's developmental progress indicated that a loss of cultural values and a general lack of knowledge regarding national developmental goals constituted the major challenges for realising the country's development plan 'Vision 2020'.

Three ministries⁶ were subsequently charged with the development of a 'culture-bound' program to counter the shortcomings diagnosed. By means of civic education and cultural adjustment training the program was to promote a collective 'mind-set change' through an orientation toward traditional values with the aim to foster development promoting attitudes in the population. The design of the program reflected the importance the government had attributed to traditional values for the nation's renewal articulated, for instance, in article 8 of the preamble of the national constitution (2003), which claims "to draw from our centuries-old history the positive values which characterized our ancestors that must be the basis for the existence and flourishing of our Nation." The first draft of the program, published by the newly set up Itorero Task Force of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in 2007, made it clear that the attempt to revitalise the Itorero tradition was based on a specific understanding of

6 These included the *Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture* and the *National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)*.

culture linked to the government's understanding of national history. Based on the diagnosis that Rwanda had become a 'society without values' due to the cultural uprooting caused by colonization (also understood as a main cause of genocide) the Government justified the revitalization of traditional culture, i. e., the civilization of society, as an urgent ethical duty.⁷ The Government wanted to counteract the serious impacts of the loss of culture, it thus caused the 'de-humanization' of Rwandan citizens inhibiting development potentials, in the sense of common wellbeing: "the main challenge is the lower mind-set level of Rwandans, which handicaps the achievement of government policies that would be useful to them. [...] values which used to characterize [the Rwandan culture] since years were lost whereas they helped Rwandans to be characterized by human nature, and helped the Rwandan society to develop. [...] the Government of Rwanda found it better to fetch from the Rwandan culture ways of practicability to solve problems [...] be it those that are economic, social and those related to governance. It is in this regard that the Cabinet meeting [...] approved the creation of the Itorero ry'Igihugu as a remedy to a quick mind-set change and development aiming at achieving the Vision 2020." (NURC 2009a: 6)

With this mission the program, which was considered a multifunctional development instrument, started off as a one-year pilot⁸ following the parliamentary ratification on November 12, 2007 and presidential approval four days later. In December the National Dialogue Council⁹ decided that in the future all citizens should go through the training program in order to "build new Rwandan citizens by helping them change their mind-set, behaviour and values which correlate with current trends." (NURC 2009a: 27) The objective to 'build' new Rwandan citizens underlined the program's all-encompassing claim.

7 Interview with a Itorero Task Force official (2009); see also Government of Rwanda (1999); Ministry of Sports and Culture (2008); NURC (2011).

8 During that time the *Itorero Task Force of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission* developed with the organization PLANEF a policy paper, the Strategic Plan (NURC 2009a), with a general survey of structures, guide lines for program implementation and program philosophy. On the basis thereof a new plan (NURC 2009b) was developed by NURC (see MINALOC 2008).

9 Council members are the President, representatives of the Councils for Local Administration, Member of the Cabinet and Parliament.

From November 2007 till the end of 2012 more than three million Rwandans – around 27% of the total population of about eleven million people – should have passed the basic training to subsequently support as multipliers the training of the new Intore within the separate administrative structure the program set up parallel to the state administration for the purpose of decentralization.¹⁰

Whilst abroad – e.g. in Belgium, in Canada and the US – training for the Rwandan diaspora communities were organized by Rwandan embassies¹¹, within the national territory, a Steering Committee with representatives from different government institutions under supervision of the Itorero Task Force at the NURC was charged with the implementation of Itorero ry'Igihugu from the end of 2008 until 2011. In 2011 the newly founded National Itorero Commission (NIC) took over this task and extended the program function to a National Service (Urugerero) for 18 - 35 year old adults including obligatory military and civil service¹² (NIC 2011: 4, 9-10, 14-15). As defined in article 47 of the constitution (2003) Itorero ry'Igihugu's objective is to instil a culture of voluntarism, general commitment to voluntary work for the benefit of the nation.¹³

Itorero ry'Igihugu is not only by name, but also by its basic structures, ideas and ideals oriented towards a specific interpretation of the pre-colonial Itorero tradition¹⁴ the significance of which changed in the course of history.

10 For the period 2009–2012 the number of participants indicated is 2 967 400 persons. To be added are 67 995 people trained from November 2007 till April 2008 and at least the same number for the following months until the official start of the program in 2009. Until 2012 each village (*Umudugudu*) should have a minimum of four trained people (NURC 2009a: 92, 101).

11 See www.rwandandiaspora.gov.rw/index.php?id=49 (04.10.2013).

12 The *National Service* includes a training period with a basic military course and can be done within a year according to personal qualifications and the general need in various sectors of society.

13 “All citizens have a duty to participate, through work, in the development of the country; to safeguard peace, democracy, social justice and equality and to participate in the defense of the motherland.” (Ibid.)

14 To preserve the memory of this tradition a Itorero documentary center is planned in Nkumba.

Historical Transformations of the Itorero Tradition

Prior to the introduction of the Itorero ry'Igihugu program, little was left of the Itorero other than the folkloristic warrior dances, performed on the occasion of national holidays, at weddings and for tourism purposes. However, Itorero dates back to the times of the foundation of the Rwandan kingdom in the 17th century. According to Jan Vansina, at that time these troops (called Itorero) were protection forces at the courts of the African Great Lakes region. In Rwanda, they became of utmost importance for the early state- and nation-building when single troops were untied to build an army, at first under King Ndori around 1700. The development of an army supported the territorial expansion of what was to become the Rwandan kingdom and the creation of an administrative structure for its territory which favoured cultural homogenisation. The founding of the army, as well as its growth and professionalization, were, according to Vansina, essential to obtain administrative control over the country (Igihugu) and achieve social integration of the kingdom's population. The armies controlled whole territories, turning them into administrative units of the kingdom, putting the population – obligated to feed and support the soldiers – at the service of the army and the king. The Amatorero (plural of Itorero¹⁵) having names reflecting their esprit de corps and military mind-set, for instance “the Undefeated”. Here, the Intore (“chosen ones”) – most from influential families for higher military service elected Tutsi men – were trained to elite warriors that went to war for the king.¹⁶ (Vansina 2004: 60-62)

In addition, the Intore y'Umwami (‘chosen ones of the king’) were imparted with knowledge on ancestral traditions and underwent socialization in the ways of the court. Here, the virtues of a military and courtly-pastoral tradition of the Tutsi elite – noble behaviour (Ikuy-abupfura/Ubupfura), fighting spirit and heroic courage (Ubutware), manfulness (Ubugabo), discipline and self-control (Itonde) – were

15 *Itorero* (radical *toor-*) can be derived from the verbs *gutora/gutoza* which means as much as exercise, accustom oneself, progressively learn or also making the first dance steps (Nkulikiyinka 2002: 171).

16 Vansina (2004) emphasizes the connection between the military and pastoral tradition of the Tutsi and presumes that formerly the organization of herds served as an example to building up the military apparatus. The armies responsible for the royal herds were called *Umutwe* (head) like in the pastoral tradition it was the usual designation for a number of flocks.

cultivated. As educational institutions and cultural centres, where poetry and traditional dances were trained, the Amatorero may – as Jan Vansina assumes – also have contributed to form a linguistically uniform national language, Kinyarwanda, as well as they may have favoured the population’s identification with the kingdom, whereby the latter seems plausible regarding the Intore. But apart from the institution’s potentially integrating effect, the military system also institutionalized distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi as a hierarchic relationship. The high-ranking Intore soldiers had servants and soldiers at their disposal which they called ‘Hutu’ (Vansina 2004: 135)¹⁷.¹⁸ This military culture spread into other spheres of Rwandan society.

The military system promoted a military culture and a bellicose, heroic self-image displayed in artistic performances at the court that were to become central to the representation of the nation. According to Vansina, the Amatorero supported what he describes as an indoctrinating “exaltation of violence, imposture, and the right of the strongest that became the universal theme of all literary and choreographic artistic forms.” (Vansina 2004: 62) In military parades at the king’s court the Intore celebrated real or fictitious military conquests and victories with war dances (Umuhamirizo), songs and a bellicose poetry, demonstrated the power of the kingdom due to its excellent warriors.

In their sophisticated performances that were accompanied by the rhythm of drums, Intore presented their fighting skills and spirit with agile, elegant movements, aggressive postures and war cries displaying courage and military superiority. During these performances Intore, dressed in loincloth, carried a spear and a shield and wore wigs of long fair hair, reminiscent of a lion’s mane (similar to the king’s headdress and symbolizing the relationship with him), as well as sashes crossing the chest, awarded to warriors of those times for heroic deeds. In their choreographies Intore staged their competition as excellent warriors, competitively praising their talents with a bellicose self-praising poetry called *Ibyivugo* (in singular: *Icyivugo*).¹⁹ Glorifications of one’s own

17 Vansina refers to oral traditions (*Ibitékerezo*) and documents of Peter Schumacher, Microfilm library Anthropos No. 28 A, Posieux, Freiburg 1958.

18 Regarding pre-colonial *Itorero* see Vansina 2004, 2001, 1961, as to *Itorero* in the 19th and 20th century Maquet (1961: 109pp); Bale (2002); Kagame (1963: 196).

19 The term *Icyivugo*, derived from the reflexive verb *kwivuga* (*talk of oneself, pride oneself or boast*) reveals that this genre is a form of self-congratulation. As to *Ibyivugo* see Kagame (1969: 15pp).

military courage, superiority and unscrupulous violence against the enemy were defining characteristics of this genre and remain so in performances to this day.

Expressions of respect and signs of appreciation towards the authorities indicate that these performances also were meant to draw the attention of the powerful.²⁰ These could award the status of a hero and important positions for military merits (Maquet 1961: 109) – the number of killed enemies –, yet also punish for defeats. The cultural anthropologist Jan Czekanowski, who travelled to the East-African Great Lakes region for the purpose of ethnographic research at the beginning of the 20th century, reported on how warriors returning from a lost battle against the Mutwa Chief Bassebia “in order to cover up their failure and not to be despised due to lacking trophies, [...] [killed] a number of peaceful peasants taking their heads and genitals, to allow a glorious entry of the troops into the capital” (Czekanowski 1917: 276). Military defeats could result in the death penalty (Ibid). Keeping the dependence on and orientation towards the ruler in mind, the question arises, whether the Intore’s performances could not also be regarded as expressions of an authoritarian political culture. Intore chosen by and at the same time existentially dependent on the king celebrated their heroic deeds for king and country, the successful fulfilment of a royal order as a personal victory, demonstrating at the same time the accordance of their individual aspirations with those of the ruler. In this respect the Intore’s performances could be viewed as testimonies of loyalty and thus also as a specific form of an African culture of praise (as to African praise songs see Vogels 2001: 503-504), unveiling not only opportune acclamations of the king but in the portrayal of acts of violence also an ultimately devoted commitment to king and fatherland. However, what real relation there was between the literary portrayal of violence and the violence actually perpetrated cannot be assessed retrospectively.

20 The following extract may give an example: “Rutinduka [...] I killed you by thrusting my lance [...] He shed blood while the lance pierced his body, and I mutilated him before he drew his last breath [...]. The commander of the expedition, very emotionally: “Oh, you virtuosic javelin thrower”, he said, “You fill me with joy! Come closer and tell me about your glorious deeds!” “In Rugeyo”, I said, “I had killed a petty prince and vaunting my feat, armed with a successful bow, I provided another trophy to our drummer.” (Kagame 1969: 26-27, own translation from French.)

It is open to speculation whether the bellicose performances – similar to Zimmerman’s findings regarding representations of violence in antiquity (Zimmermann 2009:7) – had an identity-creating function and cultivated a collective self-image linked to a martial, violence glorifying tradition as the still popular saying “Urwanda ruratera, ntiruterwa!” [Rwanda attacks and will never be attacked!] , dating back to the 18th century, and other similar sayings suggest (Vansina 2004: 120). At any rate, the performances, stating ultimate commitment, excellence and competition, illustrated a meritocratic norm of Rwanda’s military that accepted only victory and tolerated no defeat – “Defeat is the only bad news.” (Des Forges 2011)

These staging’s presenting Rwanda as a victorious kingdom due to the ultimate endeavour of its warriors became a central trait of the performances representing the monarchy and subsequently Rwanda as a nation. Under King Kigeri Rwabugiri (1835-1895), a special company (Itorero) was first established, specializing in artistic performances (Nkulikiyinka 2002: 173pp)²¹. This likely marked the beginning of a professionalization in the artistic representation of Rwanda through the war dances of the Intore. At least, the performances of the newly established Royal Ballet maintained their importance for representing the nation (Nkulikiyinka 2002: 173-179, 205), while the traditional Itorero institution gradually lost its significance with the introduction of mission schools in the colonial era.

The instrumentalization of court culture for missionary purposes promoted a popularisation of its traditions. Missionaries adapting the term Intore and its local meaning for Christian converts – at first mostly ordinary Hutu and Twa – Intore ry’Imana [God’s chosen ones]²². Linking the Tutsi associated higher social status signified by the term with the converts was to enhance their status and at the same time implied an obligation to serve Imana or God (instead of the king as the term Intore ry’Umwami implied) and as his worldly institution the Church and its mission. Under the influence of colonial educational policy, citizens founded dance companies, also called Itorero, in which

21 The ensembles at first are said to have been exclusively Tutsi. An exception was the dance group *Ibirusha*, whose members were Hutu that were children of the magicians and the slaughter of the king’s court (Ibid.).

22 Interviews with Jean-Baptiste Nkulikiyinka 2010 and a missionary of the White Fathers in 2009. Still today churchgoers in mass are addressed as *Intore ry’Imana* (also see Mbonimana/Ntezimana 1990).

they imitated the Intore's war dances (see Nkulikiyinka 2002: 172-173). This may have contributed to a lessening of the Intore's exclusive association with Tutsi court culture, turning their dances into a shared cultural heritage in which the memory of the martial tradition was preserved as in the newly designed national symbols of the country.

It is remarkable in this connection that Rwanda's first national emblem which Belgium designed on the occasion of the 25-year jubilee of King Rudahigwa in 1957 shows headdress, spear and shield as worn by the Intore.²³ The same symbols were also used, together with the crown crane emblem, totem bird of the royal Abanyiginya clan, in the coat of arms of the royal house. The Royal Ballet started representing Rwanda on the international stage in colonial times – for the first time at the Colonial Exhibition on occasion of the 1958 World Exhibition in Brussels – establishing the Intore warrior dances as part of Rwanda's national symbolism.

Surprisingly these warrior dances continued to be performed after independence and the abolition of monarchy under the following Hutu governments, in spite of the marginalisation of court traditions, now stigmatised as culture of the former oppressors. The dances, however, were adapted to the new political context. The colours of the dancer's dressing were changed to the colours of the new national flag (reminding of the Hutu revolution as new founding myth).

Similarly, an attempt was made to exchange the traditional names of the dances and dance companies linked to the pastoral Tutsi tradition for names referring to the new political course, such as "Indepandansi" (recalling the recent independence from colonial rule) or other terms reflecting a new political self-image and the abolished Ubuhake-client system, where Tutsi chiefs had exploited Hutu, "Nangubuhake" ("I detest Ubuhake"). However, over time, these symbolic political dissociations failed to eradicate the traditional terminology (see Nkulikiyinka 2002: 178, 205).

The fact that the new national flag showed a hoe, linked to the agricultural tradition of the Hutu, as well as bow and arrow, could be seen as a sign of continued identification with the military tradition of the kingdom, otherwise rejected. Contrary to the virtue of nobility

23 The fascination the dance spectacles of the *Intore* exerted on Europeans may have been reason for the choice of the symbols.

formerly connected to the Tutsi elite warriors, heroism remained a central national value which now referred to the commitment to the fatherland in the sense of the 'Social Revolution'. In Hutu nationalism, the virtue of nobility, once central to the court's canon of values and likely an ongoing aspect of the self-image of 'noble' Tutsi in the diaspora,²⁴ took on a negative connotation. Nobility here was associated with an elitist attitude of Tutsi associated with the disdain for Hutu as 'uncivilized,' an image the media used in the 1990s to fuel hostility towards the Tutsi (see Chrétien 1995).

On national holidays during the Second Republic, the MRND (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement) government presented Rwanda in spectacular dance performances as a nation of industrious peasants promoting the country's development through their physically hard manual labour in the fields – said to have been little esteemed by Tutsi.²⁵ Notwithstanding the fact that the governments of the First and the Second Republic distanced themselves from the Tutsi court culture, a continuity of its tradition can be seen in the praise of the Head of State – which led Lemarchand to refer to the First Republic as a 'presidential Mwamiship' (presidential kingdom).²⁶

The names of the music and dance companies (Itorero), so-called 'groupes choque', praising the president in the MRND one-party state, as well as those of the party militia mobilised for the genocide against the Tutsi, had names resembling those of the former military Itorero troops²⁷ like Interahamwe ("Those who attack together") and Impuzamugabi ("Those who pursue a common objective"), symbolising a fighting spirit.

24 A hint pointing at the continued importance of this virtue in the diaspora maybe the example of a praise song in the 1990s from RPF commander Fred Rwigyema, descendant of the royal Nyiginy clan, whose nobility is honored (see Higirow 2007: 78).

25 Photos from the archives of the Rwandan Ministry of Information (ORINFOR), Kigali. As to "Peasant Ideology" see Verwimp (1999); also see Nkulikiyinka (2002: 93).

26 In the performance culture of the First Republic, described by Lemarchand as 'presidential Mwamiship' (presidential Kingdom), as well as of the Second Republic Lemarchand at any rate viewed a continuity of court performance tradition and interpreted it as a sign of the continued authority-centred political culture (Lemarchand 1970: 269).

27 Interview with a former participant in 2009, female postal worker. Also see Des Forges (2002: 69). The government provided costumes for participants on which there were symbols of the party and similar to the *Intore* costumes - thus establishing a symbolic connection between "ruler" and "followers".

In the course of history the Intore's dances became a cultural heritage hardly associated with the old Tutsi tradition. Whilst the image of the Intore warrior turned into a national icon, the pre-colonial Itorero institution fell into oblivion.²⁸ Its government-initiated revitalization through the Itorero ry'Igihugu program is justified precisely with this loss and interestingly does not refer to the Tutsi origin of the tradition. However, until 2010 the Ministry of Culture (MINESPOC) pointed to this very origin in a (meanwhile no longer accessible to the public) description of national culture on its home page, emphasizing the political function of the art of praise of the Intore during the Tutsi kingdom and its change according to the 'ethnic orientation' of subsequent governments: "the tall, splendidly adorned all-male Tutsi Intore dancers, characterized by coordinated drilling dances reflecting the warrior tradition of the Tutsi [...] were attractions for travellers. [...] Much of Rwanda's traditional cultural heritage revolved around dances, praise songs, and dynastic poems designed to enhance the legitimacy of the Tutsi kingship. Since independence in 1962 another set of traditions has emerged, emphasizing a different cultural stream, identified with a Hutu heritage. Regional dances, including the celebrated hoe dance of the north, are given pride of place in the country's cultural repertoire."²⁹

What Relevance Does the Tradition Have for the Present?

Does the Government with the help of the Itorero ry'Igihugu program – oriented less towards the vivid aspects of the old tradition than towards the pre-colonial institution – now aim at re-shaping the nation by revitalizing the pre-colonial Tutsi tradition and at integrating all Rwandans, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, in this formerly exclusive elite culture whilst possibly reviving or continuing an authoritarian military tradition? Would not a revitalization of a Tutsi associated tradition as point of reference for a new, integrative sense of national identity contradict the policy of national unity and reconciliation? A forced emphasis of a Tutsi tradition could be perceived as a provoking demonstration of Tutsi superiority.

28 The Rwandans I interviewed did not see any connection between the dances and Tutsi tradition.

29 The text was on the home page of the Ministry of Culture until beginning of 2010 under <http://www.minispoc.gov.rw/>, (latest update 08/2008).

As a symbolic trap (Kaufman 2006), this could – contrary to Government interests – reinforce the demonization of the Tutsi and thus jeopardize the new political order. A re-introduction of a Tutsi tradition connoted a national guiding culture (Leitkultur) could, from an ideological perspective – given the RPF’s origin in the Tutsi diaspora and against the backdrop of the RPF’s seizure of power – be proof of the once much-vaunted doomsday scenario of the (re)conquest of power by ‘the Tutsi’ to establish a Tutsi empire by subjugating the Hutu (see Chrétien 1995, Des Forges 2002: 108-112). Against the backdrop of the idea of a Tutsi-imposed stigmatisation of the Hutu as uncivilized people, the Government’s ambition for cultural and social readjustment by reviving the old values of the kingdom might trigger the critical impact on the process of national integration.

The Government’s recourse to the pre-colonial Itorero raises further questions: Would not the orientation towards an authoritarian, violence-glorifying tradition hamper the Government’s promotion of a democratic culture of peace which the Government precisely views to be its central task in the process of coming to terms with the consequences of the genocide? How does the Government meet the difficulties that may arise from the revitalization of the old tradition?

What renders the Itorero tradition attractive to the Government? When looking at the historical development of the tradition it is eventually remarkable that notwithstanding the marginalisation of the court tradition the Intore’s dances after independence remained part of the national performance culture. Along with the fact that these elite culture dances had become a shared cultural heritage no longer exclusively associated with the Tutsi, both the fact that the dances had become well-established conventions of the political mis-en-scene and their particular quality of impressively evidencing national strength and pride may explain their preservation. It may also be that the Intore’s performances – as a culture of praise – were inherited as part of a traditionally authoritarian political culture. At any rate, these performances seem to reflect and (through the psychologically effective embodiment of a heroic attitude) potentially foster a social or political ideal or norm in an entertaining, aesthetically attractive form. The aesthetic attractiveness and the ensuing popularity of the dance spectacles, which are cheerful, entertaining and in Rwanda most popular events, may explain their preservation

and be the reason why the present Government draws on the Itorero tradition. Its attractiveness and the potentially mobilizing force may account for the specific psychological impact of the heroic self-image, Intore warriors represent.

Although it remains speculative whether the Intore's dances have any psychological impact or relevance in this sense, some reflections on the cultural psycho-logic of the figure may provide further insights. A mobilising power of the figure could lie not only in its function as a socially defined role model, but equally in its potential to appeal to the need for self-enhancement which the social psychologist Herbert Kelman (1997) identified as central to creating bonds between the individual and the social group mobilising people's commitment to the in-group cause. The awareness of being "chosen" for a higher mission may increase self-esteem and motivate participants to meet role expectations – i. e., benefitting the nation through recognised heroic deeds. In the self-enhancement growing from the awareness to be called for a higher mission lies a mobilising power exploited in former times by the king and later by Christian missionaries to achieve their goals. Does the present Government also use these potentials? How does the Itorero ry'Igihugu program exactly relate to the Itorero tradition to create a new societal order and meet its development objectives?

The Re-interpretation of the Itorero Tradition: The Itorero ry'Igihugu Program

The Itorero is note [sic!] a new creation but an endogen opportunity which will help Rwandans to rebuild a patriotism culture based on values of excellence, integrity, equity, heroism and nobility. (NURC 2009b: 25)

Itorero ry'Igihugu is a programme for all and its objective is to make every Rwandan Intore. (NURC 2009a: 18)

What is meant when the Government describes Itorero as an endogenous opportunity to rebuild a patriotic culture defining as its objective to make every Rwandan Intore? How does the Government draw on the old tradition to achieve its objectives? The Government's description of the pre-colonial Itorero institution and the tradition's history, laying the conceptual and legitimizing foundation for the program, provides

deeper insights. It is remarkable that the program's historical narrative links the pre-colonial and the modern Itorero, following the logic of the Government's interpretation of history. The approach suggests a return to a Golden Age-like original state of the nation said to have been gradually destroyed (by the destruction of traditional values) since colonial times. Here, the relevance of the old Itorero as Rwanda's educational institution imparting common Rwandan values, the exchange on issues of national interest and collaboration to achieve national objectives, are emphasized. The very characteristics that led to the Itorero's destruction as any institution during colonialism reveal its fundamental importance to the existence and well-being of the nation today. Against this backdrop a revitalization, a "new edition" of Itorero is demanded: "Itorero was the school of that time [...] intended to impart Rwandan values. [...] Yet during colonization this cultural center [...] was destroyed and its destruction allowed [...] anti-values to emerge ending up in genocide. [...] We need to reestablish this forum, a common national vision, in order to [...] agree on values and anti-values. An Intore is someone who has a vision, respects values and prohibits anti-values. This is what we want to create. We want Intore for Rwanda."³⁰ The use of a modern terminology in describing the old Itorero (by referring to "national programs", "courses and debates on national values") seems to mirror present-day political paradigms: "Itorero ry'Igihugu was [...] the channel through which the nation could convey several courses regarding national culture (language, patriotism, social relations, sports, dancing and songs, defense of the nation [...]). The participants were encouraged to discuss different national programs and values [...] could develop their judgment, psychology, work and mutual aid, life and collaboration with others." (NURC 2009a: 11) In the programme's descriptions the Itorero's military function is moved to the background. Remarkably, the link to the Tutsi origin of the tradition goes unmentioned in the programme's strategic plan and was even denied by the Itorero Task Force staff.³¹

30 Interview with Government officials of the *Itorero Task Force*, February 2009/Audio, author's own translation from French.

31 Interviews in 2009 and 2011. This contrasts with the results of a Government research done in 2008 in co-operation with the Dutch NGO *La Benevolencija* and the German NGO *Ziviler Friedensdienst (ZFD)* in the project "*Memos Learning from History*", in which memories of old *Intore*, identifying themselves as Tutsi, about the former *Itorero* were documented. The Strategic Plan of *Itorero ry'Igihugu* refers to this research as a source of historical knowledge about *Itorero* (NURC 2009a: 11). The interviewed recalled *Itorero* as a Tutsi elite institution and state their self-

Pre-colonial Itorero is explicitly presented as a non-exclusive, integrative non-segregating institution for all Rwandans and as such a source of national strength: “In Itorero, there was no discrimination or segregation; and this was the weapon that helped Rwandans to expand and develop their country.” (NURC 2009a: 11) Instead of a hierarchic relationship between Hutu and Tutsi, formerly characterizing the military system, brotherhood, and equality among Intore are emphasized, describing a fair meritocratic principle according to which only high achievers were rewarded and promoted in their careers irrespective of origin: “Itorero was not segregative, that is why even captured foreigners could have access to it and, if they behaved fairly, could be rewarded like others. It wasn’t for all Intore to get cows or hills, only the good-performers could get them.” (NURC 2009a: 11) Against this background, a performance-based hierarchy among Intore as established in the Itorero ry’Igihugu program, is legitimized. The description of the traditional Itorero affirms the institution’s significance for the recruitment of national leaders after proven qualification. (NURC 2009a: 11) It further implies the Intore’s obedience, the obligation to loyalty and the team leaders’ authorization to flexibly adapt the course of instruction and mobilize the Intore according to current requirements – an issue apparently relevant to ‘command structures’ within the Itorero ry’Igihugu program: “Several occupations of Itorero were planned by the Itorero trainer, it was up to him to know what to begin by in the morning and the way of managing the whole day, he could put an emphasis in such quickly needed action depending on time.” (NURC 2009a: 11)

The new Itorero ry’Igihugu is to be a place where Rwandans meet and are empowered to efficiently contribute to bringing about a social and economic revolution in their own sphere of influence based on Rwandan values: “Itorero ry’Igihugu is a [...] cultural centre which mentors

image as Tutsi of the higher class (also see Adamczyk 2008). The documentary film of ZFD based on the project, showing Interviews with the old *Intore*, could not be made available by the Government, who actually has the film, nor by ZFD. ZFD stated, there were difficulties with the Government regarding the release of the film. Excerpts from the film were used by ZFD for a peace education film “*Kuvuga Neza*”. It introduces the former elite culture as a point of reference for a new culture of peace. The Government (NURC) produced two films about the *Itorero ry’Igihugu* program available, which, however, do not refer to the eye-witness reports, the *Memos* project documented: “*Urugendo Rw’Intore*” (“The journey of the Intore”), released in February 2008 and “*Itorero Isonga*”, not dated, a summary of program activities.

Rwandan citizens on civic education [...] enabling them to embark on an economic and social revolution. [...] where all Rwandans meet and are mentored on having objectives and vision in their ways of working and life [...] are taught the national objectives and the ways to achieve them by using the Rwandan culture.” (NURC 2009a: 6-7) Promoting the program as a multifunctional tool for national well-being and development, the Government affirms the extraordinary comprehensive scope of the program as it is not only to bring about attitude and behavioral change in the population, but also political transformation regarding governance in accordance with globalized norms of political practice: “Itorero ry’Igihugu comes to contribute in solving problems related to mind-set, ill behavior [...] [it] couldn’t be considered as normal programs of training and mobilizing because it aims at mentoring a Rwandan citizen a positive change maker. [...] is a concern for all citizens in all sectors of life, [...] a pillar to help other national policies to accomplish their mission. [...] a great pillar for good governance and democracy as it will help Rwandans and Leaders to learn more and behave fairly.” (NURC 2009a: 14) Itorero ry’Igihugu, the government contends, will help Rwanda turn into a well-to-do, morally just and internationally well-respected country: “Itorero ry’Igihugu will help to promote unity and mutual help in a Rwandan society that is characterized by a culture built on values that make Rwanda a respected, a valuable country, with dignity in the international arena, a great nation for its citizens and visitors, and a continuously progressive country, comfortable for all.” (NURC 2009a: 6-7, 14) Itorero ry’Igihugu thus aims to educate Rwandans on common values, visions and a patriotic attitude implying dignity and heroism: “The vision [...] is [...] to have Rwandans: - With a shared mindset and values to promote their unity and patriotism [...] - Characterized by [...] pride to develop their country” (NURC 2009a: 16) “to: a) Mentor Intore suitable for the country [...] c) Praise dignity (ishema) and heroic aspects (ibigwi) of Rwanda and Rwandans” (NURC 2009a: 16) Thus a “culture of volunteerism” is to be established, symbolized by the Intore as the image of an ideal citizen, encouraging altruistic service to the nation – “selfless service to the Nation” (NIC 2011: 4).

The Intore Warrior: Symbol of the New Citizen

As symbolic figure the Intore warrior represents an ideal image of a human, central to the Government's philosophy of societal recreation, which on the one hand ensues from the aristocratic court and military tradition and on the other hand from newly defined ideal features referring to modern, development promoting orientations. Intore are seen as distinct from other parts of society for their refined intellectual and moral qualities, always acting in conformity with the nation's interests, giving proof of their strong sense of responsibility towards the fatherland, as persons by their education united in brotherhood striving for the fulfilment of duties and excellence: "Intore and normal person were different. The one who adhered to Itorerero was knowledgeable [...] intelligent [...] A good Intore had to protect himself against neglecting others [...] Intore were very good friends and unified [...] friendship continued even after Itorerero due to courses [...] encouraging them to brotherhood." (NURC 2009a: 12) The newly defined national values such as unity, patriotism, integrity, commitment, reliability as well as modesty are among the values the Intore represents. Heroism (Ubutware) and nobility (Ubutwura) are considered the Intore's outstanding virtues, inclusive of the aforementioned values and being central to the Ubutwura, the Intore's specific character. (NURC 2009a: 16; NIC 2011: 20)

Yet what exactly is understood here by nobility and heroism? Remarkably, the meaning of nobility, which under Hutu-nationalism was related to a negative Tutsi stereotype, now is attributed a new, clearly contrary significance. Whilst nobility under Hutu-nationalism connoted idle arrogance, listlessness, laziness and the exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi, it now signifies ethical behaviour: "A noble person is a person with good behaviour, credible and faithful. Ubutwura or nobility goes with having true love, a heart with care and pity, generous without vanity [...] Nobility is not selfish and violent. A noble person will not abandon you on a journey, will not reveal a secret, is not greedy, and cares about your orphans. A noble person is kind, welcoming, does not misbehave, is punctual, organized, transparent, and is humble and lives in peace with others." (NURC 2009a: 16)

As a core value of the new national code of ethics the new significance of nobility takes some of the sting out of the old Hutu-nationalist in-

terpretation. Nobility now is declared a virtue intrinsically linked to heroism (Ubutware). Heroes are those individuals who by ambition and purposefulness have proved to be successful in the permanent competition of life, reflecting an expressly meritocratic principle. The heroic commitment for the fatherland becomes a question of personal dignity (Ishema). It is said that one should rather die than show misconduct becoming a traitor to the country that way: “The whole life of a human being is a very hard struggle, like others that person is engaged in and must win. Nobility and heroism always go together, better to die instead of misbehaving, and better to die instead of being a traitor to the country. A person becomes a hero due to heroic actions done for his/her country.” (NURC 2009a: 16) The Intore, in his or her sphere of action, is regarded as a driving force of national development and a shining example to his fellow citizens. (NURC 2009b: 11; NURC 2009a: 23) Anyone living up to the principles of the programme, meeting the performance commitments (Imihugo) – contracts on agreed development goals –, shall be an Intore. (NURC 2009a: 15)

The Intore stand for a culture of moral, peace, performance and progress. The designation ‘chosen one’ emphasizes the belonging to a community of the elected implying election for higher tasks, potentially mobilizing forces that draw on the enhancement of self-esteem through group-affiliation and performance to the benefit of the nation (as to the psychology beyond see Kelman 1997). The community of the Intore is one based on a clear confession to Intore’s creed, on common ethical principles, a way of living as well as on a common vision.

Structures, Teaching Practices and Syllabuses

The program participants, recruited via national administrative structures, are given identification numbers and partially equipped with uniforms when they start the introductory training (Gutoza). Sessions are tailored – as to time and content – to the different target groups³² of different sizes, called Itorero. The training lasts from a couple of days to several weeks, they are held in public facilities all over the

32 There are training for all age groups of a family, for professionals like journalists, artists, farmers, government officials, high school graduates, university graduates, etc. (see NURC 2009a: 18).

country. The educated elite meet in the Peace and Leadership Center in Nkumba near Ruhengeri, mostly isolated from the public.³³

A regular school day starts with marching – called Chaka-Mchaka playing on the onomatopoeic denomination of a national Ugandan mobilization program – supplemented by military exercises for special target groups.³⁴ In addition the syllabus provides a Civic Education module, Character Building and a Community Service module (NIC 2011: 20).³⁵

During the introductory courses participants are instructed on national history, government policy and the programme's tasks and structures. In the participatory part of the courses participants are asked to reflect in small groups on developmental issues in their living environment. By taking examples of their own world of experience, they identify attitudes which hamper or foster the realization of the developmental vision and the corresponding Rwandan values and taboos, and look for practicable solutions to development challenges in the specific context. (Interview with NURC officials in 2009; also see NURC 2009a: 22) The thus determined values (Indangaciro) and taboos (Kirazira) are intended to build and foster the new national code of ethics. Collective collaborative work (Good Will Actions) as practiced country-wide each month in the Umuganda called community work as well as celebrating together are to create a spirit of community and support the internalization of the lessons learned.

33 As to the trainings see NURC (2009b), NURC (2009a), NIC (2011); Government film "*Urugendo Rw'Intore*" (2008). The Government organizes transport to training centers, provides for food and accommodation. Local people are asked to provide adequate logistical support. Financing is provided from the State Budget as well as grants from international organizations (Ibid).

34 For fear of a biased view of the program as a military means of mobilization this is avoided in public presentation. Interview with NURC official, May 2011.

35 In an article of 12.06.2011 in the pro-government journal *The New Times* online under the heading *Teen Times* a participant tells about the fears before start of the program for the sanitary situation, harsh education methods – for the punishment of rolling around in the dirt (*kwiviringita*) – and then about his own experiences in the *Itorero ry'Igihugu* Training with 50.000 high-school graduates. The participants are isolation for several weeks, who have to hand in their mobile phones during the training, the large military and police array to protect the trainees – it remains unclear what they should be protected against –, the common use of rubber boots, apart from monotonous food extensive care is taken of participants by the Government, the advantages, the sense and success of the program – as with regard to an increase in patriotism – are described. Also Rwanda and its leaders are praised.

Song and poetry contributions, partly composed by the participants themselves, incorporate references to the programme's curriculum. The government counts on the educational impact of Rwandans sayings (Imigani migufi), praise songs (Ibyivugo) and stories evidencing exemplary commitment, as well as on artistic traditions which the government (because of their familiarity and cheerful character) views a vehicle facilitating information transfer and involvement of the less educated, whilst, at the same time, maintaining a cultural tradition.³⁶

In their graduating ceremony participants pledge to adhere to the program's Code of Conduct and sign the Imihugo called performance contracts, committing themselves to achieve defined developmental goals within a stipulated period of time. The Intore's performance is monitored through the program's administrative structure, which oversees the work of Itorero groups from all over the country. (NURC 2009a: 21-23, 26, 30; NIC 2011: 19) The Itorero ry'Igihugu's administration structure parallels governmental administration with a number of different levels, some bearing names from the precolonial military system. Corresponding to the 30 districts of the country, the program structures the national territory (and its population) into 30 large divisions called Umutwe (as the pre-colonial armies), which are comprised of 416 Urugerero named units. Mirroring the Imidugudu, the lowest administrative level in Rwanda, some 14,837 Ingando sections exist country-wide. Within this system, meetings on different levels are organized at regular intervals, providing the framework for a constant involvement of the population, a system for efficient knowledge management, for controlling and promoting development progress.

36 Excerpt from the minutes of an interview with the former NURC director, Fatuma Ndagiza (27.2.2009), authors own translation from English: "We use [...] *Ingando* und *Itorero* to convey ideas, and in Rwandan culture especially songs, poems and stories are of central importance, because they reach people of different ages and different educational backgrounds. Since they are entertaining, they are less tiring than political discourses and support the successful conveyance of our messages. We use the potentials of these non-intellectual forms of instruction. Issues like reconciliation after genocide can be discussed more easily with the help of Rwandan artistic traditions. Since they are not dependent on the educational level these artistic traditions also allow less educated, yet artistically talented to actively participate. Different from the messages conveyed by the media, there is a special contact with the audience here. Information is passed here in a direct way and can thus be shared. Watching and listening creates at best a connection between narrator and the recipients within a community."

Based on the evaluations of the Intore's achievements according to the Imihigo contracts, participants receive categories of evaluations. The high-achievers receive the title of Indongozi, meaning 'leader' in the sense of an older wise person. The low performers and the under-achievers are called Ibigwari ('cowards' or 'weaklings'). Whilst the latter are being publicly humiliated and depreciated, the former are celebrated at a nightly ceremony (Inkera y'abahizi) and awarded in three categories: first, for merits in the social field, second for patriotic heroic action and good governance and third for exemplary individual achievements and contributions to the country's development. The country-wide best Intore are honored at the national level on Itorero ry'Igihugu Day³⁷ (NIC 2011: 15-16)³⁸, yearly celebrated on November 16, marking the day of the introduction of the program.

Itorero ry'Igihugu thus establishes a meritocratic hierarchy of Intore, where the high performers would also be the morally strongest and best executives. An apparent conflict remains, however, between the program's meritocratic orientation and its emphasis on charity and solidarity, particularly when addressing involuntarily weak performers.

Itorero ry'Igihugu Day: Staging a New National Community³⁹

On Itorero ry'Igihugu Day thousands of awarded Intore from all over the country come together to celebrate the efforts of the new national community in the Amahoro stadium in the capital of Kigali. They wear uniforms in the national colours with the Itorero logo badge which has written on it "Unity is the fundament for peace" and display banners with the names of the Itorero administration districts such as 'Inganji' [the Conquerors or the Supremes], reminders of the old military tradition. These men and women parade through the stadium,

37 Prior to this day there is a *Itorero ry'Igihugu Week*, during which the program is the main issue in the media.

38 Interview with an official of the Itorero Task Force, February 2009. See also NURC (2009a: 11).

39 The following description is based on the Government film "Urugendo rw'Intore" (2008) – The journey of Intore –, documenting a. o. the Itorero ry'Igihugu Day 2007 in Kigali contents of which were translated from Knyarwanda into English (Urugendo rw'Intore 2010). The songs and poems quoted can also be found in documents provided by the NURC.

accompanied by the rhythm of whistles, songs, reciting government slogans, and the cheering of other Intore gathered in the stands. Some of them wear Intore costumes and traditional festive garments, carry baskets and calabashes (objects of high symbolic value in the Rwandan culture). Symbolic references as made through the performance of a man dressed up like the king, reminiscent of the parades at the king's court, evoking memories of the 'Golden Age' of the nation. Poems and songs of praise are performed in a traditional manner and performance pledges (Imihigo) are made before an audience including the president, his ministers and various government representatives. The Intore celebrate themselves as 'persistent fighters' and call all Rwandans to unite in order to rebuild the country and realize Vision 2020. Reciting government slogans, they call for the 'fight against corruption and clientelism,' and demand the eradication of the genocide ideology. In their songs they praise the decentralization of the state as a sustainable step towards democracy and express their determinedness to foster national unity, serve the country, and nurture prosperity for all as a result of their joint efforts: "Chosen people, yee! Go forward, yee! We will build it [...]! In the whole world [...] People, unity and reconciliation, good governance!" "Genocide ideology, let us uproot it with all its roots. All of you, have wealth! Let us struggle for it and work for it as Rwandese people!" They call upon Rwandans to learn the lessons from history – as taught in the program – and to support and believe in the new revolution: "Let us assimilate these lessons we received, let us increase our belief, these lessons are needed! History lessons, let us assimilate it, let us increase the belief, these lessons are needed! [...] Lesson on revolution, let us assimilate it, and let us increase the belief, these lessons are needed!"⁴⁰ Surprisingly, with a text and melody identical to the political song popular under Habyarimana (and possibly under Kayibanda) recounting the "[S]ocial Revolution" of Hutu in 1959, the singers celebrate themselves and their leader as revolutionary forces⁴¹: "We are promoters of revolution! Our President is a promotor of revolution!"⁴²

40 "Ayo masomo twize tuyakamirike, twongere morali aya masomo arakenewe, Isomory'amateka turikamirike, twongere morali aya masommo arakenewe, Ref.: Ayo masomo twize tuyakamirike, twongere morali aya masomo arakenewe, Impinduramatwara, turikamirike." (Translated from Kinyarwanda, Urugendo Rw'Intore 2010)

41 Information from interviews with Rwandans in 2009 and 2011.

42 "*Turi abakangurambaga b'impinduramatwara! Perezida wacu ni umukangurambaga!*" (Translated from Kinyarwanda, Urugendo Rw'Intore 2010)

According to the African tradition of praise songs, the Intore thank and celebrate their political leaders and call for applause: “Leaders be praised, [...] for the courage and skillfulness with which you lead us! Let us praise our President! He leads us well! [...] He brought peace, let us thank him! He restored unity among Rwandese people, let us thank him! Where are the acclamations?!” Rwanda is praised as beautiful homeland, the heart of Africa, to be proudly presented to the world. Referring to the mythical origin of the old kingdom near the Muhazi Lake where Gihanga is said to have founded Rwanda (Gasabo), the singers proclaim: “Our beautiful Gasabo! Praising Rwanda is not an exaggeration: it is the heart of Africa, which is always smart [...]. The brand of beauty, which we present to the world!” (translated from Kinyarwanda, Urugendo rw’Intore 2010) The songs glorify Rwandan culture as a culture of solidarity and community and underline the Intore’s commitment to restore this genuine tradition: “We will bring back Rwandese culture so that it may not die and be lost, we will bring it back! [...] Old people will bring it back. The culture of evenings spent together, culture of assistance during marriage process, the culture of solidarity, the culture of assistance in case of danger we will bring it back!”⁴³

Ibyivugo poetry is also adjusted to the new political context. It trivializes the importance of ethnic identification in a humoristic way, ridiculing the pride of one’s ethnic origin and demonstrating its uselessness by pointing out that ethnicity does not bring any economic benefit.⁴⁴ In addition, the following excerpt from an Ibyivugo poem also calls for peaceful co-operation, joint efforts to reconstruct Rwanda

43 “Tuzawugarura umuco w’Abanarwanda utazavaho ucika, tukandagara, tuzawugarura! [...] Basaza bawgarura, umuco w’igitaramo, umuco wo gutarama, umuco wo gusabairana, muco wo gufatanya, umuco wo gutabarana. Tuzawugarura!” (Translated from Kinyarwanda, Urugendo Rw’Intore 2010)

44 A trainer of the program described the traditionally violent content of *Ibyivugo*, especially against the Hutu – a name also used for denominating and despising enemies of the kingdom (Vansina 2004: 135) – as inconsistent with Government policy and reported on modifications to the contents of the poems: “Today we have changed the contents of the Ibyivugo since we don’t want to re-open old wounds. Today they are about recent experiences and successes. We avoid offending and we avoid talking about ethnic groups, about having defeated or killed the others. How can I pride myself today if saying: “I killed that many Hutu!?” The contents of Ibyivugo are no longer violent like in the past!” (Interview, April 2009, own translation from French)

as the common home country, which appears as a focal point of a new, inclusive national identity:

“What is an ethnic group? I found that it is worth nothing! Let me give an example: If someone who finds it [the ethnic group] very useful can take his Tutsiness which he praises to go shopping with without money and they will give him salt, we will congratulate you! If you praise your Hutuness, bring it to [the bus company] Jaguar or to ATRACO Express. If you reach Kampala [the capital of Uganda] without ticket or paying, we will congratulate you! If you praise your Twaness, feel totally proud of it, bring it to the pitch and score goals by praising it, we will congratulate you! If all those things are null, there is no reason to praise them. Most important for us is tolerance, to be peaceful as Rwandese people, let us be tolerant, Rwandese people born in Rwanda, let us reconstruct our country as Rwandese people!” (Translated from Kinyarwanda, Urugendo rw’Intore 2010)

The “Poem of the Intore”, which could be regarded as a manifesto of »Intore-hood«, stylizes the Intore as morally and intellectually superior Rwandan citizens, contrasting them with the image of a »Non-Intore« as immoral people without valuable goals. »Non-Intore« are described as traitors to the nation and a threat to the people, doomed to failure for having turned away from Rwandan humanism (symbol of which is the mythical founding father Gihanga). They are predicted to lead a life in poverty characterized by envy of the wealth of relatives in Europe, without any prospect of prosperity, if they do not turn away from the misleading ideologies of the past (“carrying dead things”) – presumably Hutu-nationalism. Yet the poem indicates that ‘Non-Intore’ have three things in common with the Intore: they are Rwandans, they are, in principle, skilful and they are striving for prosperity. To escape from decline, their »conversion« to ‘Intore-hood’ is suggested. In accepting the new guiding culture and the new national objectives, they can become well respected and full members of the national community of chosen ones. The rhetorical question whether the biological parents that left their child behind or foster parents that adopted, well received and educated it are the better parents can be metaphorically understood as a comparison of the former Hutu-nationalist and the present government, the latter apparently being the morally committed saviour. Implied are the superiority and advantages of a national community based on common ethnical principles over the ideology

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of a common descent. The “Poem of the Intore” calls upon Rwandans to support the Government’s project and become part of and profit from a new national movement:

Be strong and make strong, Intore!

Those who as skillful people, skillful people living far far away, cheat you,

may they be afraid of the one who created us!

They are scared, fleeing, refusing to accept Gihanga [the creator of Rwanda] who could fill them with humaneness which prevents such [ideological] contamination

And those wandering around, where are they finally going?

The one who is not Intore passes his time in his village hatching vicious plans, killing persons and animals, thinking of his relatives living in Europe who do not give him any potatoes. In the morning he takes a club to threaten people so that the world may know that there is no peace.

Thus, which of the two is your parent: the one who gave birth to you and abandoned you or the one who affiliated and educates you thereafter?

If we refuse to be Intore, we will die, become like the dead, shameless and without nobility, we will become like the dead carrying dead things! He will die, you will die, you will become a widow and lose your children! We will leave behind orphans dying!⁴⁵

Government representatives praise the Intore on Itorero ry’Igihugu Day for the missions that have been accomplished and evoke the dream of a new flourishing Rwanda. In the Government film “Urugendo rw’Intore” (2008), President Kagame is presented as an Intore among Intore. The film shows a speech by the President emphasizing equality but also the obligations of the Intore and highlights the population’s and its leader’s confidence in Rwanda’s ‘chosen ones’: “All of us, we are Intore. Even these high personalities are Intore [applause]. Among Intore, there are no big, small, all are Intore [ap-

45 Excerpt from a poem. Translated from a Kinyarwanda. poem, it can be found in full length in NURC (2007).

plause]. Intore are characterized by love, the struggle for individual and country development. Intore are brave and faithful. Intore live in harmonious togetherness. Intore do not break agreements. Intore do respect themselves and others. Intore do not struggle for their individual interests only, they struggle for common interests. Intore are always proud [noble]. Somehow, you have been chosen to be part of the “chosen ones” because of trust they have in you, in order to be Intore for them and for our Rwanda.” (Translated from Kinyarwanda, Urugendo rw’Intore 2010)

The Culture-bound Logic of Societal Reconstruction

Although Itorero ry’Igihugu draws on the pre-colonial tradition it does not fully reproduce its genuine form, due to the new function of the program and its role as an expression of the political will to overcome divisions. Access to the group of ‘chosen ones’ is no longer exclusively restricted to Tutsi but open to all loyal patriots irrespective of their origin. The new patriotism is far from being exclusive, giving after all publicity to the possibility of social integration of even ‘Non-Intore’ (defined as enemies of the nation), through conversion and commitment to one ‘moral culture’ and future vision. Access to the new national community is a matter of choice and none of descent – even though recourse to the mythical founding father Gihanga may as well imply a genealogical legitimization of the nation.

The program equalizes individual, national and government objectives and, at the same time, prioritizes national interests over the value of the individual and his life by demanding a commitment to the nation including self-sacrifice and by promoting a meritocratic norm (symbolized by the inner hierarchy among the Intore). Performance is understood as a voluntary, patriotically and morally motivated work to the benefit of the nation’s development and is introduced as a fair principle legitimizing new social differentiations. In Itorero, only high achievers living up to the national ideals merit recognition, whereas underachievers are at risk of becoming devalued. The program’s virtues of compassion and solidarity seem to contrast with the pedagogy of punishment which (besides civic education and cultural adjustment training) is to educate Rwandans to become Intore.

The traditional designation “chosen one” may by addressing the need for positive self-regard and distinctiveness potentially create emotional bonds between the individual and the new community and motivate commitment to the in-group cause (Kelman 1997). In Itorero, honoring the Intore is linked to a depreciation of Rwandan »Non-Intore« and may trigger a psychological impact facilitating the integration of opponents into the new political order. Assuming that people generally strive for a positive social identity and better life opportunities, the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) suggests that degradation of the Non-Intore, exclusion from the community of the chosen as defined enemies of the country and conjuring of their lack of future prospects may encourage members of stigmatized groups to switch sides in an effort to gain self-esteem and economic benefits.

Itorero ry'Igihugu may also further national unity as it promotes cooperation to achieve a common objective. The Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif 1966) states that the need for cooperation of conflicting groups in order to achieve a common goal is likely to reduce intergroup tensions as well as dismantle hostile images of the other. A strict organization as set up with the program increases efficiency and promises developmental outcomes which in turn could favour social cohesion. On the other hand, the same efficient control structure, reminiscent of an army, may also meet security interests, creating a double security architecture as is the case in Uganda (see e. g. Kagoro 2012). Accordingly, Rwandan opinions of the program show that there is both hope for an improvement of social and economic conditions, as well as fear based on past experience of a continued political functionalization of cultural traditions, government programs and the restriction of individual freedom.

The new image of the national culture symbolized by the Intore seems to be closely related to the tradition of the RPF's Tutsi and, at the same time, counters negative Tutsi-stereotypes and the image of the Rwandan culture promoted by Hutu-nationalism. However, the Government's founding narrative of a culture-based, moral, united and strong pre-colonial nation and its cultural decline seems to serve nation-rebuilding. By defining all Rwandans as victims of a loss of culture and simultaneously as heroic promoters of a cultural and moral revolution for the return to a 'Golden Age'-like state, this narrative of national recreation externalizes guilt by making the colonizers

responsible for social tensions and bridges social divides by providing a positive, heroic collective self-image, derived from the familiar figure of the Intore. It is furthermore remarkable that although Hutu-nationalism is rejected, elements of its political rhetoric, such as the repeated reference to a moral 'revolution', are integrated into the new political context and combined with patterns of the old tradition. Itorero ry'Igihugu draws on the continuity of the Itorero tradition as a shared cultural heritage. It applies principles of participation and equality to ensure the people's commitment to Government goals. By drawing on the new interpretation of the old, originally military tradition, the Government aims at establishing a democratic culture of peace and interestingly doesn't perceive 'community spirit' and a 'top-down approach' as collectivism or authoritarianism and as diametrically opposed to this objective. It, however, seems as if the program draws on a rather different aspect of the Itorero tradition, namely on an authoritarian-like normative orientation exemplified through the artistic performances of the Intore.⁴⁶

One can wonder if the revitalization of the Itorero tradition is possibly the only way of addressing all Rwandans, of motivating and uniting them by making the new community imaginable and emotionally accessible. Do glorifications of Rwanda's culture, defined as moral and heroic, and staging Rwandans as heroic people help overcome a national trauma and create a new positive and integrative national self-image after genocide? Or do they hinder a critical appraisal of the past with its nationalistic mobilization and handed down cultural and political conventions? Jan Assmann's presumption as to a historically grown collective self-image that "[t]hrough its cultural heritage a society becomes visible to itself and to others. Which past becomes evident in that heritage and which values emerge in its identificatory appropriation tells us much about the constitution and the tendencies of a society" (Assmann 1995: 133) could be given an entirely different interpretation as far as Itorero ry'Igihugu is concerned. Does the Government with the adapted Itorero tradition possibly hold up a 'cultural mirror' to society, for Rwandans to recognize and at the same time re-create and re-invent themselves as a nation? Far from any idea-

46 This specific recourse to a Rwandan tradition could also be seen as an expression of Rwanda's modernity in the sense of Shmuel Eisenstadt.

lization of cultural heritage as conflict medicine⁴⁷ Itorero ry'Igihugu exemplifies numerous facets of harnessing and the complex impacts of a reinterpretation of an old tradition for the purpose of designing a new political order and overcoming inner divisions.

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⁴⁷ See e. g. Zartman (2000), Bräuchler (2011). *Itorero* has not yet been added to the UNESCO list of „intangible cultural heritage“. Within the framework of the *Declaration of Libreville*, made at the *International Conference on Intercultural Dialogue and the Culture of Peace in Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region* in Libreville (18-20.11.2003) only *Gacaca* (Graca [!]) was enlisted as peace promoting immaterial cultural heritage.

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REPORTS

THE SECOND YEAR OF ASIXOXE

Alena Rettová

The second run of the SOAS conference on African Philosophy, Asixoxe – Let’s Talk!, organized by Benedetta Lanfranchi and Alena Rettová, took place in London on the 1st and 2nd May 2015. As Alena Rettová, Associate Head of the Department of Languages and Cultures of Africa and Senior Lecturer in Swahili Literature and Culture, emphasized in her short opening speech, Asixoxe is primarily a student conference, but this should not be taken to imply a lower academic level. On the contrary, for people at such early stages of their academic development, learning is a truly existential encounter: students are confronted with new, and often radically different theorizations of the world which shatter their habitual outlooks. This is doubly true in SOAS, whose environment adds a markedly intercultural dimension to these intellectual challenges. In Alena Rettová’s words, “grappling with the diverse perspectives on how the world is conceptualized across disciplines and across cultures is a humbling experience; you are exposed to your naked self and left to recreate that self with the conceptual repertoire of other cultures.”

The participants’ strong engagement with their academic pursuits was evident both from the themes of the presentations and from their personal investment. The presentations covered a wide range of topics, from ethics and moral thought to political philosophy, from epistemology to the intersections between African philosophy and anthropology or literature. The theories discussed in connection with African philosophy included analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, in particular existentialism, structuralism and poststructuralism, postcolonial theory, but also interdisciplinary theoretical models involving non-Aristotelian logics and post-Newtonian physics. While the geographical and cultural focus of most presentations was, understandably, Africa, the SOAS context proved a fertile soil also for

comparisons with Asian (Chinese and Japanese) and Latin American (Bolivian) cultures and philosophies.

An explicit intercultural focus was present in Aleksandra Manikowska's (BA Chinese Studies) paper on the influence of Maoism on the political theories of Julius Nyerere, and in Katherine Furman's (PhD candidate, LSE) and Yola West-Dennis's (BSc Philosophy and Physics, Bristol) presentations on the applications of British analytical philosophy to, respectively, South African politics and Yorubá epistemology. Interdisciplinary concerns were pervasive in the papers which highlighted the philosophical relevance of literature in African languages. Roberto Gaudio (PhD candidate, Bayreuth) analysed the influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger on Tanzanian writer Euphrase Kezilahabi's poetry. Livia Cossa (BA Politics and African Studies) studied the repercussions of Nyerere's thought in three genres of Swahili poetry. Katya Nell (BA Swahili and Development Studies) offered an original interpretation of William Mkufya's novel *Ziraili na Zirani* as an allegory for the revolution of the proletariat, and Christine Gibson (BA Swahili and Social Anthropology) elaborated the link between Said Ahmed Mohamed's novel *Dunia Yao* and theories of artistic mimesis, including the innovative reading of the concept by anthropologist Michael Taussig. Becca Stacey (BA African Studies) explored the existentialist perspectives embodied in four characters in the Swahili novels *Kichwamaji* and *Ua la Faraja*. The links between epistemology and African literature were considered in Alena Rettová's paper. The importance of language and multilingualism in philosophy was the topic of Ella Hiesmayr's (BA Philosophy, Vienna) paper. Ida Hadjivayanis's (Teaching Fellow in Swahili, SOAS) paper on initiation rituals in Luguru society combined gender theories and anthropology, and the role of anthropology in philosophy was theoretically discussed by Adam Rodgers Johns (BA African Studies and Social Anthropology). Estrella Sendra (Mphil/PhD candidate, SOAS) examined the influence of Negritude on cultural festivals in Senegal. Conflicting Euro-American, Far Eastern, and African theorizations of technology were compared by Aviv Milgram (MA Religion in Global Politics). Some presentations covered relatively little studied areas of African philosophy: the philosophy of the Mozambican thinker Severino Elias Ngoenha was reviewed by Anaïs Brémond (MA History, LSE). The two concluding papers offered in-depth critical readings of the Kenyan philosopher and theologian, John S. Mbiti. Claire Amaladoss

(BA Swahili and Development Studies) compared Mbiti's present-oriented view of time with the phenomenological study of time by Edmund Husserl, while Hannah Simmons (BA African Language and Culture) contrasted Mbiti's and Cheikh Anta Diop's concepts of time as two distinct possibilities to project the future of African philosophy.

While the majority of the presenters were SOAS students of Swahili literature and African philosophy, the conference also attracted students from other UK universities, such as LSE and Bristol, and from Europe, in particular Bayreuth and Vienna. SOAS has very good relations with both of these universities. SOAS students of Swahili literature regularly have a strong presence at the annual international Swahili Colloquium in Bayreuth, and the cooperation between both universities has recently been strengthened by an Erasmus+ mobility contract. Ugandan philosopher Wilfred Lajul was unable to attend the conference in person, but his paper was read out by one of the organizers, Benedetta Lanfranchi (PhD candidate, SOAS), who extensively cooperated with Lajul during her fieldwork in Uganda. The conference was well attended by students and staff from SOAS, as well as researchers from other UK institutions, such as Patrice Haynes, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Liverpool, and Stefanie Kolbusa from London's Aga Khan University. The friendly and intellectually stimulating atmosphere extended into the breaks and evening hours, and as Rettová said, "it is in the liminal space between work and privacy that friendships are sealed and future cooperations projected."

The words of Chenjerai Shire can be quoted in conclusion. The Zimbabwean linguist debated in his talk the Southern African concept of humanity or personhood, ubuntu (Nguni languages) or unhu (Shona): "If you lack the ability to care for others, you do not have ubuntu, even if you are biologically human. The verb ukuxoxa, from which asixoxe is derived, means to talk, to chat, to be together, to share, to care for each other. This is the very foundation of Ubuntu."

THE 6TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON AFRICAN STUDIES, PARIS 8-10 JULY 2015

Petr Skalník

The biennial European conferences on African studies are now firmly fixed in the calendar of all who want to communicate their research findings to colleagues not only in Europe but also on other continents. This year the conference, organized by the Institut des mondes africains (IMAF) and Les Afriques dans le monde (LAM) took place in the buildings of the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and attendance was very high. Registered participants surpassed 1300 although not all came. More colleagues would have attended if the registration fee had not been so high (200 Euro). If we realise that most Africans live on 1 Euro a day then this fee is simply scandalously high. Does it mean that Africanists are those whose incomes surpass 50 times the income of Africans? At any rate to be an Africanist in Europe appears to be a luxury enterprise, enabling Europeans to watch Africa from the safe distance of rich Europe. Therefore one cannot avoid thinking of cynicism and irony when we realise that the theme of the conference was the “Collective Mobilisations in Africa. Contestation, Resistance, Revolt.” Nevertheless there were Africans among the European Africanists and also some Africans from Africa among the participants in the ECAS 6. The spectrum was supplemented by American and Asian Africanists. However, Africanists from the former Communist bloc were just too few to be noticeable, probably because they do not belong to the European rich.

The opening ceremony reminded the listeners that Patrick Chabal, former president of AEGIS, passed away in the period between the 5th and 6th ECAS (for the obituary and memorial issue, see *Modern Africa*, vol. 1). His contribution to critical African studies cannot be easily overestimated. Pierre Boilley and Céline Thiriot, the respective directors of IMAF and LAM, mentioned that these institutions are new merger developments on the French scene. The African Studies Network of France (GIS) and CNRS give considerable support to African studies in France. The speakers expressed the thought that the conference would reaffirm “the fundamental importance of reflecting on Africa

and its diasporas as spaces intimately linked to the world at large, in ways that eschew simplification, focusing instead on diversity and doing away once and for all with stereotypes, condescending clichés and all too common lapses into Afro-pessimism.” Paul Nugent, in his last presidential address before he stepped down, admitted that AEGIS growth has slowed but expressed the hope that the next president, Clara Carvalho, will continue caring for African studies in Europe. The Gerti Hesseling Prize, promoting the work of African scholars was also awarded at a special session. The conference included beside a plethora of 235 panels (each panel had a maximum of 5 panelists) four plenary sessions with keynote speakers, a number of round tables, book launches, film screenings, publishers’ exhibition and a weeklong arts performance of ‘Africa Acts.’

The main keynote address, attached to the opening of the ECAS 6, was delivered by Mamoudou Gazibo, political scientist from Université de Montréal in Canada. He comparatively examined collective mobilizations and democratization in Africa. He attempted to understand the new wave of protest rocking Africa and asked the question why some regimes are more vulnerable to popular uprisings than others? Ousmane Oumar Kane from the Harvard Divinity School in the USA, presented the Lugard Lecture. He analyzed Arabo-Islamic learning in West Africa and thus assess the contribution of Muslim scholars to the production and transmission of knowledge and its contribution to the state and society there. The Codesria Lecture was offered by Cheikh Ibrahima Niang of Dakar, Senegal. He addressed the cultural concepts of freedom and dignity as related to the community resilience to the Ebola epidemics in West Africa. The author based his paper on fieldwork carried out in Sierra Leone, Mali and Guinea. The last plenary speaker was Jemima Pierre from the University of California at Los Angeles and her topic was “Pan-Africanism, Decolonization and the Black Radical Tradition.” The speaker blamed the failure of decolonization and the unsuccessful analysis of colonialism for the current ascent of ‘neoliberal neocolonialism.’

Among the panels many did not correspond to the main theme of the conference. These could have been interesting equally as the topical ones. For example there was a panel on the concepts of justice in African philosophy, two panels on the right to the city, another on gender, sexuality and re-interpretations of ‘African culture and

tradition', big-man power in the African context. Other panels were on citizenship on the state margins, political parties in Africa or the African middle classes, pan-Africanism in relation to the nation-state, governing war but producing the state, street children in Africa, militancy in the Sahara. The panel African arts in the former socialist bloc countries was intriguing, convened by Romuald Tchibofo from Benin. Similarly a panel convened by Abel Kouvouama and Lucette Labache broached the topic of studying in the former Soviet bloc as a protest project. Chris Saunders and Helder Fonseca convened a session on liberation in southern Africa while Baz Lecocq organized a session on the historical dimensions of Mali-Azawad. Manuel Ramos and Preben Kaarsholm convened the panel on collective mobilisations in Africa and the Indian Ocean. Elísio Macamo and Noemi Steuer dedicated their panel to the biographies and utopias of protesting students in West Africa during the 1960s and 1980s. The majority of papers nevertheless approached from different angles the main topic of mobilisations. The lengthy row of panels does not allow me to mention them all. I shall limit myself to those panels and round tables I was able to attend. Arrigo Pallotti and Melber Henning convened a panel on collective mobilisations under former liberation movements in southern Africa, whereas Miles Larmer and Vito Laterza put together a panel on social and political mobilisation in mining communities in southern and central Africa. My own panel dealt with the comparison of the political cultures of post-colonial Africa and post-communist Europe. The papers compared political culture in countries as diverse as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia on the African side, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria on the European side. Good attendance and a lively discussion showed that the topic was relevant and I hope to publish the papers. One panelist from Bulgaria could not come because of the prohibitive costs of registration.

There were eleven round tables at ECAS 6 devoted to various topics such as the ebola epidemic, Boko Haram, gender, ethics, and journalists in crisis. I attended the round table convened by Georg Klute which discussed spatial readings of violent conflict in Africa. Several speakers such as Jon Abbink, Till Förster, Jana Hoenke, and Clionadh Raleigh shared with the audience their experience. The advantage of round tables, especially under skilled leadership, is that they allow for discussion more than panels. So it was in two other round tables that I attended. They were meant to explain how Africanist journals

work, what are the problems to be tackled before a text is accepted for publication. They also discussed promoting young scholars and interdisciplinary research. Speakers included Nic Cheeseman from *African Affairs*, Henning Melber of *Africa Spectrum*, Peter Geschiere (*African Studies Review*), Nadège Chabloz (*Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*) and several others. I was able to mention repeatedly *Modern Africa* and the problems we are encountering in publishing it, especially recruitment of peer reviewers. Round table participants were informed about the new journal. A special leaflet prepared for the conference was distributed widely.

The representative book exhibition not only showed that production in the field of African studies is enormous and growing fast but also that prices of books grow and become prohibitive for individuals.

The ECAS 6 proved that meetings of this kind are important both scientifically and socially. The problem is the enormous number of panels which on the one hand enables many young researchers to present their findings but it is practically impossible to attend but a handful of the panels. Round tables, on the other hand, proved their usefulness by more democratic attendance and active participation from the audience. Luckily, the conference booklet was very well prepared and easy to use so that at least one could see what is happening at every moment of the conference. The next ECAS 7 will be organized by the Centre for African Studies at Basel, Switzerland, 22-24 June 2017. The theme will be Urban Africa - Urban Africans – New encounters of the urban and the rural.

REVIEWS

Lukáš Zorád, Peter Farárik. 2015. *Afrika – Mýty a skutočnosti*. Bratislava: Človek v ohrození, o. z., 71 p. ISBN 978-80-971607-2-2

Africa - myths and facts is an interesting publication published this spring by the Slovak civic association Človek v ohrození. It highlights the increasingly distressing stereotypes about Africa and its people, and draws attention to the wide range of facts, which induce the reader to reconsider the deep-seated misconceptions on the African continent. The media promote a picture of poverty, hunger or violence. Simplified, sporadic and distorted information is a breeding ground for the misleading stereotypes in people's minds.

Lukáš Zorád, a field worker in development projects in East Africa and a geography teacher Peter Farárik chose to bring a contrast to this, respectively, illustrating a view of Africa to clichés. Africa is presented as a modern developing continent that also bears its rich history. Refusing the generalisation in the spirit of the words of the Polish reporter Ryszard Kapuściński, under which there is no such thing as 'African culture' or 'African religions' because the essence of Africa is in its infinite diversity.

Although the book is primarily intended for teachers in primary and secondary schools, its content attracts a wider general public, thanks to attention to the main stereotypes and misconceptions about the 'dark' continent.

The first part of the book presents a brief look from the other side, that is what myths about people from the Western world are being spread around Africa. Subsequently, Zorád and Farárik discuss customary myths about Africa, dividing them into fifteen main chapters. In the discussed myths such as: Africa has no history (except Egypt) authors agree that ideas about Africa are associated with primitive tribes. But simultaneously Africa is a continent where in Ethiopia Christianity became the state religion in the first century A.D.; Timbuktu was a famous cultural centre and a seat of a university in 15th-16th century;

the Ashanti Empire, the kingdom of Mali or a stone structure of the Mapungubwe civilization is the other evidence to the contrary.

Most people are poor and are starving – is another typical view of African people. It is a fact that from 2010 to 2012 about a quarter of the inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa suffered from malnutrition, but surprisingly this region has nowadays the fastest increase in the prevalence of obesity in the world together with Latin America.

African countries are economically backward is one of many other myths. Africa is the continent with the fastest growing economy in the world. The economy grows by 6 percent per annum. It is certainly interesting that the population of the economically vexed Portugal are searching for better employment in their former colonies.

In each chapter, when representing facts, the authors give examples from different countries. They seek not to negate the myths, but point to the facts, which customary notions put into a broader context and offer a broader range of information. There is no system and a slight preponderance of the data from Kenya, where Zorád operates, which is not distracting. The texts are accompanied by maps, charts, references to the Internet, comments or other text blocks that visually and contextually complete the publication.

The second part consists of practical activities with advice for teachers that support the learning process through creativity and encourages students to look for the other realities of Africa.

What I appreciate most is the availability of the book in electronic form on the Internet, it is thus accessible to each reader.

Authors of the publication certainly fulfil their desire, which is presented at the beginning of the book that is to change people's attitude in the perception of the African continent. I would argue that the book is a rich source of useful information for teachers and fills a kind of vacuum in the area of schoolbooks on History, Geography and Social studies. It is also a good source of knowledge for anyone who likes to work on eliminating prejudices and misconceptions about Africa.

Emília Bihariová

**Klíma, Jan. 2015. Dějiny Namibie [History of Namibia].
Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 273 p. ISBN
978-80-7422-375-4.**

At a time of increased interest of Czech diplomacy in Namibia and also coinciding with the 25th anniversary of its independence a book tracing the history of a desert country far in the southern part of Africa was presented to Czech readers. Jan Klíma (born 1943) offers a neatly illustrated book from the History of states series which is presenting the milestones in the history of Namibia through its easy to follow language and a transparent and logical structure.

Ten years after publishing a book recounting the late colonial expansion of the German Empire (*Under the German flag. The story of a colonial empire*, Libri 2005) and six years after releasing an early volume devoted to Namibia (*Namibia*, Libri 2009), the well-known and reputable Czech Ibero-Americanist and Africanist offers a compact book containing beside a descriptive text also a well prepared appendices. With a basic chronological overview of major events and a list of representatives of the state governments and domestic dynasties the book could be taken as a de facto complement to a regular Namibia travel guide.

The area of southwest Africa (today's Namibia) came in the consciousness of Europeans rather late. The so-called pre-colonial period due to a lack of suitable ports and its inhospitable desert belt (aptly named Skeleton Coast) dated back up to the last third of the 19th century, when the region was seized by the German Empire in the spirit of the "Scramble for Africa". Knowledgeable readers will certainly not be surprised by the description of the period before the arrival of white settlers and missionaries in the book, which is rather limited. This fact is a part of "no event, no history" problem which generally comes with the lack of written sources all over the (not only) African cultures. In the case of Namibia, the historically very low density of settlement plays an important role too. In addition, we have to take into account some tragic events which marked the turbulent changes in the social structure and cohesion of Namibia during the 20th Century.

Klíma rightly intersects the modern interpretation of Namibian history with straight links to Britain's Cape Colony, which later formed the

Union of South Africa (since 1910) and finally the Republic of South Africa (since 1961). The German domination of the then South West Africa happened under the watchful eye of the neighbouring British colony. The author in the sections devoted to the German settlement provides a vivid picture of building the colony of dreams - a mix of civilizational ethos and modern Germanness imbued with elements of nationalism and the Protestant faith in hard work that deserves to be rewarded. Studying relevant passages the reader should keep in mind that the total number of German settlers even during the greatest boom hardly ever exceeded five percent of the total population of the country, which casts an interesting light on the depth of the tracks that are left behind by the Germans there. Administrators and soldiers were mostly of German domination - with the major exception of the campaign to suppress the Herero and Nama rebellion in 1904-1905 - limited to only a few hundred people operating in selected administrative centers spread across the vast area ten times larger than the Czech Republic.

From the general perspective of the world public, Namibia attracted attention at least three times. In two cases with totally disastrous effects to the vast majority of its people. The massacre of the Herero and Nama, two rebel ethnic groups whose leaders opposed the German land grabs, earned the dubious honor as the first genocide of the 20th century. The Germans discovered then the effectiveness of concentration camps, where most of the prisoners died. It was in the German Southwest Africa, where the famous anthropologists looked for evidence of racial theories, whose design they did not hesitate to illustrate with the bodies of internees. Their legacy had a direct link with the later established Nazi racial politics. Reports about the cruel treatment of the Herero and Nama, however, already had arrived to the old continent, where it heated political debate not only in the German Empire. In a sense this debate was concluded only a few years ago, when the descendants of the murdered and tortured Herero and Nama got an apology and subsequent compensation from the German federal government. In his description based on German and English-language sources Klíma does not omit any of these important facts.

The second equally important milestone of Namibian history represents a decades-long occupation by neighbouring South Africa. Originally a temporary administration mandate given by the League of Nations to the British dominion of the Union of South Africa stretched

in the end for more than seven decades despite repeated protests of the world public. After a series of fruitless appeals Namibia became one of the central themes of the UN Security Council at least since 1978, when it was clear that the situation in neighboring Angola would drag the whole African region between millstones of the two rival superpowers. Armed resistance against South African occupation led by the pro-Marxist SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization) became part of a broader struggle for the division of spheres of influence between the US, the USSR, as well as the PRC. A tangle of targeted alliances, where each party of the conflict watched geopolitical, local and its own interests at once, conserved for a decade the strange status quo. There was no shortage of seemingly contradictory statements by politicians and unexpected support from formally opposing parties (e.g. protection of western oil companies by communist guerrillas etc.). There was much at stake. South African leaders and its business elite were well aware of the strategic importance of this huge territory with the only deep-harbour, Walvis Bay, between Cape Town up to the border of Angola, in the middle. Also profitable mining played a big role in discussions about keeping close links with South Africa. At least on the table was obviously also an effort to keep the apartheid regime (highly unpopular with both the West and the East) favoring white minority and stabilize the increasingly unstable South African economy. The described struggle was after several years of negotiations at the highest level (accompanied by constant fighting) formally completed by the declaration of independence of Namibia on 21 March 1990.

In order not to be only pessimistic to the end, here we have to add the third milestone and highlight the successful transition to democracy in Namibia which attracted the world public so much in those years of changes. Klíma notes the multilevel shape of the liberation struggle, as nothing was seen as black and white from the European perspective. Definitively he does not even withhold from readers various conflicts between ethnic groups, or within the SWAPO in exile, where leaders did not hesitate to suppress apostasy by the most brutal means, including the torture and murder of former comrades and the internment of their children. The reviewer regrets that the book leaves aside the deeper description of the history of the Ovambo, who throughout German and South African domination managed their territory with a large degree of autonomy. Members of this majo-

rity ethnic group (about 50 % of the population) finally formed the cadres of the SWAPO in exile, and after independence also most of the top and lower members of state and local governments. Not only scholars would appreciate a broader interpretation of the ideology and practice of the SWAPO organization melted into a political party. It would help to frame the current developments in Namibia, which, as Klíma rightly says, begin to suffer the syndrome of the disappearing cadres. Former guerrilla fighters are passing away leaving a generational change unresolved. From the current placement of figures on the political chessboard, it appears that they are perhaps still not ready to do so (SWAPO is a sovereign winner of all the national elections, after the two founding members of SWAPO a member of the politburo and longtime diplomat of the then exiled SWAPO was elected in May 2015 as the third president).

In the last chapter of his book Klíma also remarks, that in the mid-80s the history of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and SWAPO crossed in quite an uncommon way. Though thousands of kilometers away, Czechoslovakia provided strong support to the Namibian children from the guerrilla refugee camps in Angola. Little girls and boys lived in a boarding school for six years before they could return to free Namibia. Meanwhile, they attended Czech school facilities and became strongly influenced by the Czech way of life and accustomed to the forested landscape of Czechoslovakia. From this example we can be reminded that it is the personal history of each human, together with a “big” history of a particular state, nation or movement, which gives the full picture of what really happened. It is no different in the case of Namibia.

Tomáš Machalík

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Emília Bihariová is currently a student of a PhD programme at the University of SS. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava. She specializes in African studies, especially in the changes in the traditional life of pastoral nomads in Eastern Africa. *emi.bihi@gmail.com*

Erika Dahlmanns is a research fellow at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies, University of Bayreuth (Germany), and a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for the Study of Governance Innovation at the University of Pretoria (South Africa). She also lectures in the Department of Cultural Anthropology at the University of Marburg in Germany. She conducted extensive field research in Rwanda between 2006 and 2011, where she researched issues related to local political imaginations and practices of social reconstruction. *e.dahlmanns@yahoo.de*

Tamer Abd Elkreem is a lecturer at the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Khartoum. Currently Mr. Abd Elkreem is completing his PhD in the Anthropology of Development at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), University of Bayreuth, Germany. *tamer.246@hotmail.com*

Otakar Hulec is a historian of Africa, specializing in southern African history. Until his retirement he was a Senior Researcher in the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. He is the author of the standard *A History of South Africa* (in Czech). *ohulec@gmail.com*

Aneta Kříčková is a PhD student at the Department of Politics, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové. She specializes in theories of conflict resolution, political and social issues in South Africa, and Spanish-speaking countries. *aneta.krickova@uhk.cz*

Tomáš Machalík, PhD, is a graduate of Ethnology from the University of West Bohemia in Plzen. He is a member of the Organizing and Scientific Committee of the International conference on African studies VIVA AFRICA and a co-founder of the Cultura Africa association. Since 2008 he has been working for the Ministry of Education,

Youth and Sports as an expert on professional and lifelong learning. Presently he acts as secretary of the Czech Association for African Studies. tomasmachalik@gmail.com

Alena Rettová lectures on Swahili literature and African philosophy at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Her publications include *Afrophone Philosophies: Reality Challenge* (2007) and *Chanter l'existence: La poésie de Sando Marteau et ses horizons philosophiques* (2013). ar42@soas.ac.uk

Matthew Sabbi is a Junior Research Fellow in Development Sociology at the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies, University of Bayreuth Germany. His research focuses on institutional analysis of developmental policy, local state bureaucracy and behaviour in organizations. matthewsabbi@yahoo.com

Petr Skalník is the editor of *Modern Africa* and a research associate in the Department of Politics, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové. He specializes in political anthropology. petr.skalnik@uhk.cz

Gabriel Szuma is an investment analyst at a Boutique Venture Capital Fund with offices in Prague and Silicon Valley. He graduated *Summa Cum Laude* from Charles University in International Economic and Political Studies focusing on philosophy, economics and business. gabriel.szuma@gmail.com

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Rokitanského 62, 500 03 Hradec Králové

Czech Republic

petr.skalnik@uhk.cz

tel.: +420-604373308

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