

POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONTEMPORARY ZAMBIA: A VIEW FROM WITHIN¹

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Abstract: This article examines the organization of Zambian political parties via the extended case method of the reflexive science model (Burawoy 1998). 23 in-depth interviews with party members and activists were conducted in three Zambian provinces around the time of the tripartite general elections in 2011. The inter-subjective encounters focused on the parties' day-to-day functioning and were used to construe a model of party members' life-world and its connections to macro-social forces studied by positive science. The study describes the Zambian political party scene as a 'one party multi-partism' that is characterized by a lack of organizational cohesion and party switching of both individuals and structures. Using this interpretation as a springboard, the second part initiates a theoretical discussion of party ideology, party – voter interface, the dynamics of non-cohesive party competition, and the role of informal politics in the party's internal organization. A picture emerges of political parties that are well adapted to the environment in which they operate and that strategically use a full range of symbolic, organizational, and financial resources available to them.

Keywords: *Zambia, political parties, party organization, party cohesion, ideology, extended case method*

Introduction

While a rich body of literature exists about the Zambian party system and elections (recent examples are Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010; Larmer and Fraser 2007; Resnick 2012), writings on parties' organization are rare. Apart from academic scholarship (Hopkins 2010; LeBas 2011; Paget 2010; Rakner 2011), four evaluative reports (Kabemba et al. 2004; Momba 2005; Momba and Madimutsa 2009; NDI/FODEP 2003) have been produced. This research contributes to the study of sub-Saharan political parties in two ways. Firstly, it examines parties' internal organization via fieldwork that is not 'confined

1 The fieldwork on which this article is based was funded from Specific Research, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové in calendar year 2011. I greatly benefited from discussions with and comments from Pat Lyons from the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. I thank Arlene Archer for language help. Without openness, trust, and courage of my Zambian informants a research of this kind would have been impossible to conduct.

to the party headquarters in the capital' (Erdmann et al. 2007: 11). Secondly, it does not employ the positivist science paradigm (Neuman 2003: 70-75). Instead, it uses a deliberately interventionist approach that engages and perturbs situational power relations including those between the researcher and the study subjects. The article starts with a rationale for and description of the particular research methodology and thereafter it is divided into two parts. First, it presents a Weberian ideal-type model of Zambian parties, which is subsequently illustrated by ethnographic evidence. Second, it explores the theoretical consequences of the model and the ethnography in terms of party ideology, party – voter interface, the dynamics of non-cohesive party competition, and informal politics.

Methodology

In contrast to richer parts of the world, political parties in poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa mostly rely on direct contact with their voters. They are not just 'brand names' whose content and salience is conveyed to the population via the media. For most people, it is party activists in the field that keep them up to date about party developments and make election campaigns happen. At the same time, the parties resemble a state within a state with its own (often confidential) procedures, records, intelligence, and counter-intelligence. More often than not, their non-public activities are inaccessible to participant observation; their archives are not opened to researchers. One possible way how to glean a picture of parties' inner workings, of the day-to-day linkage between the party and the population, is discreet conversations with party officials and activists in the field.

The fieldwork on which this article is based used the extended case method formulated most cogently by Burawoy (1998). The method falls within the critical science paradigm and is distinct from both positivism and interpretive social science (Neuman 2003: 81). It claims that fieldwork and its produce cannot be detached from local power struggles; in fact, they are an integral part of it. 'No claims to "impartiality" can release us from either the dilemmas of being part of the world we study or from the unintended consequences of what we write' (Burawoy 1998: 17). The research encounters took place during a period of intense political competition. The 2011 elections, from the point of view of ordinary Zambians, were a turning point in modern Zambian history since the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) lost after 20 years in power. Significant parts of the interviews covered sensitive issues such as (non-)adherence to party regulations and intra-party corruption. Also, a white researcher from a 'rich Western democracy' was encountering black party members from a poor 'African labyrinth' (Sartori 1976: 248-254).

The interviewees thus faced several dilemmas when sharing their knowledge and opinions: they could threaten their own position in the party by disclosing anything in the first place, they could disclose a piece of information to a stranger that would be useful to competing political parties, they could put their party in a bad light, and they could put Zambian political culture in a bad light in front of a foreign visitor.²

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- 2 The fieldwork lasted five weeks between 29 August and 2 October 2011 (nine days in Lusaka, 16 days in the Western Province and 11 days in the Eastern Province). During this period 23 in-depth interviews were conducted (Tables 1 and 2). As tripartite (i.e. presidential, parliamentary, and local government) general elections were held on 20 September 2011, the election campaign and several election rallies in Mongu (Western Province) and Lusaka were observed. Most interviews were conducted in two peripheral provinces; they covered all levels of party membership, and all were anonymous due to their focus on sensitive information. In total, 26 party members of various ranks were interviewed, plus one analyst running a private political consultancy firm and two temporary workers from this firm. Out of the 29 people interviewed, three were women (one party member and the two temporary political consultancy employees). In order to have as diverse a sample as possible, party members were approached during their day-to-day campaign activities, at election rallies, in and around party offices, in front of polling stations, via contact lists provided by election observers, via phone numbers posted on party web pages, on the recommendation of other party members and ordinary citizens, etc. The time and place of meetings was agreed either face-to-face or via phone calls. The interviews took place in restaurants of various guesthouses, a few on party premises, in private homes, in the open air, etc. An informed consent procedure was performed with every research subject, including an offer of full confidentiality. The permission to take hand-written notes during the interview was obtained. A few subjects volunteered to be named and cited but this option was not pursued any further. The interviewees were not paid; in one case a small amount of cash was provided for transport. The opening theme of the interviews was a short political autobiography, the subsequent discussion covered the following topics: party membership, activities in between elections, party conferences, constitutions, selection of party officials, selection of candidates for general elections, funding, disciplinary procedures, intra-party corruption, ethnic and other kinds of loyalty, and manifestos. The topics were not necessarily approached in this order and not all of them were raised in each interview. Concrete examples of events and situations were elicited whenever possible. At the end of the interview the participants were encouraged to pose their own questions about the research itself, political systems in European countries, etc. Identifying, setting appointments with, and actually meeting suitable informants for the interview did not pose any serious problems. Being a visitor from an obscure European country probably helped as well. As far as the goals of this study are concerned, the middle and lower party cadres and ordinary members tended to contribute more useful information. High-ranking politicians tended to present rather smooth and coherent stories and they shied away from tricky questions more easily. As far as the researcher is able to judge, evasion and/

Instead of approving or rejecting hypotheses, the extended case method 'has the purpose of discovering flaws in, and then modifying, existing social theories' (Babbie 2010: 310). It does so by relying on an explicit prior theory which '[t]he researcher constantly builds and rebuilds ... in a dialogue with the people studied and ... other researchers' (Neuman 2003: 87), a process Burawoy (1998: 18) calls 'successive approximation'. The method is called 'extended' because it 'extends out' from the 'locality' to macro-social forces that frame it and constrain it (Burawoy 1998: 5, 15). Here, the *prior* theory guiding the author's entry into the field drew on the literature on informal politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999), clientelistic links between politicians and electorate (de Smedt 2009; Gyimah-Boadi 2007), the low level of political violence in modern-day Zambia (Burnell 2005; DiJohn 2010), and the complexities of Zambian party strategies and their internal dynamics (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010; Larmer and Fraser 2007).

or clichés (rather than making things up) were the chief strategies employed by the interviewees when invited to share information they considered too sensitive. One can distinguish three phases of interpreting the encounters. First, during the interviews while notes were being taken and the attention of the researcher focused on the flow of the conversation. The second phase took place shortly after the interview when the researcher was transcribing his notes and everything else he remembered onto a computer. The 'raw data' was written down in the author's mother tongue with a host of citations in English. For each interview, an assessment of credibility and the psychological dynamics of the encounter were recorded. The final text file amounted to 35600 words. The third phase took place while preparing this article. As the interviews were conducted on an informal basis and resulted from the good will of individual citizens, no research permit was sought.

I.

Zambia's 'One Party'

Zambia is nominally a Republic with a separation of powers and a liberal representative model of political participation. It has a Societies Act regulating the existence of associations, including political parties, and an Electoral Act. Both Acts conform to international standards. In terms of governance, Zambia is a centralized country with a strong presidency with weak local administration. As in other former colonies, a modern state constitution was hastily implanted on the racist and exploitative system of rule shortly before independence in 1964 and the country became a one-party state in 1973. After the end of the Cold War, multipartism was re-introduced and competitive general elections have taken place on a regular basis since 1991. The country uses a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system for all three organs: the presidency, a unicameral parliament, and local government. All legislative elections between 1991 and 2006 were won by the MMD (see Table 3). Similarly, all presidential elections between 1991 and 2008 (president Levy Mwanawasa died in the middle of his second term and a presidential by-election was held in 2008) were won by MMD candidates. The last tripartite elections in September 2011 were won by the main opposition party, the Patriotic Front (PF), and its presidential candidate Michael Sata.

Table 3: General Election Results 1991–2011 in Terms of Parliamentary Seats

PARTY	REGISTERED (YEAR)	PARLIAMENTARY SEATS*				
		1991	1996	2001	2006	2011**
United National Independence Party (UNIP)	1958	25	boycott	13	UDA	
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)	1991	125	131	69	75	55
National Party (NP)	1993		5			
Agenda for Zambia (AZ)	1996		2			
Zambian Democratic Congress (ZADECO)	1995		2			
Independents	N/A		10	1	3	3
United Party for National Development (UPND)	1998			49	UDA	28
Zambian Republican Party (ZRP)	2000			1	NDF	
Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)	2001			12	UDA	1
Heritage Party (HP)	2001			4		
Patriotic Front (PF)	2001			1	43	60
United Democratic Alliance (UDA)***	2006				26	
United Liberal Party (ULP)	2006				2	
National Democratic Focus (NDF)****	2006				1	
Alliance for Development and Democracy (ADD)	2009					1

Sources:³

African Elections Database. 2012. <<http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html>>, accessed on 13 February 2012.

EISA. 2007. <<http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zam2006resultsl.htm>>, accessed on 21 February 2012.

Electoral Commission of Zambia. 2012. <http://www.elections.org.zm/past_election_results.php>, accessed on 21 February 2012.

Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003: 11 (see References).

Lusaka Times 2010 (see References).

Momba 2005: 15-16 (see References).

³ All webpages cited in this article were saved in pdf format and are available upon request from the author.

United Liberal Party Manifesto 2007. 2012. <<http://sadcblog.wordpress.com>>, accessed on 28 April 2012.

* 150 members elected plus eight members appointed by the president (they are not included in the count).

** 148 members elected in 2011 as elections in two constituencies deferred.

*** The United Democratic Alliance (UDA) was a coalition of three parties: the UPND, the UNIP, and the FDD.

**** The National Democratic Focus (NDF) was a coalition of smaller parties.

The model of Zambian party politics presented below pictures Zambia as a multi-party state with only 'one' political party. It integrates all five parliamentary parties (PF, MMD, UPND, ADD, FDD) with the ruling party (the MMD until 2011, thereafter the PF) playing a distinct role.⁴ The fact that all the parties are treated as 'one' does not mean that they are 'the same' or that ordinary Zambians cannot distinguish them. It is an analytical step that deliberately suppresses some of their differences to elevate one of their common characteristics, i.e. circulation of party members and elites, for the sake of parsimony and clarity of the model. The model does not necessarily correspond to empirical reality. As other similar models in social sciences, it rather 'captures the spirit of the key institutions and of the self-understanding of the actors themselves' (Hall 2000: 33). It is best understood as a tool that assists one in grasping local idioms and organizing our observations according to their specific logic.

Zambian political parties are remarkably similar in terms of their structure and procedures. Whatever programmatic differences they try to exhibit, these are poorly understood by the general populace. The key policy term is 'development', a vague concept largely synonymous with the word 'improvement' and understood in terms of 'modern' infrastructure and state services: salaried employment, piped water, roads, schools, hospitals, and sewerage. It is extremely easy to become a member of any of these parties, their members have hardly any obligations (in some cases none at all), and previous membership in another party need not be cancelled. Changing party allegiance is a frequent practice and is not sanctioned in any way. Defections are common, and not only among individuals; especially in pre-election periods, whole party structures may switch and become co-opted by another party. In terms

4 The model does not apply to the National Restoration Party (NAREP), a newly founded party of urban intelligentsia. The NAREP is unique with regards to its manifesto, its emphasis on 'clean politics', and attempts to cultivate a 'specific party culture' (A1, A2). At this moment it is unclear whether the NAREP has any political future, whether it can carve a niche in the Zambian party 'system'.

of funding, Zambian political parties receive no contributions from the state budget. There is no law obliging the parties to disclose their financial operations. While voluntary donations of members and sympathizers either in cash or kind are possible at any level, head offices of big parties are mainly funded by members on state payroll via salary deductions or by the personal wealth of their founding members. The ruling party can invariably mobilize the largest amount of financial and material resources due to its abuse of state funds and property. The ruling party then systematically disburses these resources in between elections, preferably among poor, rural populace to optimize value (votes) for money.

The way political parties are funded interlocks with poverty, high levels of socio-economic inequality, and the FPTP system to create an intra-party plutocracy with little regard for formal organizational procedures as defined in party statutes. Members of this elite group are free to circulate from one party to another or found their own according to the logic of the personality-oriented political culture. The concomitant factionalism interlinks with the single round of voting to keep the opposition fragmented. The fragmented opposition faces a ruling party that profits from the control of a partly privatized state, and thanks to its clientelistic linkages, (enabled by corruption, prebendalism, and patronage) stands a good chance to keep winning elections which can be manipulated (via open fraud) or micro-manipulated (via vote buying and/or interfering with the secrecy of the vote) if necessary. On an individual level, the winner of this game is a rich politician/businessman with a solid base of clientele. Party members of average or low socioeconomic status realize they can only rise up to a certain level within the party hierarchy. Their usefulness for the party ends roughly with the membership in provincial committees, because they are not able to fund an MP campaign or pursue a political career in Lusaka, the centre of power. Besides financial and material incentives, party cohesion is ensured by suspensions and expulsions. On the national level, disciplinary procedures are initiated to get rid of intra-party opponents and are at least as important for the composition of party organs as the electivity of the positions declared in party statutes. On lower levels, the disciplinary procedures tend to resolve genuine problems having to do mostly with inter- and intra-party corruption in the run-up to elections. The parties are best understood as organizations whose *raison d'être* is to gain access to resources of the state and, from the point of view of most of their supporters, as organizations that distribute resources and offices.

The concept of 'national policy-making' is weak due to a combination of FPTP, the presidential system, and the high centralization of the state, clientelism, and under-development. MPs are understood and tend to act as mediators/brokers between their constituencies and coffers of the executive. General

elections take place every five years (since 2001 they have always been tripartite) and the electoral competition has a strong 'winner takes all' tendency. The willingness of other parties to engage for five years as a 'democratic opposition' is low because the meaningfulness of such role is doubtful. In the period following elections there is always, on all levels including the parliament, a wave of defectors joining the ranks of the winner. However, this does not rule out an occasional alteration of the ruling party due to a massive loss of credibility and a simultaneous challenge by a well-organized opposition headed by a charismatic leader as it happened in 2011. The model neither precludes periods of better governance as more competent and less corrupt politicians may temporarily unite within the ruling party or join a promising opposition party that subsequently wins elections.

Ethnography

This section uses the ethnographic material gathered during fieldwork to illustrate the basic elements and mechanisms of the model. The evidence is necessarily selective. It does not strive to be systematic or exhaustive and it cannot be, as this would require the presentation of a huge volume of ethnographic description to the reader. The statements and opinions provided by the interviewees should not be understood literally. While they have been corroborated and in some instances verified against external sources, they first and foremost approximate the life-world of active members of Zambian political parties.

Party similarity

Several respondents claimed that the structures and formal procedures of the parties are similar (A2, A7, A8, A9, A15) and nobody contradicted this view. Comparison of party statutes supports this claim (ADD 2011; FDD 2011; PF 2011; UPND 2011). Some respondents said that the structures and formal procedures of Zambian political parties were the same, only terminology (for example, the way party organs are named) might differ (A7, A8, A9). The left-right political spectrum was understood by middle- and high-ranking party officials upon a direct question and they were able to classify individual parties in this way (A9, A14, A15, A16, A27). However, when it came to the question of party programmes (manifestos), several participants saw manifestos of Zambian political parties as similar (A11, A20, A23), identical but expressed in different words (A2), or outright identical (A27). Some even accused other parties of having copied their manifesto (A11, A16, and A19). Only three informants were able to present details of their party's programme (A7, A8, A16) and another four were able to indicate some differences in emphasis (A9,

A14, A15, A26). This was a surprisingly mixed picture given the fact that many interviewees were middle and high-ranking party officials.

On three occasions the informants considered the MMD manifesto (current or 'original') as good but criticized its implementation (A10, A13, A28). In a similar vein, a PF member concluded that the main difference between the parties was not in ideas but in how they acted in practice (A23). Another informant characterized the communication of his party's programme in rural settings in the following way: 'You tell them you will give them fertilizer and you have a manifesto'. The same person said the decisive factor of election campaigns was the party's financial resources rather than its programme (A27). Another party member claimed that the election campaign was not based on any positive programme but on declaring reasons why the politician left his/her former party and what it did wrong. In his view, parties are formed on personal differences. He remarked that 'in a real sense there is no alternative'. He explained that the 'majority of Zambians do not know what is in the manifesto. Their choice is based on hardship'. People are not well educated and what they seek from politicians is 'liberation' from the hardships of their daily life (A26). Partly echoing the same line of thought and referring to the MMD and the PF, one person said that their manifestos were similar and the main difference lay in the person of the party leader (A21).

'Easy' membership

Any adult can become a member of a Zambian political party; no recommendation by existing members is required. One registers at the lowest party segment that exists in the area, usually a ward or a branch. This unit is then contacted in case somebody's membership needs to be ascertained (A7, A20, A21). The register of members kept by the unit's head is not considered a valuable or sensitive internal document (A21). Some parties, such as the MMD, the UPND, the ULP, and the ADD, issue cards to their members (A6, A9, A11, and A14). The PF does not issue any cards; the membership 'is in your heart' (A7). The MMD, ADD or NAREP charge a small fee for the card/membership. The fee is equivalent to anything between 10 and 50 US cents so that anybody could afford it (A1, A6, A9). The PF and the UPND do not charge any membership fees (A7, A11). Changing parties is common (A4, A25, A26) and not necessarily looked down upon (A17, A18). When leaving for another party it is not necessary to cancel the previous membership (A14). 23 party members discussed their political biography with the author. 10 of them have never been in any other party; eight have been in two parties, and five in three parties (non-active membership in pre-1991 UNIP is not counted). Altogether, out of 10 persons that had been in the MMD at one time or another, eight were

now in the PF, one in the UPND, and one in the ADD. The frequent membership in the MDD is not surprising as it originally was a broad-based political movement.

Defections

A fine line must be drawn between (1) leaving for another party because the original one is defunct, lacks potential, or because one's political views change, (2) a defection to a party because it is about to win or has just won elections, and (3) being 'bought' (i.e. offered a material stimulus in exchange for a service against one's party) which does not necessarily entail a defection (or at least not immediately). Whole party structures change allegiance and become co-opted by another party (A9, A17). Encouraging individual or group defections is a conscious strategy. It can have significant influence on general election results, as has happened in 2011 (A28). Once influential politicians (often from the ruling party) start to feel 'the wind of change' (A19), some of them start to negotiate the terms of their co-optation with the central committee of a promising competitor (A9, A20, A21, A27). It is a delicate process that has to be weighed against a potential backlash by aspiring candidates and party structures that may already be in place (A21). If the local structures are weak or non-existent, the terms of defection are easily agreed. If party structures are already developed, perhaps thanks to several years of hard work by local partisans, the co-optation can lead to a conflict, especially if it concerns whole structures. High-profile defections have a public relations aspect as well. They may be read by the population as signs that the (ruling) party is disintegrating. Using a football metaphor, one informant made a comparison to a good player from a historically strong team transferring to a promising new team (A20). Party strategists need to strike the right balance between the advantages of retaining many party members whose loyalty is questionable or restricting membership to much smaller groups of strong partisans. As one informant explained: 'If you chase them out you are losing out' (A22).

Funding

Zambian political parties get no contributions from the state budget and there is no law obliging them to disclose the sources of their funding (A2). While voluntary donations from rich members and sympathizers either in cash or in kind are possible at any level (A6, A16, A19, A20), the national headquarters of the big parties are mostly funded by the salaries of members on state payroll, such as MPs, ministers and other high-ranking positions in the state administration (A7, A8). Such a way of funding can only work at all if the party has members in such positions. For example, a UNPD member

remarked that Hakainde Hichilema, a wealthy businessman and the president of the UPND, was currently irreplaceable as there was no other rich person in the central committee who would be able to fund the party (A19). Provincial, district, and other officials have to fund their party segments out of their own pockets (A3, A18, and A27). Some of these structures receive small and often secret gifts from sympathizing businessmen in the order of tens or hundreds of US dollars (A20). The only examples mentioned of funding from the head office were high-profile visits of party leaders from Lusaka (A2) and a contribution for the funerals of two long-time party members (A20).

The ruling party is in a completely different position thanks to its access to state resources (A12). An MMD member explained that working for the party was a voluntary activity: 'party is like football' (A6). At the same time, working for the MMD brought various advantages, bonuses, and occasional cash payments. While some of them were relatively direct and transparent others were less so. As for the former, a party functionary or an active member could profit from the following: a payment for community work such as building a playground or a clinic; a payment for specific tasks during the election campaign; a payment for gathering intelligence for the party; a payment for attending a meeting, etc. The payments could be made in cash or in kind (a bike, a motorbike, or a car lent by the party) (A6, A17). As for the less direct rewards, an MMD member could get a bank loan to start a business or two sacks of subsidized fertilizer from a state agency that non-members would not have received (A6).

As for presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections, candidates finance their own campaigns (A7, A8, A9). Estimates of the total cost of one MP campaign varied wildly from high amounts, such as US\$300,000 (A24), US\$400,000 (A18) and US\$10,000 per week (A27) to 'at least US\$20,000' (A28). Though all candidates have sponsors (A9, A14) and may get a contribution from their party, it is themselves who bear the brunt of the costs. Council seats seem to be the only elective positions within the reach of persons of average socioeconomic status. A candidate's competence, political skills and rhetorical support from a popular MP candidate of the same party may suffice to become elected (A19). The plutocracy effect works the other way around as well: an interviewee from the UNIP admitted that his party attracted mostly poor candidates because their chances of winning on the UNIP ticket were low (A27).

(In)formal procedures

Adherence to statutes was discussed with seven interviewees: four of them were evasive (A25, A27, A28), one of them admitted that the party constitu-

tion was not always followed (A11) and three others gave concrete examples of non-compliance (A7, A20, and A26). A PF member reported a case of two persons who were not re-elected to their positions during a provincial conference. They 'petitioned the central committee' who 'nullified' the vote and reinstated them. Other local officials complained and the matter was put straight a few months later when the PF vice-president visited the province, but 'for the sake of the unity of the party' the central committee created special positions for the two disgruntled petitioners so that they would not end up empty-handed (A20). According to another PF member, the formal rules are not followed during elections for positions at various levels of party hierarchy. He gave an example of four ward chairmen who voted during a provincial conference even though they did not have the right to do so. Other delegates complained, but no formal protest was submitted. The same interviewee described a case of a former district chairman who took part in such a conference, although he was not supposed to be there at all. He not only voted, but competed for positions in spite of the fact that only conference delegates could do so. It has even happened that somebody else was elected to a provincial level position in this way (A26). Yet another PF member simply summarized that the regulations were followed as long as they did not prevent influential party officials from pursuing their goals. When the statutes are perceived as burdensome or counter-productive, they are simply bypassed and overruled by 'local culture' (A7). The same person spontaneously remarked that Africans lived two lives: one, a life lived in their own culture, and a second one, pretending to adhere to Western culture and democracy (A7). Two informants also agreed that ignorance rather than intention was often the cause of non-adherence to the regulations, especially at lower levels of the party hierarchy (A20, A26). From the dispassionate and down-to-earth way the participants referred to non-adherence and the amount of detail they provided, one can safely conclude that party statutes are certainly not followed to the letter; they rather serve as a general 'guide' (A11).

Good examples of the lax attitude to formal procedures are the national party conferences/conventions. A national conference is the supreme organ of all Zambian parties: it adopts the constitution, elects the party president and members of the central committee with extensive powers. In case of a newly founded party, all structures remain interim until the first convention (A16). Most party constitutions state a convention shall be held every five years (ADD 2011; PF 2011; UPND 2011). In reality, especially the opposition parties do not hold conventions as often as envisaged. For example, it took the PF ten years to organize its first convention and to approve the constitution. The ADD was founded in 2009 but has not held a convention so far. The UPND held a convention that elected party leaders in 2006 and does not

plan to organize another one until 2014 (Lusaka Times 2012). Furthermore, even when a conference does take place, there is little genuine competition for the positions in the central committee and the presidency. According to a PF member, hardly anybody dares to submit a candidacy without prior approval by party leaders. People would be sent to 'explain' to the contender (even using violence or the threat of it) to make him or her withdraw his or her candidacy (A7). This does not mean, however, that the conventions are completely ceremonial or staged. Intra-party tensions may boil over and the event can turn into an arena of intense political struggle (for example, the UPND conference after the death of Mazoka in 2006 or the MMD convention in April 2011).

Party cohesion

A business-like attitude to political activity prevailed among the interviewees. A PF member explained that he had to buy drinks and food when he started to organize groups of party supporters in spring 2011 for the upcoming election campaign, as otherwise nobody would have lifted a finger (A18). An MMD member told the author that people were always interested in politics four months before elections but once parties stopped paying them, politics would disappear from their lives (A13). An interviewee from the UPND spontaneously expressed disapproval over the fact that people expected gifts from political parties in exchange for support rather than asking what they could do for them (A19). A PF respondent openly admitted he hoped to get a job via his political connections in the case his party won the elections (A18). An ordinary member of the MMD explained his alignment with the party solely in terms of real or expected material benefits (A17). A UPND member warned the author not to be deceived by superficial impressions and attributed noisy behaviour of young male PF supporters to the work of campaign managers, who were buying the youths *tujili jili* (plastic sachets with a small amount of liquor), rather than to any genuine enthusiasm (A11). While it could have been a mere disparaging remark about a competitor, it fits in well with the general sober views of the respondents about the motivations of party supporters. The patron–client relationship seemed especially strong in the case of the ruling party and the author had the impression that one had to 'deserve' its favour by working on community projects, for example. While an MMD member official claimed the work was paid (A6), 'to be seen' may easily be another motive for participation: in case of personal difficulties, the party may be the only organization that can help. The ruling MMD was active during its rule regardless of the election cycle. It organized regular meetings of its organs and sponsored community projects for ordinary members and sympathizers, as well as its women's and youth wings. They included sport events and workshops on health, agriculture, nutrition, poverty alleviation, etc. (A6,

A17). The MMD also organizes periodical fund-raising activities connected to the renewal of one's card/membership. One has to pay a minimum fee and any amount in excess is considered a donation. The donations can be paid in cash or in kind and vary from one member to another, with high-ranking officials contributing equivalents of tens or hundreds of US dollars (A6).

Disciplinary procedures play a significant role as well. Membership suspensions, expulsion, and related court challenges are common. Two levels have to be distinguished: national versus provincial and local. Even a cursory look at the national political arena clearly shows that disciplinary procedures are used to get rid of intra-party opponents. As for the provinces, a total of 16 cases of expulsion or suspension were mentioned (A9, A19, A20, A25, A26, and A27) and details were shared about 12 of them: six had to do with working for or corruption by other parties, and three with a lack of discipline or competence, while the rest were special cases. In contrast to the way disciplinary procedures are applied at the national level, a great majority of the provincial cases resembled genuine disciplinary problems rather than the targeting of opponents.

Personality-oriented political culture

Personal wealth is not the only prerequisite of leadership; a strong, charismatic personality is another one. Several interviewees expressed this opinion. 'A strong party has to have a strong leader', explained one interviewee (A18). Responding to a question about people's support for this or that party, an ADD member told the author that 'most people prefer parties according to who is the leader'. He elaborated that the ADD had been trying to 'talk issues and not personalities', but unfortunately it had always reverted to personalities. According to this respondent, one deals with 'personality-based politics' in Zambia (A14). In the opinion of another research participant, the PF, the UPND, and the NAREP will disintegrate after their leaders leave them or die: they are personality-based parties (A2), though a PF participant partly challenged this view (A18). An intuitive bond between political leaders and voters was postulated by an ADD interviewee: 'You vote for a person', he said and likened the process to a wife selecting her husband. She learns about him what she can, but ultimately only she 'knows' why she made her choice and even then she may not be able to give a coherent account of why she acted the way she did (A9). In a similar context, a UPND member emphasized the need for face-to-face contact between candidates and their potential voters (A19). Factionalism and party splitting are a direct consequence of personality-oriented politics. As a PF interviewee explained, Zambian political parties were formed based on 'emotional differences' or 'personal differences' with the underlying

logic ‘if I do not like you, I will found my own party’ (A26). Four interviewees spontaneously mentioned personalism as an obstacle to the formation of an opposition coalition (A1, A3, A19, and A28).

Intra- and inter-party corruption

The issue of the ‘buying’ of party officials and election candidates by other parties came up repeatedly and spontaneously during the discussions. One can ‘buy’ MPs (A14), candidates (A16, A19, A20), or anybody, even whole parties (A12, A23). The selection process of party candidates for general elections was researched in greater detail. A number of interviewees admitted intra- and/or inter-party corruption was taking place during the process (A6, A9, A11, A13, A14, A19, A20, A26) and two denied it (A15, A27). The candidacy contenders are selected by party organs, a process that theoretically starts at the grass-root level and moves up via the constituency, district, and province to the national committees (or even the party president), where the final list of names is approved. Up to the provincial level, the contenders are interviewed by so called interviewing committees, whose size, composition, and style of work differ from one party to another. Multiple concrete cases of corruption were discussed with the author. At least three different ways of bribing were brought up. Firstly, members of an interviewing committee can be bribed by a contender to influence the committee’s ranking (A13, A20). There may be signs that such things have happened. For example, at the ward level, one contender may get no votes and the other one all of them (A9). Similarly, it can happen that lower level party officials suddenly start to support one contender but they are not able to explain why (A14). The fact that evaluations by the constituency, district, and province are not in agreement is another warning sign (A11). Secondly, candidates themselves can be bribed by another party to withdraw their candidacy at the last moment when it becomes too late for the party to submit another name to the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). In this way, the party ends up with no candidate in the constituency. For this reason, the party may keep the list of its candidates secret until the last moment (A16, A19). Thirdly, a party official can be bribed by another party to withhold important documents, which in turn results in candidates’ submissions to the ECZ being incomplete and their nomination not being approved (A19). The committees work under time pressure, with limited resources, limited access to information, and are exposed to various kinds of manipulation (A11, A26). For example, a committee may receive a party intelligence report or an anonymous letter accusing the applicant of corrupting members of a lower level committee (A6, A26) or of having been bought by another party (A11). However, these accusations may be related to intra-party power struggles which make it difficult for the committee to evaluate them (A26). A disgruntled

contender for the MMD parliamentary ticket vividly described an atmosphere of time pressure, noise, and confusion during a provincial round of interviews with 52 applicants from 17 constituencies. There was no timetable, no food and no drinks, with the procedure continuing until late in the evening. The questioning itself was short and formal with rumours flying around that some applicants had already been shortlisted. In his opinion the process was a scam (informant's identification withheld for confidentiality reasons).

The politics of poverty

The term 'politics of poverty' was used by several interviewees to describe Zambia's *party system* (A14, A18, A22, and A23). 'The person who controls the resources controls everything' was the most general expression of it (A22, A23). The two dimensions of the concept were cogently explained by an ADD member: 'the parties want to keep the people poor, they make sure they keep them poor' and he added that '[poor] people's minds are easily manipulated' (A14). It is only before elections that the parties flood people with gifts; the politicians say: 'we will give you more if you vote for us' but they never show up again once they are elected (A14). Several interviewees saw that the only possible way of how to break the circle was through better education which would gradually improve people's understanding of politics (A11, A13, A14, and A26). However, two interviewees pointed out there were limits to the voters' manipulation and that a link between the parties' governance record/competence and the results of the electoral competition did exist (A9, A26).

As the fieldwork was mostly conducted in two peripheral provinces away from the capital, the issue of vote buying among poor rural voters, a concrete expression of the politics of poverty was raised very early on during the interview process. The author further probed into the topic by posing a number of questions about the secrecy of the vote. Gift-giving was understood as an integral part of the campaigning of all parties (A1, A16, A22), whether in kind or in cash (A17, A19). 'People listen but they are disappointed if you do not "deliver" during the campaign', a UPND member summarized the issue (A19). 'Don't kubeba' ('don't tell' in Bemba) was the main slogan of the PF election campaign, meaning implicitly 'you are free to accept gifts from other parties, just do not tell them you will vote for us'. Poverty was named as the reason why gift-giving works (A9, A11, A12, and A27). A member of the NAREP explained it was gratitude born out of extreme poverty and illiteracy that prevented people from trying to cast their ballot for another candidate/party than the one they had accepted the gift from (A1); a UPND member said they felt obliged to do so because they were 'honest' (A11). An interviewee from the PF mentioned they had to stage short theatre performances during election

rallies to teach people that they could vote for another party than the one they had accepted a gift from (A22). Upon direct questioning, three participants claimed the vote was secret (A20, A27, A28), but another two explained how one could see where people were marking the ballot paper if the observer was positioned at a right angle (A17, A21). A PF member admitted the marking might have been visible, but the prevention of casting pre-filled ballots was more important than the position of polling booths (A22) (polling booths were deliberately opened towards the audience during the 2011 vote, with voters using their body to bar others from seeing where they were marking the ballot paper).

II.

Extending the case ideology

Scholars of African politics have noted for some time that the parties don't form around policy agendas that follow from specific ideologies (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 251; Ottaway 1999: 311; van de Walle and Butler 1999: 23). In Erdmann's (2007: 40) words, "most of the parties do not have an ideology and programme that differentiate them from one another and give their members, supporters and voters a clear value system on the basis of which to judge what happens in politics". The present study points in another direction. What if there is an ideology, and one which is very strong indeed? It is worth considering if 'development' could be this ideology in Zambia, *the only one available*. 'Development' is perceived by the population not as one policy issue among many, but as the essence and the ultimate goal of politics, the 'purpose' of both the politicians and the state. Development in this sense easily fulfils Gerring's (1997: 979-986) criteria (namely coherence and political orientation) of ideology. Therefore, members, supporters and voter of political parties in Zambia (and very probably elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa) *do* have "a clear value system" (Erdmann 2007: 40) which, at the same time, cannot differentiate between the parties because it is the only one across the board. Why has political party ideology not taken on more diverse forms in contemporary (post-Cold War) sub-Saharan Africa? This is a complex question which will not be discussed here but the author would like to make two further remarks. Firstly, in their article on Zambian presidential elections in 2008, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010: 62) claim that the Zambian experience was 'an important corrective to the assumption that African politics is "devoid of ideology"'. They borrow a model from LeBas (2010: 63, 68), whereby certain parties 'form policies and election strategies ... in anticipation of the strategy most likely to be adopted by the rival party' and 'the continual interaction influences the dynamics of election campaigns and ultimately shapes government policy'.

The fieldwork conducted for this study supports Cheeseman and Hinfelaar's observation that policy issues are important in Zambian party competition. It is also possible that the process of increasing polarization à la LeBas (2010) is at work. But the author of this research thinks that it is premature to call such trading of issues "ideology". Many of the policy stances are ad hoc, opportunist and populist attacks. Especially, their ad hoc character contradicts Ger-ring's (1997: 979-981) minimal definition of ideology as a coherent set of ideas. Secondly, if we accept the dominance of development as an ideology in sub-Saharan Africa, the question arises why it has escaped wider attention as such, why has it been invisible? In the author's opinion, local observers fail to see it precisely because it is so dominant and shared across almost all political parties and social groups. If a phenomenon cannot be contrasted with a different phenomenon of the same class, one fails to notice it. As far as Western scholars are concerned, ethnocentrism is to blame. For them, "ideology" simply means "Western ideology". If there is none, ideology as such must be absent.

Party – voter interface

The fieldwork experience suggests that party strategists know very well why they organize their campaigns the way they do and voters carefully select who to vote for. The fieldwork also shows that besides clientelist, ethno-regional and populist appeals and more or less discernible policy platforms, there must be other factors that give meaning to the party – voter relationship. What more is there if ideology is always one and the same? Upon a closer look at the ethnographic material one can discern a fine line that repeatedly places emphasis on the 'implementation' of a programme (rather than the programme itself), on 'practice' (rather than ideas), on specific values (we are not corrupt, we know how to behave vis-à-vis our supporters) and on 'face-to-face' (rather than mediated) contact between candidates and voters. These observations allow us to draw a preliminary conclusion that a lot of different messages are simultaneously exchanged at the party – voter interface and direct physical contact is somehow very important to this interaction. Generally conceived competence is one of the key appeals (we are fit to govern; we are fitter than the incumbent). Another one concerns broadly conceived set of party values that corresponds to Drucker's (1991: 244) ethos, to "what an earlier age might have called the spirit of the party; its traditions and habits, its feel". Drucker (1991: 244-245) understands ethos as one of two components of party ideology - the implicit one, the second one being 'doctrine' - the explicit one (cf. Ware 1996: 20-21). In Zambia, by emitting a superior (often symbolically communicated) ethos, the party guarantees to the voters that it is well suited to 'implement' the more explicit component of its ideology, i.e. 'development' in Zambia. Parties' emphasis on the ethos may also partly explain a relatively low appeal of

pre-election coalitions (NDF, UDA) in the FPTP system because they necessarily dilute the respective ethos of the coalition partners. Voters may view such coalitions as too instrumental and party elites may prefer to keep one of their most precious assets intact. Among the methods of election manipulation, it was the so called vote-buying that preoccupied the interviewees the most (recall the main PF campaign slogan 'don't kubeba'). On the surface, this practice is to make poor, illiterate peasants to cast the ballot for the donor in exchange for a tangible reward.⁵ However, a more thorough analysis of vote-buying reveals a multi-faceted phenomenon rather than simple clientelism. Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter (2009: 3) offer a rationalist classification of vote-buying along the axes absenting/voting and incumbent/opposition preference. In fact, the basic features of the practice seem to be indifference and preference for the winner rather than their two axes (cf. van de Walle 2007: 64). While the reward dimension surely plays a role, gift-giving is simultaneously an act of munificence and the service in return is a sign of respect; the practice thus embodies specific social values (cf. Hansen 2010: 435-436; Osei 2012: 260-263; van de Walle 2007: 64). Gift-giving can also be perceived as a sign of competence on the side of the donor, i.e. evidence he or she is able enough to accumulate an abundance of material resources (cf. Hansen 2010: 435-436; van de Walle 2007: 64). In addition, both the fieldwork in Zambia and the author's experience with election observation in Togo and Burundi in 2010 suggest that the casting of ballots can, and indeed is occasionally monitored by ruling parties, especially in rural settings. Even if the casting is not directly monitored, an impression can be created to this effect by spreading rumours of such monitoring.⁶ From this perspective vote-buying also involves an element of coercion. In sum, the practice has at least four different facets: reward, ethos, competence, and coercion.

In Zambia, competence-based and ethos-based appeals complement other factors such as clientelism, ethno-regional ties, vote-buying, the piecemeal policy platforms (at least among the urban poor, peri-urban and rural voters), etc. All these non-programmatic party-voter connections seem to be the most effective when combined with populism (at least among the urban

5 In terms of party-building and electoral competition, peasants have a peculiar 'uncaptured' quality about them (Hyden 2008). While being poor, they are to a large extent economically self-sufficient and autonomous of political institutions; state services and infrastructure hardly reach them. From the point of view of political parties, they harbour little mobilization potential both for practical reasons (long distances, low population density) and their parochial interests. Yet they still represent a huge, potentially decisive reservoir of votes that have to be courted.

6 For a contrasting assessment see Hansen (2010: 436), Resnick (2012: 1354) and van de Walle (2007: 64).

poor and peri-urban voters). Each of these messages / interactions has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, the competence-based and ethos-based appeals always pay off, while populism may frighten the more sophisticated urban population (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010: 73; Resnick 2012: 1361) and lack of traction in rural voters who tend to be down-to-earth, conservative, and more receptive to ethno-regional campaigning (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010: 74) and vote-buying. One notable advantage of the non-programmatic appeals in general is their seamless link to personalist political culture where charisma and symbolic spectacle play an important role (BBC News 2008; Larmer and Fraser 2007: 629-630; Resnick 2012: 1361-1362; Times of Zambia 2011). Thus, one can say that in Zambia, rather than building the party and its following around a coherent policy agenda, the real political mastery consists in the strategic use of a wide range of different appeals which are applied selectively depending on specific geographic and social contexts.

Dynamics of non-cohesive party competition

LeBas (2011: 256-257) argues that in hybrid regimes (opposition) parties have to maintain both high cohesion⁷ and high mobilization potential over time to succeed. This is because they operate in a harsh, post-authoritarian environment where incumbents 'can use an array of tools – electoral fraud, violence, the misuse of state resources – to win elections' (see also Momba and Madimutsa 2009: 6-7; Rakner and van de Walle 2009: 119). Parties 'may be able to mobilize mass constituencies and even win elections, but they are likely to, eventually, fall prey to the collapse of mobilization or the fragmentation of the party at the elite level' (LeBas 2011: 25; see also Burnell 2001: 260; NDI/FODEP 2003: 18). The way the FPTP system has been working in Zambia since 1991 is an interesting case. Putting aside the question of individuals, defections of whole party structures have been documented by several observers (Hopkins 2010: 19-22; Larmer and Fraser 2007: 625; LeBas 2011: 215-217). This research documented at least one case of MMD structures that were co-opted even though PF grass-root structures had already been in place (A21, A26). The fostering of UNIP's disintegration from within as an election strategy of the MMD in 1991 has also been pointed out (LeBas 2011: 216). The same strategy was, to a lesser degree, successfully used by the PF against the MMD in 2011. The strategic use and abuse of defections and co-optations is thus part and parcel of Zambian party-building (NDI/FODEP 2003: 18). In

7 LeBas (2011) does not define party cohesion. For the purpose of our exploratory inquiry would define it as a prerequisite of Panebianco's (1988: 49-54) institutionalization, i.e. a system of incentives that are sufficiently strong to hold core party members together when facing adversity.

contrast to other sub-Saharan countries such as Botswana, where the FPTP electoral system has contributed to a long-term deadlock, the Zambian example shows that, under specific circumstances, the same system can at times prove extremely dynamic and swing against the incumbent, as has happened in 2011. As for party organization, this analysis shows that institutionalization without cohesion is a waste of energy and resources. LeBas (2011: 247) mentions two reasons why the MMD failed to pay attention to the need for sustained mobilization in 1991: it did not face a strong rival and it won the elections overwhelmingly. More than twenty years later, the reasons as to why the PF seems to be following the path of the MDD may lie in the long-established situational attitude to politics in Zambia (Burnell 2001: 244, 247, 253; cf. NDI/FODEP 2003: 15-16, 22). Only two party-building strategies remain valid: a (state) resource-driven institutionalization of the ruling party which is primarily oriented on forming clientelistic links; or the mobilization à la PF (or à la MDD in 1990-1991) which is driven by a society-wide demand for political turnover.

Informal politics

There are few signs that the parties are willing and able to follow their own formal procedures (cf. NDI/FODEP 2003: 17). To mention just one example among many, the failure to convene party conferences undermines the whole concept of formal party rules and the seriousness with which they are taken. There are two main reasons why a convention may not be held. Firstly, the numbers of delegates at party conventions can be huge (anything between one to five thousand delegates), because the parties have not been able to free themselves from the grandiose style of the UNIP. It is not surprising that the parties often lack the human and financial resources to stage such an event. Secondly, there is not much willingness on the side of party elites to organize the conferences, as they would expose their positions to intra-party competition and would bear most of the financial costs (cf. Rakner 2011: 1115). While general reasons for preferring informal channels may be socio-cultural ones (Hyden 2006; Chabal and Daloz 1999), in the case of party procedures they interlock with the interests of the party plutocracy that pays everything and does not gain anything unless the party wins elections or strikes a deal with the winner (cf. Rakner 2011: 1114; NDI/FODEP 2003: 14). Besides immediate financial considerations, the informal and centralized decision-making within parties is already encoded in the way they were formed, in the choice of the founding elite not to dwell on 'institutionalized procedures for the resolution of conflict' and the related inability 'to process competing demands and formulate clear and consistent policies' (LeBas 2011: 249; for a description of the centralized nature of the Zambian parties see NDI/FODEP 2003: 14-18). The

study of a party's political trajectory thus becomes, to a large extent, the study of intra-party factionalism (cf. Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010: 57-61; Paget 2010).

Conclusion

What is unique about the immediate context shaping the Zambian party-building when compared to sub-Saharan countries with similar institutional frameworks? Historically low levels of political violence (Burnell 2005) and the measured attitude of both the population and politicians towards instrumentalized ethnicity immediately come to one's mind. Leaders originating from two main ethno-linguistic groups (Nyanja and Bemba) have become presidents while Anderson Mazoka (of Tonga⁸ origin) very probably could have become one in 2001 (Gould 2007). While in some cases ethnicity plays a major role in elections (the UPND won 17 out of 18 MP seats in the Southern Province in 2011), in other cases it is overruled by alternative considerations (the ADD won just one out of 17 MP seats in the Western Province in 2011) (Electoral Commission of Zambia 2011). Zambia's experience with a strong, cross-ethnic social network, i.e. labour unions, certainly deserves to be named as several scholars have convincingly shown (see LeBas 2011 for a comparative analysis). This author would add a fourth characteristic: a steady supply of 'non-regime' figures that are willing to fund party-building from their personal wealth, are ready to seriously challenge the incumbent, and harbour smaller or greater ambitions to cross ethnic lines (Anderson Mazoka, Hakainde Hichilema, Charles Milupi, Elias Chipimo Jr., etc.). While none of these factors is unique on its own, together they provide a relatively distinct playing field.

A successful opposition party can be launched in Zambia as the example of the UPND and the PF clearly shows. In spite of the presence of only one ideology-as-a-doctrine (development), all parties have a range of tools at their disposal to differentiate themselves from their competitors: ideology-as-ethos, populism, policy platforms, competence-based, and ethno-regional appeals. These resources have to be used strategically and selectively, as only some of them (such as ethos and competence) are beneficial under all circumstances (cf. Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010: 75). Richer parties can also gain political weight via vote-buying and the cultivation of clientelist ties. At the same time, due to a complex set of inter-related factors (party funding, party switching, centralized decision-making, a business-like attitude to politics, poverty, etc.) maintaining party cohesion and mobilization potential in the long-term is impossible. There are no signs a version of 'issue-based' politics will take hold any time soon or that it would significantly alter the overall picture. Neither

8 There are four main ethno-linguistic groups in Zambia, Lozi is the fourth one.

are there signs that the process of producing ‘more cohesive and more socially rooted political party organizations’ via a sharp polarization of the political landscape as described by LeBas (2011: 5) for Zimbabwe will start one day. It only follows that in terms of governance, alteration of the ruling party does not ensure anything (cf. Burnell 2001: 262-263; LeBas 2011: 262). As far as the 2011 election campaign is concerned, besides Michael Sata’s populism, the PF’s campaign strategies were very similar to those of the MMD. Whether the PF governance will be any different from the rule of the MMD remains to be seen. While the Zambian ‘one party multipartism’ is, in many regards, a mockery of vertical accountability, even in this extremely dynamic and volatile ‘system’ the link between party performance in government and election results still appears to exist, though much weaker than many would wish for.

Table 1: List of 23 research interviews and their participants.

The interviews were conducted between 2 September and 2 October 2011 and are listed in chronological order.

No.	PARTICIPANT	POLITICAL PARTY	PLACE	DURATION (min)	HOW MANY TIMES REFERENCED
1	Anonymous 1 (A1)	NAREP	Mongu	75	5
2	A2	N/A	Mongu	90	6
3	A3	ULP	Mongu	45	2
4	A4, A5	N/A	Mongu	60	1 (1+0)
5	A6	MMD	Mongu	60	11
6	A7, A8	PF	Mongu	75	17 (12+5)
7	A9, A10	ADD	Mongu	80	17 (16+1)
8	A11	UPND	Mongu	90	14
9	A12	UPND	Mongu	105	3
10	A13	MMD	Mongu	75	5
11	A14	ADD	W Province	120	13
12	A15	PF	Lusaka	30	4
13	A16	ADD	Lusaka	75	8
14	A17	MMD	Chipata	90	7
15	A18	PF	Chipata	210	8
16	A19	UPND	Chipata	90	15

17	A20	PF	Chipata	105	15
18	A21	PF	Chipata	60	7
19	A22, A23, A24	PF	Chipata	125	12 (6+5+1)
20	A25	PF	Chipata	30	3
21	A26	PF	Chipata	150	15
22	A27	UNIP	E Province	105	12
23	A28, A29	UNIP	Lusaka	90	6 (6+0)
Total	29 persons	7 parties	5 locations	33h 55min	206

Source: Fieldnotes

Note: Average interview duration was 90 minutes. The last column shows the total count of referencing individual respondents in the article. For group interviews the counts are added up. The counts give a general idea about proportion of individual contributions.

Table 2: Positions of 26 party members interviewed*

Level / Type	Position	Number
Ordinary members	(Two of them from campaign teams)	5
Ward	Chairperson	1
Constituency	Coordinator	1
	Constituency secretary	1
District	Chairperson	4
	Vice-chairperson	1
	Publicity and information secretary	1
	District secretary	1
Province	Campaign manager	1
	Youth chairperson	1
	Publicity and information secretary	2

National	President	2
	Vice-president	1
	Central committee member	1
	National secretary	1
	Unknown	1
Unknown (province?)	Unknown	1
Candidates	MP candidate	1
	MP candidacy contender	1
	Local government candidate	1
Total		29**

Source: Fieldnotes

* The position of the only female party member is de-gendered for confidentiality reasons.

**The three candidates appear twice since their party positions are counted as well.

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